ATP 3-24.2

TECHNIQUES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

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Preface

ATP 3-24.2 provides the doctrinal framework and techniques for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. It describes lessons learned from historic COIN and current operations.

The principal audiences for ATP 3-24.2 are commanders, staffs, leaders, and Soldiers responsible for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing COIN operations. Additional intended audiences include institutions and components of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, as well as the United States Army Special Operations Command. This publication serves as a doctrinal reference for personnel developing doctrine and training material and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standard operating procedures for COIN.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the tactics in ADP 3-07, FM 3-90, and FM 3-96. To comprehend how the company, battalion, and brigade combat team organize and employ in COIN, the reader must understand the doctrine (fundamental principles and tactics) in FM 3-24.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Service members operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for legal compliance.)

ATP 3-24.2 uses joint terms where applicable. Select joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent (the authority) of any Army terms. The use of a trade or brand name does not constitute endorsement of any specific commercial product, commodity, service, or enterprise by the United States Army.

ATP 3-24.2 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (of the United States), and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-24.2 is the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the Doctrine and Collective Training Division, Department of Tactics, Training, and Doctrine, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence and Fort Benning, ATZK-TDD (ATP 3-24.2), 1 Karker St., Fort Benning, GA 31905-5410; by email to usarmy.benning.mcoe.mbx.doctrine@army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. ATP 3-24.2 provides the U.S. Army with a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a COIN. To accomplish this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment. ATP 3-24.2 replaces FM 3-24.2 (2009, obsolete).

ATP 3-24.2 covers doctrinal guidance; techniques; organizational roles and functions; capabilities; limitations; and responsibilities for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing COIN operations. This publication addresses significant changes in Army doctrinal and training terminology, concepts, and constructs and in proven tactics, techniques, and procedures developed during recent operations. The following is a brief introduction by chapter:

- Chapter 1–Understanding an Operational Environment provides a brief overview and historical account of U.S. COIN operations. It helps commanders and subordinate leaders define the operational environment of COIN by getting them to use operational variables, employ the mission variables, understand the effects of the operational environment, and comprehend the importance of cultural capability.
- Chapter 2–Foundations of Insurgency categorizes insurgent groups by their components—elements, dynamics, and strategies—and by their manifestations—tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities.
- Chapter 3–Foundations of Counterinsurgency reviews the foundations of a successful COIN through sections on armed political competition, historical theories, tactical considerations, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, other major COIN tactical operations, and the phases of COIN operations.
- Chapter 4–Counterinsurgency Planning and Preparation reviews the common practices, tactical actions, conceptual and detail planning, and tactical-level targeting within COIN operations.
- Chapter 5–Offensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency addresses offensive techniques that tactical units employ during COIN operations.
- Chapter 6–Defensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency addresses defensive techniques that tactical units employ during COIN operations.
- Chapter 7–Stability Considerations in Counterinsurgency addresses stability techniques that tactical units employ during COIN operations.
- Chapter 8–Support to Host-nation Security Forces reviews the steps (measure [assess], organize, train, equipment, rebuild/build, advise, mentor [assess]) that units take to train, advise, and partner with host-nation security forces.

Four appendixes complement the body of this publication:

- Appendix A–Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency Operations.
- Appendix B–Readings for Counterinsurgency Tactical Leaders in a Time-constrained Environment.
- Appendix C–"Twenty-Eight Articles": Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency.
- Appendix D–Twenty-seven Articles of T.E. Lawrence.

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Chapter 1

Understanding an Operational Environment

Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments (OEs) for their particular operations. The particular OE heavily influences both the nature of insurgent warfare and the methods of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. An OE for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist in a specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander's OE is part of a higher echelon commander's OE. This chapter provides a brief overview and historical account of U.S. COIN operations. It helps commanders and subordinate leaders define the OE of COIN by using operational variables, employing the mission variables; understanding the effects of the OE; and comprehending the importance of cultural capability.

Note. The irregular warfare (IW) implementation guidance issued by the DoD emphasizes the importance of IW in addressing modern threats and ensuring that U.S. forces are prepared for both conventional and irregular conflicts. COIN is a central component of IW and serves as a critical tool in addressing complex, asymmetric threats. IW, including COIN, is essential to achieving U.S. strategic objectives across the competition continuum. COIN operations are designed not only to defeat insurgents but also to address the root causes of instability by integrating military, political, and economic actions. COIN plays a crucial role in building the legitimacy of the host nation's (HN's) government while simultaneously dismantling insurgent networks. These efforts are integral to IW's broader objective of securing favorable outcomes below the threshold of conventional war.

SECTION I – OVERVIEW

1-1. For more than two centuries, the U.S. military has been called upon to defeat insurgencies like the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, the Native American nations resisting U.S. expansion, the Boxer Rebellion in China, Pancho Villa in Mexico and New Mexico, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, and Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua. Although the U.S. Army does have historic examples of COIN operations, its doctrine and COIN skills atrophied between Vietnam and the invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, the world is increasingly shaped by population explosion, migration, urbanization, globalization, technology, religious conflict, resource demand, climate change and related natural disasters, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The increasing complexity of the world has increased the challenge for governments to maintain order and satisfy rapidly growing public needs. As governments maintain a tenuous hold on power, dissatisfied members of the population have, like dissatisfied groups for thousands of years, turned to violence to achieve political goals. Using violence to achieve political goals is known as insurgency. As a result, U.S. Forces have conducted COIN operations around the world such as in Colombia, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. This section reviews a historical account of U.S. COIN operations and the effects of insurgencies, COINs, and other influences that shape an OE. An *operational environment* is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0).

HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY

1-2. U.S. Army philosophy and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. Army leaders have viewed the Army's efforts as defeating guerrilla forces—usually communist forces—rather than defeating an entire insurgency. They considered success achievable by force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. They began to shape this doctrine of COIN shortly after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, 1951 version

(obsolete), FM 31-20, 1955 version (obsolete), and later in FM 31-15, 1961 version (obsolete). The Army refined COIN doctrine during the Vietnam War in FM 31-22, 1963 version (obsolete), FM 31-16, 1963 version (obsolete), and FM 31-23, 1972 version (obsolete). After the Vietnam War, the Army split COIN doctrine from that for conventional, high-intensity operations in FM 100-20, 1990 version (obsolete), in which so-called light forces owned COIN, and FM 90-8, 1986 version (obsolete), which maintained focus on defeating guerrilla forces.

1-3. More recently, FM 3-24, 2006 version (obsolete) filled an important doctrinal gap for U.S. Forces engaged in COIN operations. FM 3-24.2, 2009 version (obsolete) was the historical successor to FM 90-8, 1986 version (obsolete). In addition, FM 3-24.2 (2009, obsolete) integrates parts of FM 100-20 (1990, obsolete), the Army's concept of full-spectrum operations, and all elements of COIN operations. FM 3-24 currently provides doctrine that frames COIN within the context of a range of military operations and provides a framework for different ways land forces could counter an insurgency. FM 3-24 serves to support the development of understanding throughout the Army of insurgencies, the OEs in which they exist, the ways in which the United States counters insurgencies, and how commanders synchronize their efforts to achieve desired end states.

1-4. At its heart, a COIN is an armed struggle for popular support. The gain or loss of popular support occurs through information activities, strong representative government, provision of goods and services, the evocation of public fear, or the introduction of violence to populated areas. As an armed struggle, COIN involves eliminating insurgents who threaten public safety and security. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work is in discovering and solving underlying public issues—that is, the root causes of the public dissatisfaction with the current arrangement of political power. Dealing with diverse issues such as demographic, sectarian and/or ethnic divisions, land reform, unemployment, oppressive leadership, or ethical tensions places a premium on tactical leaders who can operate objectively among factions, under-promise and over-deliver, provide for safe and secure environment and an ability to work with host-nation security forces (HNSF). These leaders can close with the enemy, negotiate agreements, operate with nonmilitary agencies and other nations, restore essential services, speak local languages, orchestrate political deals, and disseminate information among the populace.

1-5. Today's COIN OE is increasingly cluttered with U.S. Forces, HN forces, and other coalition forces, each with their own strengths and limitations. In addition, multiple insurgent groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), armed contractors, and a local population of several ethnic groups add to this clutter. A long-range COIN plan for a tactical unit combines elements of offense, defense, and stability. This publication further explains COIN operational methods addressed in JP 3-24. To achieve the appropriate ratio between these and to accomplish unity of effort among diverse units and actors, units build long-term plans which often center around lines of operation (LOOs) and lines of effort (LOEs). LOOs and LOEs are important planning tools to move conceptual planning into detailed planning. These planning tools help delineate how a military force turns a commander's understanding of the current situation into a desired end state. An *end state* is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives (JP 3-0).

1-6. COIN is an iterative process. Tactical units conduct a wide variety of operations, which include anything from a combined cordon and search operation with HNSF, to a medical operation to inoculate a hamlet's children against disease, to a road project to connect a village to the highway, to a loudspeaker broadcast to inform a village about a recent council meeting. Regardless of the mission, successful tactical units learn and adapt as they discover more about their own strengths and limitations, as well as the strengths and limitations of the HN government, the populace, and the insurgents. This publication furthers FM 3-24's and JP 3-24's current theories that, in COIN, an effective force is a learning organization. Each COIN is unique. Commanders and subordinate leaders maintain good judgment, tactical patience, and innovation to defeat an insurgency. As the U.S. Army continues its lengthy battles against insurgency around the world, tactical units must first focus on establishing a safe and secure environment; however, they never lose their focus the level of popular support. Leaders ensure that their units' actions maintain the support of those locals who already support the government and change the minds of fence-sitters in the middle, focusing lethal combat operations on only those in the insurgency who are irredeemable. As security improves, COIN becomes a whole-of-government effort. Critical to success is that units learn and adapt more rapidly than insurgents.

INSURGENCY

1-7. *Insurgency* refers both to the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region and to the group itself (JP 3-24). The key distinction between an insurgency and other movements is it is restricted to rebellious acts that do not reach the proportions of an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency. An insurgency is typically an internal struggle within a state, not between states. It is normally a protracted political and military struggle designed to weaken the existing government's power, control, and legitimacy while increasing the insurgency's power, control, and legitimacy. While an insurgency is an internal struggle, it is almost always aided by external countries for ideological purposes

1-8. Most insurgencies have been limited to local regions or specific countries. However, today's instant communications allow insurgent groups and leaders to communicate worldwide, find support for their causes, and support causes they view as compatible with their own goals. External forces, including nation-states, may support an insurgency for their own benefit. They may also oppose a competing nation-state who supports the existing government. As a result, modern insurgencies often cross multiple countries.

1-9. An insurgency comprises components (the five insurgent elements, the eight dynamics, and one or more of the six insurgent strategies) and manifestations (tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities). For example, insurgent leaders may leverage specific components of their organizational structure, such as the public component. As the overt political component of an insurgency, the public component can engage in overt social networks while the core leadership remains in the clandestine underground, thus minimizing both social and physical risks. (See chapter 2 for information on insurgencies.)

COUNTERINSURGENCY

1-10. *Counterinsurgency* is the comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (JP 3-24). It involves all the political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. COIN operations include supporting an HN's military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions to defeat an insurgency. Avoiding the recruitment of insurgents and convincing existing insurgents to end their participation are vital for defeating an insurgency. COIN operations often include security assistance programs such as foreign military sales programs, the foreign military financing program, and international military training and education programs.

1-11. On the other hand, *counterguerrilla operations*—activities conducted by security forces against the armed paramilitary wing of an insurgency (JP 3-24)—focus on detecting and defeating the armed insurgent or guerrilla without solving the society's underlying problems. Military efforts alone cannot defeat an insurgency; however, they can easily worsen a fragile situation and erode popular support. Counterguerrilla operations are useful when the insurgent force is clearly identifiable, or when the security situation is too bad to proceed with other lines of effort.

1-12. *Paramilitary forces* are the armed forces or groups distinct from the conventional armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission (JP 3-24). HN military, police, and paramilitary forces are often the most visible elements of the HN government's power and authority. (See chapter 3 for information on COIN, counterguerrilla operations, and paramilitary forces.)

INFLUENCES ON CURRENT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-13. An understanding of the OE enables the development of a COIN approach that includes realistic, achievable objectives and properly aligns ends, ways, and means. Understanding the influences on the current OE is accomplished through tailoring the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) process and assessment requirements for COIN. Assessment requires determining why and when progress is being achieved along the LOO with each LOE. The COIN OE encompasses the relevant actors and the physical areas and sociocultural and other factors throughout the entire OE. (See FM 3-24 for information on influences on current OEs.) Paragraphs 1-14 through 1-22 provide eight examples of influences on current OEs.

POPULATION EXPLOSION

1-14. Population explosion is the rapid growth of the world's population since the mid-20th century. In 1950, the world's population was 2.5 billion people; in 2050, the population is expected to reach 9 billion. Most population growth will occur in the developing world. Population growth, urbanization, and competition for limited resources in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia contribute to increased resource scarcity and may present governance challenges. Population explosion increases opportunities for insurgencies to hide among the general population and places a premium on winning the struggle for popular support. As the population continues to grow, governments will struggle to provide residents with food, water, and power, affording insurgent groups an opportunity to exploit a vulnerable populace. These trends could lead to failed states and problems such as excessive corruption or displacement of workers due to globalization, will affect regional and global security.

URBANIZATION

1-15. Urbanization is the growth of urban areas due to population surges and migration. In 1950, 29 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas; by 2050, scientists estimate 60 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas, such as the urban littorals, for example, major coastal cities and cities on inland waterways. This rapid growth, the accompanying crowded conditions, and the potential for high unemployment create greater potential for insurgencies to arise in urban areas.

GLOBALIZATION

1-16. Globalization is a combination of the technological, economic, social, cultural, and political forces that are bringing nation-states and all the people of the world closer together. These forces increase the world's interconnectivity and link economies. Positively, globalization reduces poverty in nations such as China and India. Yet, it widens the gap between financially stable nations and those struggling with financial security, and it increases the demand for resources.

TECHNOLOGY

1-17. Technological developments such as the computer, the internet, the digital camera, and satellite television have transformed the world since 1950. People can exchange information across the globe in less than a second. The increase in accessibility also increases the reach, impact, and influence of media—particularly social media—for the insurgency and COIN. Additionally, these same technologies, along with advanced weaponry, have dramatically changed the OE. Both insurgencies and COINs will continue to innovate and adapt these technologies to the OEs of today and tomorrow.

RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

1-18. Religious fundamentalism typically refers to a movement within any religious tradition marked by a strict adherence to its perceived fundamental principles. Religious fundamentalism, among other things, usually includes a belief in the infallibility of sacred writings as well as the accuracy of a particular interpretation of those writings, absolute religious authority, a rigid compliance to a set of basic religious principles or dogma without any compromise, and a suspicion of those who are deemed outsiders. As nation-states struggle to provide for residents, some of the dissatisfied members of the population may turn to organizations based in religious fundamentalism. Those organizations in turn provide those needs that the government cannot.

RESOURCE DEMAND AND CONTROLS

1-19. Demand for energy, water, and food for growing populations increases competition and, potentially, conflict. Resource controls (the regulation of the movement or consumption of materiel resources in an OE) enable a COIN to mobilize materiel resources and deny materiel to the insurgency. Such control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and facility inspections. By using resource controls, the COIN can interdict the movement of weapons, supplies, or leaders. Such interdiction may lead insurgents to believe they are isolated and have little or no chance of winning an armed conflict against the government.

NATURAL PHENOMENA

1-20. Natural phenomena (for example, monsoons, seasonal floods and droughts, volcanic and seismic activity) further compound already difficult conditions in developing countries. They can cause humanitarian crises, drive regionally destabilizing population migrations, and increase potential for epidemic diseases.

PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

1-21. The likelihood of insurgents obtaining WMD will continue to increase the potential for catastrophic attack due to many factors including proliferation, terrorism, globalization, and failed states. Insurgents may seek to acquire WMD for their destructive, psychological, and political impacts. WMD would provide a non-state actor with capabilities possessed by only select state actors which could pose challenges to the world order. This could be exacerbated if these insurgents collaborate terrorist acts with ethnic or ideological groups across state boundaries while operating from safe havens in failed states.

1-22. Insurgents can threaten use of WMD as leverage in negotiations or employ WMD against critical infrastructure or military forces. Such an attack could create national, regional, or global effects. Concepts of employment may include conventional or clandestine delivery of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons to destroy, disrupt, destabilize, or coerce.

Note. In addition, terrorist organizations and other groups have access to conventional weapons. This includes surplus and functional weapons from the Second World War or those from conflict plagued regions, such as the ubiquitous AK-47 and in some instances, man-portable air-defense systems.

ADDITIONAL INFLUENCES

1-23. Additional influences on current OEs can include:

- Competing ideologies.
- Ethnic/sectarian divides.
- Real or perceived inequities (land, money, sectarian favoritism, disparate power-sharing, access to resources).
- Oppressive/heavy-handed governance.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES

1-24. Operational and mission variables are tools to assist commanders and staffs in refining their understanding of the domains and dimensions of an OE. Operational variables help leaders understand the land domain and its interrelationships with information, relevant actors, and capabilities in the other domains. Commanders analyze information categorized by the operational variables in the context of the missions they are assigned. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct COIN operations.

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-25. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an OE in terms of interrelated operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Paragraphs 1-26 through 1-38 address those eight operational variables as fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of an OE.

POLITICAL

1-26. The political variable involves the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government. Since an insurgency is fundamentally a struggle for political power, the political environment in the HN is critical. Not just the formal political systems (such as political parties and elected officials) but also the informal political systems (such as tribes, ethnic groups, and other centers of power) receive due attention. Long-term success in COIN ultimately depends on political efforts; all counterinsurgents focus on the political impact of their actions. Tactical leaders often need to broker local political solutions. Before doing so, they must understand all relevant local and regional stakeholders and the competing dynamics of their various positions as well as the potential ramifications of various decisions.

1-27. HN, U.S., and coalition political considerations drive the conduct of COIN operations. This is especially true for the involvement of the U.S. Government and U.S. public opinion. A major goal of most insurgencies is to influence U.S. public opinion against U.S. involvement as a COIN force. Successful COINs, therefore, not only prevent insurgencies from attaining this goal but also actively work to influence public opinion for the COIN mission.

1-28. Commanders remain prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The HN's form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy. The HN's governance may even be repugnant to U.S. leaders; however, they cannot let their personal opinions or western norms compromise the COIN mission. U.S. Forces at the tactical level may be tasked to support reform or professionalization of the host-nation's local governance or security forces. U.S. Forces should not exceed the parameters of those reform efforts set by higher headquarters (HQ) and should not compromise personal relationships with HN leaders by imposing standards that they are unwilling or unable to meet. U.S. efforts focus on establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces the HN government's legitimacy.

MILITARY

1-29. This variable involves the military capabilities of all armed forces. Most COIN units need to analyze the insurgency's military forces, guerrilla forces, local militias, and HNSF. Commanders consider qualitative aspects (for example, conscription or recruitment systems), economic supports (including appropriations systems), and positions of forces in national and local governmental structures. Additional qualitative considerations include general organization, training and doctrine, efficiency, public rapport, and the police's role in the nation's internal security. For example, at one point, a typical U.S. brigade in Iraq might have had to analyze a Sunni guerrilla force, a Shia guerrilla force, an Iraq National Police brigade, an Iraqi Army brigade, the Iraqi local police, and a Sons of Iraq militia unit.

Note. U.S. Forces consider the training capability, capacity, and training focus of HNSF. U.S. Forces also determine if they are a police force/carabinieri, infantry, or if they are trained to kill people. U.S. Forces also determine if they are irregular forces prone to human rights abuses, such as the Atlacatl battalion in El Salvador. Other determinations need to be made, such as if they are controlled by politicians or by military leaders, if they are loyal to the country, the local leaders, or a particular general. Other considerations include whether the recruits are local or from far away. U.S. Forces also determine if they are from a local sect, or from an opposing sect. Some cases require knowledge of locals' assessment and perception of the HNSF's proficiency and if the HNSF are considered murderous thugs, if they are compromised, if they are considered patriots or considered to be corrupt.

ECONOMIC

1-30. The economic variable involves the general economic categories of an OE (for example, energy; raw materials; government development policy; labor policies and distribution of labor; income distribution; national food distribution; free market or socialistic interface and functions; consumption patterns; external investment; taxation policy; port authorities; movement of goods; consumer issues; border controls; foreign trade; tariffs; graft and corruption). A low standard of living and a desire for economic reform can engender public resentment toward the government. Generally, counterinsurgents plan their operations so as not to damage the economic structure of an area and to have adverse psychological and economic impacts, but rather to support economic development.

Note. Additional considerations encompass the overall character of the local/regional economy. It may be agrarian or manufacturing-based. The economy may be socialist or capitalist in nature. Furthermore, the presence of competing ideologies should be considered. Lastly, it is important to evaluate the potential for growth and the opportunities to sway popular support for governance.

SOCIAL

1-31. The social variable involves societies in an OE. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, and exhibit a macroculture and shared identity. The success of both insurgents and counterinsurgents requires popular support. Most insurgencies attempt to increase friction between different groups in a society and to gain support from or increase support in any group who shares common elements with the insurgency. Alignment within these groups may follow racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language similarities or shared traditions can also be reasons to align. Religious influences often play a major role in the sociological factors affecting insurgency.

1-32. To be successful against insurgents in a particular OE and to avoid alienating the populace, counterinsurgents maintain an understanding of the local environment. This includes local social issues and national issues affecting the local environment. For instance, units who operated in Afghanistan interacted with groups of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Nuristanis across their areas of operations (AOs).

INFORMATION

1-33. The information variable involves the collection of, access to, use of, manipulation of, rapid distribution of, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems—both civilian and military—by global and local communities. Insurgents seek to control and manipulate how local, regional, national, and international communities perceive their cause and the events in their OEs. To achieve this, they try to control and manipulate information, and they distribute information.

1-34. Understanding the existing communications systems is important since they influence local, regional, national, and international audiences. Media coverage in particular influences U.S. political decision making, U.S. public opinion, and the sensitivities of coalition members. Local meeting places may control more local public opinion and common talk. Commanders use information activities to achieve tactical goals. Commanders must realize that local media may only present one side of an issue, creating skewed perceptions of reality. Conversely, commanders must also understand when the media is presenting multiple, some or most points of view and understand all of them.

1-35. Insurgents observe the actions of both government and COIN forces. They use propaganda to gain credibility and legitimacy with the public and simultaneously undermine opponents. Successful insurgencies seize the moral high ground against any of the COIN's mistakes, both real and perceived. These include political, militaristic, economic, social, religious, cultural, or legal errors. Insurgencies use all available means, including media, NGOs, and religious and civic leaders, to disseminate information to all audiences. Because insurgent forces usually know when actions such as attacks will occur, they will always get their point of view into the media first, shaping public opinions. Likewise, insurgents generally have no concerns about accuracy or truthfulness in the media, preferring exaggerations or divisive language with which to inflame public sentiment. U.S. forces must be prepared to operate within this environment.

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-36. The infrastructure variable involves the basic facilities, services, and installations a community or society needs to function. The state of the infrastructure determines the requisite resources for reconstruction. Typical key infrastructure includes sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations (SWEAT-MSO). The degradation or destruction of infrastructure negatively affects both the HN government and its population. Thus, the degradation or destruction of infrastructure often benefits an insurgency, especially with respect to propaganda and public perception in the HN.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-37. The physical environment variable is often the most noticeable aspect of an OE. The military aspect of terrain (see paragraph 1-42) in a particular OE undergoes evaluation to determine its public impact, including that to both insurgency and COIN forces. In COIN operations, planners commonly categorize terrain as either rural or urban. Weather and climate influence insurgents, the population, and counterinsurgents. COIN planners analyze the military aspect of weather (see paragraph 1-42) to determine its effect on public well-being and civil-military operations (CMO). Planners pay particular attention to dismounted and mounted trafficability, conditions of limited visibility, and equipment degradation and maintenance. Despite weather extremes, most insurgents have an advantage since they are usually native to the climate. Because most insurgencies receive material support from external sources, they are reliant on cross-border supply routes, often called rat lines. Identifying and interdicting these lines often becomes a key military objective.

TIME

1-38. Time affects everything and influences all decisions. However, civilians, COINs, and insurgencies often view time differently. Insurgencies often design operations with the intent to influence the U.S. political process or elections. COINs remain aware that popular support for extended operations may diminish over time. (See figure 1-1 for a demonstration of the difference between counterinsurgent and insurgent perceptions of time.) For U.S. Forces, one key factor in time is their commitment. U.S. Forces have tended to deploy for somewhere between 7 and 15 months and view their operations within that time. Typically, they require two or more months to become minimally effective and spend the final month or more of the mission handing off to a subsequent unit. It is critical to mission success that U.S. Forces focus on executing the higher forces' long term campaign plan objectives rather than consuming time developing a new plan every rotation of forces. Higher commands must take efforts to ensure this continuity happens.




Figure 1-1. Comparison of insurgent and counterinsurgent perceptions of time

MISSION VARIABLES

1-39. While analysis, in terms of the operational variables, serves to deepen one's understanding of the OE, it does not lend itself directly to mission accomplishment. For operations at the tactical level, Army commanders and staffs use the variables of METT-TC (I), which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations, to deepen their understanding of their missions within the contexts of their assigned AOs. *Informational considerations* are those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information (FM 3-0). Civil considerations are especially important to COIN. When commanders and staffs receive specific missions or identify particular problems, they can draw relevant information from their ongoing analyses of their OEs through the lens of the operational variables to further complement their analyses of mission variables. When leaders use the mission variables along with their knowledge of the operational variables, they maintain their capabilities to understand the threat(s), act effectively, and anticipate the consequences of their operations before, during, and after mission execution.

Note. Leaders filter relevant information through the categories of METT-TC (I). They use the METT-TC (I) variables to analyze and understand a situation in relation to the unit's mission. The first six variables are not new. However, the increase in the use of information (both military and civilian) to generate cognitive effects requires leaders' continuous assessment of the informational aspects of and impacts on operations. Because of this, informational considerations, represented with **(I)**, now appears as part of the familiar METT-TC acronym. The term *informational considerations* appears as a parenthetical variable since it is not an independent variable but remains an important component of all the mission variables, to which leaders pay particular attention when developing their understanding of a situation. (See FM 5-0 for information on mission variables.)

MISSION

1-40. The *mission* entails the essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action (JP 3-0). Even when local commanders have the best understanding of the local situation, they still require access to or control of the resources they need to produce timely, relevant, and predictive intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage information collection and CMO. Since effective COIN operations at the local level by their nature remain decentralized, higher commanders owe it to subordinates to allocate as many capabilities as possible to their levels. At the same time, in counterbalance, they must ensure commanders and subordinate leaders maintain situational understanding of the wider consequences of their actions. While tactical missions tasks are essential, commanders ensure those tactical missions tasks support the overall objectives toward defeating the

insurgency. In a counterinsurgency, commanders need to be ready to consider tactical mission tasks in different ways, such as varying the use of lethal force, and accounting for more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE).

ENEMY

1-41. An *enemy* is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). The purpose of evaluating the enemy (step 3 of the IPOE process) is to understand how that enemy can affect friendly operations. COIN operations by their nature involve a confused enemy situation since the enemy generally lacks traditional task organization. Moreover, the enemy (insurgents) have varying levels of training, capability, commitment, involvement, and experience. In addition to analyzing the insurgency's disposition and composition and insurgent strengths and weaknesses, counterinsurgent leaders identify and analyze the five elements of the insurgency—political and military leadership, underground elements, guerrillas, auxiliary members, and transnational and transregional violent extremists. Furthermore, of further importance to understanding are the eight dynamics of the insurgency—leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns. The final criticality is identifying the strategies the insurgency is employing. Its own ends, ways, and means determine an insurgency's strategies, specifically the relationships between an insurgency's ends, ways, and means as influenced by numerous important variables. (See chapter 2 for more information on enemy insurgents.) The variables may include those following:

- How an insurgency gains legitimacy and controls a populace.
- Whether the insurgency has politics, violence, or the economy at its center.
- The nature of an insurgent's political ideology, religious ideology, and their penchant for violence.
- The relationship of the insurgency to the economy.
- The nature and design of the insurgent organization.
- The sense of time as a basis for action or response.
- The insurgency capability to adapt.
- Whether the insurgency is home-grown or externally supported.
- Whether it has access to modern weapons and/or supplies to conduct the insurgency.

Note. Making the situation far more complex, U.S. and HNSFs may have to deal with multiple enemies simultaneously. For instance, in certain cities in Iraq, U.S. Forces were routinely in contact with both religious extremists who waged war on U.S. Forces, the Iraqi government, and other religious sects, while other insurgent forces were simply opposed to the presence of U.S. Forces. It is essential that analysis identifies and differentiates between various enemy forces and combats them accordingly.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

1-42. Terrain and weather effects inform step 2 of the IPOE process (that is, describe the environmental effects on operations), the accomplishment of which occurs through the analysis and determination of the influences of the five military aspects of terrain and the military aspects of weather on future operations. When evaluating the effects of terrain and weather on COIN operations, the commander considers the seasons of the year (including planting and harvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal tides. Terrain includes both the natural features such as rivers and mountains and the artificial features such as cities, airfields, and bridges in a particular OE. The five military aspects of terrain are observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment. The military aspects of weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure.

TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE

1-43. Successful COIN operations depend upon the commander's employment of available assets to maximize force strengths and minimize force vulnerabilities. To accomplish this, the commander realistically appraises the capabilities and limitations of organic assets, as well as those of unified action partners, to organize and employ them on suitable missions. In the COIN environment, the tactical unit identifies, maintains accountability for, and leverages all HNSF—police, army, and paramilitary—to secure and control the populace and disrupt the insurgency.

TIME AVAILABLE

1-44. For COIN operations, the time available for planning and execution varies. Major operations require prolonged periods of detailed planning. Stability operations, which address political, economic, and social issues, usually take a considerable length of time to complete. As such, after the initial period of planning, the time available for modified or future planning is often quite long.

1-45. With short-term actions such as offensive operations against fleeting insurgent targets, planning time is usually short, and information is scarce. Commanders at all levels use the time available to them more efficiently by planning contingency missions. One way to reduce planning time is to codify those routine tasks common among similar missions within standard operating procedures (SOPs). When the need arises to execute a contingency mission, the basic plan can undergo review with only minor adjustments.

Note. In COIN operations, cultural and religious considerations frequently guide mission planning and execution. As such, the selection of appropriate dates for operations can be a critical factor in achieving mission success. Historical dates of significance, religious and cultural observances, and the local day of communal prayer (such as the Muslim day of prayer held every Friday) are all important factors to consider when planning operations. For example, the timing of a combined security patrol may need to be adjusted to avoid coinciding with Ramadan, a month-long period of fasting and prayer for Muslims. While this consideration overlaps with broader civil considerations, it is also a crucial time factor in COIN operations.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

1-46. In COIN operations, the civilian population is vital since the organization with popular support has the advantage. Consequently, civil considerations are normally the most important mission variable for COIN. These involve the influences of societal infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations in the OE upon the conduct of military operations. Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations by the categories of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). (See ATP 2-01.3 for information on these categories.) As with the enemy, understanding civil considerations is far more complex because no society is homogenous. Analysis of civil considerations requires an understanding of multiple, competing dynamics along sectarian, political, tribal, residential, historical, and economic planes, many of which are unfamiliar to U.S. Forces.

INFORMATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-47. The leader integrates information into all operations and activities to create favorable support and circumstances for friendly action, limit enemy or adversary action, and minimize unintended consequences. Informational considerations are the relevant friendly, threat, and neutral (both military and civilian) individuals, organizations, and systems capable of generating cognitive effects and influencing behavior. Paragraphs 1-38 through 1-45 address informational considerations and example information-related questions within each mission variable. These considerations and example questions are not exhaustive but guide platoon leaders in integrating informational considerations into mission variable analysis. (See FM 5-0 and FM 3-13 for information on informational considerations.)

SECTION III – CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS ANALYSIS WITH THE ACRONYM ASCOPE

1-48. In-depth analysis of civil considerations is vital for the long-term success of the counterinsurgent unit. Six categories compose the ASCOPE acronym. During the IPOE process, the commander and staff analyze civil considerations from several perspectives—the population's, the insurgents', and the counterinsurgents'—to determine the effects on friendly and enemy courses of action (COAs). Analyzing civil considerations through the six categories and from multiple perspectives deepens a commander's and staff's understanding of the OE and how to isolate insurgents from the general population. (See FM 2-0 for information on the IPOE process.)

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-49. Commanders and staffs consider operational variables (in coordination with [ICW] division and corps staffs) and mission variables (placing emphasis on civil considerations) to deepen their understanding of the interests and motivations particular to different groups and individuals and thereby to enhance their situational understanding. Interactions of various actors affect the COIN OE's operational and mission variables. In considering these actors, the commander must understand their public agenda, their hidden agendas, and where they sit on a spectrum of support ranging from pro-government through fence-sitter, to tacit supporter of insurgents, to being an active insurgent. Some of the actors include the following:

- Unified action partners (with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations) such as the following:
  - U.S., coalition, and HN government organizations and security forces.
  - NGOs.
  - Elements of the private sector.
- Private, volunteer organizations.
- International and private security organizations.
- Media.
- Multinational corporations.
- Transnational criminal organizations.
- Insurgents.
- Violent extremist organizations.
- Tribes, clans, and ethnic groups native to the AO.
- Regional or local non-government power brokers or others with influence.
- Regional influences such as other nation-states.

1-50. Since civilians are normally present in operations with a dominant stability component, commanders normally moderate the use of force when conducting COIN operations. However, commanders remain responsible for protecting the force and consider their responsibility when considering ROE. They must clearly explain any restrictions on the conduct of operations and the use of force and then ensure everyone's understanding. Commanders, subordinate leaders, and Soldiers understand their actions, no matter how minor, have far-reaching positive and negative effects. Commanders, subordinate leaders, and Soldiers realize media (either hostile or neutral) and adversaries can quickly exploit (or misrepresent) their actions, especially the way they treat the civilian population.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1-51. The ASCOPE analytical framework is useful for thinking through the impacts of the key physical factors in the COIN OE. In COIN, the relevance of the physical and informational aspects of the OE (for example, IW) is potentially much greater than their relevance in conventional warfare. Due to their increased relevance, understanding the physical and informational factors within each category of ASCOPE is critical in COIN. (See table 1-1 for typical examples for each category of ASCOPE.) Furthermore, viewing the aspects of each category of ASCOPE through the lens of political strategy, especially their impact on the decisions of relevant actors, develops operationally relevant understanding.

Table 1-1. Examples of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

Areas	• Nations • Tribes • Families/clans • Ethnicities • Religions • Social classes	• Economic districts • Trade routes • Smuggling routes • Gang territories • Political districts • Borders/cross-border checkpoints	• Military districts • School districts • Water districts • Water sources • Water coverage	• Road systems • Power grids • Construction sites • Safe areas/ sanctuaries
Structures	• Cemeteries • Religious shrines • Houses of worship • Social gathering places • Bars and tea shops • Internet cafes	• Printshops • Television • Radio stations • Police stations • Jails • Military barracks	• Storage facilities • Hospitals • Banks • Dams • Bridges • Gas stations	• Oil and gas pipelines • Water pumping stations • Water lines • Power lines
Capabilities	• Water • Sewer • Electrical • Trash • Basic public needs • Public health	• Medical • Security • Crime and justice • Political voice • Academic	• Civil and individual rights • Displaced persons and refugees • Religion	• Employment and commerce • Market (use and goods) • Economic (jobs)
Organizations	• Tribes • Neighborhood communities • Families/clans • Ethnic groups • Religious communities • Intergovernmental organizations	• Government agencies or social services • Military or militia units • U.S. Forces and coalition forces • Police forces • Insurgent groups	• Illicit organizations • Gangs • Political groups • Labor unions • Farmers or farmer unions • Businesses • Contractors	• NGOs • Volunteer groups and charities • Displaced persons and refugees • Nomads
People	• Televised media • Visual recordings (videos, DVDs) • Radio broadcast media • Audio transmissions (pirated or illegal radio) • Religious leaders	• Internet-based platforms • Print media (newspaper) • Visual images (graffiti, signs) • Speeches • Rallies or demonstrations • Local and regional informal leaders	• Door-to-door • Face-to-face meetings • Phones • Restaurants • Bars and tea shops • Parks • Social media	• Family gatherings • Religious gatherings • Sports events • Markets • Food lines • Job lines • Gas lines • Influencers
Events	• Holidays • Major religious events • Religious gatherings	• Funerals • Weddings • Birthdays • Harvests • External influences	• Anniversaries of wars and battles • Town or council meetings	• Elections • Reconstruction openings • Sports events

Legend:
DVD—digital video disc NGO—nongovernmental organization U.S.—United States

OVERLAYS AND MATRIXES

1-52. While analyzing civil considerations, counterinsurgents develop both ASCOPE matrixes and map overlays. The development of these products occurs in partnership with HNSF and local government officials. U.S. Forces must be alert that host-nation biases do not reflect in products, whether inadvertently or by design. The effective analysis of civil considerations facilitates proper understanding of the OE. Leaders obtain supporting information for inclusion within overlays and matrixes, although not all inclusive, from the IPOE, through engagements with the population, and from satellite and/or drone imagery.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS OVERLAY

1-53. A civil consideration overlay (see figure 1-2 for an example) provides insight on the AO by identifying sectarian and demographic groups and any active issues with their SWEAT-MSO capabilities. The status of each SWEAT-MSO capability receives a green, amber, red, or black designation. Green indicates operability and readiness such that the capability is satisfactorily sustaining the serviced population. Amber indicates positive functioning despite the presence of some compromise to the capability such that the capability is not adequately fulfilling public requirements. Red indicates inoperability or inaccessibility such that the capability is not currently supporting the serviced population. Black indicates a nonexistent capability.




Figure 1-2. Civil considerations overlay, example

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS MATRIXES

1-54. A separate matrix is helpful for each of the six categories of ASCOPE in regard to any demographic group. An ASCOPE map overlay marking the boundaries of each identified demographic group is also helpful. The government's districts (for example, police, utilities, political) often fall along natural demographic lines. When they do not, the boundary conflicts with how the population defines their neighborhood. Such a situation can cause friction between the population and government. For each area, staffs sometimes choose to identify the demographic group an area accommodates as their first step. Then, they work through the remaining categories of ASCOPE. For example, a counterinsurgent unit with an area accommodating two main tribes develops a separate ASCOPE matrix for each tribe.

1-55. Three key perspectives inform one's understanding of the categories of ASCOPE. First, the public perspective refers to that of the local community. Second, the insurgency's perspective refers to that of any group illegally impeding the functions of the government, such as insurgents, militias, gangs, criminals, foreign agents, and terrorists. Third, the COIN's perspective refers to that of the forces and groups conducting

or supporting the COIN. These entities include the HNSF, local police, government leaders and employees, U.S. military forces, government agencies, provincial reconstruction teams, and coalition members.

1-56. When developing separate matrices for different sub-groups, the value of analysis only becomes evident when comparing them. For instance, comparing differing group access to a resource or capability in the neighborhood could highlight a disparity and, therefore, a source of friction and instability.

Areas

1-57. This category includes the specific localities in an AO and those in which multiple demographic groups live—neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block. Unless a counterinsurgent unit occupies an ethnically homogenous area, it will have multiple demographic borders in its AO. In addition, a single demographic area may cross several unit boundaries. Examples of specific areas are social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves and those defined by political boundaries, such as city districts or regional municipalities. Analysis of some areas, such as those demarcated by political boundaries or neighborhoods is straightforward. However, continued analysis entails understanding the areas within which more nebulous concepts exist, such as particular ideologies.

1-58. Once a counterinsurgent unit defines the geographic area occupied by a demographic group, it completes the rest of its ASCOPE analysis for that area. The unit then repeats this process for other areas. (See table 1-2 for an example area matrix.) The following defines an area matrix's columns:

- Area—each of the subareas of a unit's AO, such as tribal, religious, economic, or political districts.
- Location—boundaries of each group, within which reside multiple demographics since groups often overlap.
- Population—public perception and public use of the area.
- Insurgents—insurgent perception and organizational use of the area.
- Counterinsurgents—counterinsurgent perception and organizational use of the area.

Table 1-2. Area matrix, example

		From the Perspective of		
Area	***Location***	***Population***	***Insurgents***	***Counterinsurgents***
Group/Tribe A (specific name)	Grid coordinates or boundaries, for example	Safe haven; provides early warning from attack; community watches out for each other	Area provides freedom of movement, protection from government forces, cache sites, and safe houses	Nonpermissive terrain; all roads in area of heightened threat; history of improvised explosive devices and small arms fire
Religious Group A	Boundary	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Political District A	Boundary	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only. Do not use information in this table as data for the matrix.				

Note. An *improvised explosive device* is a weapon fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals (JP 3-42).

Structures

1-59. Existing structures play many significant roles. Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams are important infrastructure. Cultural sites such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals also play important roles in the community. Other structures such as jails, warehouses, television and radio stations, and print plants have practical applications. Structures may be less obvious; for example, a memorial or monument may have local or regional significance. Some aspects of the civilian infrastructure such as the location of toxic industrial materials influence operations. Analyzing a structure involves determining how its location, functions, and capabilities support an operation. Commanders also consider the consequences of using a certain structure. They carefully weigh the expected military benefits against the future community

costs that would eventually require addressing. (See table 1-3 for an example structures matrix.) The following defines a structures matrix's columns:

- Structure—the specific structures in the AO.
- Location—the specific location (given in grid coordinates) of each structure.
- Population—public perception and public use of the structure.
- Insurgents—insurgent perception and organizational use of the structure.
- Counterinsurgents—counterinsurgent perception and organizational use of the structure.

Table 1-3. Structures matrix, example

		From the Perspective of		
Structure	***Location***	***Population***	***Insurgents***	***Counterinsurgents***
Hospital (specific name)	XM123456	Needed medical care; however, shortage of staff and meds	Can provide medications from an illegal market to fill shortages	Funding and personnel shortfalls; needs expanding
House of worship	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Police station	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only. Do not use information in this table as data for the matrix.				

Capabilities

1-60. The capabilities category includes the ability of local authorities to provide citizens with key services such as public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food. The category includes other public needs that often require support after combat operations, such as public works and utilities, public health, economy, and commerce. And finally, the category includes those resources and services contractors can provide to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. The HN or other nations sometimes provide these resources and services. Commanders and staffs analyze capabilities from different perspectives. They prioritize capabilities by whether they save, sustain, or enhance life (in that order).

1-61. For each demographic group, commanders and staffs identify who is responsible overall for each requisite item to save, sustain, or enhance life. These items include preexisting needs, as well as public needs after combat operations or disaster. This first identification process plays a large part in the subsequent identification of the insurgency's root causes. Though items are listed, the focus remains on who is responsible for each item. (See table 1-4 for an example capabilities matrix.) The following defines a capabilities matrix's columns:

- Capabilities—at a minimum, the SWEAT-MSO items with the status of each item as follows:
  - Black—nonexistent.
  - Red—nonfunctioning.
  - Amber—present but not fulfilling public requirements; needs labor, parts, or fuel for maintenance; expected to fail without support.
  - Green—satisfactory for sustaining population.
- Location—the specific location (given in grid coordinates) of each structure.
- Population—individuals whom the population considers responsible for each SWEAT-MSO item.
- Insurgents—the insurgency's perspective.
- Counterinsurgents—the individual whom the local government considers responsible for each SWEAT-MSO item.

Table 1-4. Capabilities matrix, example

Capability	*Location*	*From the Perspective of*		
		Population	*Insurgents*	*Counterinsurgents*
Sewer (black, red, amber, green)	XM134423	Blame tribal sheikh; hurts economic development	Major issue to use against tribal sheikhs; will destroy repairs	City manager places low priority on this tribal area
Water (black, red, amber, green)	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Electrical (black, red, amber, green)	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only. Do not use information in this table as data for the matrix.				

Organization

1-62. Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with the populace, military units, and each other. Organizations generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations are native to the area, such as tribes and ethnic groups. Other organizations include church groups, fraternal, patriotic, or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, political parties, and community watch groups. Still other organizations come from outside the AO, such as multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, U.S. Government agencies, and NGOs. (See table 1-5 for an example organizations matrix.) The following defines an organizations matrix's columns:

- Organization—the specific organizations in the AO.

Note. The area matrix identifies some, but this matrix details the group whereas the area matrix identifies their locations only.

- Location—the specific location (given in grid coordinates) of each organization.
- Population—public perception of and public interactions with the organization.
- Insurgents—insurgent perception of and interorganizational interaction with the organization.
- Counterinsurgents—counterinsurgent perception of the organization.

Table 1-5. Organizations matrix, example

Organization	*Location*	*From the Perspective of*		
		Population	*Insurgents*	*Counterinsurgents*
Tribe	XM123456	Tribal loyalties and interactions dominate life	Looks to increase intertribal strife and violence	Must include tribal leaders in government
Political group	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Social group	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only. Do not use information in this table as data for the matrix.				

People (Means of Communication)

1-63. An important aspect of people is how they communicate. In this context, people include all civilians in the AO or area of interest (AOI) whose actions or opinions can affect the mission. Both formal and informal means of passing information, actions, opinions, and political influence are critical to understanding the AO. All counterinsurgents remain observant for obvious audio-visual signals and where people gather. Visual signal examples include graffiti, posters, signs, billboards, murals, videos, and television productions. Audio signal examples include pirated radio broadcasts, loudspeakers from religious structures, public readings, speeches, and religious teachings or services.

1-64. The people matrix includes noteworthy spokespeople in communities (for example, community, labor, and religious leaders). If the counterinsurgents' information dissemination techniques differed from those of the insurgents, this difference could explain why the enemy's propaganda is more credible, timelier, and seemingly more legitimate to the *target audience*—an individual or group selected for influence (JP 3-04). (See table 1-6 for an example people matrix.) The following defines a people matrix's columns:

- People—key communicators or the specific methods people employ to communicate in this area.
- Location—the locations where people communicate or where key communicators live and work.
- Population—public perception of those who serve as key sources of communication.
- Insurgents—people the insurgents engage to communicate with the civilian population.
- Counterinsurgents—people the HN engages to communicate with the civilian population.

Table 1-6. People (means of communication) matrix, example

People (Means of Communication)	***Location***	***From the Perspective of***		
		Population	***Insurgents***	***Counterinsurgents***
Phones	XM155489	Local storeowner	Unknown	Tribal and community leaders' cellular phones
Mass media/ radio	Grid coordinates	Individual names…	Individual names…	Individual names…
Religious services	Grid coordinates	Individual names…	Individual names…	Individual names…
Influential individuals such as mayor, police chief, or store owner	Grid coordinates	Respected leader believed to be unbiased	Enemy of the people	Tolerated as from different ethnic group
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only. Do not use information in this table as data for the matrix.				

Events

1-65. Events, both public and private, are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that affect organizations, people, and military operations. Examples include national and religious holidays, agricultural crop and livestock duties, market cycles, elections, civil disturbances, and celebrations. Once tactical units recognize significant events are occurring, they template the events and analyze their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. (See table 1-7 for an example events matrix.) The following defines the events matrix's columns:

- Event—all events of popular importance (for example, religious holidays, seasonal harvests or migrations of insurgents, council meetings, religious services, special shopping days).
- Location—the location (normally given in military grid reference system format), including a date-time group.
- Population—public perception of the event.
- Insurgents—insurgent perception of the event.
- Counterinsurgents—the HN's perception of the event.

Table 1-7. Events matrix, example

Event	*Location*	*From the Perspective of*		
		Population	*Insurgents*	*Counterinsurgents*
Religious Festival XX	Route XYZ	One religion approves; another disapproves	Opportunity to promote religious strife	Religious freedom must be accepted
Fire Station XX Opening	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Funeral for XX	Grid coordinates	Perspective is…	Perspective is…	Perspective is…
Note: This table is for illustrative purposes only. Do not use information in this table as data for the matrix.				

SECTION IV – ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1-66. Describing the environmental effects on COIN operations is step 2 of the IPOE process. It involves taking the facts about an AO—grouped by the mission variables of terrain, weather, and civil considerations—and analyzing them to arrive at a conclusion about their effects on enemy and friendly COAs. In addition to the normal analytical tools, examining each of the prerequisites of an insurgency and the root causes of the insurgency has proven useful in identifying long-term societal problems. These problems lie at the heart of the competition for popular support between the insurgency and COIN.

PREREQUISITES FOR AN INSURGENCY

1-67. The success of an insurgency in any given area relies on three prerequisites—opportunity, motive, and means. When all three exist in one area, an insurgency can operate with some freedom of movement, gain popular support, and entrench itself over time. (See FM 3-24 for information on prerequisites for an insurgency.)

OPPORTUNITY (VULNERABLE POPULATION)

1-68. A population is vulnerable when real or perceived public grievances exist for insurgents to exploit. Insurgents can exploit the population by offering hope for change. They can also exploit any public dissatisfaction with the current government in political, economic, or societal matters. A gap between public expectations and an existing incapacity to meet those expectations can fuel public unrest, including a turning in popular support toward an insurgency. The larger the gap, the greater the public perception or relative sense of deprivation in what people have, as well as in what people believe they should have. Similarly, the larger the gap, the more susceptible the population is to insurgent influence due to the insurgency's promises to close the gap.

MOTIVE (LEADERSHIP AVAILABLE FOR DIRECTION)

1-69. The prerequisite of opportunity alone is insufficient to support a burgeoning insurgency. Leaders who can direct public frustration is another prerequisite. When insurgents recruit, co-opt, or coerce local leaders or when local leaders already exist as part of the insurgency, these leaders can direct public frustration. Building a compelling narrative that links public grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes popular support of a violent social movement takes established or emerging leaders. The narrative explains who is to blame for the cause of the grievance, how new leaders will address grievances and their causes, and why the populace and insurgency should work together to accomplish the goal. Ideology often provides a coherent set of ideas as a compelling framework for a narrative. Where opportunity and motive (grievances) intersect, leaders emerge to attempt to mobilize the populace.

MEANS (LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL)

1-70. The real or perceived lack of governmental control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces or other agencies. The greater the control the government has over the

situation, the less likely the chances are for insurgent success. The opposite is also true. When the government is not providing what people believe their government should, insurgents may provide an alternative government, or they may merely nullify governance to allow freedom of action and movement, depending on their end state. The HN's failure to recognize an issue or the HN's outright refusal to change can further strengthen the realization of this prerequisite.

1-71. Counterinsurgent planning efforts consider how an insurgent movement resources itself. It takes considerable resources to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent political authorities, and the methods an insurgency uses to secure those means determine a great deal about its behavior. The leaders of a potential insurgency assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of secure communications and logistics. An insurgency often depends on a local populace for resourcing and recruitment. In these cases, insurgents base an insurgency on social relationships to resource and recruit other villages, clans, tribes, or ethnicities or other groups. However, historical, successful insurgencies are supported by external powers.

ROOT CAUSES

1-72. For discussion purposes only, this publication presents five general categories of root causes for insurgency—identity, religion, occupation or exploitation, economic failure, and corruption and repression. A root cause serves as the basis of a public grievance. Some of or all these grievances may fuel an insurgency to varying degrees. The importance of the root causes, or even their existence, can change over time. Additionally, insurgencies are often adept at manipulating or creating root causes and public grievances to serve their purposes.

IDENTITY

1-73. Many factors affect a person's sense of identity, but membership in a sociocultural group can have the deepest influence. When one group feels strong conflict between their identity and the group identity of the HN government majority, an insurgency with the goal of seceding or overthrowing the government may arise. Furthermore, external nations with similar social identities as those of the insurgents may assist.

RELIGION

1-74. Religion is often a primary contributor to an individual's or a group's identity. However, a religious sect can grow to such significance that people perceive it as warranting a separate identity unto itself. In this way, religious extremism can become a root cause of an insurgency. External groups with similar views to the insurgency's (religious extremism) may assist them in achieving their goals.

OCCUPATION OR EXPLOITATION

1-75. Public perception of outsiders occupying the HN or of the excessive pandering of the HN to outsiders can inspire insurgency. For example, foreign businesses can dominate critical portions of the local economy. In response, some may feel exploited or believe their country is being exploited. An outside military presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment. The mere presence or specific actions of foreigners may offend religious or cultural sensibilities as well.

ECONOMIC FAILURE

1-76. Pervasive and desperate poverty is often a root cause of insurgency. Starving young people without income sources or hope of subsistence are ripe for recruitment as insurgents, especially when the government is perceived as having failed to deliver on a promise. A large gap between an impoverished vast majority and an affluent small minority often exacerbates these issues.

CORRUPTION OR REPRESSION

1-77. Corruption and repression can lead to public dissatisfaction with the current government. Rampant corruption leads to loss in the HN government's legitimacy and possibly to public desire to change or replace the HN government.

SECTION V – CULTURAL CAPABILITY AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

1-78. One definition of culture is the system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of a society use to engage their world and one another. Since all wars are fought among a populace, members of the U.S. Army develop their understanding of and their ability to work within a culture. Cultural capability is individual competence in the knowledge, skills, and abilities concerning the characteristics of specific cultures, the forecasting of the behaviors of the members of that culture, and the favorable influence upon those peoples and their cultures. This section defines social structure and culture; identifies the two major components of cultural capability—cultural competence and regional competence; and reviews the three cultural capability proficiency levels—cultural awareness, cultural understanding, and cultural expertise.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE

1-79. Each society has a social structure and at least one culture. The relations among groups of persons within a system of groups provide the social structure. Social structures persist over time. That is, they continue with regularity despite disturbances, and the relations between the parts remain steady even as groups expand and diminish. An army's organizational structure, for example, arranges soldiers into groups such as divisions, brigades, battalions, and companies and into a hierarchy of ranks. Culture informs how people interpret, understand, and respond to events and the other people around them. Cultural competence is critical because cultural norms often determine those a society deems legitimate.

ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

1-80. Social structures include groups, institutions, organizations, and networks. Their arrangement constitutes society, the organization of social positions, and the distribution of people across those positions. (See table 1-8 for relevant inquiries into elements of the social structure.)

Table 1-8. Inquiries into elements of social structures

Social groups	What are the major groups both inside and outside the area of operations?
	What are the formal relationships such as treaties or alliances and the informal relationships such as tolerant or fractious groups? What are the divisions or the crosscutting ties between groups (for example, religious convictions intersecting ethnic differences)?
	Do the insurgency leaders and their rank and file belong to separate groups? Does the population belong to a different social group than the insurgents? Can seams among insurgents or between insurgents and the population be widened?
	How do people identify themselves (for example, tribes, religions, ethnicities, provinces or regions, classes, occupations, and common languages)?
	Are there many refugees, squatters, displaced people, or those without housing? What do the local people think of them?
Norms, roles, and statuses	What are the expected behaviors (roles) for people in different social statuses? How should a parent, political leader, military figure, or religious leader behave? What are the appropriate treatments of women and children? What are the common courtesies such as gift offerings? What are the local business practices such as bribes and haggling?
	What traditional roles does each family member play?
	What are people in the society expected to do (norm)? Norms may be either ethical (for example, incest prohibition, homicide prohibition) or customary (for example, praying before a meal, removing shoes before entering a house).
	How important is punctuality in the society, for both business and social gatherings?
	What are the punishments (formal and informal) for role violations? What earns public disapproval? What are the requirements for vengeance when honor is lost?

INTERRELATED NATURE OF CULTURE

1-81. In one mode, culture is learned, shared by members of a society, and internalized. This sense of acculturation is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as inherent by people in the society. When culture operates in this way, it conditions an individual's range of actions and ideas, including what to do and what not to do, how to do or avoid doing it, and with whom to do it or not to do it. In this mode, culture also dictates the circumstances for shifts in or changes of those governing rules. And finally, culture, when operating as an influencer, impacts public judgment about what is right and wrong, assessment of what is important and unimportant, categorization of things, and treatment of things that do not fit into those categories. Cultural rules are flexible in practice, whether discussing how culture impacts people (which is the focus here) or how people impact culture.

Cultural Knowledge (Taxonomy)

1-82. Cultural knowledge is essential to successful COIN. Members of other societies usually have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior, religion, politics, social order, and sex. An external observer may witness unexpected conduct or a confusing convening that an HN group member finds self-evident and vice versa. One way to lay out a visual construct of a culture is to chart systematically the distinctions, orderings, and names of groups as a sort of cultural taxonomy. (See figure 1-3 on page 22 for an example cultural taxonomy.) To do so, leaders and staffs define a culture's influences, variations, and manifestations. Cultural influences and variations explain why the culture is the way it is. Cultural manifestations refer to what one may encounter in a culture.

Cultural Influences	*Cultural Variations*	*Cultural Manifestations*
History	*Values*	Planning Style
Language	Individualism vs Collectivism	View of Authority
Geography	Power Distance	Negotiation Styles
Religion	Formality vs Informality	Willingness to Compromise
Communications	Uncertainty Avoidance	Risk Avoidance
Political Science	Relationship vs Deal	Time to Decision
Military Arts and Science	Focus	
Sociology	Long vs Short Term	
Cultural Anthropology	Orientation	
Economics	Time Orientation	
Education	Cognition	
Art, Music, Entertainment	Reasoning Styles	
Literature		
Food and Drink		
Psychology		
Law and Criminal Justice		
Science and Technology		
Philosophy		

Figure 1-3. Cultural taxonomy, example

Influences upon Culture

1-83. Culture and identity complicate the challenge of understanding the public perspective. Faced with the uncertainty and insecurity associated with civil conflict, civilians pursue their interests rationally; their decisions are consistent with their assessment of their current local environment and how it is most likely to evolve. That assessment is heavily shaped by a range of contextual factors that include both individual and communal characteristics such as past experiences, collective memory, dominant historical narratives, normative beliefs, access to information, socioeconomic status, and the degree to which individuals are dependent upon membership in their communities for survival. Members of the population influence culture differently depending on their geographic location or group affiliation. A COIN operation should identify and evaluate influences upon cultures. Questions related to these influences aid units in defining the different, specific influences upon a culture (see table 1-9 on page 23 through page 25).

Table 1-9. Inquiries into influences upon culture

History	
What major wars, massacres, and conflicts shaped the larger national or smaller local culture?	
Who are some of the great leaders, heroes, or legends in the nation's history?	
Who are some of the infamous people or villains in the nation's history?	
Who founded the country?	
Who brought the country (or its macroculture, microcultures, historic moment, or standpoint) to its current form (for example, infrastructure, present conditions, state of affairs, characteristics)?	
Which were some of the significant eras, impactful generations, or major shifts in the nation's history?	
Language	
What are the commonly spoken languages or dialects?	
Are there common sayings, clichés, slang words, or idioms?	
Do local cultures share common, informal words or phrases for reasons of etiquette (for example, *hello*, *goodbye*, *please*, *thank you*, *you're welcome*, *how are you*, *may I help you*)?	
Do local cultures share more formal expressions for reasons of etiquette (for example, *God bless you*, *God save the king*, *excuse me*, *pardon me*)?	
What are the customary behaviors for greetings and departures (for example, shaking hands, kissing, bowing)?	
Are toasts sociable? Does one make a toast with a specific beverage deemed appropriate for the occasion?	
Does one pray over or show gratitude for food or meals in general society?	
Geography	
What typically defines a community or neighborhood (for example, economic, ethnic, tribal, religious, or political traits)? Where are the neighborhood boundaries?	
From where do new arrivals, immigrants, workers, and displaced people typically come? Why did they migrate here? Is the migration seasonal, temporary, or permanent?	
What are the most significant local, natural and artificial landmarks and structures (for example, religious architecture, historical sites, cultural constructs)?	
Religion	
What are the main religions? Is there an official religion?	What traditions do funerals and mourning practice?
What are the important religious events and holidays?	Do religious differences cause any tension in the nation?
What role do religious leaders play within the society?	What are the tenets of the main religions?
Communication	
How do people communicate?	
How do people receive information (for example, radio, television, newspaper, meetings, word of mouth)?	
Where do people usually gather (for example, bars, tea or coffee shops, restaurants, markets)?	
Where do people randomly socialize or congregate in previously unrecognized manners (for example, waiting in long lines, seeking day labor, commuting, attending sporting events and tournaments)?	
Who are the principal communicators within a local community?	
Political science	
How do people view the role of the host nation government?	
What roles do civilian (nongovernmental) community leaders play, and of how much importance are those roles?	
What are the major political parties?	
Is the local government effective? Why or why not?	
What civil and human rights does the populace hold most sacred?	
Is the government secular or religious?	
Does the country have a constitution or other document or set of guidelines that lays out the role of the government, rights of the people, and laws?	

Table 1-9. Inquiries into influences upon culture (continued)

Military arts and science
How respected is military service by the civilian population? How are military veterans treated?
Who are some of the famous military leaders or revolutionaries in the country?
Is there a noncommissioned officer corps? How are noncommissioned officers selected? What are their duties and responsibilities? What is the relationship between officers and soldiers?
Do members of the military swear an oath of allegiance upon enrollment, and what are those vows?
What colors, banners, symbols, or uniforms do antigovernment forces use?
Sociology
Do people identify themselves with organizations or affiliations (for example, tribes, religions, ethnicities, provinces or regions, classes, occupations)? Does language or dialect differentiate any groups?
What are the major problems for the population and underlying public issues?
Are there many unhoused people, refugees, squatters, or displaced people? What do the local people think of them?
How are guests or strangers treated, and have people developed customs for engaging them? Are people friendly or guarded with strangers?
What are the shared core values by which one might identify people?
What is the daily or weekly schedule of most citizens (for example, waking time, mealtimes and their frequency, work shifts, social time, sleeping hours)?
Cultural anthropology
Have current warring groups or factions ever lived side by side in peace? What changed?
What are the key cultural aspects of the local tribes or nomadic groups?
What traditional role does each family member play?
To whom do people look for leadership (governmental and nongovernmental)?
How important is punctuality in the society, for both business and social gatherings?
How do people correct social mistakes?
Economy
Of what export are people most proud, or for what local product are people known?
Are bribes or incentivizing gifts normal when dealing with businesses, government officials, or police? What is acceptable in terms of levels of corruption?
What infrastructure is necessary for supporting the economic growth (for example, electricity for factories, roads to move produce, security to minimize extortion or illegal trade)?
What is the daily wage of an average worker? Which jobs are considered honorable?
What economic organizations are important to or influential in the society (for example, labor unions, merchant guilds)?
Is there localized illegal trade? Of what products or services? Who is involved? Is the activity or any actor tied to the community and local government?
Are prices fixed or negotiated in normal commerce?
Education
What is the literacy rate?
Is public education operational and accessible? Who does and does not attend school, and why? What are the last possible and typical years of public education? Are public schools secular or religious?
What influence do local colleges or universities maintain (for example, professors promoting radicalism, schools serving as recruitment centers)?
Art, music, and entertainment
How important is the national anthem to the civilian population? What values do the lyrics prioritize?
What types of music and movies are popular?
What are the favored holidays, and how do people celebrate them? Do people affiliate any special foods with holidays and special occasions?
What are the most popular hobbies and recreations?

Table 1-9. Inquiries into influences upon culture (continued)

Literature
What types of stories do children read? What are the morals of these stories?
What stories, fables, and epics (oral or written) do families and communities relay to forthcoming generations? Do these serve to define the culture in part?
Who are the most famous and infamous characters in popular literature?
Who are the fictional or literary legends for the nation?
What are the popular books, and who are the controversial authors (past and present)?
Food and drink
What are the attributes of local cuisines? What are the typical or traditional foods and drinks? How are they prepared?
Of what import is sharing a meal? Are food and drink offerings part of hospitality expressions or requirements?
Do people forbid or otherwise limit any specific foods or drinks or their general consumption? Do people ever present any foods or drinks or their offerings as sacred?
Psychology
Who or what do people fear (for example, during COIN operations in Iraq, many Iraqis either feared dogs or considered them unclean)?
How would people rank the following entities from most to least important: God, family, tribe, neighborhood, country, political party, and ethnic group?
How would people rank the following needs from most to least important: esteem (for self and others), safety (security and stability), self-actualization (meeting one's potential), love (belonging), and physiological (essentials for life—clean air and water, sanitary food, adequate shelter)?
Law and criminal justice
Who makes and enforces local laws? What justice can victims or their families exercise or attain?
What are the basic traffic laws and rules of the road and for right-of-way? Do people obey them?
What types of organized crime exist? What symbols, colors, graffiti, or uniforms do local gangs or criminal organizations use? What functions do each serve (for example, marking territories, identifying targets, intimidating the populace)?
How do people feel about corporal and capital punishments?
What could dishonor an individual, family, or group? How would one correct serious situations between individuals, families, or groups of families?
Science and technology
Do(es) the country or major areas have internet service? Do(es) satellites or hardwiring provide it?
Does the enemy use the internet? For what purposes?
What internet sites are forbidden or blocked? By what authority?
What inventions or discoveries are attributable to the country? What do citizens generally believe their country invented or discovered?

Cultural Variations

1-84. Cultural variations are the behaviors, values, and interests common to a culture. The size of a nation, its diverse subcultures, different educational levels, and geographic backgrounds contribute to a great range of cultural variations between individuals and within groups. Understanding these variations allows U.S. Forces and HNSF to interact and, thus, to operate more effectively in negotiations, advisory roles, populace control, and the daily public interaction that increases their cultural capability.

Behaviors

1-85. A culture's behavior includes observable actions, specifically the use of language, social norms, customs, structures, and institutions. Culturally competent units understand and train to recognize these behaviors to identify insurgent actions, anticipate public actions, and detect subtle changes within the populace. Actions inconsistent with the culture's behavior could be indicators of guerrilla activity or internal conflict or could serve to confirm or deny intelligence reports, estimates, and assessments. Living and operating among the populace are essential practices for developing one's understanding of the culture's behavior.

Values

1-86. Values are the principles by which people evaluate alternatives to or consequences of decisions and actions because values govern attitudes. They originate in beliefs held by individuals or by cultural groups with which individuals identify (for example, Army Values). Through their values, people come to understand their places in a society and what they will and will not tolerate from others. Values define their sense of honor and of respect, and these are often unchangeable. U.S. Forces are never to attempt to change public values, confuse U.S. interests with the values of U.S. residents, or use U.S. interests to alter the values of U.S. residents. During tactical operations, COIN forces prioritize public values over public interests to demonstrate the HN government's legitimacy in supporting the general population.

Interests

1-87. Public interests are a group's wants or desires for that group's benefit or advantage. People often perceive them as their right or themselves as having a legitimate claim to them. Public interests are flexible and can change. They remain linked to each situation (that is, what people want at present). Public perception from outside nations, including the United States, does not dictate what the HN civilian population needs and wants. An insurgency likely understands these needs and wants and often eagerly exploits them to gain popular support, as well as to turn public opinion against the HN government. A vulnerable population gravitates toward the entity it feels best understands and satisfies public needs and wants. During tactical COIN operations, the COIN remains aware of competing or involved cultures and how the local populace differentiates between a need and a want and does not operate with a U.S. cultural bias.

Cultural Manifestations

1-88. Cultural manifestations are concrete displays of the thinking behind a culture's behavior, which observers may measure by their senses. They demonstrate public views on authority, legitimacy, negotiation styles, compromise, and other similar concepts and approaches.

CULTURAL CAPABILITY

1-89. Warfare with its focus of operations on the population requires a different cultural capability than that of warfare with its focus of operations on the military defeat of a more conventional threat. In COIN operations, cultural capability demands an adaptive and flexible mindset toward understanding the population, anticipating insurgent actions, remaining comfortable among the populace, and appreciating the comprehensive approach of COIN. Cultural capability has two major components—cultural competence and regional competence.

CULTURAL COMPETENCE

1-90. Cultural competence involves general knowledge, skills, and abilities specific to culture. All Soldiers devote time to developing their cultural competence. This competency demonstrates a Soldier's understanding of a culture, and Soldiers develop it by humanities studies (including films and other media), international travel, and personal interactions with people from countries outside the United States.

REGIONAL COMPETENCE

1-91. Regional competence involves knowledge, skills, and abilities regarding the cultures of a specific country or region. Soldiers develop it by lifelong studies of a region. They receive tailored training during their preparation for a deployment.

CULTURAL CAPABILITY PROFICIENCY LEVELS

1-92. As Soldiers develop cultural and regional competence over time, broad descriptions of their proficiency levels show the depth of their knowledge, skills, and abilities in those competencies. These descriptions represent a standard that curriculum design for cultural and foreign language education and training targets achieving. Paragraphs 1-93 through 1-95 define the cultural capability proficiency levels. While developing cultural and regional competence, an individual Soldier will portray improved proficiency over time (see figure 1-4).




Figure 1-4. Changes in cultural capability over time

Cultural Awareness

1-93. Soldiers at this proficiency level demonstrate basic cultural competence in all three subcomponent areas—culture fundamentals, cultural self-awareness, and cross-cultural skills. They meet a minimum requirement in regional competence of performing assigned tasks in a specific geographic area. They maintain the capability of describing key cultural terms, factors, and concepts. Their other abilities are setting the conditions to learn about cultures, nurturing an appropriate mindset, and building upon their basic cultural capability.

Cultural Understanding

1-94. This proficiency level describes Soldiers and leaders with well-developed cultural competence. They possess a comprehensive level of regional competence, allowing them to accomplish missions in a specific geographic area. They maintain the capability of applying relevant cultural terms, factors, and concepts and regional information to their tasks and mission. Additional characteristics of cultural understanding follow:

- Familiarity with a specific region.
- Ability to identify economic, religious, legal, governmental, political, and infrastructural features of a specific region.
- Awareness of regional sensitivities regarding sex and race, local observances, and public perception of the United States and its allies.

Cultural Expertise

1-95. This proficiency level describes Soldiers and leaders with an advanced level of cultural competence. They possess sophistication in regional competence pertaining to a specific geographic area. These Soldiers and leaders maintain the capabilities of integrating and synthesizing cultural terms, factors, and concepts and regional information into plans, programs, and advice to commanders. Additional proficiencies in cultural expertise include the following:

- Use of secondary languages.
- Effective cross-cultural persuasion, negotiation, conflict resolution, influence, or leadership.
- Understanding of the most salient (historical and current) structural and cultural factors of a specific geographic area.
- Ability to advise regional commanders on military operations.

CULTURALLY INFLUENCED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

1-96. Situational awareness, the goal of every leader and Soldier, is the immediate knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and temporally. Culturally influenced situational awareness allows counterinsurgents to detect subtle indicators of change or threat in the OE and consider how those will affect insurgent decisions and planning. When conducting COIN operations, continuous assessments of cultural capability are key for a Soldier, leader, or tactical unit developing culturally influenced situational awareness. Within small units, superb cultural capability and improved situational awareness result in greater chances of mission accomplishment, tactical effectiveness, and protection.

ASSESSMENT

1-97. Leaders or Soldiers have begun to achieve culturally influenced situational awareness when they can ask and accurately answer such questions as those following:

- What do the observed behavioral cues mean?
- What is the adversary thinking, and why?
- What are the HNSF thinking, and why?
- What are groups of people thinking, and why?
- What would the adversary, groups of people, adjacent units, coalition partners, and HNSF do if I took action X, and why?
- How are cultural factors influencing my operations?
- How can I influence groups of people and HNSF toward desired actions?

COMPLEXITY

1-98. Assessments in COIN can be extremely complex and differ from assessments of many traditional operations because success of the operation often relies on nonmilitary factors and factors outside the unit's direct control. This lack of control increases the unit's focus on diplomatic, informational, and economic objectives. Additionally at its core, COIN is a struggle for popular support. Understanding that struggle or becoming "the world expert on your district" (Kilcullen, "'Twenty-Eight Articles'"; see appendix C) is the foundation for a unit's situational awareness. A unit that uses the four tools (operational variables, mission variables, prerequisites and root causes, and cultural capability) described in this chapter dramatically increases its likelihood of success against an insurgency. These four tools involve the unit's—

- Studying its OE carefully, using the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time; see paragraphs 1-24 through 1-38).
- Defining its situation, using the METT-TC (I) variables (see paragraphs 1-39 through 1-46).
- Analyzing the prerequisites (see paragraphs 1-66 through 1-71) and determining the root causes (see paragraphs 1-72 through 1-77) of the insurgency.
- Developing its cultural capability and thereby increasing its ability to understand and interact with the populace (see paragraphs 1-89 through 1-95).

Chapter 2

Foundations of Insurgency

An insurgency and the operational environment (OE) must be understood before the insurgency can be defeated. Information that assists the counterinsurgency (COIN) in understanding and predicting insurgent actions include the elements and dynamics of an insurgency, insurgent strategies and tactics, and insurgent strengths and vulnerabilities. Together, this information provides leaders at all levels with the means to comprehend and defeat the insurgency. This chapter categorizes insurgent groups by their components (elements, dynamics, and strategies) and their manifestations (tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities).

SECTION I – INSURGENT COMPONENTS AND MANIFESTATIONS

2-1. The central struggle of most insurgencies is to gain and maintain popular support. However, insurgent elements, dynamics, strategies, tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities are each unique to an individual insurgent group. Tactical leaders, from the platoon to the brigade, first and foremost identify and understand any insurgent groups they are fighting before determining potential insurgent courses of action (COAs) and friendly COAs. This section introduces the relationship between insurgent components and manifestations. When a counterinsurgent unit understands both insurgent components and manifestations, the unit can correctly apply pressure along the COIN lines of operation (LOOs) and lines of effort (LOEs) to defeat the insurgency (see chapter 3 for details). This section concludes with a historical example of an insurgency.

INSURGENT COMPONENTS

2-2. Insurgent components comprise five elements, eight dynamics, and six strategies. The elements are the five groups—leaders, guerrillas, underground elements, auxiliary forces, and a mass base—that form the insurgent organization. (This publication adds a fifth organizational group to the four addressed in FM 3-24—a mass base, the portion of the state's population sympathetic to the insurgent movement.) The dynamics are the eight categories that define an insurgency—leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns. Finally, the six insurgent strategies are the urban, military-focused, protracted popular war, identity-focused, conspiratorial, and the composite and coalition. Together, the components—the five elements, the eight dynamics, and the six strategies—are tools of analysis that allow the COIN to grasp the nature of the insurgency fully.

INSURGENT MANIFESTATIONS

2-3. Insurgent manifestations are the visible outputs of the insurgency. They comprise the insurgent tactics and the insurgent strengths and vulnerabilities, all of which COINs track to analyze and lay out the insurgency's pattern and thereby to devise a means to defeat the insurgency. (See figure 2-1 on page 30 for a depiction of the relationship between insurgent components and manifestations.)




Figure 2-1. Insurgent components and manifestations

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF AN INSURGENCY

2-4. With an understanding of insurgent components, a counterinsurgent unit can identify, describe, and categorize any insurgency. (See figure 2-2 for the insurgent components of a historical insurgency.)




Figure 2-2. Components of Malayan insurgency

SECTION II – COMPONENT ELEMENTS, DYNAMICS, AND STRATEGIES

2-5. Few insurgencies fit neatly into a rigid classification. However, insurgencies do have common components on which to build a more accurate picture of an insurgency and by which commanders develop their understanding of the situation. Commanders and staffs at the tactical level who understand the three components (elements, dynamics, and strategies) of an insurgency can conduct stronger analysis of insurgent tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities. The independent analysis of each component is valuable, but analyzing the interactions and relationships between the components as a whole is the key to developing understanding of an insurgency. This section reviews the three components of an insurgency—insurgent organizational elements, dynamics, and strategies—in detail.

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS

2-6. Insurgent organizations vary considerably but typically comprise five elements supported by a military wing and a political wing. The proportions of each element depend on insurgent strategy and the degree of active popular support. Upon the elimination of the existing government presence in a particular area, these elements can exist openly. Wherever the host nation (HN) government presence remains strong, insurgent elements maintain a clandestine existence. The five insurgent organizational elements are leaders, guerrillas, underground elements, auxiliary forces, and a mass base within the civilian population (see figure 2-3).




Figure 2-3. Insurgent organizational elements

LEADERS

2-7. Leaders provide direction to the insurgency. They excel in generating ideas and plans. They usually exercise leadership through force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas, and personal charisma. Generally, they introduce insurgent ideology into objectives and direct the military efforts of the guerrillas. In some insurgencies, they may hold their positions through religious, clan-based, or tribal authority.

2-8. The political cadre comprises those leaders who form the political core of the insurgency. They are actively and politically engaged in the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. They may also compose a formal political party to signify their political importance. These political leaders drive the propaganda.

Modern noncommunist insurgencies rarely, if ever, refer to cadres, yet these movements usually include a group who performs similar functions. In a movement based on religious extremism, religious leaders can play a similar role to that of the political cadre. Insurgencies based on religious extremism usually include religious and spiritual advisors among their political cadres.

2-9. The leaders of an insurgency are leaders from the political cadre or guerrilla or auxiliary forces. They may or may not be the same individuals. They may include supporting members, much like commanders and staff in a regular military. These supporting members may include advisors, logistics and administration personnel, spokespersons, and those leading operations. Insurgent leaders may attain positions within the government and work to undermine the government. Analysis of an insurgency's leaders yields information on how effective the leaders are in mobilizing the populace and investing resources to undermine the HN.

2-10. At a tactical level, units may identify such leaders as an improvised explosive device (IED) cell leader; political cadre, religious, or social leaders who direct the propaganda and nonviolent efforts of the insurgency; business leaders who provide extensive resource support to the insurgency; or those serving in other roles. Leaders (and an insurgency's structure of leadership) can vary greatly, depending on whether the insurgency is a network or hierarchy. Due to their importance, the first dynamic revisits the concept of leadership.

GUERRILLAS

2-11. A guerrilla is any insurgent who uses a weapon of any sort and does the actual fighting for the insurgency. Guerrillas may conduct acts of terror, guerrilla warfare, criminal activities, or conventional operations. They are often mistaken for the movement or insurgency itself, but they are merely the foot soldiers of the movement or insurgency. Guerrilla forces vary widely in size, composition, tactics, and methods from one insurgency to another. They even vary widely within an insurgency, especially in each of the three phases (see paragraphs 2-73 through 2-78) of an insurgency.

2-12. Guerrillas may continue in their normal positions in society and lead clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Guerrillas tend to organize themselves according to the activity they will be conducting. Those focused on using terrorism usually operate individually or in small cells and are often armed with explosives. Guerrilla bands, historically, have lived in remote areas and conducted raids on HN governmental infrastructures. Historical examples of guerrillas include the Maquis in France during World War II, the Viet Cong in the Vietnam War, and the Mahdi Army in Iraq.

UNDERGROUND ELEMENTS

2-13. The underground is a cell-based organization of active supporters of an insurgency. It may contain an element working in the HN government. Keeping the nature of the work for the insurgency secret is often paramount. Members are more engaged than auxiliary forces and serve as guerrillas when using weapons or conducting combat operations. They operate in all areas, especially those denied to any established guerrilla force and those unsuitable for guerrilla operations. They conduct clandestine, covert, and overt operations, sometimes infiltrating the HN government. They often continue in their normal positions in society but lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Some insurgencies are unique in that they conduct most of their political activities within the underground while a different section trains recruits, maintains propaganda, and helps with populace control. The underground may—

- Spread propaganda.
- Support sabotage, assassination, and subversion.
- Support intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) operations.
- Run safe houses.
- Provide transportation.
- Manufacture and maintain arms and explosives.

AUXILIARY FORCES

2-14. An auxiliary is a support element of an insurgency. Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who provide important logistical services but do not directly participate in combat operations. When they participate in guerrilla activities, they become guerrillas. Auxiliaries perform full-time or part-time work for the insurgency and generally conduct safer activities than the underground. They often include women, children, and other of those individuals who undergo a lesser level of scrutiny by COIN forces. Examples of auxiliaries include

shepherds or street merchants who openly operate near a counterinsurgent base and provide intelligence regarding that site. The following are some examples of auxiliary-provided support:

- Storing weapons and supplies.
- Performing courier operations.
- Conducting passive information collection.
- Giving early warning of counterinsurgent movements.
- Acquiring funds from lawful and unlawful sources.
- Providing forged or stolen documents.
- Promoting and facilitating desertion of security forces.
- Recruiting and screening new members.
- Creating and spreading propaganda.
- Providing medical support.
- Manufacturing and maintaining equipment.

MASS BASE

2-15. The mass base consists of those of the state's population who are sympathetic to the insurgent movement. This sympathy varies between specific elements of the population such as religious and ethnic groups and members of the specific elements themselves. This mass base, by nature, passively supports the insurgency. As occasions arise, they may provide active support. Leaders often recruit members of the mass base to serve in auxiliary forces, underground elements or as guerrillas. Mass base members are the true silent supporters of the insurgency and are often the most accessible for the HN government to influence positively.

EXAMPLE INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

2-16. Though no two insurgencies or insurgent organizations are alike, they still have identifiable elements with some form of hierarchy. For example, an insurgent organization with a developed structure may have an underground element financing the insurgency (see figure 2-4).




Figure 2-4. Insurgent organization, example

INSURGENT DYNAMICS

2-17. Insurgencies are political movements resulting from real or perceived public grievances or from governmental neglect that so easily alienates the civilian population. Eight dynamics are common components of an insurgency. Knowing and understanding these dynamics, therefore, develops one's understanding of the insurgency as a whole. The eight dynamics are leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns.

LEADERSHIP

2-18. Insurgent leaders provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organization for an insurgent movement. Successful insurgent leaders interpret and direct public frustration; they use it in the insurgent strategies. They often provide solutions to public grievances by advancing alternatives to existing conditions whose public adoption would serve to support the insurgency. Effective insurgent leaders publicize their cause and solutions to gain popular support.

2-19. Individual insurgent leaders are often members of the social elite alienated for various reasons from the power structure. Their educations, backgrounds, family connections, social standings, and experiences contribute to their abilities to organize and inspire other insurgents. To be successful, they must break the ties between the civilian population and the government and establish credibility for their movements.

Leadership Structure

2-20. Leaders may work closely together or operate in a decentralized manner, depending on their security needs or other operational concerns. The three categories of insurgent leaders are single person, single group or party, and group of groups. Group leadership operates in a decentralized or centralized manner.

Single Person

2-21. One person may be the overall leader of an insurgency. In this leadership structure, one person provides cohesion, motivation, and direction for the insurgency. Cuba's Fidel Castro is an excellent example of the single leader structure. However, this lone leader may centralize power or decentralize decision making and execution, delegating those roles to subordinates. At the local level, most units see organizations controlled by a single person.

Single Group or Party

2-22. A ruling council, who makes and executes policy, may head an insurgency. This lead group or party may also control other groups involved in the insurgency. The Chinese Communist Party, before the ascendancy of Mao (see appendix B), is an example of a single group leading an insurgency.

Group of Groups

2-23. Different groups with differing concepts of proper state governance compose the leadership in this structure. Therefore, this leadership structure has multiple leaders, who may be unified only in their opposition to the standing government. They compete both with the current government and among themselves. For example, the partisan forces in Yugoslavia and Greece during World War II united in their fight against the German occupation but ranged from monarchist to democratic to communist. Sometimes, they fought each other more violently than they did the Germans.

Decentralized

2-24. The power base of some insurgencies is collective, and their effectiveness does not depend on specific leaders or personalities. These insurgencies are easier to penetrate but recover rapidly when they lose key personnel. Decentralization restricts an insurgency's abilities to function as a coherent body and to create a viable counter state. However, decentralized insurgencies are very hard to destroy and can continue to sow disorder even when degraded. For example, al Qaeda in 2008 was a loose, decentralized organization with a shared goal of reestablishing the Caliphate.

Centralized

2-25. Other insurgent organizations depend on a single, often charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and direction. Centralized insurgencies make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly. However, the removal, co-opting, discredit, or elimination of their key personalities render them vulnerable to disruption. Traditional authority figures such as tribal sheikhs, local warlords, and religious leaders often lead these insurgencies. For example, Tecumseh (Shawnee chief and warrior who promoted resistance to the expansion of the United States onto Native American lands) was the major influencer in the founding of the Shawnee confederation. After he was killed in battle, the confederation fell apart.

Identification of Key Leaders

2-26. Identifying leaders can be critical when determining an insurgent organization's structure, strategy, and tactics. Understanding the known key leaders' beliefs, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities is extremely important in countering insurgency. Removing these key leaders normally degrades an organization's capabilities. Che Guevara was a well-known, centralized leader whom counterinsurgents effectively targeted. When he was killed, his insurgency fell apart. Alternately, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under the decentralized leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, continued functioning after his death, though severely disrupted. The following information is vital for understanding and targeting an insurgent leader:

- Role.
- Activities.
- Associates.
- Personal background.
- Personal beliefs, motivations, and ideology.
- Education and training.
- Temperament.
- Position within the organization.
- Public popularity.

IDEOLOGY

2-27. Public demonstration of insurgent ideology speaks to a capability to provide when the government cannot provide or is not providing. Insurgent ideology envisions and proposes an ideal societal structure, including political and economic systems. It differs from insurgent strategy, which is the way in which insurgents intend to achieve their desired end state. Two of the most identifiable insurgent ideologies have been communism and religious extremism.

2-28. Ideology is a motivating factor of insurgent activities. Insurgencies gather recruits and amass popular support through ideological appeal, which includes religious or other cultural factors. Insurgent ideologies recognize the difficulties experienced by the insurgency's followers and provide a means to remedy those ills. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotional public concerns. Tactical units might see ideology expressed in the propaganda and recruitment techniques of local insurgents.

2-29. Propaganda and recruitment techniques are two of the most important political tools an insurgency possesses. Propaganda provides the means for the insurgency to communicate a message, often political, to the general population. It allows the insurgency to create narratives of why the government's actions are not legitimate and how the insurgency can eliminate the root causes of the conflict. Tactical units continuously assess their actions for their potential to foster public resentment and hatred, which would fuel insurgent propaganda and benefit insurgent recruitment and support building.

Communism

2-30. Communism is a political and economic system whose goal is to engender a classless society, even at the state level, thereby eradicating socioeconomic class struggles. Historically, countries with uneven wealth distribution across the socioeconomic classes have advocated for it. Communism was once the most common insurgent ideology and has often proven successful at gaining popular support amongst the financially disadvantaged or perhaps (debatably) at reducing economic inequality. Since the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, communism has not been as common of a motivator for insurgents, especially when little or no external support for communistic insurgencies exists.

Religious Extremism

2-31. Religious extremism is a possible byproduct of radical religious fundamentalism (see paragraph 1-18). Religious extremism typically refers to actions conducted by a radical religious community deemed harmful by the greater community. However, these actions are seen as necessary steps of obedience to their religious authority. Religious extremist communities may utilize inequity in social, political, or economic development to energize such ideology, and rally others to their cause. Adherents often receive formal instruction in their radical religious sect, and an insurgency uses adherence to the religious sect as a recruiting tool. Extremist religious leaders can play lead roles within an insurgency, and often will replace any existing leaders that challenges their authority. Insurgencies rooted in religious extremism want their values incorporated into the nation's governmental structure. Characteristics of those insurgencies motivated by religious extremism differ from traditional insurgencies in the following ways:

- Individual duty with an indifference to popular support.
- Use of violence to maximize shock, awe, and casualties.
- Disinterest with governance and lack of a practical political objective.
- Ability to recruit guerrillas without popular support.

Narrative

2-32. Narrative is the most important cultural construct to a COIN's understanding. Members of a society express and absorb ideologies through narratives. Narratives in the story form can serve as rhetorical devices to demonstrate the benefits of a certain ideology to their audiences. Narratives are often central in representing identity, including the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groups, and tribal elements. For example, stories based on a specific community's history connect the relevant actions and consequences in a meaningful or revelatory way. In military application, stories often serve as the basis for strategies, actions, and interpretations of others' intentions. Insurgent organizations use narratives and religious concepts very effectively in gaining popular support, spreading influence, and mobilizing followers.

2-33. The al Qaeda narrative depicted Osama bin Laden as a purified man in the mountains of Afghanistan who was gathering and inspiring followers and punishing infidels. The collective imagination of Bin Laden and his followers heralded them as agents of Islamic history who would reverse the decline of the umma [the bound Muslim community as a whole], reestablish the Caliphate, and bring about its inevitable triumph. This image mobilized support for al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims.

OBJECTIVES

2-34. Insurgencies normally seek to achieve one of three objectives: to overthrow the existing government and subsequently to reallocate power; to expel whom they perceive as outsiders or occupiers; or to create or maintain an exploitable area due to its lack of governmental control. Insurgencies' objectives include independence and defeat of political, ethnic, or religious rivals or of foreign invaders. The central issue in insurgency is the reallocation of power. Usually, an insurgency mounts a political challenge to the existing state through the formation of a counter state, which it promotes as an alternative to the existing state.

2-35. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential for analyzing the insurgency's objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires awareness of the insurgents' strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. These objectives can be psychological or physical in nature or a combination of the two.

Strategic Objectives

2-36. The overall political goals of insurgencies are their strategic objectives. An insurgency's desired end state comprises the requisite conditions for the successful achievement of the insurgency's objectives. The following are some examples of strategic objectives:

- Overthrowing an established government.
- Establishing an autonomous national territory.

- Causing the withdrawal of a foreign occupying power.
- Extracting political concessions.

Operational Objectives

2-37. Insurgents pursue operational objectives to destroy a government's legitimacy and progress toward achieving their political end state. The objectives serve as the means to link tactical goals with strategic end states. They often target the government's inability to address the root causes that led to the insurgency. The insurgents' operational objectives define their overall plan, though most insurgents do not have a formal plan. They base their objectives on the greater insurgent strategy across political, military, economic, and social objectives. The following categorizes specific examples of operational objectives:

- Political:
  - Disrupt elections.
  - Develop or strengthen an insurgency's political wing.
  - Gain government recognition of a political party.
  - Attack the government's legitimacy.
  - Gain the ability to run candidates for elected office.
- Military:
  - Disrupt operational lines of communication and supply routes.
  - Force U.S. or HN units out of an area.
  - Keep government forces in their bases.
  - Draw U.S. Forces or HN forces into combat.
  - Provoke an overreaction from U.S. Forces or HN forces that results in media-reported civilian casualties.
- Economic:
  - Attack infrastructure and disrupt reconstruction, thereby preventing the government from addressing root causes.
  - Prevent the government from addressing public issues.
- Social:
  - Spark sectarian violence.
  - Subvert the education system.
  - Cause the civilian population to question the government.
  - Highlight corrupt or oppressive police.
  - Establish a regular means for mass communication (for example, radio, newspaper).

Tactical Objectives

2-38. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts such as disseminating propaganda (for example, posters, compact discs, handbills), killing individuals, or attacking and seizing key facilities. These objectives can have both physical and psychological aspects. Counterinsurgents often gain insight into tactical goals by analyzing insurgent propaganda. Tactical objectives have their basis in the greater insurgent strategy across political, military, economic, and social objectives. The following categorizes specific examples of tactical objectives:

- Political:
  - Intimidate a local official.
  - Disseminate propaganda.
- Military:
  - Attack a U.S. Government or HN government convoy or checkpoint.
  - Conduct random indirect fire attacks on bases.
- Economic:
  - Attack manufacturing centers, stores, and markets.
  - Sabotage roads, bridges, electrical lines, and pipelines.
  - Threaten violence against storeowners, employees, and customers.
- Social:
  - Attack a police station.
  - Directly interact and communicate with the populace.

General Insurgent Goals for Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare

2-39. Insurgents typically work toward achieving general goals as they gain popular support. Insurgent activity, like all other aspects of the insurgency, develops and evolves over time. Paragraphs 2-40 through 2-49 provide ten general goals for discussion purposes.

Gaining Popular Support

2-40. An insurgency's operations normally focus directly or indirectly at undermining popular support for the existing government. Simultaneously, competent insurgents gain popular support for the insurgent movement through propaganda, coercion, or terror. When they cannot gain active support, they seek passive support such as public silence.

Undermining Host Nation Government Legitimacy

2-41. Insurgent efforts can damage or destroy both real and perceived economic and political targets. The loss of governmental services, overreaction by government forces, or belief that the government is powerless against the insurgency contributes to public dissatisfaction with the government.

Lessening Governmental Control

2-42. After an insurgency has defeated the smaller government forces in an area, it can force the remaining government forces to consolidate into larger elements or bases. This can effectively reduce the overall presence of the COIN force and allow an insurgency force to operate openly in areas now devoid of COIN forces, even if only for a short period of time. Such an accomplishment can inspire public perception of the insurgency's increased control, the government's decreased control, or the government's legitimacy being unfounded or unrecognized.

Providing Psychological Victories

2-43. The guerrilla seeks to gain small psychological victories. These victories do not need to be significant in terms of material damage to the government or its armed forces. Rather, these are tactical victories and serve to demonstrate the guerrilla capability of defeating the much larger government force.

Tying up or Blocking Host Nation Government Resources

2-44. By forcing the HN government to expend resources on military operations against guerrillas, the insurgency seeks to tie up resources that could best be used by the government to provide public services and development programs. This translates to the government not providing for public needs and wants.

Weakening Host Nation Government Resolve

2-45. By defeating small elements of the host-nation security forces (HNSF) and attacking government agencies, guerrillas weaken the resolve of government employees and forces. Small government forces and agencies become aware of their vulnerability. Desertion, absence from work, willingness to compromise, difficulty in recruiting, or limitations in services to dangerous areas all benefit the insurgency's purpose.

Intimidating the Populace

2-46. By attacking vocal opponents and informed influencers such as teachers, insurgents seek to frighten the populace. For example, one insurgency may increase its assassinations of opposing insurgents in the area to frighten locals.

Acquiring Supplies and Equipment

2-47. Guerrillas seek to acquire government weapons, uniforms, equipment, supplies, and vehicles. *Explosive hazards*—any material posing a potential threat that contains an explosive component (JP 3-15)—such as mines and IEDs are common material acquisitions for insurgencies. Insurgents can acquire weapons through legal and illegal purchases and from foreign sources. A common insurgent tactic is to capture weapons from government forces.

Infiltrating Host Nation Government and Government Forces

2-48. Insurgents often attempt to infiltrate various government ministries and security forces by emplacing sympathizers and by converting existing members of those agencies. These infiltrators gather intelligence and subvert operations. In addition, insurgents, if they have successfully infiltrated a government agency, can initiate an inside attack, often referred to as green on blue, on personnel. The risk of such attacks underscores the need for thorough vetting, accurate census data, and continuous adherence to standing operating procedures involving security operations.

Causing Counterinsurgency Security Force Overreaction

2-49. Since a COIN fight is a fight for popular support, the intent of insurgents using terrorism or guerrilla warfare is to incite a heavy-handed response from the COIN force or HNSF to those attacks. These strong responses often drive popular support toward the insurgency.

ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY

2-50. Environment and geography—including cultural, religious, tribal, and other demographic factors along with terrain and weather—affect all participants in an OE. How insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each. Chapter 1 stressed the importance of understanding an area of operations (AO), specifically the civil considerations within the categories of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). Examples of environmental and geographic factors that influence the levels and types of insurgent activity follow:

- Population density and distribution, especially the degree of urbanization.
- Lack of essential services, security, markets, governance, municipal council representation, or schools within an urban population.
- Lack of land ownership, grazing rights, water rights, inclusion in the political process, or access to markets or schools within a rural population.
- Planting, growing, and harvesting seasons and rainy or dry seasons.
- Use of structures and infrastructures by both the insurgent organization and the general population.
- Tribal, religious, or other types of affiliations, which have a tremendous effect on popular support of an insurgency depending on public and insurgent perceptions of those affiliated organizations as sanctuaries or hazards.
- Proximity to international borders with nations that may provide sanctuary or support.
- Rugged, inaccessible terrain with populations—often hostile to outsiders—who may provide sanctuary or support.
- Economic enclaves such as markets, low-income housing communities, and high-income housing neighborhoods.
- Geographic divisions along ethnic, tribal, religious, political, or other factors.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

2-51. Types of external support include moral and political, as well as provisions of resources or of sanctuary. External support can come from any entity outside the HN—not just neighboring states. Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence also support insurgencies. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the internet to create a support network. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may provide a form of external support and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies. Access to external support influences the effectiveness of insurgencies.

2-52. Accepting external support can affect the insurgency's or COIN's legitimacy. The act of acceptance implies the inability to sustain oneself. In addition, the country or group providing support attaches its legitimacy to that of the insurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation.

Moral Support

2-53. Moral support is an acknowledgement of the just and admirable nature of the insurgency or their cause. It starts as public approval and can culminate into negative media attention on the COIN or HN. Moral support often leads to political support or the provisions of resources or sanctuary.

Political Support

2-54. Political support is the active promotion of insurgent strategic goals in international forums. International forums such as the United Nations, trade sanctions and embargoes, and political discussion in the United States can all provide political support, which negatively influences counterinsurgent efforts. Another form of political support manifests by a legitimate state's official recognition of an insurgent group as a legitimate authority. Political support is the most dangerous form of support since it can result in the international legitimization of an insurgency, consequently forcing the COIN to stop actively targeting it.

Resource Provisions

2-55. Resource provisions are typically guerrillas, money, weapons, equipment, food, advisors, and training. This form of external support often proves itself the most important form, as it did during the French experience in Algeria. Though insurgents were numerous, their weapons were not. The French had succeeded in closing international borders and thereby preventing arms smuggling.

Sanctuary Provision

2-56. A sanctuary to an insurgency is a secure site to train, secure sustainment, rest, and refit. Yet, the meaning of sanctuary evolves. Historically, sanctuaries provided insurgents with places to rebuild and reorganize without fear of HN or COIN interference. Often these were in neighboring countries or in remote areas difficult to access. Today, sanctuaries include areas inside a state, such as including neighborhoods in which HNSF cannot or will not conduct operations. An accurate ASCOPE analysis will inform Soldiers as to where, what is often referred to as no-go zones, potentially exist. Most recently, insurgents draw on digital or internet-based sanctuaries, global financial systems, and international media. These virtual sanctuaries are useful for presenting insurgent actions as acceptable and worthy of internal and external support. Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries.

Note. Colloquially, this is often referred to as no-go zones for example, by local law enforcement, at best, or at worse, de-policing. The latter is a known reality, and there is an element truth to the former. For example, if one law enforcement entity feels compelled to delay entry into a specific area until backup arrives, this by default is a no-go zone because that law enforcement entity did not enter until, and if, they assessed they had the necessary support, that is, overwhelming force. In the end, this reflects a political decision, for example, will, and a reflection of law enforcement capability.

INTERNAL SUPPORT

2-57. Internal support is any provision of support from inside the HN. It normally fits into two general categories—popular and logistic support. Together, these two categories constitute a mass base element. This publication adds one other category, insurgent bases.

Popular Support

2-58. An insurgent movement requires popular support to survive, and popular support is even more essential for an insurgency to succeed. Typically, the degree of popular support (see figure 2-5) and the size of the insurgency are related. To grow, an insurgency needs an adequately sized mass base who will afford this growth. One of the best means of defeating insurgencies is to reduce the size of this mass base by inciting the populace to hostility or at least apathy toward the insurgents.




Figure 2-5. Gradient scale of popular support

Types of Popular Support

2-59. Popular support can be either active or passive, coming from a small segment or a broad base of the population. Supporters of an insurgency may also be overt or clandestine.

2-60. Active supporters provide open sympathy to the movement, participate in legal insurgent activities such as strikes, find new recruits, and sometimes join organizational elements of the insurgency such as the guerrillas, underground elements, or auxiliary forces. They are usually central to insurgent propaganda efforts.

2-61. Passive supporters vary from those who are sympathetic yet inactive to those who are not sympathetic but choose to remain silent about insurgent activities. Public silence concerning insurgent activities provides passive support.

Recruitment

2-62. Local insurgent representatives address local grievances and conduct recruiting. Members of the population who are dissatisfied with existing conditions or those who have been marginalized through psychological alienation are prone to insurgent recruitment. The cadre often credits the insurgent movement for all local successes and blames government forces for all failures and problems. Cadre members associate every promise and appeal they make with tangible solutions and deeds. Competent insurgents and counterinsurgents seek to mobilize and sustain popular support for their causes while discouraging popular support for their adversary's causes. Five methods are common for use, either individually or in various combinations, to mobilize popular support. Awareness of them allows counterinsurgents to identify and counter them when they are in play. The following lists and defines the five common methods:

- Persuasion—political, social, religious, security, and economic promises that entice people to support one side or the other.
- Coercion—the threat of violence or abuse intended to force people into supporting insurgents.

Note. Citizens seek alliance with groups who can guarantee their safety.

- Reaction to abuses—governmental tyranny that has generated resistance to the government's rule.

Note. The firmness of security forces often necessary to establish a secure OE does not qualify here as public abuse.

- Foreign support—the expertise, international legitimacy, munitions and armament, and money that governments outside the HN provide to start or intensify a conflict inside the HN.
- Apolitical motivations—insurgency-provided motivators such as money or extremism that attract foreign volunteers, criminals, mercenaries, and proxy forces.

Measurement of Popular Support

2-63. The reality for insurgencies is popular support fluctuates between them and the government. The fluctuation is due to many factors, but no one side ever secures universal popular support. Quantifying the causes of public favor for the government or insurgency is difficult, but evaluating the issue remains important. Gauging aspects such as public reaction to the presence of troops or government leaders can help

to estimate popular support at the tactical level. Asking people directly or surveying a population through other modes yields valuable insight into popular support and public attitudes.

Logistic Support

2-64. Modern warfare is inherently resource intensive. An insurgency requires continual access to supplies, weapons, ammunition, and money, and this, in turn, requires insurgents to maintain open supply lines. While logistic support may be the greatest insurgent vulnerability, it can also prove difficult to interdict. As an insurgency develops and expands, logistic support increasingly relies on external sources. In a conventional war, insurgency forces often receive significant amounts of supplies from external sources—usually from one of the opposing nations involved in the conflict. The protracted popular war strategy emphasizes mobilization of the masses and requires considerable resources to build and maintain a counter state. The urban strategy requires significantly less support.

Supplies

2-65. Once the insurgency exhausts its supplies on hand, they must come from the civilian population or an external source. In most insurgencies, initial support comes from the civilian population, either voluntarily or by coercion. Identifying types of supplies the insurgency needs and then discovering how the insurgency is obtaining these supplies are significant steps toward identifying insurgent supporters and bases. Medical supplies often prove the most critical supply class to the insurgency.

Weapons and Ammunition

2-66. External sources often sustain specialized arms and equipment. Insurgents obtain these weapons through legal and illegal purchases and from foreign sources. Another common insurgent tactic is to capture weapons from government forces.

Money

2-67. Money is essential to insurgency in funding critical supplies, especially high technology weapons and ammunition and bomb-making materials. It is also essential for hiring guerrillas and bribing officials. Money is obtainable through many sources, and in today's electronic world, currency crosses all boundaries. While money ships to insurgents just like other supplies, local financial institutions also move and hold funds. In some cases, such as with hawala in the Muslim world, insurgencies develop an underground exchange system for laundering money. As with supply lines, the money path is susceptible to discovery, tracking, and disruption. Funding greatly influences insurgent vulnerabilities and an insurgency's character. Local supporters or international front organizations provide donations. Sometimes, insurgencies establish legitimate businesses to furnish funding. Insurgency-controlled areas experience confiscation or taxation, especially when insurgencies are providing essential public services. Another common source of funding is criminal activity, especially the illegal trade of drugs.

Supply Lines

2-68. In all cases, either the insurgents must go to their suppliers, or the suppliers must come to the insurgents. Discovering and tracking these supply lines can provide key information on insurgency forces and support. Though rarely overt, all insurgent organizations have supply lines, means of transportation, and storage facilities. Skillful counterinsurgents attempt to cut off the flow of supplies, especially weapons and ammunition. Often, a nation neighboring an insurgency's AO serves as a depot.

Insurgent Bases

2-69. Two general types of insurgent bases exist—safe houses and guerrilla base camps. Insurgents normally establish multiple safe houses or guerrilla base camps based on functioning groups or cells. Urban insurgents tend to use safe houses, while rural insurgents tend to use guerrilla base camps. Additionally, insurgents establish training camps, sometimes inside a safe house. However, their emplacements normally lie in a rural guerrilla base camp, an outside territory controlled by the existing government, or a foreign country.

Safe Houses

2-70. Many legitimate and illegitimate organizations use safe houses. A safe house typically accommodates a member of an auxiliary force and temporarily hides insurgents. Normally, organizations have carefully selected a system of safe houses. To avoid detection, each safe house occupant follows set procedures for moving insurgents along select routes at the best times.

Guerrilla Base Camps

2-71. Like any other armed force, guerrillas have requirements for command and control, resting, resupplying, refitting, and training. The larger the guerrilla force and more active it is, the more it needs established bases, both semipermanent and temporary. Base camps must be relatively safe and secure locations for insurgents to rest, eat, and plan. More sophisticated guerrilla base camps have command posts (CPs), training areas, communications facilities, medical stations, and sustainment centers. Base camps, however, are not the same as conventional bases. They are usually small in overall scope, spread out, and sometimes underground. Insurgents tend to locate base camps in insurgency-controlled areas in which cover and concealment provide security against detection. Rural base camps tend to be in remote areas characterized by rough, inaccessible terrain. Urban base camps tend to be in areas where the insurgency has popular support. Urban insurgents may rent houses for use as temporary base camps. Insurgents normally avoid battling over base camps. Once detected, they move to alternate locations. Routes into a base camp undergo constant observation for security. Mines, booby traps, special-purpose munitions, expedient devices, and ambushes are standard security enhancements. When surprised and cornered, they vigorously defend themselves with a delaying action while evacuating key personnel and equipment.

Insurgent Training Camps

2-72. Insurgent training camps exist in both urban and rural environments. While some training occurs in urban safe houses or rural guerrilla base camps, most training occurs at locations focused on training. Examples of such locations are special urban safe houses, remote guerrilla base camps, or insurgent training centers in other countries.

PHASING AND TIMING

2-73. Insurgencies often progress through three phases in their efforts. While most writing about insurgency makes common use of these three phases, their names vary considerably. However, what defines each phase, or what each writing means by each phase, remains nearly identical across these writings.

Phase I—Latent and Incipient

2-74. The first phase of an insurgency tends to begin with the government's having stronger forces than the insurgency has. A common result of this situation is insurgents must concentrate on surviving and building support. Possible insurgent efforts follow:

- Establishing and expanding the organization.
- Spreading insurgent ideology through information activities.
- Starting or supporting antigovernment activity such as demonstrations and strikes.
- Raising funds through illegal taxation and crime.
- Organizing small, local guerrilla forces who conduct small-scale, intermittent operations.
- Using terrorism and sabotage to intimidate uncooperative government officials and the civilian population.

Phase II—Guerrilla Warfare

2-75. The second phase of an insurgency starts when force correlations approach equilibrium and when guerrilla warfare becomes the most important, most pervasive activity. Possible insurgent efforts follow:

- Increasing the scale of the guerrilla attacks and thereby attempting to force government forces into the defense.
- Increasing the use of sabotage and terrorism.
- Intensifying propaganda.

- Attempting to gain control of isolated geographic areas and to develop bases for further operations.
- Driving government officials out of areas with strong insurgent support.
- Establishing local shadow governments.
- Increasing efforts to gain international recognition and support.

Phase III—War of Movement

2-76. The third phase of an insurgency normally begins when insurgents believe they have superior strength and when their military forces attempt conventional operations to destroy the government's military capability. Possible insurgent efforts follow:

- Combining guerrilla forces and training them to fight as conventional forces.

Note. Over time, these conventional forces form multiple echelons confronting counterinsurgents in conventional battle.

- Acquiring more powerful and sophisticated weapons through foreign assistance or capture.
- Obtaining support from external combat forces such as special or conventional forces.
- Expanding areas of an insurgency's control and increasing political activity.

2-77. Not all insurgencies progress through all three phases, and linear progression through all three phases is certainly not a requirement for success. Insurgent success can occur in any phase. Also, insurgencies can revert to an earlier phase and resume development when favorable conditions return.

2-78. Movement from one phase to another phase does not end the operational and tactical activities of earlier phases; it incorporates them. Therefore, it is difficult to determine when an insurgency moves from one phase to another. In addition, a single insurgency may be in different phases in different parts of the country. Advanced insurgencies can rapidly shift, split, combine, or reorganize, for they are dynamic and adaptive.

Organizational and Operational Patterns

2-79. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. Although each insurgent organization is unique, similarities often exist among them, and knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques they may employ against the government. Other considerations include the OE, level of success of the insurgency, and the length of time an insurgency has been operating. Counterinsurgents learn about the insurgency and adapt to its operational and organizational patterns.

2-80. Insurgent operational and organizational patterns vary widely between one province or urban area and another. Different insurgent groups using different methods may form loose coalitions when doing so serves their interests. These groups may also fight among themselves. The result is more than just a three-block war; it is a shifting, mosaic war—difficult for counterinsurgents to envision holistically. In such situations, an effective counterinsurgent strategy is multifaceted and flexible. Insurgents gain ground by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere. Counterinsurgents lose ground by failing to maintain stability and order everywhere. Insurgencies often begin substantially weaker than the established government. This sets the tone for how they operate and how they fight.

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

2-81. An insurgency's ends, ways, and means determine its strategies (see paragraph 1-41). Even if modern insurgencies use more than one doctrinal model or theory for their strategy, aspects of these strategies and recognizable characteristics do exist. An insurgency might take several approaches to achieve its objectives. Six common approaches to insurgent strategies are urban, military-focused, protracted popular war, identity-focused, conspiratorial, and composite and coalition. Insurgencies often operate using different strategies, in different phases, in different geographical areas. At the tactical level, a COIN most often deals with only the urban, military-focused, and protracted popular war strategies. These insurgent strategies provide a common frame of reference for the COIN. The COIN must identify an insurgency's use of one or a combination of these strategies. Knowing which strategy insurgents are using facilitates anticipating

insurgent COAs. (See FM 3-24 for information on the variables influencing the relationships between an insurgency's ends, ways, and means.)

URBAN STRATEGY

2-82. In the urban strategy, the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the government's repressive measures to enrage the people, so they revolt, support the insurgency, and overthrow the government. Insurgents can initiate this strategy without popular support. Its success relies almost exclusively on a spontaneous uprising sparked by rage at government oppression. However, an insurgency occurring in an urban area does not necessarily mean it uses the urban strategy. On November 1, 1954, the National Liberation Front in Algeria used a form of the urban strategy when it launched a series of bombings and attacks, causing significant civilian casualties, to shock the French into negotiations.

2-83. The urban strategy actions are often predictable and have two reasons underlying them. First, insurgents often use terrorist attacks in densely populated areas due to their potentials for high visibility and mass casualties. Their true intention may not necessarily be to cause fear or terror, but rather to provoke the government into overreaction. Second, insurgent propaganda—focusing on governmental brutality and calling attention to specific harsh government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances of individuals, and brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations—is most widely disseminated and discussed among larger populations.

MILITARY-FOCUSED STRATEGY

2-84. The military-focused strategy relies on the ability of military action to create the necessary conditions for success. Military-focused insurgencies often believe a small group of guerrillas operating in an area with public grievance can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims. The success of this small group depends upon successful military action and popular support. Che Guevara and Fidel Castro demonstrated the most iconic military-focused strategies; both leaders proposed attacks on military and government targets until they gathered the necessary support to seize power. Military-focused strategies include those following:

- Attacks on HN targets to gain popular support.
- Propaganda demonstrating the HN government's weakness and illegitimacy and inciting people to join the insurgency in revolting against the government.
- Minimal long-term efforts at building a political base.
- Little effort at either building the political wing or infiltrating legitimate organizations.

PROTRACTED WAR STRATEGY

2-85. The protracted popular war strategy divides into three distinct phases—latent or incipient, guerrilla warfare, and war of movement. (Appendix B lists a translation of Mao Tse-tung's theories on protracted war, which provides additional insight for the protracted popular war strategy.) Each phase builds on the previous phase and continues activities from the previous phases. The protracted popular war strategy has both a political and a military wing. This strategy requires a high level of organization and indoctrination, actions along multiple LOOs and LOEs, and leadership to direct the shifting of phases as circumstances change. Across all variations of this strategy, certain characteristics remain consistent:

- Continuous, long-term efforts to build popular support, infiltrate legitimate government organizations, and establish and maintain a clandestine organization.
- Highly indoctrinated leaders, political cadre, and guerrilla fighters.
- Extensive, well-organized, unarmed auxiliary.
- Leaders capable of exerting control over the insurgency.
- Ability to shift phases at the leader's direction, including a return to a previous phase when necessary.
- Attacks on infrastructure and attacks designed to wear down the government and counterinsurgents.
- Continuous operations along multiple LOEs, though some phases emphasize different LOEs.

IDENTITY-FOCUSED STRATEGY

2-86. The identity-focused strategy mobilizes support based on religious, tribal, or ethnic affiliation. In this strategy, legitimacy and popular support link to identity, and often, no effort is made to garner popular support

for reasons besides that of identity. Rather, entire communities join the insurgent movement, bringing with them their existing social or military hierarchy. External support is garnered from international elements who share the same identity. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fought an insurgency against the government for decades to establish an ethnic Tamil state and, at times, received support from India. Contemporary characteristics of the identity-focused strategy include those following:

- Attacks on those who threaten the traditions and social structure of the affiliation by which members identify with one another.
- Little or no need to establish a shadow government since a governing body is already established within the affiliation.
- Protection over what it considers to be the interests of the affiliates.
- Willingness to use tactics from other strategies.
- A mass base who easily aligns with an insurgency's objectives.

CONSPIRATORIAL STRATEGY

2-87. The conspiratorial strategy attempts to subvert the government from within and often involves a few leaders and a militant cadre. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies, particularly in the protracted popular war or urban strategies, conspiratorial strategies are often attempts to legitimize an illegal political party, to enter that party into the governmental structure, and ultimately to take control of the government. Insurgencies using the conspiratorial strategy do not intend to integrate into the national government, but rather to overthrow the government. Once the insurgency gains legitimate political representation, the newly legitimized politicians, who may be previous targets of counterinsurgents, undergo reevaluation to determine whether they are still legitimate targets. In the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik Party, led by Vladimir Lenin, and their allies drove out Russia's provisional government at the time. They occupied government buildings and other strategic locations to form a new government headed by Lenin. Distinguishing characteristics of the conspiratorial strategy include those following:

- Insurgents seeking meetings with the HN government to discuss ceasefires.
- Attacks on infrastructure designed to wear down the government and reduce its credibility.
- Political cadre distancing itself from the insurgency by making public statements denouncing violence and yet remaining insurgent controlled.
- Public breach between militant and political elements of the insurgency, though often a deception.
- Formation of new alliances, often with groups who have seemingly little in common with the insurgency or little alignment with its ideology, apart from the desire for governmental change.
- Termination of or reduction in guerrilla activity concurrent with an increase in political activity.
- Intensive efforts to gain international political and moral support.
- Use of sophisticated propaganda aimed at specific target audiences.
- Political wing of the insurgency seeking recognition by and entry into politics, including election to local, district, departmental, regional, or national offices.

COMPOSITE AND COALITION STRATEGY

2-88. The composite and coalition strategy combines different insurgent groups using different strategies into loose coalitions to serve the purposes of those involved. The strategy usually unites the differing groups in their opposition (for example, the groups agree to oppose an occupier or the cause of a specific public grievance). Multiple competing entities, each seeking to maximize their individuated survival and influence, may occupy a single AO. Al-Qaeda in Iraq provides an example of a composite and coalition strategy; they founded the Islamic State of Iraq and became an umbrella group for many other established insurgent groups. Contemporary outcomes of the composite and coalition strategy include the following:

- Unclear or vague objectives.
- Multiple or disjointed strategies in a single AO.
- Greater likelihood of forming alliances with criminal actors.
- Attacks on other members of the coalition.

STRATEGY AND PHASE SHIFTS

2-89. Insurgencies often operate under different strategies, in different phases, in different geographic areas. The OE and an insurgency's objectives inform these decisions. Most insurgencies eventually move to the protracted popular war or subversive strategy after another strategy proves unsuccessful.

2-90. Insurgencies can shift both phases and strategies. Pressure from the COIN can force an insurgency to move laterally to a new strategy or to return to an earlier phase (see figure 2-6). For example, an insurgency in phase I (Latent and Incipient) and using an urban strategy might build sufficient strength to progress to phase II (Guerrilla Warfare). Once in phase II, the insurgents might believe themselves strong enough to initiate a series of attacks. Then, were counterinsurgents to drive out those insurgents, the insurgents would normally consolidate and reorganize elsewhere. However, this failure might force the insurgency back to phase I in that area. Additionally, insurgency leaders might transition from the urban strategy to a protracted popular war strategy. In this example, should the insurgent leaders come to believe themselves ready, the insurgency might return to phase II.




Figure 2-6. Shifts between strategies and phases

2-91. Insurgencies are often vulnerable when they shift between strategies or phases. These shifts may originate in setbacks or in fractures or other changes within the insurgency's leadership. They may also occur due to time constraints, changes in external support, or counterinsurgent action. These shifts are often rapid; thus, COINs maintain the capabilities of recognizing and exploiting them. Indicators of a shift in strategies may be—

- Changes in propaganda messaging.
- Uncharacteristic increases in communications.
- Unexplained pauses or sudden increases in guerrilla attacks.
- Shifts between urban and rural efforts.
- Displacements of insurgents from one location to another.

- Unanticipated statements of support for an insurgency from external actors.
- Increased organization, indoctrination, and secure means of communication.
- Increased efforts to infiltrate legitimate organizations such as trade unions, professional or business organizations, and universities.
- New advocacy for rights of peasants, farmers, or other working-class groups.
- Changes in the focus of attacks, such as the targeting of a specific sector.

SECTION III – INSURGENT MANIFESTATIONS: TACTICS, STRENGTHS, VULNERABILITIES

2-92. Insurgencies use different approaches at different times, applying tactics that take advantage of circumstances (see paragraph 2-81). They may also combine methods that include tactics drawn from any of or all the other approaches. Tactics for an insurgency include political activities, criminal actions, and military tactics. COINs consider how these threat characteristics create strengths and vulnerabilities for an insurgency.

INSURGENT TACTICS

2-93. Insurgencies employ both violent and nonviolent tactics to achieve their objectives. Nonviolent tactics attempt to achieve political goals without the use of force. Violent tactics often incorporate a variety of nonviolent tactics. Used together, these tactics, along with supporting propaganda, can assist in recruiting and in gaining popular support. Historically, insurgencies have fielded dedicated personnel to foment nonviolent action such as strikes and protests to supplement violent action. Insurgencies are, by nature, an asymmetric threat. For example, in asymmetric warfare, a conflict may involve a weaker opponent who uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack the weak points of a stronger opponent, especially tactics including terrorism, guerrilla warfare, criminal activity, subversion, and propaganda. Violent tactics by insurgencies include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and conventional operations. Insurgencies often use terrorism and guerrilla tactics to achieve their goals because they do not have the capability to contest the government or COIN force in conventional operations.

VIOLENT TACTICS

2-94. The typical characteristics of violent tactics are elusiveness and surprise, and these tactics often involve brief, violent action. Early in an insurgency, violent tactics are often divided between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. In Phase III of an insurgency, conventional operations are more common. Four general tactics are available to an insurgency using violence: terrorism, guerrilla tactics, conventional tactics, and criminal activity. The challenge exists in the insurgency's capacity to use any of them and at any given time. For clarity, guerrillas, as an insurgent organizational element, perform any of these four types of violence.

2-95. Violence can serve to alienate the civilian population from the insurgency when the latter fails to link it to a vision of a better life or when the former views it as indiscriminate. Nevertheless, the commitment to use violence is a potent insurgent weapon. Targets of violence can be anyone or anything an insurgency deems to be an obstruction to its cause. HNSF, foreign forces, aid workers, members of the civilian population who do not accept insurgents' claims, and infrastructure are typical insurgent targets.

2-96. Normally, organized groups of insurgents using terrorism or guerrilla warfare employ violent tactics. The distinctions between these two can blur, especially in an urban environment or when the government exerts strong control. Though not necessarily violent, criminal activity does provide a ready source of income for insurgencies and, for the purposes of this publication, is deemed violent in that context. Examples of violent tactics follow (see FM 3-24 for information):

- Ambushes.
- Assassination.
- Arson.
- Bombings and high explosive detonations.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapon use.
- Hijacking and skyjacking.
- Hostage taking.
- Indirect fire.

- Kidnapping.
- Raids or attacks on facilities.
- Sabotage.
- Seizures.

Terrorism

2-97. A terrorist is an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result. Insurgents may use terrorism. Terrorist attacks employ violence primarily against noncombatants to increase the civilian population's vulnerability and decrease public perception of security. Insurgent terrorism techniques include assassination, arson, extortion, bombings, hijacking, kidnapping, threats, murder, mutilation, and torture. The insurgency's use of terrorism often targets economic and political symbols to undermine the government's legitimacy. Any overreaction by government forces or other authorities adds to public resentment toward the government and turns popular support toward the insurgency.

2-98. Insurgencies using terrorism generally require fewer personnel than guerrilla warfare or conventional operations. Inherently, these activities have greater security and lower support requirements. Insurgencies using terrorism often select targets for their political and psychological impact. Insurgent attacks can be effective in generating support within one faction when used against a competing faction. They can also be effective in forcing a government reaction that alters government policies to the point of benefitting the insurgency's objectives.

Guerrilla Tactics

2-99. Guerrilla tactics are typified by hit-and-run attacks from lightly armed, small groups. The guerrilla is the combat element of the insurgency. Guerrilla tactics emphasize ambushes, raids, rocket and mortar attacks, the employment of snipers, and the use of explosive devices. They also include assassination, coercion, and kidnapping to gain support or eliminate opposition.

Guerrilla Operations

2-100. Guerrilla operations are generally offensive—not defensive—and harassing in nature. Guerrillas seldom attempt to seize and defend physical objectives and, in general, avoid decisive engagement. Often, their overall aims are to cause confusion, to destroy infrastructure or security forces, and to lower public morale. Guerrilla harassment keeps government forces on the defensive and weakens the HN. Examples are destroying resources and disrupting lines of communication. One advantage of harassment is its influence on public perception, creating the belief that the guerrilla can strike anywhere without the HN's being able to prevent it. Because of this, counterinsurgents must not win only small battles, but also the battle over public perception. In rural areas, guerrillas may seize a remote area or conduct raids and small-scale attacks on remote targets and lines of communication.

Numerical Superiority

2-101. While government forces outnumber guerrilla forces, guerrillas seek to attain local numerical superiority. When guerrillas are successful at concentrating against counterinsurgents, they can attain victory over small elements of government forces. Guerrillas often use simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver, and especially infiltration. Near the target area, small guerrilla elements often mass to conduct a specific, larger scale operation. The baited ambush is a favorite guerrilla technique. Guerrillas often pose incidents such as arsons, bombings, and hoaxes as bait. The bait lures small government forces of all types into a mechanical or human ambush.

Conventional Tactics

2-102. Conventional operations are not always necessary for success. However, guerrillas may engage in conventional operations after an insurgency develops extensive popular and logistic support. When they feel the conditions are set, insurgencies may generate a conventional military force capable of directly confronting HNSF. These conventional operations vary from small, regional operations to general, conventional warfare. Large conventional operations are usually an attempt to attain the strategic or operational objectives.

Criminal Activity

2-103. Sustainment requirements, especially funding, often bring insurgents into relationships with organized crime, or insurgents, themselves, may turn to criminal activity. Reaping windfall profits and avoiding the costs and difficulties involved in securing external support make illegal activity attractive to insurgents. Taxing a mass base usually yields low returns and alienates the civilian population, especially in cases in which the insurgency is providing essential services to that public. In contrast, kidnapping or hostage taking, extortion, armed robbery, and trafficking (illicit drugs, humans, goods through illegal markets)—four possible insurgent criminal activities—are very lucrative, though they also serve to alienate the civilian population. The activities of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (commonly known as FARC) are a perfect example. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia received millions of U.S. dollars from a single, high-profile kidnapping. Similarly, failed and failing states with rich natural resources like oil or poppies are particularly lucrative areas for criminal activity.

2-104. Devoting exceptional amounts of time and effort to fundraising requires insurgents to shortchange ideological or armed action. Indeed, the method of raising funds is often at the heart of internal debates within the insurgency. For example, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia's involvement in the drug trade made it the wealthiest self-sustaining insurgent group in history.

2-105. Many insurgencies have degenerated into criminality. This occurred when the primary movements disintegrated, and the remaining elements were cast adrift. Such disintegration is desirable for the COIN. It replaces a dangerous, ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals with a less dangerous but more diverse body. Such a transition means the COIN may also transition to more of a law-and-order approach. The ideal approach eliminates both the insurgency and any criminal threats.

NONVIOLENT TACTICS

2-106. Successful insurgencies use nonviolent tactics in conjunction with violent tactics. Subversion and propaganda are the two most prevalent techniques of nonviolent warfare. Although some subversive activities bleed into violent activities, for the purposes of this publication, an emphasis on nonviolent activities underscores the nonviolent nature of subversion. Examples of nonviolent tactics follow (see FM 3-24 for information):

- Demonstrations.
- Denial and deception.
- Hoaxes.
- Infiltration.
- Strikes.

Subversion

2-107. *Subversion* comprises the actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority (JP 3-24). In addition, anyone lending aid, comfort, or moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations who advocate the overthrow of incumbent governments by force and violence is practicing subversive activity. All willful acts intended as detrimental to the government's best interests and that do not already fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage are subversive activity.

2-108. Insurgents use various subversive techniques in their attempts to convince the populace to resist the government and COIN forces and to support the insurgency. These techniques include demonstrations, boycotts, clandestine radio broadcasts, and newspaper and pamphlet distributions. In addition, movement leaders organize or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, and trade unions. This technique gains popular support for later political and military activities. Subversive activities often openly challenge, in an organized pattern but just short of violence, the established government's and the COIN force's control and legitimacy.

2-109. One of the most visible forms of subversion is civil unrest. The fomenting of riots, organizing of strikes, and staging of demonstrations can drain the power, presence, and capabilities of the government and conversely increase the power and prestige of the insurgency. Another means of subversion is the infiltration

of government organizations, political parties, labor unions, community groups, universities, and charitable organizations.

2-110. To increase public credibility, attract new supporters, generate revenue, and acquire other resources, insurgent groups may establish their own front groups. Front groups are organizations purporting independence when, in actuality, insurgent leaders created and control them. A historic example of a front group is the Sinn Féin. The Irish Republican Army used Sinn Féin, their more political wing comprising a political cadre, to serve as the Irish Republican Army's respectable public face.

Propaganda

2-111. Insurgent groups commonly use propaganda to increase their base of support or to undermine the support for the COIN force. Propaganda is any form of communication supporting national objectives yet still benefitting the sponsor (either directly or indirectly). By design, it influences the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group. Insurgents use propaganda to further their own ends.

2-112. Insurgent propaganda efforts include both production (such as clandestine radio broadcasts) and publication through the internet, newspapers, graffiti, and pamphlets. These communications openly challenge the established government's control and legitimacy. Insurgents use any means to leverage their propaganda, including seeking support based on the shared identity of a religious, tribal, or ethnic affiliation. Additionally, insurgents often create new problems or reinforce existing problems that they can then exploit. They arrange for the seemingly coincidental presence of photographers or cameras at planned events. Whenever the government is unwilling or unable to address problems successfully, the insurgency might claim it would solve them. The following are some propaganda efforts common to insurgencies:

- Encouraging the HN populace or specific neutral parties to avoid supporting HN or other friendly government forces.
- Fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions to increase the insurgent will to resist.
- Inciting riots or organizing rallies such as those to honor insurgents as martyrs.
- Causing or exacerbating a civilian displacement crisis.
- Fostering public distrust of the HNSF.
- Undermining the support of local leaders or other influential public figures.
- Creating or intensifying general ethnic or religious tension.
- Supporting or revitalizing oppositional organizations.
- Linking local groups with similar groups in neighboring regions or countries.
- Discrediting or ridiculing specific host-nation or counterinsurgent officials.
- Characterizing government leaders as puppets or tools of foreign COIN forces.
- Spreading hostile coverage of COIN personnel or any of the COIN's mistakes.
- Using artificial intelligence to create false images and to generate voice cloning.

2-113. Effective COIN efforts involve countering insurgent propaganda. One way is to conduct information activities to exploit inconsistencies in insurgent propaganda and the insurgency's excessive use of force or intimidation. Additionally, COINs maintain a coherent and unified information activities plan. The planning, preparing, and execution of this information activities plan incorporates input from all appropriate civil and military agencies, especially the HN.

INSURGENT STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

2-114. Understanding typical insurgent strengths and vulnerabilities allows counterinsurgents at the tactical level to work toward neutralizing or avoiding insurgency capabilities and exploiting insurgent weaknesses. The remainder of this chapter covers typical insurgent strengths and vulnerabilities.

INSURGENT STRENGTHS

2-115. The recognized strengths of insurgent warfare provide a basis from which to analyze the specific insurgent threat. No two insurgency forces are identical. Known strengths are applied against a specific situation the COIN force encounters and are refined by local analysis. Countermeasures reduce or circumvent identified insurgent strengths. (See table 2-1 on page 52 for insurgent strengths and their countermeasures within COIN operations.)

Table 2-1. Insurgent strengths and related countermeasures

	Insurgent Strengths	*Countermeasures*
RESIDENTIAL STATUS	Insurgents are usually native to the local area and have the support of at least some of the populace. Therefore, they can blend into the local populace. In many cases, they have two roles as a local resident one moment and an insurgent the next. This duality enhances their capability to operate without discovery in a given area.	The counterinsurgency force must separate the insurgents from the rest of the populace, which is best accomplished through the effective use of populace and resources control. The force must take care no civilians are injured or mistreated due to counterinsurgency operations.
KNOWLEDGE	Since most insurgents are native, they possess firsthand knowledge of the local populace, customs, issues, language, and terrain. The insurgents use this knowledge to develop working relationships with the populace, as well as effective propaganda. If insurgents can get some of the local populace to identify to some degree with their cause, they can gain their support and new recruits. If insurgents cannot persuade locals to help or refrain from hindering, they may resort to coercion.	The counterinsurgency force fosters a strong relationship with government security forces, other counterinsurgency forces, and the populace to overcome the insurgents' advantage in knowledge about the local area and its inhabitants. Counterinsurgency forces ideally include members of the local populace and reside in the area. Maintaining continuous counterinsurgency operations in a given area through a permanently stationed counterinsurgency force, such as a combat outpost is important. The skillful use of local assets or the creation of a local civilian defense force who has the support and backing of the government are two ways to achieve this priority.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS	The insurgents' inherent advantage with the populace allows them to develop intelligence networks and infrastructure within the government and populace. Such networks afford continuous and current information on the government's or counterinsurgency's disposition and capabilities and governmental or counterinsurgent strengths and weaknesses.	The counterinsurgency force highly prioritizes counterintelligence operations, information collecting, and intelligence analyses. It constantly emphasizes the use of compartmentalization, deception, operations security, and communications security. Since insurgents are native, the counterinsurgency force can infiltrate their intelligence networks and infrastructures to gather intelligence and turn insurgent operatives into double agents.
MOTIVATION	Some insurgents are devoted to their cause to the point of fanaticism. Insurgents wishing to abandon the movement face major challenges. Cessation is difficult. The government and local populace may not welcome them back, and the remaining insurgents may view them as traitors and threats. Intimidation and threats of violence on them and their families maintain high motivation within the insurgency.	The counterinsurgency force promotes the belief that remaining an insurgent will lead only to death and defeat while at the same time establishes a viable method for defecting insurgents to return to normal life. Host nation government programs for reintegration, reconciliation, and amnesty remain important elements for success.
FOCUSED RESPONSIBILITY	Insurgents are not responsible for maintaining typical governmental obligations to society. This condition frees their efforts so that they might conduct focused operations in support of their goals. However, they do often provide aid and services to the local community, especially when governmental services have fallen short, and they highly advertise this fact.	Counterinsurgency forces utilize the insurgents' lack of provisions to local society to increase governmental support of counterinsurgency operations and to decrease popular support of insurgents. In addition, they show how insurgents have acted irresponsibly. Increasing the host nation government's ability to provide social services diminishes insurgent efforts.
INSURGENT TACTICS	The insurgency uses a broad range of tactics, from conventional warfare to terrorism. They escalate or deescalate their activity in response to government or counterinsurgent activity and seemingly at will.	Counterinsurgents remain flexible and adaptive to disband, defeat, or destroy the insurgency force successfully and to prevent any tactical successes for the insurgency. They must learn and adapt quickly to accomplish these missions.
ENDURING HARDSHIP	Insurgents are often young, in good shape, and from impoverished backgrounds. They can make do with less by both design and experience. Successful insurgents are innovative in their tactics, techniques, and procedures. They learn and adapt to changes in the operational environment.	The counterinsurgency force establishes controls and eliminates resource support. It maintains tight security and control on arms and ammunition, including the thorough destruction of unused, abandoned, and discarded equipment. Hardships are still hardships, so the harder life is for the insurgents, the more likely they are to quit.

INSURGENT VULNERABILITIES

2-116. Insurgent vulnerabilities provide the COIN force with a basis for analysis to gain advantage over the insurgents and to enhance effectiveness. The COIN force targets and exploits weaknesses. (See table 2-2 for insurgent vulnerabilities and their related considerations for COIN operations.)

Table 2-2. Insurgent vulnerabilities and related considerations

	Insurgent Vulnerabilities	*Considerations*
LIMITED PERSONNEL	Insurgents operate in small bands to avoid detection by government and counterinsurgency forces. Due to the challenges involved in recruiting insurgents, insurgency forces cannot easily replace insurgent personnel losses.	Counterinsurgency forces can identify and exploit the methods insurgents use to recruit replacements.
LIMITED RESOURCES	Due to their covert nature, insurgency forces must rely on stolen resources or those that friendly entities or supporters clandestinely deliver. This is especially true for sophisticated equipment, cash, replacement parts, and expendable supplies.	Insurgency forces cannot easily replace equipment losses, and counterinsurgency forces can discover, sever, and track resupply methods to their sources and destinations.
COMBAT POWER	Insurgents normally lack the combat power for a sustained fight. As a result, insurgents typically avoid decisive engagements with government forces. By design, insurgents' operations are usually limited in scope and driven by both engagement and disengagement plans.	Insurgents usually break off engagements that become too intense since the potential for higher loss is rarely worth the risk. However, insurgents may conduct a standup fight when they have a large base of expendable guerrillas or can manipulate a large political gain. They may also do so during a rite of passage.
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS	The insurgent endures a life of physical danger, privation, and many stressors (such as combat and the fear of combat; the need to live covertly [due to the constant fear of discovery by the government and to the recognition of the numeric superiority of the government forces]; the fear of criminal treatment should they be captured by the government; the fear of violence to self and family [often threatened by the insurgent organization to ensure cooperation]). Besides a belief in the cause, the insurgent may remain an insurgent due to fear of the government's or the insurgent organization's own reprisal.	Counterinsurgency forces exploit these stresses. Offering insurgents a pardon, including food, shelter, and protection from both the government and insurgent organization, sometimes provides enough incentive to induce insurgent desertions.
POPULAR SUPPORT	The insurgency's dependence on popular support is a major weakness. This support includes direct aid and active intelligence reporting.	When popular support is withdrawn, the insurgency cannot operate effectively. When the populace turns against the insurgency, the government reaps significant benefits. Willing locals can help locate, capture, or kill insurgents who have lost popular support.
OPERATIONAL FACTORS	Insurgent operational weaknesses include security (requiring extensive resources and thereby potentially slowing responsiveness); bases and safe houses (difficult to acquire and operate); a lack of sophisticated communications (requiring excessive amounts of time to launch operations); and a lack of both technology and the ability to maintain captured high technology (as would a peer threat to the United States).	The counterinsurgency force exploits insurgent weaknesses by interdicting supply route traffic and facility access and egress, following the supply trail, forcing desertion due to hardships, and inflicting combat losses that are hard to replace.

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Chapter 3
Foundations of Counterinsurgency

The participation of the United States and a host nation (HN) in combating an insurgency includes simultaneous military and nonmilitary efforts that build upon the HN's governmental efforts, government institutions, and plans. This chapter reviews the foundations of a successful counterinsurgency (COIN)—armed political competition, historical theories, tactical considerations, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, other major COIN tactical operations, and the phases of COIN operations.

Note. COIN does not operate in isolation but is intertwined with other irregular warfare (IW) operations and activities, such as foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), and civil affairs operations (CAO). FID and CAO provide the foundation for COIN by enhancing local governance and building HN security forces to counter internal threats. Additionally, SFA, as a key component with security cooperation (SC), ensures that partner nations develop the capacity to manage their own security challenges, making them more resilient against insurgencies and irregular threats. These complementary IW activities work together to stabilize regions, promote development, and prevent the resurgence of violence, particularly in post-conflict environments.

SECTION I – ARMED POLITICAL COMPETITION

3-1. COIN is fundamentally an armed political competition between a government and its partners and an insurgency and its supporters. Military operations to kill or capture insurgents, degrade their capabilities, and disrupt their organizations are a critical element of a broader comprehensive approach. COIN approaches are adaptable and agile. Strategies use a balanced approach that seeks to affect the civilian population and insurgents. They seek to reinforce the affected government's legitimacy while reducing insurgent influence. These objectives are often only achievable when pursued in concert with political reform to improve the quality of governance and address underlying public grievances, many of which are legitimate. This section addresses the COIN mindset. It explains the concepts of FID and internal defense and development (IDAD). It describes the scores of units, agencies, and organizations with whom units are likely to work in their areas of operations (AOs). It addresses direct approaches for countering insurgencies. Finally, it introduces lines of operation (LOOs), lines of effort (LOEs), and readings for historical examples, all of which can support participants in achieving unity of effort and a common goal.

COUNTERINSURGENCY MINDSET

3-2. COIN is distinct from conventional warfare by the focus of its operations (a relevant civilian population), by its strategic purpose (to gain or maintain control or influence), and by the popular support it gains through political, psychological, and economic methods. Warfare that has the population as its focus of operations requires a different mindset than warfare that focuses on defeating a threat militarily. In COIN operations, this translates to an adaptive and flexible mindset focused on understanding the population, anticipating insurgent actions, remaining comfortable among the populace, and appreciating the comprehensive approach of unified action.

POLITICAL STRATEGY

3-3. A key aspect of the COIN mindset is understanding insurgent strategy and an insurgency's narrative to anticipate and counter the insurgency's operations. The military instrument of national power is only one part of a comprehensive approach through unified action for unity of effort. In addition to security needs, the COIN force needs to remain flexible toward executing tasks other organizations are better suited to conduct—at least initially during COIN operations—until the security situation is stable enough for their participation.

3-4. The COIN political strategy articulates how the HN will address the root causes (opportunity, motives, and means) driving the insurgency (see paragraphs 1-72 through 1-77). The strategy provides a framework to organize all other programs and activities. Depending on the insurgency's root causes, the strategy may mix political reform, reconciliation, popular support mobilization, economic development, and governmental capacity building. In general terms, a COIN operation is only as good as the political strategy it supports and only as good as the HN's motivation to enact the above political reforms and capacity building. Where the political strategy is vague, unrealistic, or lacking in support from domestic or international stakeholders, the operation is unlikely to succeed, whatever the merit of the individual programs. An effective political strategy focuses on strengthening the government's capability, capacity, and willingness to respond—and be perceived as responding—to public expectations.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

3-5. COIN is a comprehensive approach involving all elements of national power, even down to the tactical level. In a COIN, HN forces and partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the HN government's legitimacy. COIN operations strive to achieve unity of effort among many unified action partners. COIN includes tactical planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and Soldier and leader engagement. U.S. Forces often lead the U.S. Government's counterinsurgent efforts because the U.S. military can quickly project a COIN force and sustain not only its force but also other agencies.

END STATE

3-6. The primary source for any commander's desired end state is the mission the commander received. Conceptual planning helps commanders visualize how to generate the conditions for achieving that end state. It also allows commanders to determine whether that end state is achievable, whether additional resources are necessary, an acceptable level of risk, and whether modifications to the mission and expectations are necessary. The desired end state may change as the situation changes. LOOs and LOEs help provide the necessary details to turn the commander's visualization and the *operational approach*—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0)—into a detailed plan.

3-7. The end state of COIN operations is a legitimate HN government that can provide effective governance. This includes providing for their populace, eliminating the root causes of the insurgency, and preventing those root causes from returning. COIN operations can successfully defeat an insurgency; achieve unity of effort along multiple LOOs and LOEs; isolate the insurgents from the general population; and increase the HN government's legitimacy. The five requirements for successful COIN operations at the tactical level follow:

- Together, U.S. and HN military commanders devise the plan for attacking the insurgent strategy and focus on bolstering the HN government's legitimacy.
- HN forces and U.S. Forces establish control of the area and secure the populace continuously.
- Operations initiate from the HN government's area of strength against areas under the insurgency's control.
- Regaining control of the insurgency's areas requires the HN government to expand operations to secure and support the population.
- Soldier and leader engagements shape public perception of the HN government's legitimacy, obtain local support for COIN operations, publicize insurgent violence, and discredit insurgent propaganda.

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

3-8. COIN operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, diplomatic, political, economic, law enforcement, psychological, and civic actions. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal tensions, and injustice. As such, they defy nonviolent solutions available through the ordinary course of governance. Army forces can compel obedience and secure areas. However, they cannot by themselves achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Effective approaches to COIN utilize civilian agencies, U.S. military forces, and multinational forces. COIN supports local institutions and their ability to enable good governance. These efforts purposefully attack the root causes of

the insurgency rather than just its fighters and comprehensively address the associated, core public grievances. Host-nation leaders remain purposefully involved in this effort and ultimately take lead responsibility for it. Paragraphs 3-9 through 3-32 address an example construct (for discussion purposes only and not inclusive of all the involved organizations) of requisite civilian and military organizations within the conduct of COIN operations.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

3-9. *Foreign internal defense* is the participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). FID programs are useful in supporting friendly nations threatened with hostilities. As a tool of U.S. foreign policy, FID is a national-level effort that involves numerous U.S. Government agencies all working together to eliminate the root causes of an insurgency.

3-10. U.S. military involvement in FID has traditionally focused on COIN. Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, U.S. FID programs may aim at other threats to an HN's internal stability such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, or terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illicit drug trafficking continue. Typical tactical involvement in FID entails conducting combat operations against guerrillas, conducting actions across all established LOEs to defeat insurgency, and training host-nation security forces (HNSF).

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

3-11. *Internal defense and development* comprise the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). IDAD not only provision a single master plan but also compile all IDAD plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that a nation possesses. The fundamental goal of IDAD is to prevent subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, and terrorism by forestalling or defeating the threat and by working to correct the conditions that prompted the violence. Tactical units may see the local government strategy, economic development plan, or the long-range military plan of their partner HNSF unit, which are part of the IDAD plan.

JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

3-12. Conducting a COIN requires operating within different organizational environments. Brigade, battalion, and company commanders integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in their AOs. The inner workings of other interagency and multinational partners are important to understand. The strengths and limitations of all civil-military entities in the AO inform the development of an LOO and LOE, each of which drives operations. For example, commanders and subordinate leaders maintain awareness of a development agency's capability and willingness to conform to the approach under development by the military force. If not, then planning accounts for this through interagency coordination. Only through a firm baseline understanding of the capabilities, processes, and procedures of each entity within the multinational force can the military force develop an operational approach resulting in unity of effort. The following are some common entities within a COIN environment:

- *Joint*—organizations, activities, or missions, in which two or more significant elements of Military Departments operate under a single joint force commander or leader (JP 1, Volume 1).
- *Interagency*—of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense (JP 3-08).
- International—between international government organizations (for example, United Nations, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and African Union).
- *Multinational*—between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners (JP 5-0).

Unity of Effort Across the Operational Environment

3-13. Identifying and targeting the root causes of instability in an operational environment (OE) transform the drivers of instability while maintaining *unity of effort*—coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action (JP 1, Volume 2)—among diverse actors. Commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders identify and mitigate sources of instability, understand and nest operations within political objectives, and achieve unity of effort and a shared vision across the OE. Continuous coordination and liaison between the military force and *unified action partners*—those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0)—help to build unity of effort, especially with civilian organizations due to the variety of external organizations and the inherent coordination challenges.

3-14. LOOs and LOEs (see paragraphs 3-45 through 3-61) are critical for establishing unity of effort for actions conducted by U.S. and international militaries, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the HN government, and HNSF. These actions range from killing or capturing an insurgent cell emplacing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to solving local unemployment, to publicizing the opening of a water treatment facility. Without unity of effort over time, long-range planning at the tactical level will face challenges in securing the populace, gaining popular support, and defeating the insurgency.

3-15. Fundamental to long-term stability, specific to COIN, and critical to the HN government's legitimacy are the HN government's involvement in and feeling of responsibility for building trust and confidence among those governed. Building partner capacity addresses potentially the most important effort to support and enable partners so they can perform their roles effectively. (See FM 3-96 and FM 3-24 for information on unity of effort.)

Center of Gravity

3-16. The *center of gravity* is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). A thorough understanding of the OE is essential to center of gravity (COG) analysis. Commanders do not assume the populace is the COG in COIN, yet the populace does typically have a primary influence upon the success or failure of the insurgency. COGs range from a major, external, relevant actor to popular core leaders. Due to the variety of relevant actors, commanders and staffs develop understanding of their opportunities, motives, and means to determine appropriate points of influence more accurately. The degree to which they understand the OE determines the level of relevancy of any COG analysis, network analysis, or other tools for developing courses of action (COAs).

3-17. COGs consist of certain critical factors (critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities) that help commanders identify and analyze COGs and formulate the decisive points, LOOs, and LOEs to affect them. The COG analysis for COIN includes understanding critical factors for friendly (U.S., multinational, HN, and local) supporters, relevant populations, insurgents, other protagonists such as transnational terrorists, and any external supporters for either side. In COIN, it is not enough to attack the enemy's COGs and to protect the COIN's COGs. Commanders and staffs remain mindful that COIN is both a population- and threat-focused effort. As such, their understanding of the OE includes the influences on and behavior of all relevant actors, not just the behavior of the threat. (See paragraphs 3-43 and 3-46 for information on decisive points and paragraphs 3-44 through 3-60 for LOOs and LOEs.)

Note. Social network analysis is a useful tool for determining the various connections, nodes, and influences between particular organizations and individuals. When conducting social network analysis to understand the overall OE and to identify COGs and critical capability, critical requirement, and critical vulnerability factors, commanders and planners ensure the process remains relevant at the operational level and resist the temptation to break the overall OE picture into small, discrete systems and individuals. The latter approach may be appropriate at the tactical or targeting level, but to develop understanding of the OE and its players, commanders strive for the larger, more holistic picture. (See FM 3-24 for information.)

Command Responsibilities

3-18. When the joint force works with interagency, international (intergovernmental and nongovernmental), and multinational entities, U.S. Army commanders have inherent responsibilities that include clarifying the military's mission; determining the controlling legal and policy authorities; and sustaining and caring for these organizations and individuals. Information sharing between elements is essential for establishing ground truth, despite disagreement on the nature or scope of requisite support or on the operation's progress. U.S. Forces remain purposefully involved in information sharing but ultimately in most cases may not have the lead/responsibility for the support or operations process.

3-19. Gaining and maintaining popular support presents a formidable challenge that the military cannot accomplish alone. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN agencies in a coordinated approach. Coordination at the lowest level is essential for unity of effort. The following are some likely participants in COIN operations:

- U.S. military forces.
- Multinational (including HN) military forces.
- U.S. Government organizations.
- Intergovernmental organizations.
- NGOs.
- Multinational corporations and contractors.
- Citizen populations and domestic institutions.

United States Military Forces

3-20. The military's contribution is vital for counterinsurgent efforts. Demanding and complex, COIN draws heavily on a broad range of capabilities across all domains (air, space, cyberspace, maritime, and land) and requires a different mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations from that expected for major combat operations. All components contribute to successful operations and to the vital effort to separate insurgents from the general population.

3-21. The most important Army assets in COIN are disciplined Soldiers with adaptive, self-aware, and intelligent leaders. Tactical units may employ specially trained or attached personnel with certain capabilities:

- Civil affairs (CA).
- Contractors.
- Engineers.
- Intelligence analysts.
- Human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
- Language specialists (linguists and/or interpreters).
- Legal affairs.
- Logistic support.
- Medical units.
- Military police.
- Military working dogs.
- Joint terminal air control.
- Psychological operations (PSYOP).
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

Multinational Military Forces

3-22. Army forces may function as part of a multinational force. In COIN operations, U.S. Forces usually operate with the HNSF. Each multinational participant provides capabilities and strengths that U.S. Forces may not have. Other countries' military forces bring different cultural backgrounds, historical experiences, languages, and other capabilities that can be particularly valuable to counterinsurgent efforts. Multinational forces are frequently limited in what they can do by national caveats that constrain their employment. U.S. Forces must understand these caveats and incorporate them within planning. It is far easier to factor these caveats into planning rather than attempt to persuade a coalition force member to violate their caveats.

United States Government Organizations

3-23. The commanders' situational awareness includes familiarity with other U.S. Government organizations participating in the counterinsurgent effort and contributing to the COIN's capabilities. Commanders and leaders of other U.S. Government organizations collaborate in the planning and coordination of actions to avoid duplication or conflicting purposes. (See table 3-1 for key U.S. Government organizations with whom tactical units may work.) U.S. Forces should attempt to flatten organizations and engage in effective information-sharing regardless of who the lead agency is.

Table 3-1. U.S. Government organizations

Department of State
• Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
U.S. Agency for International Development
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Justice
• Drug Enforcement Administration
• Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Homeland Security
• U.S. Coast Guard
• Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of Agriculture

Intergovernmental Organizations

3-24. A formal agreement binds an intergovernmental organization together (for example, a treaty between two or more governments). An intergovernmental organization may rest upon a global, regional, or functional base for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Member states form such organizations to protect and promote their shared national interests. The most notable intergovernmental organization is the United Nations. Depending on the situation and host-nation needs, tactical units encounter any number of United Nations organizations in their AOs, such as those following:

- Department of Peace Operations.
- World Food Program USA.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees the United Nations Refugee Agency.
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Nongovernmental Organizations

3-25. Joint doctrine defines a *nongovernmental organization* as a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). Several thousand NGOs of many different types exist. NGOs' organizing charters and their members' motivations govern their activities. Commanders must be aware that NGOs may have vastly different agendas, motivations, understanding of the security situation, and viewpoints on the insurgents than do each other, or than do security forces and are not bound by security forces' considerations such as operations security (OPSEC). Typical NGOs for tactical units to encounter follow:

- Médecins sans Frontières (commonly known as Doctors without Borders).
- Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (commonly known as CARE).
- Oxfam International.
- Save the Children.
- Red Cross.

Citizen Population and Domestic Institutions

3-26. The citizen population and domestic institutions are the civil constructs of an AO, including government, tribal, commercial, and private entities. The population includes citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians. This is the most important group for counterinsurgent units to protect and the most important group with whom to interact and to synchronize actions.

Multinational Corporations and Contractors

3-27. Multinational corporations engage in reconstruction, economic development, security, and governance activities. At a minimum, commanders maintain awareness of the companies present in their AOs and where they conduct business. Such information prevents *fratricide*—the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly firepower (ADP 3-37)—and destruction of private property.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

3-28. A tactical unit conducting COIN operations expects to work with a wide range of agencies, and it tracks, manages, supports, and coordinates with all of them, some of whose agendas or desired outcomes may not coincide with the overall counterinsurgent effort. Commanders at all levels work to integrate all the agencies and organizations present in their AOs toward a common end state, overcoming many challenges.

3-29. Challenges to the integration of military and civilian agencies include differing organizational cultures, capabilities, and structures. Some organizations are not trained or equipped to operate in austere, unsecured environments or are unable to sustain themselves in remote areas. Some are averse to assuming risk, thereby hindering the overall counterinsurgent effort. Military and government organizations are heavily dependent on establishing and implementing their internal operating procedures and are often reluctant to adapt or change those to accommodate the addition of new actors. Different expectations among the organizations lead to heightened tensions and create interagency friction.

3-30. U.S. Government and civilian agencies provide critical capabilities for accomplishing the COIN mission. Most agencies have their own budgets and often more robust financial capabilities than military units. An effective interagency effort uses the organizations' budgets in a complementary way to facilitate stabilizing and developmental efforts. Civilian agencies provide links to strategic resources unavailable to tactical units. They also have access to information, resources, and enablers that help military units develop a comprehensive understanding of the OE.

3-31. Military forces have several complementary characteristics of value to other agencies—the most obvious being their ability to provide security and transportation assets. They can also accurately assess whether an area is ready and able to support essential services and economic development projects. Once these indicators are apparent, COIN forces provide logistic support, security, and expertise to a project.

3-32. Forming civil-military teams unites complementary capabilities that mitigate the inherent weaknesses of both the COIN force and civilian agencies. Effective interagency teams conduct concurrent operations to capitalize on gains achieved through security operations. For example, in Afghanistan in 2002, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives, in coordination with (ICW) units, rendered immediate aid to civilian families returning to combat-damaged residences.

COUNTERING AN INSURGENCY

3-33. Using U.S. military forces to counter an insurgency in a combined arms operations role is resource intensive when done on a large scale but often necessary for full counterinsurgent effort support. When the desired end state is HN government capability to provide effective governance, and their counterinsurgent effort is critical to achieving that, then a direct approach is useful. Military forces can use a direct approach after or during a major conflict or when the comprehensive approach necessitates stability in a failed or failing state. The military component can also integrate forces into ongoing host-nation efforts. Unfortunately, unintended consequences such as increased tensions among segments of society or resistance to U.S. military involvement often accompany a direct approach. Commanders carefully plan and execute operations before and during a direct response to avoid negative consequences. (See paragraph 3-43 for more information on direct and indirect approaches.)

OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

3-34. Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations as part of integrated joint, interagency, and multinational teams. Combined arms operations entail simultaneous and continuous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations (see figure 3-1). Depending on the mission, one type of operation may predominate. Commanders shift the predominant type of operation based on their assessments of the current situation as they shape the OE and set the conditions to achieve the end state.




Figure 3-1. Simultaneous and continuous combined arms operations

3-35. Like any Army operation at the tactical level, COIN operations comprise offensive, defensive, and stability operations. COIN offensive operations focus on eliminating insurgents. COIN defensive operations focus on protecting the populace and infrastructure from insurgent attacks. COIN stability operations focus on addressing the root causes that allowed the insurgency to emerge and arise. Determining the appropriate combination of the three is not easy since what is appropriate depends on the situation, mission, and commander's desired end state. However, they are closely related. For instance, too much focus on defensive operations may cede terrain to the insurgency, requiring unanticipated offensive operations. Offensive operation may result in excessive civilian casualties or collateral damage, requiring stability operations—either before, during, or after. All three of these operations may be ongoing in different parts of the AO at the same time (for example, within an area security mission).

Offensive Operations

3-36. Conducting offensive operations defeats and destroys enemy forces and seizes terrain, resources, and population centers. These operations impose the commander's will on the enemy. Active imposition of land power can render the offense the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation-state supporting the insurgency. The physical presence of land forces also enhances stability operations through the threat of offensive action in areas they occupy. COIN offensive operations aim at destroying the guerrillas, underground elements, or insurgent leaders to establish a secure environment and thereby to reestablish the rule of law, legitimate government, and economic development. Effective COIN planners realize that insurgents do not have to be destroyed to be defeated. Operations that render the insurgents unable to recruit, raise funds, limit their freedom of movement or otherwise deny them the ability to function are appropriate offensive objectives. Offensive operations are particularly important in the clear phase of COIN operations. The successful counterinsurgent unit designs its offensive operations to complement its defensive and stability operations. Chapter 5 further addresses offensive operations.

Defensive Operations

3-37. Conducting defensive operations defeats enemy attacks, gains time, economizes forces, and develops favorable conditions for offensive or stability operations. These operations destroy as many attackers as necessary to defeat an enemy attack. The defense preserves physical dominance over land, resources, and populations. These operations retain terrain and protect the HN population and key resources. COIN defensive operations aim at securing the populace and key sites and personnel and protecting COIN forces. Once security forces have cleared insurgent forces from a particular area, it is critical that defensive operations retain that terrain and deny insurgent forces from operating within it. Failure to do so will invite retribution on any local nationals that supported the security forces, and it will cause a loss of support for security forces within the region. Defensive operations are the main effort during the hold phase of COIN operations. The successful counterinsurgent unit designs its defensive operations to complement its offensive and stability operations. Chapter 6 further addresses defensive operations.

Stability Operations

3-38. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted ICW other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe, secure environment and to provide essential governance, services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Most stability operations are both multiagency and multinational. Stability operations will be the main effort during the build and transition phases of COIN operations; however, security forces engaged in stability operations may have to conduct defensive and offensive operations to defend themselves or to destroy forces seeking to undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission.

3-39. Stability operations consist of six tasks—establish civil security, conduct SC, provide support to civil control, restore essential services, provide support to governance, and provide support to economic and infrastructure development. At the tactical level, the stability operations tasks may serve as LOEs or simply as guideposts to ensure broader unity of effort. In this publication, they become the nucleus for the established COIN LOEs (see paragraphs 3-50 through 3-60).

3-40. The degree to which U.S. Army forces engage in stability operations depends on any given operation's specific circumstances. In some operations, the HN carries out most security operations, and Army forces engage in stability operations to offset any negative public impact from military presence. In operations in a failed state, Army forces may be responsible for public well-being. For example, they may provide basic civil functions while working with other agencies to restore essential services to a localized area, such as in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993. (Chapter 7 further addresses stability operations.)

Levels of Direct Involvement within the Operational Approach

3-41. The level of direct involvement varies. In many cases, HNs remain fully capable of providing security for their populations. However, integration of fires or a direct-action force could enable an HN's counterinsurgent efforts. As part of a comprehensive approach, military forces bring integrable capabilities to counterinsurgent effort. When counterinsurgents consider direct U.S. military involvement, they consider activities ranging from a modest force conducting limited missions to a large force serving, at least for a time, as the primary COIN force.

3-42. The direct involvement of the U.S. military introduces a wide range of capabilities useful for creating many different operational approaches to counter an insurgency. Direct involvement by U.S. Forces may mean very little involvement to their acting as the primary counterinsurgents. When U.S. Forces act temporarily as the primary counterinsurgents, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework (see section II) forms a tactical structure for battalion and brigade operations. While the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework must be enabled with other capabilities such as with whole-of-government and unified effort approaches, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework reveals how this direct involvement will defeat an insurgency at the tactical level. Moreover, this tactical background also provides a frame of reference for understanding host-nation actions to defeat an insurgency. This understanding is essential when integrating U.S. military capabilities into a host-nation effort.

3-43. The operational approach is a commander's description of the broad actions the force is to take to attain the desired military end state. The commander may use direct or indirect approaches, or a mixture of both, to contend with the insurgency's COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy's COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy's COG by applying power against a series of decisive points, leading to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength. Commanders use a single, direct or indirect approach or, more likely, a combination of approaches to counter an insurgency and its influence. The operational approach is largely based on the commander's understanding of the OE and the nature of the insurgency. Successful development of the operational approach requires continuous analysis, learning, assessment, dialogue, and collaboration on the part of the commander and staff, as well as other subject matter experts who include other interagency and multinational partners in unified action.

3-44. An indirect approach supports existing governments, security forces, and groups by increasing COIN capacity and enabling existing capabilities. It provides a framework for working with and through an HN (that is, indirectly countering an insurgency by working with groups in the society or through HN institutions). The United States uses nation assistance and SC to aid an HN in building its institutions. Several

other indirect methods for countering insurgencies also exist, including the generational approach, negotiation and diplomacy, and the identify-separate-influence-reintegrate approach. Furthermore, several indirect enablers remain important in any COIN, including integrated monetary supporting efforts. (See FM 3-24 for information on indirect methods for countering insurgencies.)

LINES OF OPERATIONS AND LINES OF EFFORT

3-45. LOOs and LOEs are important planning tools for moving conceptual planning into detailed planning. Commanders use LOOs and LOEs to visualize, describe, and direct operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little relevance such as in an insurgency. These planning tools help describe how a military force is to realize a desired end state from the commander's initial understanding of the current situation. Commanders synchronize and sequence actions, deliberately creating complementary and reinforcing effects. The lines then converge on the well-defined, commonly understood end state outlined in the commander's intent. Commanders use LOOs and LOEs separately or in combination.

3-46. Commanders at all levels use LOOs and LOEs to develop tasks and allocate resources. A plan based on LOOs and LOEs unifies the efforts (for example, tasking, resourcing) of all the actors participating in a COIN toward a common purpose. Each LOO and LOE represents a conceptual category along which the HN government and COIN force commander intend to attack the insurgent strategy and tactics and to establish the HN government's legitimacy. During conceptual planning, commanders may designate one line as the main effort and others as supporting efforts to conceptualize and describe the concept of operations in purpose and then in resources (prioritization of efforts), respectively. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress (see paragraph 3-52) toward achieving the desired end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions.

Note. The commander and staff use an operational framework and associated vocabulary to conceptualize and describe the concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An *operational framework* is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). (See FM 3-96 for information on the operational framework.)

LINE OF OPERATIONS

3-47. The *line of operation* is a line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s) (JP 5-0). LOOs connect a series of decisive points leading to the control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. A *decisive point* means key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Decisive points help commanders select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving a desired end state. Operations designed from LOOs usually comprise a series of actions executed in accordance with (IAW) a well-defined sequence.

3-48. As in any operation, a military force operates on interior and exterior lines. *Interior lines* are the lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point (ADP 3-0). They allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter LOOs. *Exterior lines* are the lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy (ADP 3-0). They allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy. LOOs tie offensive and defensive operations to the geographic and positional references in the AO. LOOs are especially useful for addressing the physical aspects of COIN such as infrastructure protection, control of movement, and locating and engaging insurgency forces.

3-49. To summarize, an LOO helps define the orientation of the force. In conventional operations, LOOs connect actions related in time and space to an objective. During COIN or other IW operations and activities, LOOs could, for example, focus on major stability-related objectives such as security, the restoration of essential services, or the training of HN military and police forces. In any case, LOOs reinforce the idea of the cumulative gains to be made by a series of sequential operations since success or failure in any LOO impacts the other LOOs.

LINE OF EFFORT

3-50. A *line of effort* is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state (ADP 3-0). LOEs are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance such as in countering an insurgency. COIN operations involve many nonmilitary factors, and LOEs serve to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. LOEs help commanders visualize how to integrate their military capabilities into the efforts of the rest of the unified action community. LOEs depict how the actions of a COIN, over time, achieve the commander's desired end state.

3-51. In COIN, LOEs nest in host-nation actions and activities. From tactical to strategic levels, the goal of the COIN may be to support the HN, depending on its operational design. While that may mean some tactical actions do not involve HN forces, the overall effort remains the support of host-nation efforts at all levels. The COIN force supports and integrates its efforts with those of the HN's strategic and operational approaches.

3-52. LOEs are closely related but not sequential in nature. Successful achievement of the desired end state requires careful coordination of the actions undertaken along all LOEs. (See figure 3-2 for example COIN LOEs.) While the example LOEs in figure 3-2 may apply well to a COIN after large-scale combat operations, they may not apply well to other COIN operations. The United States could be providing enablers only for counterinsurgent efforts. For example, U.S. Forces might be combining capabilities—such as counter threat networks, counter threat finance activities, SIGINT, and a direct-action force—to enable the HN. Their contribution might be to stop the insurgency from attaining the means to fight, provide intelligence on an insurgency's networks and communications systems, and provide a means to neutralize the insurgency's leadership.




Figure 3-2. Counterinsurgency lines of effort, example

3-53. Figure 3-2 reveals why complex problems in COIN require critical thinking and defy solution by checklist and battle drill methodologies. When commanders and staffs use them properly, they are closely integrated within HN and multinational efforts, and tied to operational and strategic purposes, LOOs and LOEs help commanders and staffs perform successful COIN operations. Figure 3-2 provides sample LOEs. Just as individual LOEs must meet the situations in which commanders and staffs find themselves, tasks on LOEs must fit an OE and the desired end state.

3-54. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, LOEs may be the only way to link tasks to the desired end state. LOEs often help commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of unified action partners. These LOEs show how partner actions relate to each other and contribute to achieving the desired end state. Commanders often use stability operations tasks along LOEs. These tasks link military actions with the broader interagency or interorganizational efforts across the conduct of operations.

3-55. As operations progress, commanders may modify the LOEs after assessing conditions. Commanders use measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for continual assessment of operations. A *measure of performance* is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0). MOPs address whether the unit completed actions it intended to; for instance, clearing a neighborhood or enrolling the local population into a biometric database. MOPs may often be answered with a yes, no, or a percentage complete. A *measure of effectiveness* is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). (See FM 3-96 for information on lines of effort.) MOEs address the question of whether the unit's actions are having the intended effect or not. They are more difficult to assess accurately and may sometimes be expressed as a positive or negative change in a trend line. Understanding why conditions have changed is far more complex than simply changing one condition and ascribing all change to it. Commanders must be careful to avoid confirmation bias and must understand that correlation does not necessarily equal causation. MOEs should be confirmed with thorough analysis.

3-56. Success in one LOE can reinforce successes in others. Progress along each LOE contributes to attaining a stable and secure environment for the HN. Upon the achievement of one measure of stability, achievements in other LOEs follow—like public recognition of the HN government's legitimacy, improved governance, and progressive, substantive reduction in the root causes of insurgency. No single list of LOEs applies to all insurgencies. Commanders designate LOEs based on their understanding of the root causes of the insurgency with the goal of improving conditions such as governance, services, prosperity, and security such that the insurgency loses popular support. It is possible that only a portion of the overall effort may be focused on the insurgents' tactics and strategy.

3-57. Commanders at all echelons use LOEs. Lower echelon operations nest within the higher echelon's LOEs. However, lower echelon operations are conducted based on each unit's AO. Commanders at all echelons select LOEs that relate best to achieving the desired end state. The following list of possible LOEs is not all inclusive but does provide commanders with a starting place:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Support HNSF.
- Provide support to governance.
- Restore essential services.
- Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct combat operations (for example, area security, raid, ambush, cordon and search, search and attack).

3-58. Commanders may customize, rename, change altogether, or simply not use the lines they select. They may also combine two or more of the listed LOEs or split one LOE into multiple LOEs. For example, a commander might combine the two LOEs for restoring essential services and for providing support to economic and infrastructure development into one LOE. Likewise, another commander might split the rule of law from the civil control LOEs. Commanders and staffs synchronize activities along all LOEs to gain unity of effort. This approach ensures the LOEs converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state.

3-59. Tactical units, HNSF, and the HN's government can accomplish a limited number of tasks only at any one time. The COIN LOEs help prioritize and synchronize efforts along all the LOEs. One useful construct is the rheostat (regulating a line by means of variable resistances) approach with LOEs; increased effort along the LOE for establishing civil security usually means less effort along the other LOEs. Units see this during operations against a powerful insurgency or during the clear phase of a shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operation. In most cases, restoring security to their AO enables units and the HN government to meet objectives rapidly along the other LOEs. In other AOs, units increase effort along the LOEs for providing support to governance and support to economic and infrastructure development while seeing reduced effort along the LOE for establishing civil security. This occurs during operations against a weak insurgency or during the build phase of a shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operation.

3-60. Operations designed using LOEs typically employ an extended, event-driven timeline with short-, mid-, and long-term goals. These operations combine the effects of long-term operations such as neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure with cyclic and short-term events such as regular trash collection and attacks against insurgent bases. Chapter 4 reviews those considerations for planning LOEs and horizons.

Combination of Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort

3-61. Commanders use LOOs and LOEs to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. The difference between LOOs and LOEs is that LOOs are oriented on physical linkages while LOEs are oriented on logical linkages. Combining LOOs and LOEs allows a commander to include stability operations tasks in the long-term plan. This combination helps commanders begin consolidating gains and set the end state conditions for transitions in another operation.

Synchronization and Integration of Lines of Effort

3-62. In COIN, activities that affect operational and mission variables (see chapter 1, section II) in the OE cannot be planned and implemented in isolation. They are carefully synchronized at the operational and tactical levels to reinforce each other and support the COIN narrative (see paragraph 2-32). From planning through execution, the efforts of unified action partners and HN participants are integrated toward a common purpose. Insurgent opportunities, motives, and means typically cut across LOEs, so failure to integrate LOEs at best renders COIN less effective and at worst leads to counterproductive impacts across different LOEs. Counterinsurgents, therefore, have COIN to prioritize efforts while remaining cognizant of the linkages and effects these operations will have in other areas.

3-63. For example, the defeat of the insurgency's military capabilities is just one component of what is ultimately a broader struggle to reestablish control by the HN government. Gaining this control, while also preserving the perception of legitimacy by the HN populace, requires a disciplined and balanced application of force. The use of lethal weapons may not be the most effective means of achieving COIN force's

objectives. Use of nonlethal weapons can limit casualties and collateral damage. The cumulative effects created by all COIN activities should enable either ambivalence toward the insurgency or greater affiliation or allegiance of the population and other actors to the HN government rather than support for the insurgency. This behavior in turn substantiates HN government legitimacy.

HISTORICAL THEORIES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

3-64. Insurgencies are protracted conflicts by nature. Historically, they often have lasted for years, even decades. Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of time and resources, especially when conducted simultaneously with operations in a protracted war comprising both conventional warfare and IW. This section recommends readings from three historic, distinctive theorists on the proper conduct of COIN. Together, they provide a reference for forces engaged in COIN operations. Since COIN operations are complicated, studying these theories alone does not guarantee success. However, the aspects they consider serve to illumine one's understanding of the inherent challenges to defeating an insurgency.

3-65. The three recommended readings (see appendix B for the listed titles) are from the following COIN experts. Robert Thompson expounds five principles for successful COIN based on his experience during the Malayan Emergency and centered around requirements for or from the government. David Galula recommends four laws for successful COIN based on his experiences in Indochina and Algeria and centered around popular support. C.E. Callwell offers his ideas for successful COIN based on his experiences in the Boer Wars and other imperial British operations and centered around the most effective strategies for the military forces. (Douglas Porch's introduction to Callwell's book is also particularly helpful.)

CONSIDERATIONS FOCUSED TOWARD A COMMON GOAL

3-66. As for any type of operation, commanders and staffs consider all relevant operational and mission variables, as well as their effects on the conduct of operations. Urban, rural, and border area considerations improve the commander's visualization of the conduct of COIN operations that would accomplish the assigned mission. A comprehensive effort, at a minimum, incorporates all the capabilities of the U.S. Government and HN government. It may include intergovernmental and regional organizations and NGOs to address the root causes of the insurgency while the military operations aim at the insurgents themselves. This section covers considerations common to COIN operations, categorized first by the AO and then by collaboration and cooperation toward a shared goal.

URBAN, RURAL, AND BORDER AREAS

3-67. An AO's characteristics, as in all military operations, play a key role in the conduct of COIN operations. Insurgencies, for example, can be fought in urban, rural, and border areas, each with its own characteristics.

Urban Areas

3-68. As the urbanization of the world's population continues, the concealment and anonymity once provided to insurgencies by remote, rural areas only are now available in urban areas. The transient nature and size of urban populations increasingly hinder counterinsurgents' abilities to detect and identify insurgents. Insurgents use urban centers for freedom of movement, easy access to their mass base (see paragraph 2-15), and proximity to targets. Popular support at the outset of this kind of insurgency is not necessary but is attainable through intimidation and attacks on government-provided essential services. With higher population density, urban areas need more government functions and services than rural areas. This requires more government organizations for operations and a balanced approach using all LOEs.

3-69. Insurgencies thrive in an urban environment. The population density, a multiplicity of demographic variables, and the urban topography provide insurgents with opportunities for spectacular, high-casualty-producing terrorist attacks with which to sway public opinion, intimidate the population, challenge government forces control, and dominate the information campaign in ways that other areas might not. Operations against urban insurgents vary from those conducted for populace control to those for seeking out and killing or capturing insurgents. Urban areas sometimes require COIN forces to emphasize intelligence and police operations and thereby to counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistic, and terrorist activities. COIN forces may also need to reinforce HN police forces in combating insurgency-provoked riots

and disorder and in conducting raids and cordon and search activities. Military COIN forces maintain communication with HN police forces and other agencies involved in operations.

Considerations for Urban Areas

3-70. When military forces must reinforce police or defeat insurgency forces inside the urban area, leaders closely control and coordinate operations. Operations in urban terrain are particularly challenging to plan and execute. They are also far more likely to result in civilian casualties, damage to the infrastructure, or other collateral damage, all of which may occur immediately in the public eye and that of the media. Therefore, it is essential the local government determines the level of intensity for the conduct of urban operations publicly accepts responsibility for those decisions and their results. Military forces withdraw as soon as police forces can manage the situation. Common objectives for COIN operations in urban areas are as follows:

- Understand the complex ethnic, sectarian, and religious divisions within the urban area.
- Deny or disrupt insurgent freedom of movement within the urban terrain without imposing undue hardships on the local populace.
- Establish and maintain a constant, on-the-ground forward presence within the population.
- Deny insurgent opportunities to stage or operate in proximity to security forces infrastructure.
- Ensure appropriate force protection measures are established and maintained within or around security forces infrastructure (the only detectable biases should be for the HN and against insurgents).
- Security force operations are conducted objectively and without bias toward any demographic subsets of the local populace.
- Urban populations can rapidly respond to calls to assemble, riot or protest and can appear without warning anywhere in the urban area.
- Both mounted and dismounted movements in urban terrain can be easily disrupted (units must plan for multiple routes).
- Small units must be adept at seizing an appropriate building and defending from urban terrain if in contact with capable insurgent forces.
- Security forces must be prepared to mitigate or otherwise remediate the negative fallout from combat operations; for instance, planning for humanitarian assistance during operations or providing for the payment of claims in the event of damages.
- Acquire and disseminate timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.
- Consider establishing and using biometric databases.
- Security forces must be prepared to operate within the bounds of the host-nation's judicial system; for instance, ensuring sufficiency of, and compliance with, local evidentiary requirements.
- Avoid overreaction to insurgent activity.
- Ensure the population has the basic level of essential services.
- Develop relationships with competent host-nation officials.
- Incorporate counter-sniper operations, especially at roadblocks, outposts, and sentry posts.
- React to the ambush of patrols and fire on helicopters.
- Emphasize countermeasures against booby traps and explosive hazards such as IEDs and mines.
- Control access to those weapons, uniforms, and other supplies that would prove useful to insurgents.
- Protect industry and public services from attack and sabotage.
- Prevent riots, protests, and other large population incidents.
- Like traditional combat operations in an urban environment, static security forces invite targeting efforts by insurgents.
- Whether halted for the long-term or short-term, security forces must ensure local security in three-dimensions and deny enemy forces the ability to approach.
- Commanders must understand and balance the competing risks of setting an actual security posture against the potential ramifications of being seen as lacking trust in the local populace or HNSF.

Example Lines of Effort for Urban Areas

3-71. All urban operations require careful planning and coordination, particularly those operations involving application of force. The most vital requirement is timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.

Military forces maintain the capability to communicate with police and other agencies involved in the operations. Urban operations require military forces to conduct actions across all the LOEs. (See table 3-2 for LOEs common to urban operations, with at least one example action for each.)

Table 3-2. Urban operation lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Conduct targeted raids with host-nation security forces to attack key insurgent cells.
Establish civil control	Conduct investigative training for host nation police forces to increase arrests and convictions. Establish a block committee to control the populace.
Conduct security cooperation	Maximize the number, effectiveness, and employment of host-nation security forces to secure and control the populace and to prevent the insurgents' freedom of movement.
Provide support to governance	Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues of the insurgency.
Restore essential services	Provide projects such as the restoration of electrical power and sewer systems to residential blocks who support the government. Provide projects that supply positive reinforcement for desired behavior.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Provide funds to city managers to hire additional personnel and to initiate economic development projects. Hire from neutral residential blocks to increase their support for the government.
Conduct information activities	Disseminate highlights of government successes and expose insurgent defeats and excesses.

Rural Areas

3-72. Much of guerrilla warfare in the 20th century transpired in rural settings—the mountains of Yugoslavia in World War II, the jungles of South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s, and the jungles of Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s. Reduction of collateral damage, limited infrastructure, lack of urban development, and rural setting characteristics influence both the insurgent and COIN operations.

Considerations for Rural Areas

3-73. COIN operations in a rural area allow for the application of full military combat power, conventional fires, movement and maneuver, and less restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) due to the lower population density. However, leaders still plan the minimum application requirement of essential force to accomplish the mission.

3-74. In rural areas, insurgents rely on sympathetic elements within the population to provide supplies and intelligence. Rural insurgents prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment such as heavily forested and mountainous areas that hinder the COIN force in gaining access and intelligence. Though often operating from their own residences or villages, rural insurgents will move to camps when security does not permit them to remain in their residences. Insurgent camp selection follows due consideration of the ease of access to the target population, access to a friendly or neutral border, prepared escape routes, and good observation of COIN force approach routes. When COIN operations force insurgents out of their preferred base camps, the insurgents tend to establish camps in rugged, inhospitable areas not easily penetrated. Like COIN operations in urban areas, COIN in a rural area defeats the insurgency by securing the populace from the predations of insurgents, degrading their efficacy by disrupting the auxiliary forces or mass base's (see paragraphs 2-14 and 2-15, respectively) supportive actions, killing or capturing guerillas and their leadership, and bolstering the legitimacy of the government to sway popular support.

Note. The specific challenge of area security in rural terrain, and the holding of terrain in the long term is the consumption of combat power that security forces require to maintain a security presence long term. Given that security forces generally do not have enough combat power to control everywhere, they tend to conduct an operation, and then withdraw. Withdrawal over and over makes it difficult to build loyalty when an insurgent force does not withdraw. Area security and/or route clearance is huge in terms of a security effort and consumption of combat power but is essential.

3-75. The conduct of offensive operations usually occurs in either contested or insurgency-controlled areas. The usual mode of entry into these areas is either by ground or water, but air assault or parachute operations are also options. These operations use offensive tactics such as a raid, ambush, reconnaissance in force, cordon and search, attack (hasty or deliberate), pursuit, or combination of these. Their purposes are to—

- Destroy the insurgency force and the insurgent base complexes.
- Expand controlled areas.
- Isolate guerrillas from their support.
- Demonstrate support for the government and for the local populace.
- Harass the insurgents to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.

Example Lines of Effort for Rural Areas

3-76. As in urban areas, providing effective security to rural populations requires expanding the concept of security beyond the suppression of insurgent activity and protection from physical violence and intimidation. It must also include the full range of issues affecting individual lives and community life. While physical security remains the first priority, other critical factors include human rights protection and access to dispute resolution, vital community resources (migration routes, grazing land), and essential services. (See table 3-3 for LOEs common to rural operations, with at least one example action for each.)

Table 3-3. Rural operation lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Conduct raids with host-nation security forces to attack key guerrilla groups.
Establish civil control	Reinforce police operations, especially police stations and checkpoints, to increase populace control. Conduct a census.
Conduct security cooperation	Employ host-nation security forces to increase combat power, expand the area of operations, increase the number of villages secured, and increase the operation's legitimacy.
Provide support to governance	Establish or convene a village, district, provincial, or tribal council to identify and solve underlying issues.
Restore essential services	Provide projects such as wells to villages who support the government.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Provide economic stimuli such as the donation of a tractor or gasoline to neutral villages to increase their support for the government.
Conduct information activities	Generate support for the host nation government by highlighting government victories and exposing insurgent defeats and excesses.

Border Areas

3-77. In addition to typical external support, which usually means the supplies an insurgent group receives from across a border, insurgents also establish sanctuary base camps and conduct cross-border operations from adjacent countries. HN police, customs, or paramilitary border forces should be responsible for border security. However, the guerrilla threat may force the military to conduct border operations, particularly in rural areas. Because there is a significant risk of a blind eye or other corruption at border crossings, U.S. Forces should advise and assist HNSF efforts to interdict the movement of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. The focus of efforts is on isolating insurgent forces from their external

support and sanctuaries, not on petty crime or smuggling. Border operations normally require restrictive measures for tribal and ethnic groups who do not recognize the international boundary. This same group may be most prone to frequently crossing borders as their extended family networks may exist on both sides of what is, to them, an arbitrary line.

3-78. Border operations require close coordination and cooperation between armed forces, paramilitary forces, and government agencies. Physically sealing the border may be impossible since doing so could increase the requirement for forces and materiel beyond available resources. Placing forces or barriers at every crossing and entry site may also be impossible. In these cases, commanders prioritize where to place forces or barriers.

Routes

3-79. Based on detailed terrain analysis and intelligence, commanders determine infiltration and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and probable locations of base areas and sanctuaries. Such intelligence requires continuous and detailed surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance provides the information necessary for intelligence analysts to support the commander's decision making.

Zones

3-80. Any necessary establishing of restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones is possible. Doing so may require relocating many persons and always requires careful planning. Although armed forces may assist, civil authorities normally remain responsible for planning and executing the relocation program. Forced relocation is rare. (See Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions for information on the prohibition of the forced movement of civilians.)

3-81. A restricted zone is a carefully selected area, varying in width, and contiguous to the border. Authorities normally relocate all persons living in this zone. Authorities notify the public that they will regard all unauthorized individuals or groups in the restricted zone as infiltrators or insurgents.

3-82. Only civilians deemed loyal to the government live in a friendly population buffer zone. The government relocates all persons whose loyalty it cannot establish. The government may use this operation to establish information nets and employ loyal citizens in paramilitary units. The operation denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities.

Example Lines of Effort for Border Areas

3-83. In some cases, a state bordering a nation undergoing active insurgency provides havens for those insurgency forces to train, rest, and reorganize. In other cases, the neighboring state does not provide havens for insurgents. However, local or regional entities may yet allow insurgents rest and refuge despite the state's stance. (See table 3-4 for LOEs common to border operations, with at least one example action for each.)

Table 3-4. Border operation lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Conduct ambushes with and without host-nation security forces at likely insurgent crossing sites.
Establish civil control	Conduct training of host nation police and border forces to increase the speed and results of searches.
Conduct security cooperation	Maximize and integrate the number and effectiveness of host nation border police and Army forces.
Provide support to governance	Establish or convene village or tribal councils from both sides of the border to identify and solve issues.
Restore essential services	Provide projects such as restored irrigation systems to villages who assist governmental efforts to close the border. Provide projects that supply positive reinforcement for desired behavior.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Provide economic stimuli such as hiring village personnel to build border fences or to act as guards. Hire from neutral villages to increase their support for the government.
Conduct information activities	Canalize movement through official points of entry. Shape public perception of the border's legitimacy.

COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT

3-84. During COIN, a comprehensive effort typically involves actions that combine unified action partners. The increased number of military and nonmilitary participants and their divergent missions and methods present a challenge to coordination and unity of effort. Achieving unity of effort requires the greatest possible sharing of purpose and direction across all agencies. One means of achieving this is using a long-range plan designed around the COIN LOEs.

Task Organization

3-85. *Task organization* is a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission (ADP 5-0). Mission variables are categories of specific information necessary for conducting an operation. They help commanders determine the task organization and necessary augmentation of the COIN force. COIN operations generally place a premium on boots on the ground. Often, task organization for COIN operations substantially differs from task organization for units in conventional operations. During COIN operations, many units do not perform their traditional roles. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Afghanistan, many artillery Soldiers served in information activities, Infantry, CA, military police, or intelligence roles.

Troops-to-task Analysis

3-86. Given the extended nature of COIN, tactical units maximize all available assets to accomplish missions in each of the COIN LOEs and sustain Soldier proficiency, physical fitness, and emotional and psychological well-being. Troops-to-task analysis serves to maximize the employment of all assets. The process ensures units correctly assign tasks to units of appropriate size and capabilities. (See figure 3-3 on page 74 for an example format for a troops-to-task analysis worksheet.) Figure 3-3 on page 74 identifies specified and implied tasks and the requisite baseline unit or number of units, including HNSF, for accomplishing a task. It also consolidates AOs and assigns a higher headquarters (HQ). The troops-to-task process is useful for establishing units' AOs.

3-87. Often during the military decision-making process (MDMP) at the brigade combat team (BCT) and battalion echelons or during the troop leading procedures (TLP) for company and below echelons, staffs and tactical units begin troops-to-task analysis by determining a standard-sized element to use as a baseline (for example, Infantry platoon or squad, Armor platoon or section, Cavalry platoon or squad, company). The staff or tactical unit then determines the available forces, often including HNSF. Next, they list and prioritize each

task and determine the requisite forces for accomplishing each task, using the baseline element as a measure. Finally, they array forces and tasks IAW the commander's planning guidance.

		AO Platoon Requirements				
		AO 1	AO 2	AO 3	AO 4	AO 5
Specified or Implied Tasks	Secure key infrastructure	3	2	3	1	
	Establish and secure CMOC					2
	Conduct populace control	3	3	4	3	
	Conduct route security					3
	Conduct base security	1	1	1	0	1
	Secure PRT					1
	Totals:	7	6	8	4	7

Steps:

1. Subdivide urban areas into area of operations based on demographics.
2. List specified and implied tasks.
3. Determine a combat power metric such as 1 x platoon per key infrastructure, or 2 x platoon to secure the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).
4. Fill out table with number of platoons, and tally at bottom to determine how many platoons are required for each area of operations.
5. Consolidate area of operations if possible, and assign headquarters.

LEGEND
AO AREA OF OPERATIONS PRT PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

SAMPLE

Figure 3-3. Format for a troops-to-task analysis worksheet at platoon echelon, example

Sustained Tactical Operations over an Area of Operations

3-88. In larger counterinsurgent efforts, BCTs usually provide the requisite command and control apparatus to conduct sustained tactical operations over their AOs. Typically, a BCT's boundary aligns with an HN government's boundary. BCTs also allocate resources to subordinate battalions and coordinate with higher military HQs, host-nation (government) officials, HNSF, NGOs, or U.S. agencies.

3-89. Once a BCT is given an AO, it, along with the HN, coordinates with all other elements in the AO to synchronize operations, security, and sustainment. This includes the temporary attachment for control, if not command, of any element physically present in the AO. Examples include the USAID, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, military police, advisor teams, reconstruction teams, HNSF, or private contracting security firms since these elements may not completely understand the intricacies of the BCT's assigned AO.

3-90. The military force conducting COIN operations does not always consist of maneuver forces. COIN operations demand great effort, and therefore, Infantry, Armor, artillery, reconnaissance, and military police battalions serve as the primary tactical building blocks for combat in a COIN environment. The composition of the tactical force in COIN operations depends on the available forces and faced threat. Aviation, engineers, military working dog teams, special operations forces, and reconstruction teams are key force multipliers for the COIN force. In deciding how to employ these forces, leaders assess the variables of METT-TC (I), which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and information considerations. Normally, leaders organize most ground combat elements to fight as maneuver forces. However, the proper employment of other forces affords the COIN force many advantages. Unlike large scale combat operations, the elements attached to the maneuver force may actually be the main effort. It is important that commanders define the command and support relations between all

elements. In particular, they establish relationships by identifying who is the supported element and who is the supporting element.

Host-nation Security Forces

3-91. The HNSF must be included in or drive the unity of effort of counterinsurgent efforts. HNSF can be integrated in planning cells, share bases with U.S. Forces, and, at a tactical level, conduct parallel planning in corresponding staff sections. Additionally, HNSF provide many benefits to counterinsurgent efforts. (See chapter 8 for more information on HNSF.)

Capabilities Beyond Those of an Organic Unit to the Brigade Combat Team

3-92. Past COIN operations have identified the need for additional capabilities beyond the organic unit (for example, an Infantry battalion or company within an infantry brigade combat team [IBCT]). Human terrain teams, document and media exploitation (DOMEX) teams, personal security detachments, detainee holding areas (DHAs), HNSF advisor teams, base commanders and base defense commanders, (EOD) teams, intelligence support teams, information activity cells and/or non-lethal efforts cell, small kill teams (SKTs), female engagement teams, robust liaison teams, and tactical site exploitation teams have all proven useful during recent operations.

3-93. Studies, such an areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) or operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [also called PMESII-PT]) analysis or a cultural analysis, are available to the BCT, which can assist it in achieving its goals and objectives. They provide the requesting command or organization with detailed information, assessments, and conclusions about the AO and area of interest (AOI). A study can be a systems or functional analysis product. It achieves the level of detail that time allows. Studies support the development of knowledge and understanding of local populations; cultures and social hierarchies; societal systems or organizations; political systems and structures; religious practices and their impacts; ethical beliefs and their impacts; civil authority considerations; military organizations, structure, and equipment; and attitudes toward U.S. Forces, multinational forces, or HN forces. Studies include the views and attitudes of multinational and HN forces toward these factors. Complete studies include local, regional, or national perception of a foreign country.

3-94. DOMEX processes, translates, analyzes, exploits, and shares hardcopy documents and electronic media collected during operations. This capability increases in importance as the rule of law undergoes reestablishment and insurgents undergo trial instead of long-term detention.

3-95. Due to the organization of BCT and battalion headquarters, commanders and sergeant majors lack the combat power for moving freely in the OE. In recent operations, units have either built appropriate organizations or tasked platoons to serve as escorts, so they can reconnoiter their AOs, attend meetings, engage locals, check on Soldiers, and better visualize the fight. These escorts are often called personal security detachments. One technique implements a three- or four-vehicle rule for convoys, which renders that unit's strength at least 12 Soldiers strong.

3-96. A DHA is a temporary location to field-process and house any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force who can provide resources for intelligence exploitation. Detainees remain there for a short period of time and then either receive their release or undergo transfer to a theater internment facility. The DHA generally has a semipermanent structure designed to house detainees. Basic infrastructure includes latrines, basic hygiene facilities, medical care, interrogation facilities, and evidence holding areas.

3-97. HNSF advisor teams conduct operations to train HN military individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills (and limited space and cyberspace skills). They provide advice and assistance to military leaders, as well as training on select tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The BCT or battalion resources these teams, or HQ provides them. Team sizes and capabilities vary depending on the size of the HNSF they will be advising. (See chapter 8 for more information on HNSF.)

3-98. Base commanders and base defense commanders are typically internally resourced personnel and units of the brigade, battalion, and company levels. They command and control the base and supervise base defense. (See chapter 6 for more information on base defense.)

3-99. EOD support mitigates domestic or foreign explosive hazards, including unexploded explosive ordnances, booby traps, IEDs, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives. EOD units detect, identify, render safe, and dispose of explosive ordnances. Also, EOD specialists work with intelligence personnel to conduct explosive forensics and thereby identify the device makers and their ever-evolving methods of construction, emplacement, concealment, and detonation.

3-100. HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) are trained HUMINT collectors of documents and media sources that identify elements, intentions, capabilities, strengths, dispositions, tactics, and equipment. A team employs human sources as tools and a variety of collection methods to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. They conduct source operations and interrogate detainees.

3-101. A PSYOP team reinforces the effects of tactical and nontactical operations and discredits and demoralizes the insurgency. Their actions increase the probability of the unit's accomplishing its mission.

3-102. CA forces conduct CAOs to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between the unit and civilian organizations, governments, authorities, and populace within its AO. The BCT CAO officer (S-9) plans the BCTs CAO and assists the commander in planning and execution of the BCTs civil-military operations (CMO). Commanders may direct the establishment of a CMO center to establish relationships with indigenous populations and institutions and promote stability.

3-103. Site exploitation teams at the company or battalion level execute systematic actions with the appropriate equipment to ensure the proper identification, evaluation, collection, and protection of personnel, documents, electronic data, and other materials at a site. They also ensure the proper development of these sources into intelligence that will facilitate future COIN operations. They may collect biometric, physical, digital, and audio data.

PHASING FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

3-104. Phasing for COIN (that is, initial response, transformation, and sustainability fostering) mirrors the stabilization framework that guides the actions in an operation focused on stability operations tasks (see FM 3-96 for information on the stabilization framework). The OE determines the three phases. COIN operations start in any phase or even move to a previous phase due to changes in the conditions of the OE. Differences within and between phases may not occur on the surface, but relationships with HN forces can change drastically. For example, the latter stage of the transformation phase could differ greatly from the initial stages of the transformation phase. Span of control and the AO for COIN operations can expand within a phase and as operations continue within the stabilization framework. Since the three phases are based on the OE, they provide a baseline for augmentation. Augmentation focused on a common goal may require military police, legal, public affairs, CA, PSYOP, engineering, sociocultural experts, sustainment, and SFA team personnel.

Initial Response Phase

3-105. The initial response phase generally reflects tasks executed to stabilize the OE in a crisis. In this phase, military forces perform stability tasks during or directly after a conflict whose security situation hinders the introduction of civilian personnel. Activities for this phase aim to provide a safe, secure environment and to attend to the immediate essential services for public needs. At the tactical level, the initial response phase may appear similar to the clear phase of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework (see paragraphs 3-113 through 3-149). During this phase, units may incorporate strike operations (see paragraphs 3-152 through 3-157) and populace and resources control (PRC) operations (see paragraphs 3-163 through 3-166). Against a determined insurgency, the initial response may last months or years.

Transformation Phase

3-106. The transformation phase entails a broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity building. It is executable in either crisis or vulnerable states. COIN forces are most active during this time, working aggressively along all LOEs. The goal of this stage is to develop enduring capability and

capacity in the HN government and HNSF. As civil security assurance increases, focus expands to include the development of legitimate governance, the provision of essential services, and the stimulation of economic development. Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace develop and strengthen. These relationships increase the flow of intelligence. This intelligence facilitates measured offensive operations ICW the HNSF. The HN government increases its legitimacy by providing security and essential services, expanding effective governance, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

3-107. At the tactical level, the transformation phase may appear similar to the hold phase of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework (see paragraphs 3-117 through 3-150). Units may use strike operations (see paragraphs 3-152 through 3-157) and PRC operations (see paragraphs 3-163 through 3-166) that complement their holding efforts. Once again, a tenacious insurgency may cause the transformation or hold phase to last months or even years.

Sustainability Fostering Phase

3-108. The sustainability fostering phase encompasses long-term efforts of capacity building and reconstruction activities to establish the conditions that will enable sustainable development. The expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HNSF, characterize this phase. The main goal for this phase is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HNSF. During this phase, the multinational force works with the HN in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate. Some areas may still need quick reaction force and fire support capabilities, but HNSF perform more functions along all LOEs with the assistance of multinational advisors. Also, during this phase, the HN establishes or reestablishes the requisite systems to provide effective and stable governance that sustains the rule of law. The government secures the populace continuously, builds and sustains legitimacy through effective governance, effectively isolates the insurgency, and meets and manages public expectations.

3-109. The sustainability fostering phase at the tactical level may appear similar to the build phase of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework (see paragraphs 3-117 through 3-150). Due to the stable security environment, PRC operations (see paragraphs 3-163 through 3-166) may relax. Ungoverned areas may still require strike operations (see paragraphs 3-154 through 3-159) to disrupt the remnants of an insurgency. This phase progresses at the pace of the HN's ability to rebuild infrastructure and institutions, assume security control, and provide legitimate governance.

Operational Methods for Counterinsurgency

3-110. Several options are available to conduct COIN operations—generational approach; network engagement; shape, clear, hold, build, and transition; identify, separate, influence, and reintegrate; limited support; partnering; and combined action. Each operational approach offers a different but complementary avenue and is weighed against the OE. COIN operations may employ each approach individually or ICW the others. Negotiation and mediation and counterguerrilla operations are other methods to counter an insurgency. (See JP 3-24 for information on each method.)

Generational Approach

3-111. A generational approach includes activities that interact with segments of a population. It seeks to influence the HN toward educating and empowering relevant population groups to participate in legal methods of political discourse and dissent. The approach itself empowers population groups to protest in nonviolent manners and participate in decision making and development in their communities. This type of public action robs an insurgency of a disillusioned population from whom to recruit. Under the assumption that most insurgencies last for years, it becomes important not only to influence present-day leaders but also to mold the next generation of leaders into peaceful participants in the existing form of government.

Network Engagement Activities

3-112. Network engagement involves interaction with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to achieve the commander's objectives. This approach remains applicable during all military operations and to both conventional and IW.

However, network engagement is particularly important to COIN operations due to their entwinement with friendly, neutral, and threat networks. To counter insurgent, terrorist, and other threat networks effectively, COIN forces partner with friendly networks and conduct network engagement with neutral networks through mutual trust and cooperation. Conducting network engagement with neutral networks helps eliminate support for an insurgency.

Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition

3-113. A shape, clear, hold, build, and transition operation is executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt operations by the insurgency. This direct method has the following objectives: create a secure physical and psychological environment; establish firm governmental control of the geographic area; and gain the populace's support. Popular support can be measured in terms of local participation in HN programs and political systems to counter the insurgency and whether people give counterinsurgents usable information about insurgent locations and activities. (See section II for details.)

Identify, Separate, Influence, and Reintegrate

3-114. This operational approach combines several activities that affect relevant population groups. It is a proactive, indirect method of countering an insurgency and works well ICW other operational approaches. It works best when conducted by, with, and through the HN. However, fledgling or poorly trained HNSF may require conduct by U.S. Forces. The activities identify and separate insurgents from the general population and then influence those insurgents toward renouncing violence, either as individuals or as an insurgent group. The COIN force's separating out of insurgents can invoke the feeling of isolation in the latter. They may then come to believe their causes do not have popular support. When insurgents feel isolated and unpopular, they often become susceptible to influence and ultimately defect, surrender, or renounce violence.

Limited Support

3-115. COIN operations do not always require large combat formations. In many cases, U.S. support is limited to missions like advising security forces and providing fire support or sustainment. U.S. support to the Philippines and U.S. COIN support to El Salvador in the 1980s are examples of such limited support. The limited approach focuses on building HN capability and capacity. Under this approach, HNSF are to conduct the combat operations, including any clearing and holding missions.

Partnering

3-116. Effective COIN requires the integration of HN and supporting nation civil and military efforts (for example, CMO; see paragraph 3-8) into a single, holistic approach. All parties put forward a concerted effort to ensure common understanding of the overall challenge and each other's roles and capabilities in addressing it. Commanders and staffs, interagency partners, and others conducting COIN operations share an understanding of civilian roles and relationships and plan for, deconflict, and enable unity of effort for activities.

Combined Action

3-117. Combined action is a technique for joining U.S. and HN ground troops into a single organization, usually a platoon or company, to conduct COIN operations. It is appropriate in environments lacking large insurgency forces or significant insurgent resources and freedom of maneuver. Combined action normally joins a U.S. rifle squad or platoon with an HN platoon or company. Commanders use this approach to hold and build while providing a persistent counterinsurgent presence among the populace. The approach first achieves security and stability in a local area and then follows with offensive operations against insurgency forces now denied access or support. Combined action units are not equipped for offensive operations and rely on more robust combat units to perform this task. However, they can establish mutual support among villages to secure a wider area.

SECTION II – DIRECT APPROACH TO COUNTER AN INSURGENCY

3-118. The operational philosophy behind the direct approach—also called direct method (see FM 3-24)—to counter an insurgency is the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. When tactical units directly interface with society, they generally follow shape-clear-hold-build-transition phasing. In addition to guiding COIN forces' actions, these five phases comprise a framework for understanding HN actions. While the U.S. COIN force is acting as the primary COIN force until the HN deploys its forces, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides an effective operational approach. (See paragraphs 3-6, 3-12, and 3-43 through 3-44 for details on the operational approach. Also, see the note following paragraph 3-43 for information on the indirect approach.)

SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-TRANSITION FRAMEWORK

3-119. A shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework in a COIN operation combines offensive (finding and eliminating the insurgency), defensive (protecting the local populace), and stability (rebuilding the infrastructure, increasing the local government's legitimacy, and bringing the rule of law to the area) operations. Each basic structure—shape, clear, hold, build, and transition—combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees (see figure 3-4 for typical operation combinations). In the clear phase, offensive operations usually dominate; in the hold phase, defensive operations receive emphasis; and in the build phase, stability operations are preeminent. The framework usually applies to a relatively long-term operation and requires the commitment of a large number of forces.




Figure 3-4. Shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework

HISTORICAL PATTERN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

3-120. Historically, the COIN pattern of operations was to clear, hold, and build one village, area, or city at a time and then to expand into another area. This type of operation was successful in Algeria and Indochina for French forces (as tache d'huile or the oil-spot strategy), in Malaysia for British and Commonwealth forces (as The Briggs Plan), and in Tal Afar (see FM 3-24) for U.S. Forces (as clear-hold-build). This pattern of operations aimed to develop a long-term, effective HN government framework and presence in the area and thereby secure the populace and provide essential services and legitimate governance.

3-121. In 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam launched the Strategic Hamlet Program to complement its advisory efforts to the Republic of Vietnam's military. Extremely ambitious, the program was designed to build fortified hamlets, relocate the population to the hamlets, and train paramilitary forces, known as the regional or provincial forces, across South Vietnam. The intention was to increase security and quality of life for the civilian population. With the goal of fortifying half of the number the hamlets in only 18 months, the program struggled to provide governance, solve bureaucratic issues, ensure security for all the villages, and limit corruption. Additionally, the program met resistance from locals, who felt an ancestral connection to their own villages.

3-122. Although the program was abandoned in 1964 after the war, the North Vietnamese Army acknowledged that the well-run hamlets forced their guerrilla forces to relocate to other, insurgency-controlled areas. The South Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet program failed to identify or coordinate several key prerequisites for a clear-hold-build operation, especially by not obtaining an adequate number of troops, securing sufficient resources, nor providing a local government up to the task (see paragraph 3-126).

3-123. Since their inception, the purpose of America's ground forces has been to fight and win the Nation's wars. However, the Army has been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat, particularly during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN operations continue to require Soldier readiness both to fight and to build, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors.

3-124. COIN operations by nature require a substantial commitment of resources and time and a clear unity of effort by civil authorities, other agencies, and security forces. FM 3-24 (2014) introduced the operational philosophy behind the direct approach known as the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. Army doctrine was adding the shape and transition phases to the basic clear-hold-build structure. COIN commanders shape operations, first planning and preparing for a long-term effort, before conducting a clear-hold-build operation. Since all foreign armies are eventually seen as interlopers or occupiers, U.S. Forces have come to understand that the sooner decisive efforts can transition to HN institutions without unacceptable degradation, the better.

3-125. Commanders do not believe all COINs end the same way. The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides for protracted struggle. The conduct of COINs employs a wide range of operational approaches. For example, the insurgency in Sri Lanka fought with conventional tactics and ended in a traditional offensive operation, appearing more like a conventional offensive operation than an application of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. In some cases, the government or insurgents impose their will and control the populace. While specific insurgencies remain unique, in the countering of many insurgencies, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a starting point for COINs to understand HN actions and then enable those actions.

SHAPE

3-126. Commanders select where to conduct operations based on the HN's abilities to impact the root causes of the insurgency, to alter or eliminate the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist in the area, and to isolate the insurgents from the general population. Having selected an area, the commander conducts shaping operations to prepare the OE for continued COIN operations using the rest of the Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-transition framework. Shaping operations use both lethal and non-lethal capabilities against four key audiences: the population, the insurgents, the COIN force, and regional and international stakeholders. At the strategic level, commanders may use SC or FID to shape the larger area. Tactical commanders could use shaping operations such as delivering non-lethal messages against the insurgents; establishing, training, or augmenting a local security force; executing targeted raids to disrupt insurgent leadership; erecting barriers or checkpoints to deny enemy freedom of movement; or coordinating with an NGO or coalition partner to be ready to deliver support in execution. It is important the commander understand what conditions will be set by shaping operations and continuously assesses operations to ensure those conditions are achieved prior to transitioning to the next step.

Reduce the Possibility of Insurgencies

3-127. Across the range of military operations, U.S. Army forces take actions and set priorities to shape an environment capable of reducing the possibility of insurgencies. In some instances, an OE and its related variables are unstable or fragile, and hostile actions against an HN government begin. In this environment, the United States may decide to employ some type of military capability. (For example, during SC, the United States might provide military forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN.) Commanders maintain understanding of the effects of the actions and priorities of the U.S. Forces on an OE. Once acting in this environment, commanders continue to maintain situational understanding of the environment and appreciation of the effects of U.S. actions in that environment. Their understanding influences their decisions of how to shape the environment. An insurgency can occur within another conflict. For example, during large-scale combat operations, land forces take actions to prevent insurgencies from occurring both during operations and also upon the opposing conventional force's defeat. While an insurgency is only a possibility in large-scale combat operations, it can occur during major operations or afterward. Commanders and staffs assess the possibility of an insurgency in any OE and take actions to prevent one from occurring. These actions include a range of stability operations and SC activities. (See FM 3-96 for information on stability operations and SC activities.)

Identify and Coordinate Resources

3-128. During conceptual and detailed planning, commanders may designate one LOE as supporting efforts to help conceptualize and describe the concept of operations in resourcing. At a minimum before conducting operations, commanders identify or coordinate for—

- Adequate troops, both U.S. and HN, to clear insurgents from a designated area.
- Interagency cooperation and unity of effort.
- Sufficient resources, expertise, and labor to restore essential services.
- A local government willing and able to support the operation.
- The means for U.S. Forces and HNSF (military, police, and paramilitary) to share intelligence.

Conduct Shaping Missions, Tasks, and Actions Within Counterinsurgency

3-129. Shaping missions, tasks, and actions within COIN dissuade or deter insurgents, reassure the civilian population, and set conditions for continued operations. U.S. Forces do not prepare for or conduct shaping in isolation. All involved partners are necessary for shaping the area, the civilian population, and the insurgency for future operations. The persistent and consistent execution of shaping activities throughout all phases enhance the HN government's legitimacy, reinforce multinational cooperation, shape public perception, influence the behavior of relevant actors, develop HN military capabilities, improve information exchange and intelligence sharing, and mitigate conditions that could lead to a crisis or escalation of current insurgent activities.

3-130. When shaping SC activities, U.S. Forces must work with and support an HN's own IDAD programs (see paragraph 3-11). This framework applies to all units involved in the COIN (for example, an Infantry battalion directly performing SFA actions; a special forces team member advising an HN; a member of a combatant command integrating and evaluating various SC capabilities). Within the context of COIN, commanders and staffs understand and support an HN's IDAD strategy. In the long run, HN forces—and not U.S. Forces—will either defeat or be defeated by the insurgency. Supporting an HN's IDAD plan is one of the more effective ways in which the United States enables an HN to defeat an insurgency.

3-131. During shaping preparation, commanders and staffs collect information on the insurgent components. One effective tool is a population census with biometrics data collection devices. A census can collect additional data such as the specific root causes of the insurgency in a particular area, public expectations in the HN, and HN institution capabilities (for example, government, security, rule of law). Commanders and staffs conduct disruption operations to impact the insurgency's ability to influence an OE. COIN forces conduct deception operations while preparing for follow-on shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations to force the insurgency to alter its current operations.

3-132. Actual shaping missions, tasks, and actions begin by controlling access to an AO and continue by controlling key points in that AO. Security and influence can then spread from these areas. Often, the steps of shape-clear-hold-build-transition operations overlap, especially between the hold and build phases, and the conduct of activities transpire simultaneously. COIN operations generally have the following objectives:

- Create a secure environment for the physical safety and psychological well-being of the populace.
- Provide continuous security for the local populace.
- Eliminate the insurgent presence.
- Reinforce political primacy.
- Enforce the rule of law.
- Rebuild local HN institutions.
- Gain popular support.

CLEAR

3-133. A *clear* is a tactical mission task in which a unit eliminates all enemy forces within an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force destroys, captures, or forces the withdrawal of insurgent combatants and leaders. Commanders normally initiate the clear phase through a series of offensive operations including search and attack or cordon and search operations, a combat patrols (security, ambush, or raid), or an area security mission (see ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.10 for information). In COIN operations, clearance includes efforts to kill or capture insurgent leaders, identify and search insurgent infrastructure, seize and destroy stockpiles

of arms and ammunition, and otherwise degrade the insurgents' ability to conduct operations. It is unlikely that clearance operations will completely destroy or force the withdrawal of insurgents; however, it can render them inactive. Later, during the hold and build phases, local national intelligence will enable security forces to continue to clear insurgents.

Offensive Operations in the Clear Phase

3-134. Offensive operations predominate during the clear phase. However, defensive and stability operations are still conducted. Eliminating guerrilla forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent infrastructure. While insurgent leaders and underground elements exist, insurgents will continue to recruit, undermine the HN government, receive supplies, and coerce the populace through intimidation and violence. With the elimination of guerrilla forces, so begins the removal of the insurgent infrastructure such as leaders, underground elements, and auxiliary forces. This is to be done in a way that minimizes local public impact.

3-135. If insurgency forces were not eliminated but expelled or if they had broken into smaller groups, they would be prevented from reentering the area. Once counterinsurgent units establish their bases, platoons and companies are not static. They remain mobile, patrolling the entire area. The local populace receives compensation for damages that occurred while the counterinsurgents cleared the area of the insurgents.

Defensive and Stability Operations in the Clear Phase

3-136. Conducting defensive and stability operations maintains gains and sets the conditions for future activities. Examples of defensive and stability operations follow:

- Isolating an area to cut off external support and to kill or capture escaping insurgents.
- Conducting periodic patrols to identify, disrupt, eliminate, or expel insurgents, as well as secure the populace.
- Employing security forces and government representatives throughout the area to secure the populace and facilitate follow-on stages of development.

Lines of Effort to Clear

3-137. Although the clear phase emphasizes the establishment of civil security, operations across the other LOEs must also occur. (See table 3-5 for LOEs, with at least one example action for each.)

Table 3-5. Clear lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Conduct the targeting of insurgent leaders and guerrilla bands, the cordon and search activities in insurgency-controlled areas, and raids on safe houses.
Establish civil control	Train and support police or paramilitary forces to implement curfews and thereby to interdict insurgent movement.
Support host-nation security forces	Train and employ host-nation security forces to increase combat power during clearing operations.
Provide support to governance	Identify key government and local leaders who can support the reestablishment of local government to administer the area. Identify the underlying public issues.
Restore essential services	Identify those essential services requiring immediate attention.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Identify potential projects to stimulate the local economy and create additional support for the government.
Conduct information activities	Focus the public message on gaining and maintaining overt support for counterinsurgent efforts, as well as on informing the local populace that any active support for the insurgency will prolong combat operations, thereby incurring risk to them and their neighbors. Focus the message to the insurgency force on convincing it that it cannot win and that the most constructive alternatives are to surrender or cease its activities.

HOLD

3-138. After clearing the area of guerrillas, the COIN force then assigns sufficient troops to the cleared area to prevent their return, to defeat any remnants, and to secure the populace. Such is the hold task. Ideally, HNSF execute the hold framework in a COIN operation. Success or failure depends on effectively and continuously securing the populace and on reestablishing an HN local government. Although offensive and stability operations continue in this phase, the conduct of defensive operations help secure the populace.

Area Security During the Hold Phase

3-139. *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communication, installation routes and actions within a specific area (FM 3-90). Population-centric area security is common across the range of military operations but is a fixture during the conduct of COIN operations in a stability-focused OE. Population-centric area security typically combines aspects of area defense and offensive tasks (for example, search and attack, cordon and search, raid, ambush) to eliminate the effectiveness of internal defense threats. During the conduct of area security operations, the commander maintains the relationship with HN authorities and civilian population. A clear understanding of the commander's authority is essential when exercising the necessary degree of control to ensure security and safety for all military forces and the civilian population located in a COIN force's AO.

Bases

3-140. Cleared areas are best held by establishing COIN forces in bases in or adjacent to the area. From these bases, COIN forces concentrate on primary purposes—to disrupt, identify, and ultimately eliminate the insurgents, especially their leadership and infrastructure; to end popular support for the insurgency; and to gain popular support for the government.

3-141. The exact locations of these bases and their actual force composition are key counterinsurgent decisions. The main consideration is the desired effect on the populace, especially an increase in their security. If an area supports the insurgency, a base emplacement in known insurgent strongholds may sever that relationship between the insurgents and populace. However, if the area is neutral or contains pockets of support for the government, the base lies where it can best support in developing the area. Wherever they are located, commanders must be cognizant of the disruptive effects of stationing security forces in close proximity to even a receptive populace. For instance, local security patrols, serpentines, barriers, high vehicle traffic, guard points, crew-served weapons in overwatch, and the potential for rotary-wing traffic makes security force presence problematic.

Securing the Populace in the Hold Phase

3-142. When adequate HNSF are not available, units often hire and train local paramilitary forces to secure cleared villages or neighborhoods. Not only do members of the paramilitary have a stake in their area's security, but they also receive a wage. Providing jobs stimulates the economy. Having jobs improves public morale and allows locals to become members of the local governmental process. Any sort of job, even menial jobs or manual labor serves the same purpose of putting locals to work and provides them with an option for an income other than through guerilla activities. Commanders should emphasize getting locals to work as fast as practicable.

3-143. Public contact remains continuous, both planned and unplanned. Occupying an AO or emplacing a base among the civilian population forces information activities and provides opportunities for public contact. From the first day, culturally capable Soldier actions in these areas serve to build bonds with the local populace and in many cases change public attitudes. Ultimately, the goal of this contact is twofold—to develop a more accurate understanding of the situation and to turn popular support toward the government.

3-144. Another consideration is to secure key physical infrastructure and the associated troops to task analysis. Because resources remain limited, parts of the infrastructure that are vital for stability yet vulnerable to attack must receive priority of protection. Analyzing the risk and likelihood of attack on various sites in the AO informs proper prioritization. (See chapter 7 for details.)

Lines of Effort to Hold

3-145. Although the hold phase emphasizes defensive actions, operations across all LOEs must still occur. (See table 3-6 for LOEs, with at least one example action for each.)

Table 3-6. Hold lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Continuously secure the populace and separate the insurgents from the general population. Establish firm governmental presence and control over the area by recruiting, organizing, arming, and training local police or paramilitary forces and integrating them into operations against the insurgents. Continue to conduct raids on insurgent leaders or underground elements.
Establish civil control	Train and support police forces to combat crime. Enforce curfews to curtail insurgent movement.
Conduct security cooperation	Interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships. Promote specific security interests to develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. Support activities to help the United States and host nation gain credibility and build the host nation government's legitimacy. Minimize the effects of or prevent insurgencies and thwart their regeneration.
Support host-nation security forces	Conduct combined patrols, checkpoints, cordon and search activities, and raids with host-nation security forces.
Provide support to governance	Establish or reestablish a political apparatus for the government to replace the insurgent apparatus.
Line of Effort	***Example action(s)***
Restore essential services	Establish contracts and empower or finance local governments to initiate necessary repairs or restorations to sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations (SWEAT-MSO) (see paragraph 1-59).
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Conduct local improvements to increase popular support for the host nation government, secure the populace, and contribute to the reconstructing effort.
Conduct information activities	Affirm that counterinsurgency forces supporting the host nation government are in their areas of operations for the long term. Reinforce the counterinsurgency forces' intention to secure the populace from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals.

BUILD

3-146. The build phase of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework carries out programs designed to remove the root causes of the insurgency, improve the lives of the civilian population, and strengthen the HN's ability to provide effective governance. Stability operations predominate during this phase, with nonmilitary agencies conducting many important activities. During this phase, the HNSF are primarily responsible for security. Progress in building support for the HN government requires protecting the local populace. People who do not believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting counterinsurgent efforts.

Offense, Defense, and Stability in the Build Phase

3-147. COIN forces execute offensive and defensive operations and stability operations tasks when building is the dominant COIN action. The priority for tasks and operations during the build phase is stability. The main effort goes toward increasing HN governmental capacity. Examples of stability operations tasks for building include advising and assisting the HNSF, initiating professional development programs (including professional education) for host-nation security and governance, facilitating HN governance activities, providing support to local and national demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration, and developing the host-nation rule of law and conflict resolution mechanisms. U.S. Forces do still execute offensive operations during the build phase. Examples of offensive operations for building include providing a quick reaction force for the HNSF, conducting overwatch for specific HNSF operations, conducting follow and assume or follow and support for HNSF operations, or conducting precision strike operations in support of HN or U.S. objectives. COIN forces execute defensive operations as well, including protecting the populace, conducting combined action with the HNSF to secure combined positions, and conducting sanctuary denial and disruption operations.

Securing the Populace in the Build Phase

3-148. To secure the populace, security forces continuously conduct patrols and use measured force against insurgent targets of opportunity. Just as in the hold phase, when HNSF are inadequate, units consider hiring a paramilitary force to secure the village or neighborhood. Public contact is critical for the success of localized counterinsurgent efforts. Actions to eliminate the remaining covert insurgent support and infrastructure such as underground elements, auxiliary forces, and the mass base continue because any insurgent presence will continue to threaten and influence the populace.

Lines of Effort to Build

3-149. Although the build phase continues to secure the populace and separate the insurgents from the general population, the focus shifts to the other LOEs. (See table 3-7 on page 86 for LOEs, with at least one example action for each.)

Table 3-7. Build lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Conduct targeted raids led by host-nation security forces on insurgent leaders and underground elements. Provide a U.S. quick reaction force to the host-nation security forces.
Establish civil control	Continue to patrol the area and control the populace while improving host nation police training and equipment. Expand the role of the police forces appropriately.
Support host-nation security forces	Increase the number of host-nation security forces patrols. Reduce the role of the U.S. Forces.
Provide support to governance	Continue to support and enhance the local government.
Restore essential services	Continue projects to restore SWEAT-MSO items (for example, by building roads and schools, digging wells, and establishing emergency services).
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Continue providing projects to stimulate the local economy, such as market repairs.
Conduct information activities	Affirm that security forces supporting the host nation government are in the area for the long term, eliminating insurgent leaders, organizations, and infrastructure, and improving essential services. Focus information-related capabilities on two key audiences—the local populace and the counterinsurgency force. Focus the message to the populace on gaining and maintaining their overt support for counterinsurgency. Ensure command themes emphasize the continuous security provided by U.S. Forces and host nation forces affords an environment free of intimidation, violence, and coercion. Ensure the messaging to the populace underscores that U.S. Forces are repairing damaged infrastructure caused by the conflict and that their presence in the host nation is at the invitation of the government to aid the populace.
Legend: SWEAT-MSO—sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations; U.S.—United States	

TRANSITION

3-150. Transitioning is the process by which commanders and staff verify the HN institutions' preparedness to assume primary responsibility for governance and security. It is also the method by which any remaining responsibilities transfer to the HN. The transition of responsibility for a function to the HN occurs when the HN is capable of assuming responsibility. Transitions are not one-time events. Effective transitions require commanders and staffs to plan, prepare, execute, and assess transition tasks throughout the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. Transitioning is an ongoing process comprising multiple transitions to HN agencies at different times during a COIN operation. It is a deliberate, orderly course of development and transference of responsibility. It is a continual process through which the HN assumes responsibility incrementally as it is ready.

Security Cooperation

3-151. Those security tasks associated with transitioning support the U.S. Forces' transition to SC tasks. During this phase, the U.S. ground force, under the combatant command and ICW the U.S. embassy, helps generate and then implement theater engagement plans and programs. The end goal of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is to create the necessary conditions for the HN to counter an insurgency independently. However, creating these conditions does not necessarily preclude all presence of external counterinsurgents. U.S. counterinsurgents may remain in an area during and beyond the transition phase to train HNSF or institutions, provide enablers, or begin SC tasks at the request of the HN government.

End State Achievement

3-152. During the transition phase, HN government representatives reestablish government offices and normal administrative procedures. National and international development agencies rebuild infrastructure and key facilities. Local leaders develop capability and receive authority. Life for the area's inhabitants begins to stabilize.

DIRECT ENABLERS

3-153. Direct enablers during COIN operations include strike, targeted threat infrastructure, and PRC operations. Strike operations find, fix, and finish (destroy) insurgency forces in insurgency-controlled areas in which COIN forces will not maintain a post-conflict, permanent presence. Targeted threat infrastructure operations destroy an insurgency force's physical infrastructure. PRC operations are government actions to control the populace, deny insurgent access to the populace and resources, and reestablish law and order. Other direct enablers integrated into ongoing counterinsurgent efforts include indirect fires, direct action missions (special operations forces), and direct air and space enablers.

STRIKE

3-154. A *strike* is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). Strikes are short-duration (generally 1 day to several weeks), offensive, tactical operations (see chapter 5) conducted in contested or insurgency-controlled urban or rural areas to find, fix, and finish (destroy) insurgency forces. Small, highly mobile combat forces operate in dispersed formations to find and fix the insurgents. Upon locating the insurgents, commanders direct forces to attack, pursue, and destroy them. If contact is lost, the units resume aggressive patrolling (reconnaissance and surveillance) to reestablish contact and destroy insurgency forces before they can rest, reorganize, and resume operations.

3-155. Strike operations destroy insurgency forces and insurgent bases, isolate insurgency forces from their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes and lines of communication. Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. They use ground or waterborne means of entry, as well as air assault and parachute deliveries. Strike operations employ offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, attacks (hasty or deliberate), search and attack, cordon and search, and pursuits. They often complement the clear-hold-build framework.

3-156. Speed and surprise are important to strike operations. The sudden, unexpected delivery of combat forces into an insurgency-controlled or a contested area provides significant advantage to the forces conducting these operations. Speed and surprise are achievable by air assaults to insert the first forces into the AO. Later airlifts or by other modes of transportation can deliver subsequent forces. Direct and indirect fires are useful when blocking escape routes or areas that ground forces have not secured.

3-157. A strike on an insurgency force normally requires superior combat power. COIN forces strive to engage immediately and to destroy insurgents before they can disperse. Depending on the situation, attacks (hasty or deliberate) are conducted on insurgent bases with fortifications. After a successful attack on insurgency forces, troops thoroughly search the area for insurgent personnel and for the insurgency's supplies, equipment, and documents. All captured enemy documents enter intelligence channels as soon as possible to ensure their proper exploitation by DOMEX teams. Pursuit operations destroy or capture fleeing forces. Mortar and artillery fires, close air support, Army aviation attack, and air assault forces support ground pursuit.

Purpose of Strike

3-158. Strike operations serve as a means to encourage reconcilable insurgents to the negotiation table. The purposes of conducting strike operations are to—

- Harass the insurgency and thereby to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
- Destroy the insurgency force and its base complexes.
- Demonstrate government resolve and garner popular support in the local area.
- Set the conditions to expand shape-clear-hold-build-transition operations.

Lines of Effort to Strike

3-159. Some LOEs are common to strike operations in general. (See table 3-8 for LOEs common to strike operations, with an example action for each.)

Table 3-8. Strike operation lines of effort and related actions

Line of Effort	*Example Action(s)*
Establish civil security	Conduct attacks, raids, search and attack activities, and cordon and search activities with host-nation security forces against insurgency forces and insurgent bases.
Establish civil control	Conduct populace and resources control operations such as a census, a checkpoint, or a search in villages or residential blocks to control the populace.
Support host-nation security forces	Employ host-nation security forces to increase combat power.
Provide support to governance	Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying public issues.
Restore essential services	Provide projects that supply positive reinforcement for desired behavior, such as digging a well for a tribal sheikh who provides intelligence.
Provide support to economic and infrastructure development	Hire people from neutral villages or residential blocks to increase support for the government.
Conduct information activities	Use information-related capabilities to highlight government success and expose insurgent defeats and excesses.

TARGETED THREAT INFRASTRUCTURE

3-160. Targeted threat infrastructure operations destroy an insurgency force's physical infrastructure. They are normally only effective when another force is securing the populace and building legitimacy. In other words, they serve as a method to enable another force. This method seeks to destroy the necessary requirements for an insurgency to conduct combat operations. Targeted threat infrastructure operations proactively target the physical and societal mechanisms supporting and fueling the insurgency. When using this method, commanders and staffs anticipate the consequent injury to civilians or damage to civilian property, which are not to exceed the concrete, direct military advantage anticipated from an attack on a military objective. When commanders and staffs use the targeted threat infrastructure method, they avoid the outcome of the recruitment of insurgent fighters that comes from their being too heavy-handed with those elements of society who are not fully or willingly supporting the insurgency.

3-161. Targeted threat infrastructure operations integrate into a host-nation effort (lead effort) to secure the populace. They can be effective tools when well planned and executed and when they avoid the negative consequences of alienating the populace and decreasing the HN government's legitimacy. They prove essential to a HN's counterinsurgent effort when they eliminate the necessary physical infrastructure of an insurgency. However, they are a means to enable an HN and not a method to employ in lieu of another effort to secure the populace.

3-162. The effective targeting of a threat infrastructure requires knowing whence an insurgency gains its strength. Commanders and staffs then attack those areas and facilities. Targeting these resources, in turn, requires careful proportionality analysis. Any effort to attack them must balance against the HN government's

legitimacy among the affected, local population. Key targets for the targeted threat infrastructure method are any materials or physical items serving to fuel the insurgency. The following are examples:

- Illicit crops such as cannabis (for marijuana), coca bush (for cocaine), or opium poppies.
- A road network serving as the primary means of movement for insurgents.
- Power systems and water systems deep in insurgency-controlled areas.
- Illicit funds.

3-163. Aggressive strikes and raids are central to targeted threat infrastructure operations. The tactic they deploy is not a slash-and-burn technique but entails well-planned, pinpointed attacks on the critical enablers of an insurgency's operation. Commanders and staffs plan for and limit second- and third-order effects of attacks. Attacks are targeted solely against the infrastructure on which the insurgency relies. For example, crop eradication aimed at reducing cash flow would be unlikely to affect an insurgency with a large amount of financial resources. It might, however, hurt the HN government's legitimacy.

3-164. In conducting counter threat finance activities (for example, targeting the illicit funds for fueling an insurgency; see paragraph 3-52), commanders and staffs work with the power of interagency law enforcement and international legal partners to find, interdict, and seize huge sums of money that the illicit regime must launder before using again for legal currency. Counter threat finance specialists in targeted threat infrastructure operations target those funds that have been determined to have been gained through illicit means for seizure at the local level. For example, if a man were a small farm owner and lived on a palatial estate with three cars, he would undergo investigation. Also, his funds could be targeted if it were determined his wealth was from illicit means and those means were being used to fuel an insurgency. (See FM 3-24 for information on counter threat finance activities.)

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

3-165. PRC operations are government actions to protect the populace and its materiel resources from insurgents and to identify and eliminate the insurgents and the insurgent organization, activities, and influence. The objective of PRC is to support the preservation or reestablishment of law and order in an area or the entire nation. PRC operations are normally nontactical, police-type actions and a responsibility of HN governments. However, U.S. Forces may conduct PRC operations until HNSF possess the readiness and capability. PRC operations happen independently of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework or of strike operations, or they serve as an integral part of each of these operations.

3-166. In peacetime, police forces protect the populace and state resources from criminal activity of both armed and unarmed perpetrators. During an insurgency, however, the number of armed insurgents, the willingness of insurgents to use violence against the police and populace, and the potential for civilian displacement or refugees often create a situation wherein police forces and their operations cannot successfully curtail the insurgents nor protect the populace and resources.

Purpose of Control

3-167. PRC operations serve as a means to mitigate sources of instability, understand and nest operations within political objectives, and achieve unity of effort. The purposes of conducting PRC operations are to—

- Establish and maintain a secure environment of physical safety and psychological well-being for the populace.
- Limit insurgent initiative and freedom of movement.
- Sever relationships between the populace and insurgents.
- Identify and neutralize insurgent support activities.
- Establish and maintain security of resources.

Lines of Effort to Control

3-168. PRC has proven an effective way of separating insurgents from the general population, and it also helps in identifying insurgents. PRC comprises two distinct, yet linked components—populace control and resources control. Along the LOEs most common to PRC operations, the government takes actions to—

- Establish surveillance, civil reconnaissance, and information collection efforts.
- Establish and enforce control measures.
- Establish protection measures.

Establish Surveillance, Civil Reconnaissance, and Information Collection Efforts

3-169. Surveillance, civil reconnaissance, and information collection efforts include both overt and covert surveillance and civil reconnaissance of known, likely, or potential insurgents and insurgent targets. They also include the creation of a quick reaction force to exploit information collection or conduct greater surveillance and civil reconnaissance of insurgent targets. Expanded police intelligence operations and surveillance operations, including police informants and agent networks, link criminal acts of robberies, kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion to insurgent activities.

3-170. Establishing and maintaining surveillance over key individuals, groups, and activities of interest is mandatory, as is maintaining increased surveillance over critical locations, especially governmental and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. Such surveillance includes the maximum use of sensors, cameras, and other electronic surveillance equipment to provide continuous coverage of areas and routes suspected of use by insurgents. Monitoring local media (for example, radio and newspaper) collects necessary information and tip-offs for rumor control and counterpropaganda development. In addition, the public and private actions of influential local leaders provide additional insight. Living forward with the populace and listening to what they are saying are of great import. Other examples of surveillance, civil reconnaissance, and information collection efforts include:

- Establishing general covert surveillance measures at marketplaces and stores.
- Using HCTs or the HN police to recruit local civilians for surveillance and information collection.
- Establishing an incentivized system of village or residential block wardens with reporting procedures. Holding the wardens accountable for knowing what transpires in their zones.
- Integrating a broad variety of missions across multiple domains, ranging from civil reconnaissance, PSYOPs (see paragraph 3-101), and local leader engagement.

Establish Control Measures

3-171. Increased control measures have proven useful to COIN operations in limiting insurgent activities due to an insurgency's ability to hide among the general population. The performance of normal security functions remains efficient and effective, especially when these functions contribute to the root causes of the insurgency in any way. However, the insurgent presence requires the implementation of additional security measures and operational techniques. Two options involve increasing the size of police and border patrols in response to the threat and establishing quick reaction forces to reinforce any patrol or site rapidly.

3-172. Combating an insurgency requires control measures to limit insurgent freedom of movement and supporters. Thorough planning and coordination of control measures ensure rapid and efficient operations, with a minimum of delay and public inconvenience. All control measures adhere to national laws and regulations and remain enforceable. Each control measure undergoes tailoring to fit the situation and serves to establish or reinforce the HN government's credibility.

3-173. The HN government explains and justifies all control measures to the HN population. The measures remain the least restrictive while still accomplishing the purpose. Ideally, public perception views them as necessary to protect the populace from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals, and the local populace and leaders accept them before their implementation. Popular support naturally minimizes public inconvenience from the measures. The restrictions from the measures are to end as soon as the situation permits.

3-174. Once control measures are in place, the HN government implements a punitive system for offenses against them. Punishments are announced and equitably enforced. Blame for any outcomes of public inconvenience or discomfort from the measures falls squarely upon insurgents. PSYOP products, widely

disseminated among the populace, help ensure the measures produce the intended effect and undermine popular support for the insurgency. Control measures fall under one of two category types:

- Populace control measures:
  - Curfews.
  - Travel permits and passes.
  - Movement restrictions.
  - Restricted areas.
  - Censuses or resident registrations.
  - Block committees.
  - National or regional identification systems or identification cards.
  - Job licenses such as for medical, security, and construction personnel.
  - Immigration restrictions.
- Resource control measures:
  - Rationing or purchase permits.
  - Registration of firearms.
  - Registration of automobiles and trucks.
  - Export and import restrictions.

Enforce Control Measures

3-175. Enforcement operations require conduct both day and night. Checkpoints and roadblocks check and control the movement of personnel, vehicles, and materiel and prevent actions advantageous to the insurgency. During COIN operations, checkpoints and roadblocks assist the government and COIN forces in maintaining the initiative against insurgents by disrupting, interfering with, and deterring the insurgents' operations and disrupting the insurgents' decision-making cycle. Interpreters, HN police, and other HNSF are important to the conduct of checkpoints and roadblocks. The joint use of checkpoints and roadblocks can channel vehicles and personnel into a checkpoint or a search. Key considerations include the following:

- Roadblock—a barrier or obstacle (usually covered by fire) useful for blocking or limiting the movement of vehicles along a route.
- Checkpoint—staffed locations of movement control for 1 to 72 hour(s) depending on the purpose of the operation.
- Inspections—random cordon and search activities both day and night of residences, shops, and other buildings to find arms, propaganda material, and insurgents; with additional considerations:
  - Military working dog (see ATP 3-39.34) teams are very effective at intercepting contraband.
  - Ensuring the intelligence supports the inspections serves to decrease public resentment.
  - These activities also serve as a subterfuge for a meeting with key people.
- Rewards for cooperation and compliance; with additional considerations:
  - The ultimate reward to the populace is the removal or reduction of restrictions, but any reprieve must balance against the increased potential of the insurgency's benefitting from the same.
  - Establish essential service or economic stimulation projects in cooperative towns, villages, or neighborhoods.
  - The government can provide monetary or material compensation to individuals for information they provide on suspicious activities.

Establish Protection Measures

3-176. Two protection measures for lines of effort to control are detainee operations and population and resources control. DHAs and dislocated civilian camps are established to protect and care for detainees and dislocated civilians by providing appropriate shelter, medical care, and sustenance. (See FM 3-57 for the temporary resettlement of dislocated civilians and FM 3-63 for the conduct of detainee operations.)

Note. Detainees include retained persons, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), civilian internees, captured persons, or one otherwise under the control of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel. They do not include DOD personnel, DOD contractor personnel, or those held primarily for law enforcement purposes, except where the United States is the occupying power. As a matter of policy, all detainees receive treatment as an EPW until a competent authority determines and grants their appropriate legal status IAW the criteria enumerated in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), or the Third Geneva Convention. Detaining officials recognize the entitlement of detainees, including those who do not satisfy the applicable criteria in the GPW, to humane treatment. The inhumane treatment of detainees is illegal, and neither the stress of combat nor any deep provocation justifies it. (See JP 3-31 for information on detainees.)

ADDITIONAL DIRECT ENABLERS

3-177. Other direct enablers integrated into ongoing counterinsurgent efforts include indirect fires, direct action missions (special operations forces), directed actions (conventional forces), and direct air and space enablers. Indirect fires integrate well into ongoing, direct and directed action counterinsurgent efforts. Special operations forces can conduct direct actions or small-scale, short-duration strikes in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments; they employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Conventional units (directed actions) provide an effective capability to COIN operations since they integrate into host-nation efforts to perform cordon and search activities, search and attack activities, air movements, air assaults, or raids. Direct air and space enablers afford supported ground forces a significant, asymmetric advantage over insurgents with their flexibility, situational understanding, freedom of maneuver, and access to immediate joint fires. They include air mobility, casualty and medical evacuations, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, cyber operations, global positioning systems, personnel recovery, precision engagement (Army aviation attack, close air support, and air interdiction), and electromagnetic warfare (EW).

Chapter 4
Counterinsurgency Planning and Preparation

The aim of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is to set the conditions that eliminate an insurgency by securing and garnering popular support and increasing the host nation (HN) government's legitimacy. To accomplish this aim, tactical COIN planning and preparation use all capabilities, not just military capabilities. This chapter reviews the common practices, tactical actions, conceptual and detail planning, and targeting at the tactical level within COIN operations.

SECTION I – COMMON PRACTICES

4-1. The operational environment (OE) of the 21st century has proven complex due to increasing urbanization, globalization, and religious extremism; multivarious enemy, friendly, and neutral actors; and ambiguous guidance and direction which may come from a joint, combined, or otherwise multinational command. Planning and preparation focus the desired outcome and results, the ways to achieve them, and the commander's vision, intent, and tasks to subordinates. Progress in COIN is slow and difficult to measure. COIN can continue for weeks, months, or even years. Due to the complexity of COIN operations, commanders and staffs rely upon common practices when planning and preparing for COIN. These practices require certain conditions and parallel planning within tight planning horizons to impose order on the chaos and to craft functional plans for multiple counterinsurgent efforts to increase the HN government's legitimacy.

REQUIRED CONDITIONS

4-2. Historically, successful COINs tended to focus on a political set of required conditions that were unified in their approach and flexible in how they addressed core insurgency issues. To establish these conditions, COINs secured the populace, enhanced the HN government's legitimacy, and, above all, showed patience. A condition is a specific circumstance framed in military terms that, once set in place, accomplishes one aspect of the desired end state. Thus, achieving a set of conditions accomplishes the mission, and achieving all the required conditions for a desired end state attains that end state. For tactical commanders, the desired end state is typically a set of required conditions, usually for each line of effort (LOE), that defines the successful achievement of the commander's tactical objective. For a military operation to be deemed successful, it must culminate in a political end state of various conditions that have popular support.

KEY PUBLIC ISSUES

4-3. Ultimately, for an insurgency to succeed, it must provide a solution to key public issues, specifically the root causes of public grievances. Likewise, for a COIN to succeed, it must identify and address these key issues. Such provisions require close coordination and effective cooperation between the HN (civil, police, and military), the U.S. COIN force, and all coalition partners to bring the full strength of each to bear on all levels of the insurgency.

STRENGTHENING THE HOST NATION GOVERNMENT

4-4. Since no decisive battle exists in COIN operations, creating an environment in which an HN government can and will defend itself and its people often takes years. The U.S. and other COIN partners maintain their focus on strengthening the HN government's ability to defend against insurgency. Most insurgencies use coercion and terror to gain popular support and to inhibit it for the government. That being the case, their target is frequently those connected to the government—police, local administrators, and teachers. Therefore, when counterinsurgent goals include earning popular support, the COIN must protect its supporters and their families and communities. Often, protecting and controlling the populace enables the COIN to achieve other conditions.

SEPARATION

4-5. History demonstrates an advantage to COIN forces separating insurgents from the general population. Counterinsurgents both physically and psychologically separate the two parties. Physical barriers such as concrete walls and fences effect physical separation. These were proven useful in Northern Ireland, Israel, and Iraq. Historically, relocating vulnerable populations to safe zones has created successful physical barriers, as long as the relocation was voluntary. Nevertheless, unless it poses obvious risks to their security, the populace benefits most from retaining freedom of movement. Furthermore, physical barriers that emplace a level of confinement do not serve well. COIN narratives, information-related capabilities, and social media accomplish psychological separation. Aspects of electromagnetic warfare (EW) are effective in psychologically separating the insurgent organization when they are using radios, televisions, or computers to recruit or to win over a neutral population.

4-6. Populace and resources control (PRC) is effective in separating insurgents from the general population, and it helps in identifying insurgents. PRC comprises two distinct, yet linked components—populace control and resources control. For separating the two parties, populace control is the most effective component. Populace control provides security to the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies personnel to the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. These controls are normally a responsibility of HN civilian governments. U.S. Forces may implement PRC when HN civilian authorities or agencies are unable or unwilling to accomplish the task. PRC conducted as part of COIN operations requires extensive planning and preparation among various military and civilian organizations (see paragraphs 3-165 through 3-168 for more information on PRC operations).

GOVERNING RESPONSIBILITIES

4-7. Military government operations have historical significance which predates the founding of America as a nation. Historically, the U.S. Army has established a military government in the aftermath of various conflicts. Army officers and supporting personnel have conducted military government functions during regional pacification efforts in the United States. The U.S. Army conducted reconstruction with military government after combat operations in Mexico, California, U.S. Southern states, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, Germany, and Japan. Military government authority is derived from three sources: International law, the statutory authorities found in Title 10 and Title 22, United States Code, and the regulatory authority within DODD 5100.01, DODD 3000.05, and DODD 2000.13. Only the President of the United States and Congress can authorize the implementation of military government and assertion of transitional military authority. Transitional governance is the actions taken to assure appropriate control and the continuity of government transitional functions throughout the range of military operations. Transitional governance is the transition of foreign governing authorities and functions based on a U.S. Government policy decision or directive.

CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

4-8. Most successful COIN operations and campaigns, historically speaking, stressed the need for military forces to be learning organizations capable of quickly adapting to the ever-changing conditions in an OE. The most effective COIN narrative explains the current situation and describes how the HN government will defeat the insurgency. It invokes relevant cultural and historical references both to justify counterinsurgent actions and to make the case for the government's winning. Situation and course of action (COA) analyses assume every insurgency is different and conditions will change and require a carefully tailored response. The COA approach, therefore, is stated in broad categories, not specific models, and will be heavily informed by an assessment of the HN's post-conflict needs and understanding of sensitivities to foreign intervention.

ASSISTANCE ESCALATION

4-9. History demonstrates a tendency for COIN assistance to creep incrementally from small-scale, less intrusive to ever larger and more obvious forms. The involvement of the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan clearly illustrated this phenomenon. The danger in such escalation is that the in-depth assessment and policy evaluation that precede an initial decision to assist may not necessarily be repeated at every increment, and the government may find itself enmeshed in a scale of effort never reached during logical deliberation. Due to the protracted nature of a COIN, the possibility of escalating involvement remains a major consideration during the formulation of the desired end state. If the situation assessment is thorough

enough and accurate, then the chosen level of involvement should suffice to address the problem. However, more often, U.S. policy makers significantly underestimate the scale of effort it takes to defeat an insurgency.

EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION

4-10. *Knowledge management* is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). Unit staffs (led by the executive officer (XO), brigade combat team [BCT] and battalion respectively [see FM 3-96 for information on knowledge management]) use this process as the management tool to ensure the right information gets to the right users at the right time in a useable format without inundating users. Staff members also ensure users do not receive the same information multiple times. For example, circular reporting can result in erroneous analysis by intelligence professionals or can negatively impact decision making by commanders.

PROGRESS TOWARD MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

4-11. Tactical units continually measure progress toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the OE and the progress of operations and compare those results to their initial vision and commander's intent. Units evaluate an operation's progress or success through intelligence assets, patrol reports, engagement with local leaders, graffiti, or surveys. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessments to meet objectives and achieve the desired end state. Commanders must be prepared to recognize their initial assessments may have been insufficient, incomplete, or inaccurate, or that conditions have changed, and be willing to make adjustments going forward.

4-12. The assessment process measures the efforts supporting the operational and tactical objectives and the progress toward the desired military end state of the COIN across all LOEs. The process uses measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to gauge progress. An MOP applies a criterion to assess friendly actions and thereby to evaluate task accomplishment. MOPs confirm or deny the task was correctly performed. An example MOP might ask how many people registered to vote at a particular location such as a school during a given week. An MOE applies a criterion to assess changes in system behavior or capability or in the OE and thereby to evaluate the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. An example MOE might ask whether a newly dug well did indeed provide clean drinking water to the recipient village.

4-13. An MOE and MOP help commanders and staffs determine when all or part of the mission has been accomplished. The criteria used depend on the situation. Many times, the HN government or HNSF must determine and evaluate the MOPs and MOEs. These measurements often require readjustment as the situation changes and objectives evolve. When the direct measurement of an effect is not possible, indicators of the achievement of the effect are measured. An MOE or MOP has four characteristics:

- Measurable—quantitative units or qualitative standards of measurement are applicable to mission results or outcomes.
- Discrete—each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the mission.
- Relevant—each measure makes a definitive statement about mission results or outcomes such that the most accurate and simple indicators of the desired results or outcomes would be visible.
- Responsive—each measure reveals changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately and effectively.

Note. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of the resulting assessments.

4-14. Commanders and staffs develop a standard or baseline to make comparisons and identify trends. From analyzing why a trend is up or down, staffs can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse negative trends. They can also capitalize on positive trends by determining the cause and applying successful tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) more broadly.

4-15. The approved plan or order includes assessment measures (MOEs and MOPs), and these undergo continuous reevaluation throughout preparation and execution. Higher echelon staffs ensure the number of MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelons, especially battalion and below. Well-devised MOEs

and MOPs, supported by effective management of available information, help commanders and staffs understand links between tasks, LOEs, and end state.

INTEGRATING PROCESSES

4-16. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs integrate warfighting functions to synchronize the force according to the commander's intent and concept of operations. The commander and staff use integrating processes (see FM 3-96 for information) to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process in addition to the major activities. The integrating processes are intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) (see ATP 2-01), information collection (see FM 3-55), targeting (see FM 3-60), risk management (RM) (see ATP 5-19), and knowledge management (see ATP 6-01.1).

PARALLEL PLANNING AND PLANNING HORIZONS

4-17. Parallel planning is a time-saving technique for commanders and subordinate leaders at all echelons when initiating the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) prior to the receipt of a complete operation order (OPORD). It allows units to conduct a multitiered planning process and thereby to generate tempo. It might also capitalize on subordinate units' increased understanding at the local level even when time is not a constraint. The outcomes are reduction in haste and increased time for all echelons to prepare for future actions, to consider the scope of their mission, and to determine the planning horizons. (See FM 3-96 and ADP 5-0 for information on parallel planning and planning horizons.)

PARALLEL PLANNING

4-18. *Parallel planning* involves two or more echelons planning for the same operations nearly simultaneously facilitated by the use of warning orders by the higher headquarters (ADP 5-0). It requires significant interaction between echelons. It can happen only when higher headquarters (HQ) produces timely warning orders and shares newly available information with subordinate headquarters. As an example, in a COIN environment where the subordinate battalions each has a far greater understanding of their area of operations (AO), they may provide local expertise to assist the BCT in planning a larger operation.

Note. See FM 3-96 for information on collaborative and distributed planning. Collaborative planning is the real-time interaction of commanders and staffs. Distributed planning involves the commander and staff members executing planning from different locations.

PARALLEL PLANNING WITH HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES

4-19. Parallel planning with host-nation security forces (HNSF), when modified, provides unparalleled understanding of, and consideration for, local cultures and sensitivities, and enables greater cross-level efficiency and simultaneous conduct of actions. It serves as an essential step toward the HNSF transition to the lead for security in COIN. Parallel planning with the HNSF assumes adequate planning capabilities on the part of at least some of the HNSF commanders and staffs, but also provides an opportunity for U.S. Forces to train HNSF in planning techniques or model them. When using HNSF for planning, the commander assumes several potential risks, including: the loss of operational security, loss of quality in planning efforts, and the potential for taking on biases within the HNSF or potentially legitimizing HNSF security practices.

4-20. Regardless of the difficulties of parallel planning, U.S. Forces and multinational forces make every effort to understand HN planning capabilities prior to conducting operations. Despite the many challenges in conducting parallel planning with HNSF, U.S. Forces and multinational forces completely integrate into the planning process as early as possible because the HN can bring specific and essential abilities to the COIN.

4-21. When U.S. commanders and staffs conduct parallel planning with HNSF commanders and staffs, they consider, among other conditions, varying or competing agendas, literacy rates, access to computer technology, and use of graphics or visual aids. (See FM 3-24 for information on HN contributions.) U.S. Forces and multinational forces have their own national security objectives, while HN counterparts may face conflicting objectives from the national to the local level. In countries with whom U.S. Forces or multinational forces partner, literacy rates may be lower. A lack of formal education, however, does not preclude the HN force capability to adopt and adapt the Greco-Eurocentric/Napoleonic style of military

planning. Computer technology in HNs can prove less accessible than in the United States or in countries at a comparable stage of technological advancement or prioritization. Commanders and staffs stand ready to use manual and paper-based methods of data collection, storage, and dissemination. Instructional programs, whether completed on a computer or terrain model, demonstrate preference for the presentation of information through visual modalities. In successful COIN operations, U.S. and multinational advisors develop the HNSF capability to process raw data into information that provides knowledge about and serves to deepen understanding of an OE. Both the security classification of HN counterparts and the foreign disclosure restrictions identify what level of information U.S. Forces have permission to disclose to or discuss with HNSF. (See ATP 3-16.02 for additional information on the disclosure process.)

DETERMINING THE PLANNING HORIZON

4-22. A *planning horizon* is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization's planning efforts to shape future events (ADP 5-0). During operations, a headquarters sends a tactical unit an operations plan or OPORD. Tactical units then consider the scope of their mission and determine the planning horizons. Planning horizon units of measure in combat operations are hours and days, but for tactical commanders in COIN operations, the planning horizon units of measure may be weeks, months, and years. Indeed, a tactical commander's main challenge is often their unwillingness to execute a plan developed by their rotational predecessor.

4-23. In contrast, when tactical commanders have responsibility for terrain and a mission covering multiple objectives systematically achieved, they require multiple extended planning horizons. Managing extended planning horizons impacts a tactical unit. The organization of staff processes must facilitate multiple outlooks since an extended outlook does not relieve the immediacy of current operations. However, a company commander without a staff may find this challenging. The three planning horizons are short-, mid-, and long-range.

Long-range Planning

4-24. Long-range planning addresses the duration of time during which the situation is too uncertain to plan for a specific operation. Commanders visualize what future (endstate) conditions they desire to exist, resulting from the cumulative effect of all their tactical objectives. Calculating the requisite time for establishing those conditions places an approximate scope on future planning. In general, when units are in a rotation and have a planned transfer of authority, the long-range plan addresses the conditions the commander desires to exist at three months after the transfer.

4-25. The long-range plan allows a commander to describe the commander's vision of the OE, the unit's role over time using LOEs, the unit's tactical objectives, the conditions those would create, and major events. A long lead time on major events can prove critical for anticipating resources, identifying milestones, or identifying and completing a series of interrelated tasks well in advance of the event. Friendly forces (such as in a transfer of authority), the population (such as in elections), or the insurgency can drive the event as it changes in phases, strategies, or organization.

4-26. Managing long-range plans allows the unit to synchronize its efforts with adjacent units and HQ. When an objective requires the cumulative effect of hundreds of company, platoon, and squad missions to achieve the desired end state, long-range plans using LOEs serve to ensure unity of effort across the echelons. Analyzing current operation assessments reveals the creation of the desired effects or their lack. Then, the long-range plan adjusts the activities of the current operations to direct unit efforts toward the desired end state. (See table 4-1 on page 98 for COIN long-range planning cycles.)

Table 4-1. Counterinsurgency long-range planning cycle

Planning Action	*Planning Guidance*	*Planning Horizon*
Division Long-range Plan and Long-range Calendar	3 months prior to start	Long-range plan horizon of 1 year and calendar of at least 1 year
Brigade Combat Team Long-range Plan and Long-range Calendar	2 months prior to start	Long-range plan horizon of 1 year and calendar of at least 1 year
Battalion/Squadron Long-range Plan and Long-range Calendar	1 month prior to start	Long-range plan horizon of 1 year and calendar of at least 6 months

Mid-range Planning

4-27. The long-range plan informs the mid-range plans and narrows the timeframe by which objectives (or milestones that support objectives) are clearly defined and operations are planned in detail along all LOEs. Thus, mid-range plans refine and expand upon the appropriate portions of the long-range plan. Mid-range planning does not exceed a unit's capabilities to forecast events reasonably, assign resources, and commit to a particular plan.

4-28. The mid-range plan analyzes the mission in detail and produces the warning orders, fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), and OPORDs that drive daily actions. It represents a commitment of resources and initiates preparation by subordinate units. Mid-range planning must be based on current assessments of the AO and must reassess all planning assumptions, initial assessments, MOPs and MOEs, and so on, to ensure sufficient understanding. (See table 4-2 for various mid-range planning cycles.)

Table 4-2. Counterinsurgency mid-range planning cycle

Planning Action	*Planning Guidance*	*Planning Horizon*
Division Quarterly FRAGORD	6 weeks prior to start of quarter	3 months
Brigade Combat Team Quarterly FRAGORD	1 month prior to start of quarter	3 months
Battalion/Squadron Quarterly FRAGORD	2 weeks prior to start of quarter	3 months
Company Plan and Calendar	1 week prior to start of quarter	3 months
Quarterly Assessment and Backbrief	Prior to start of quarter	3 or more months
Legend: FRAGORD—fragmentary order		

Short-range Planning

4-29. Short-range planning involves the scope of detailed planning associated with a specific mission or 1 to 4 weeks of normal operations. With resources assigned through mid- and short-range planning, the unit refines and expands the plan to include the tactical arrangement of forces, execution matrixes, patrol schedules, targeting boards, and information collection plans.

4-30. A framework order, also known as a steady state order, is a FRAGORD that identifies and tasks units for missions of 1 to 4 weeks in duration. An example would be a battalion FRAGORD that identifies the company to patrol the route each day during the upcoming week. Battalions and brigades often use the targeting process to produce a FRAGORD that drives short-range operations. (See table 4-3 for possible short-range planning cycles for units.)

Table 4-3. Counterinsurgency short-range planning cycle

Planning Action	*Planning Guidance*	*Planning Horizon*
Brigade/Battalion/meetings, targeting boards, calendars, and framework FRAGORDs	3 to 4 days prior to execution	1 to 4 weeks
Company calendar and FRAGORD	1 to 2 days prior to execution	1 week
Legend: FRAGORD—fragmentary order		

PREPARING FOR PROTRACTED COUNTERINSURGENCY

4-31. Preparing for protracted COIN requires the establishment of a headquarters and support structure appropriate for long-term operations (including information collection on insurgent components and detention options), even when the COIN force plans to leave a small footprint. A sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo limits for the various components of the force form the basis for planning and commitments. Even when the U.S. Government objective is reducing its military force levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN institutions usually remains for a long time, particularly in partnerships, outreach, and civil-military operations (CMO). U.S. preparatory actions for long-term support come at the request of the HN civilian population and focus on supporting internal defense and development (IDAD).

4-32. Commanders and staffs often face combat situations with which they have little experience or for which they have few resources and little time to prepare. In such cases, additional assets or capabilities may be assigned or attached to a unit to allow it to perform its mission more effectively. Whether commanders and staffs have several months or only a few days to plan, prepare for, train for, and rehearse a mission, shortfalls in requisite assets and capabilities may become evident and require commanders and staffs to seek additional assistance from outside sources. Commanders and staffs may find a changing phase of an operation requires additional or different skill sets to accomplish the mission. For such an instance, HQ remains prepared, proactive, and expeditious in augmenting subordinates with the requisite expertise to enable effective COIN operations. Adequate planning identifies and incorporates key enablers with a low density of personnel and equipment for support across COIN forces. Practically speaking, a battalion or BCT may be tasked with a COIN mission with little notice. However, that command will be required to rapidly expand to take on attached enablers, many of which they will have no prior experience with. Both the staff and commander will be required to adapt quickly.

4-33. Leader and Soldier training is one of the most difficult aspects of preparing for COIN operations. They must be prepared to immediately escalate from a passive presence to aggressive action against a fleeting enemy and just as quickly deescalate while continuing to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. They must not behave abusively or use excessive force during combat, even in extremely stressful situations. They will be taking on legal obligations, as well as the debilitating effects of fear and combat stress. Maintaining legal conduct during COIN operations is particularly difficult because the OE is often characterized by violence, lawlessness, distrust, and deceit. Preserving the lives of noncombatants and the human dignity of all is central to the successful accomplishment of a COIN mission.

4-34. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation between HN forces and U.S. Forces affects military capability. For example, eliminating or minimizing the insider threat, especially through the proper preparation and training of forces, can prove critical to mission success. In the following example, the battalion conducts security force assistance (SFA) so HN forces may perform the organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess (OTERA-A) tasks. Select SFA brigade (see ATP 3-96.1) and BCT forces (see FM 3-96)—task-organized to align with the appropriate counterpart—plan, prepare, execute, and assess SFA. When conducting unilateral and partnered operations and training, commanders and leaders assess the potential for an insider attack. Commanders and leaders take appropriate precautions to prevent insider threats, such as identifying personnel to pull security (covertly) at each echelon and ensuring all participants maintain vigilance in identifying insider threat behavior.

4-35. Commanders and staffs must develop and incorporate force protection preventive measures commensurate with the level of risk. These measures must prevent or mitigate enemy and other threat actions directed against DOD personnel (to include family members and contractor personnel), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection must include physical security and antiterrorism measures, personnel recovery, and active information efforts to counter adversary efforts that misinform and otherwise influence Soldiers, family members, and supporting organizations. (See ADP 3-37 and ATP 3-37.2 for more information on the protection warfighting function and antiterrorism and force protection measures.) Adversaries may view attacks against U.S. Forces as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted HN forces to conduct these attacks. While these types of insider attacks have remained localized to a particular theater's context, commanders nevertheless ensure their protection plans address the potential for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures. To reduce the potential for insider attacks, commanders establish vetting procedures for identifying individuals with questionable motivations toward the HN forces and U.S. Forces. It is imperative to remove from training all personnel who have not been

vetted. Further insider threat mitigation comes from counterintelligence (CI) screenings and biometric enrollments of military recruits and applicants for base employment. Local record checks remain part of command standard operating procedures (SOPs). In certain cultures, recruits and applicants for employment must submit statements of their trustworthiness from recognized and trusted elders. Combined action and community stability activities are two effective partnering techniques.

4-36. Although commanders remain prepared to lead COIN operations, they normally focus military operations to support a comprehensive effort led by an HN government agency or HNSF. Military forces also remain prepared to work in informally or formally integrated civil-military teams, which may include, and in some cases be led by, unified action partners with relevant skills and expertise.

4-37. Commanders and leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; they then trust subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just their mastering doctrinal TTP; they also receive training and education to adapt to their local situations, develop understanding about the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with (IAW) their higher commanders' intents.

SECTION II – TACTICAL ACTIONS

4-38. During COIN operations, small units address immediate objectives through specific tactical missions (for example, area security, cordon and search, search and attack). (Additional tactical missions include ambush or raid; see ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.8 for information on each type of mission.) The COIN also accomplishes objectives, which require time, assessment, and continual redirection toward completing the tasks arranged in LOEs. In addition to presenting commanders and staffs with objectives for immediate accomplishment and those for accomplishment over time, COIN operations typically present more tactical objectives to a unit than the unit could simultaneously address. The COIN thoroughly plans for and appropriately combines simultaneous and continuous offensive, defensive, and stability operations, transitioning from tasks that support one objective to tasks that support a different objective, often on the same day. Continuous assessment of the situation allows for the development and tailoring of a systematic approach. While the complexities of major combat operations remain appreciable, COIN operations bring a different set of complexities that requires staffs to apply analytical tools to achieve mission success.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

4-39. The long-, mid-, and short-range planning horizons help units establish a comprehensive approach toward assessing the potential of the success of their plans and toward revising the plan in response to a changing OE. COIN is an iterative process. No unit—company, battalion, or brigade—understands its AO well enough to craft a perfect plan across all established LOEs. Like a rheostat, regulating a line by means of variable resistances, each must be balanced against the others. Success, for example, in the LOEs to establish civil security and to establish civil control typically allows units to focus less on security and more on the LOEs to provide support to governance and to restore essential services. The most effective command and control functions often render to one single, permanent, senior local government official the overall responsibility for the COIN in the AO. These local officials in turn establish a local board comprising representatives from the civil authority, military, police, intelligence services, and civil population and managing all civil or military assets inside their AO. Within a comprehensive approach, commanders and staffs must consider how to—

- Secure populaces who remain loyal.
- Reclaim populaces who support the insurgency.
- Eliminate the insurgency politically, militarily, and philosophically.
- Develop HN military and police forces with the following functions:
  - Defend their own bases and other critical sites.
  - Protect and secure all elements of the populace equally.
  - Support the restoration of government presence and control.
  - Aggressively oppose the insurgency to neutralize their leaders, cadre and insurgent combatants by killing, capturing, or co-opting individuals or forcing them to leave the area.
  - Promote normalcy and stability.
  - Protect essential services.

    - Assist civic action projects.
- Help establish an HN legal framework and command and control functions to aid implementation of the plan.
- Secure the critical infrastructure, including critical governmental and societal sites.
- Win the information war, an effort that includes the following functions:
    - Counter insurgent propaganda.
    - Conduct friendly information-related capabilities.
- Continually analyze and assess the success of the plan.

VISUALIZING, DESCRIBING, AND DIRECTING OPERATIONS

4-40. As chapter 3 explains, LOEs are useful for visualizing, describing, and directing operations when positional references to an adversary have little relevance such as in a COIN operation. Ideally, LOEs combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability tasks with the cyclic, short-term events typical of combat operations. Using LOEs, commanders and staffs develop tactical actions and tactical missions, allocate resources, and assess the effectiveness of the COIN operation. The commander may specify which LOE represents the main effort, which serves as supporting efforts, and which LOEs are sustainment operations. Commanders synchronize activities through a comprehensive approach along multiple LOEs to achieve the conditions for the desired end state. They do not view them as a sequential, step-by-step process to success, although the cumulative effect of those actions is to achieve the endstate.

Note. Common COIN LOEs (establish civil security, establish civil control, support HNSF, provide support to governance, restore essential services, provide support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct information activities) are intended as guides (that are nested with higher HQ LOE planning) for tactical units. (See figure 4-1 on page 102 for a notional tactical unit's LOEs during a COIN.) LOEs can be combined, eliminated, or expanded depending on the insurgency and the overall situation. Adeptly employing these common LOEs requires a unity of effort with HN and other nonmilitary agencies. Paragraphs 4-41 through 4-65 summarize example COIN LOEs and their first primary subtasks.




Figure 4-1. Common lines of effort, example

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

4-41. Civil security protects areas, resources, and the populace from both external and internal threats. Ideally, Army forces focus on the external threats while police and security elements address internal security

against terrorists, criminals, and small, hostile groups. However, during an insurgency, the U.S. Army may also address the internal security threat posed by criminals, terrorists, and guerrillas.

4-42. Most societal and government functions require a secure environment and obtaining civil security is often a prerequisite for other stability operations tasks to be effective. Although U.S. Forces and multinational forces can provide direct assistance to establish and maintain security, this situation is at best a provisional solution. Ultimately, the HN must secure its own people. Typical civil security tasks include those following:

- Enforcing cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Conducting disarmament, demobilization, and registration.
- Conducting border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Supporting identification.
- Protecting key personnel and facilities.
- Rendering safe, clearing, decontaminating and/or disposing explosive and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) hazards.

Establish Civil Control

4-43. Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. This control reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Civil control channels the population's activities to allow provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force conducting operations. Typical civil control tasks include those following:

- Establishing public order and safety.
- Establishing an interim criminal justice system.
- Supporting law enforcement and police reform.
- Supporting judicial reform.
- Supporting property dispute resolution processes.
- Supporting corrections reform.
- Supporting public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

Support Host-nation Security Forces (Security Cooperation)

4-44. The U.S. military helps the HN develop the requisite forces for establishing and sustaining stability inside their borders through proficient security forces. It may expand to multinational operations in which HN forces and U.S. Forces fight alongside one another. HNSF include military forces, police, corrections personnel, and border guards. U.S. security forces must ensure their support to HNSF does not enable or perpetuate legitimate local grievances against them or compromise U.S. security forces' ability to operate within the rule of law. Typical tasks to support HNSF in development and employment include the following:

- Measuring (assessing) HNSF.
- Organizing HNSF.
- Building or rebuilding infrastructure for HNSF.
- Training HNSF.
- Equipping HNSF.
- Advising HNSF.
- Mentoring HNSF.
- Partnering with HNSF.

Provide Support to Governance

4-45. Sometimes no HN government exists, or the government is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for governance. In those cases, this LOE may involve establishing and maintaining a military government or a civil administration while creating an HN capability to govern. When executed well, these actions can eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. Governance activities are among the most important for establishing lasting stability in a region or nation. Stability operations tasks establish conditions, and military actions help shape the environment for the success of interagency and HN actions. Military efforts help achieve progress toward effective, legitimate governance by restoring public administration, re-sorting public services, and fostering long-term efforts to establish functioning political governance. However, military efforts at governance should utilize local actors and local methods to the maximum extent possible

and run the risk of being rejected as illegitimate if not. Typical tasks to provide support to the government include the following:

- Supporting transitional administrations.
- Supporting the development of local governance.
- Supporting anticorruption initiatives.
- Supporting elections.

RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

4-46. Army forces establish or restore basic, life-supporting services for the HN population. They then protect those until a civil authority or the HN can provide them. The COIN force works toward meeting public needs. Ideally, the military provides security only for humanitarian aid from other government, intergovernmental, and HN agencies. When an HN or agency cannot perform this necessary role, Army forces may provide essential services directly. Restoration of essential services is a flashpoint for public sentiment because it is both ever-present and a source of emotional responses and may require substantial security efforts. Typical tasks to restore essential services include the following:

- Providing essential civil services.
- Attending to dislocated civilians and detainees.
- Supporting famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
- Supporting public health programs.
- Supporting education programs.

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

4-47. Military tasks executed to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic development LOEs include both short- and long-term aspects. In the short term are immediate problems such as large-scale unemployment and the need to reestablish an economy. The long term involves stimulating domestic, robust, and broad economic activity. The stability a nation enjoys is often related to its people's economic situation and its adherence to the rule of law. However, a nation's economic health also depends on its government's ability to secure its population continuously. Support toward economic and infrastructure development helps an HN develop capability and capacity in these areas. It may involve direct and indirect military assistance to local, regional, and national entities. Short term actions, often called quick wins, can promote stability and security by putting money in the locals' pockets and putting them to work. However, this sort of development must support larger, or longer-term, efforts. Typical tasks to provide support to economic and infrastructure development include the following:

- Supporting economic generation and enterprise creation.
- Supporting public sector investment programs.
- Supporting private sector development.
- Supporting agricultural development programs.
- Restoring transportation infrastructure.
- Restoring telecommunications infrastructure.
- Supporting general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
- Using money as a weapon system.

CONDUCT INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

4-48. Information activities employ information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation (LOOs) during military operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries, allies/partners, and local populace (hostile, neutral, and pro) while protecting friendly forces. Public affairs considerations inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations (PSYOP); civil affairs operations (CAO); U.S. Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy; other necessary means for influencing foreign audiences; and leader and Soldier engagements in support of counterinsurgent efforts. Information activities are one part of all the military operations in an AO. All leaders remain directly involved in conducting information activities. These operations shape the information environment in three ways: by informing audiences of facts (with public affairs); by influencing select audiences in the AO (with PSYOP, civil affairs [CA], and face-to-face

meetings); and, most importantly, by persuading audiences through the actions of leaders and Soldiers. (See FM 3-13 for information on information activities. See related note on page 100.)

Note. The information activities officer, authorized at the BCT level as a special staff officer, is responsible for synchronizing and deconflicting the information-related capabilities employed in support of BCT operations. An information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity for creating effects and operationally desired conditions within a dimension of the *information environment*—the aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information (JP 3-04). Led by the information activities officer, the BCT staff synchronizes capabilities that communicate information to audiences and that affect the information content and flow for enemy or adversary decision making while protecting the friendly information flow. The information activities staff planner prepares appendix 15 and a portion of appendixes 12, 13, and 14 to Annex C (Operations) to the OPORD. (See FM 3-96 for information on the information activities officer.)

Considerations for Constructing an Information Activities Plan

4-49. Effective information engagement rallies popular support for counterinsurgent efforts, marginalizes violent insurgent actions, and neutralizes insurgency capability to make political decisions. Everything a tactical unit does or fails to do in COIN plays a part in its information activities plan. Therefore, information activities are synchronized and nest throughout common multiechelon themes. Themes are tailored to different target audiences in their presentation and distribution. In COIN, perception is often more important than truth.

Note. Any security force action contrary to the published information activities narrative immediately starts to degrade the effectiveness of the overall information activities plan. Bad things will happen during operations and insurgent forces will immediately take advantage of them. Successful security forces anticipate those things happening and prepare and rehearse their responses like any other drill. For example, if U.S. Forces cause civilian casualties or collateral damage, leaders will document everything, coordinate for death gratuities when appropriate, provide claims cards, and coordinate for a consequence management or humanitarian assistance drop and ensure the public affairs officer releases a press release on the incident. If insurgent forces cause civilian casualties, the public affairs officer releases the appreciate press release for that incident.

Successful Planning Characteristics

4-50. To craft an effective information activities plan, tactical units decentralize it to the lowest level, execute it in a timely manner, plan it with HN counterparts, and integrate it into all COIN operations, and make it accountable to HN culture. The commander takes an active interest in the unit's information activities plan, specifically the information activities intent, its emphasis with the staff and Soldiers, and the assignment of information activities responsibilities. The information activities plan incorporates the staff and remains dedicated to information activities success. Higher HQ prevents subordinate units' committing information fratricide by integrating activities and mechanisms, most often including daily or weekly synchronization meetings.

Themes

4-51. Tactical units most often implement their information activities plans through the construct of themes that address target audiences. Themes may include simple, easily repeated messages (similar in style to those found on bumper stickers) that are often referred to as *talking points*. Successful themes are those that—

- Keep objectives simple and achievable.
- Manage public expectations and perception.
- Keep counterinsurgent goals attainable.

- Use previous HN contacts and relationships.
- Remain distributable by Soldiers at all levels and by formal and informal methods:
  - Formal methods include posting public notices, briefing community leaders, and notifying local media.
  - Informal methods include patrols talking to local citizenry, handing out leaflets, and using loudspeakers.
- Respond to events and insurgent propaganda rapidly, admit COIN tactical units' mistakes, and deal honestly with the populace.

4-52. In COIN, themes undergo tailoring to resonate with the target audience. Cultural competence informs the tailoring process. Neighborhoods, ethnicities, religions, and classes compose audiences. A target audience may include U.S. civilians, international forums, U.S. Soldiers, HN civilians, and insurgents.

Host Nation Population

4-53. The most effective themes targeting the HN populace focus on rallying them against insurgent activities and highlight successes of the HN government and HNSF. Both themes serve to reinforce legitimacy. These themes generally build public cohesion and counter insurgent, divisive themes. Cohesive themes highlight—

- Commonality of ultimate goals.
- Commonality of labor, economic, and material problems.
- Ability to separate facts from perception and solve important problems.
- Ethnic similarities and common origins.
- Religion and social similarities.
- Traditional or historical evidence of unity.
- Failure of traditional solutions accompanied by awareness of a need for new solutions.
- Patriotism and nationalism.
- Ability to provide information to the government without fear of reprisal.

Insurgents

4-54. Insurgents manage public perception through propaganda and disinformation. Rarely do they have to tell the truth. In technologically advanced insurgencies, filming an attack may be as important as the attack itself. Therefore, themes aimed at insurgents prove effective when they divide insurgent groups into smaller groups and separate the insurgents from the general population. Other effective themes counter insurgent propaganda. In many successful information activities plans, reconciliation and amnesty for certain insurgents have been key components. Examples for these two targeted thematic approaches fall under two types of themes:

- Divisive themes such as those following:
  - Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the insurgency.
  - Leadership rivalries within the insurgent movement.
  - Insurgent criminality, ineptitude, ignobility, or contrariness toward public goals.
  - Danger of betrayal among insurgents.
  - Harsh living conditions of insurgents.
  - Selfish motivation of opportunists supporting the insurgents.
  - Patriotism and nationalism of domestic groups as distinguished from their lack in foreign fighters.
  - Unacceptable levels of unrestricted violence perpetrated by foreign fighters.
  - Public outcry.
  - Reconciliation or amnesty.
- Themes designed to counter insurgent propaganda, such as those following:
  - Possibility, even likelihood, of future attacks.
  - Psychological impact of future attacks.
  - Criminal attacks against HN population.
  - Foreign ties and leadership.
  - Insurgent ineptitude.

Public Affairs

4-55. This area is a commander's responsibility. The purpose of public affairs is to inform and educate proactively through public information, command information, and direct community engagement. Unlike other elements of the commander's information activities plan, public affairs actions have a statutory responsibility to inform various publics factually and accurately, without intent to propagandize or manipulate public opinion. Public affairs efforts facilitate a commander's obligation to support the proper informing of the U.S. citizenry, U.S. Government decision makers, and non-U.S. audiences (as tactical requirements dictate). Part of the planning process for them synchronizes public affairs and other information engagement tasks to ensure consistency, command credibility, and operations security (OPSEC). (See FM 3-61 for information on public affairs. See related note on page 102.)

Note. The public affairs officer, authorized at the BCT level as a personal staff officer, develops strategies, leads, and supervises the conduct of public information, community engagements, and command information. The public affairs officer's principal role is to provide advice and counsel to the commander and staff on how affected external and internal publics will accept and understand the BCT's operations. The BCT public affairs officer understands and coordinates the flow of information to Soldiers, the Army community, and the public and prepares Annex J (Public Affairs) to the OPORD. (See FM 3-96 for information on the public affairs officer.)

4-56. In a COIN environment, the most difficult portion of information activities is dealing with the media when necessary. Normally, a public affairs officer handles media contact. However, this is not always possible, and silence is not always the best solution. Refusal to speak with accredited members of the media may create strong negative impressions with strategic implications. Media best practices include the following:

- Stress the human aspects of a story, including the public impact of opposing operations, with which readers, viewers, or listeners can identify.
- Point out extremes in public needs and the fact that both Soldiers and HN counterparts are working to meet those needs.
- When the answer is not known, try to get it and then either inform the reporter or refer the reporter to another source, thereby establishing your team as a helpful source and developing a relationship that can help ensure future balanced coverage.
- Resist the temptation to attack other groups or organizations and avoid committing information fratricide.
- When questioned about another agency's activities, never speak for them, but rather, refer any questions to that agency for comment.
- Keep trusted reporters and editors who cover the AO about significant activities there.
- Answer media inquiries promptly, accurately, and courteously.
- Learn reporters' deadlines and use those to the friendly force's advantage.
- Encourage media to see what U.S. Soldiers and HN counterparts are doing.
- Avoid reacting emotionally to skepticism or hostility.
- Discuss issues calmly.
- Use facts to back up statements.
- Stay focused on the mission.
- Follow the policies of higher HQ and the public affairs officer for media interviews.
- Remain friendly, yet professional.
- Use reporters' names.
- Use clear, understandable language.
- Be prepared. Anticipate questions and think about various responses.
- Get to know the interviewers.
- Research the media's organizations and views.
- Find out how the reporter previously conducted interviews.
- Emphasize local public interests or those of other beneficiaries of the mission.

- Avoid speculation.
- State only facts that can be verified.
- Quote statistics with care, as data is easily repurposed.
- Avoid repeating questions, especially those with incorrect or inflammatory language, as this could easily be misquoted or taken out of context.
- Refuse discussions purported as off the record since no such situation exists in actuality.
- Avoid saying *no comment* since the expression can sound evasive.
- Stay objective. Save personal opinions and beliefs for a more appropriate time and place.
- Always remember that journalists are there for the story and will not hesitate to take advantage of you or your unit's good graces to get that story.
- Regardless of the original journalist's coverage, the tone or slant of a story can change substantially in editing.
- Research the tone, stance or position of a journalist as presented in their previous work to understand how they will come into the media event.

Psychological Operations

4-57. During PSYOP, select information and indicators are conveyed to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior to favor the originator’s objectives. PSYOP can be directed at the civilian population, specific groups, or individuals outside the United States and its territories. They can influence and modify the behavior of foreign target audiences in support of U.S. objectives. In a COIN operation, psychological operations seek to build popular support for the HN government. Typically, PSYOP direct their messages to the populace. However, they may focus on convincing enemy fighters to surrender rather than risk destruction. Therefore, these capabilities may be integrated into COIN targeting (see paragraphs 4-58 through 4-59). PSYOP units may be task-organized with maneuver forces. (See FM 3-53 for information on PSYOP.)

Note. The PSYOP staff planner, a special staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) authorized at the BCT level, is responsible for synchronizing and coordinating information activities with information-related capabilities. For a unit without an assigned PSYOP NCO, the commander of an attached PSYOP unit may assume those responsibilities. The PSYOP staff planner prepares appendix 13 (Psychological Operations) and portions of appendix 14 (Military Deception) and appendix 15 (Information Activities) to Annex C (Operations) to the OPORD. (See FM 3-96 for information on the PSYOP staff planner.)

Messaging to the Civilian Population

4-58. The PSYOP message to the population in COIN has three key facets:

- Obtain buy-in by the COIN force for actions that affect the populace through—
  - Control measures.
  - Census.
- Win over passive or neutral people by showing the HN government’s legitimacy and commitment.
- Encourage locals to provide information about the insurgency to U.S. Forces or HNSF.

Messaging to Insurgents

4-59. The PSYOP message to the insurgents has three key facets:

- Divide insurgent leaders and guerrillas by emphasizing differences—
  - In ideology within the insurgency.
  - In the degree of sacrifice required by different groups.
- Divide insurgents from the mass base by emphasizing—
  - Failures of the insurgency.
  - Successes of the government.
- Create a means for insurgents to abandon the movement and return to society.

Civil Affairs Operations

4-60. Insurgencies manifest from within a nation's populace. Governments counter insurgencies by promoting their legitimacy and asserting sovereignty within their assigned borders. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are population centric. As such the conflict resides with the civil component. CA forces support COIN by executing four core competencies, namely:

- Civil-Military Integration.
- Civil Network Development and engagement.
- Civil Knowledge Integration.
- Military Government Operations.

4-61. CAO, in counterinsurgency, should focus on the following tasks:

- Planning and conducting counterreconnaissance, civil engagement, and civil network development to determine causes of instability.
- Collecting, analyzing and evaluating civil information to provide a greater understanding of the civil component.
- Developing and integrating civil knowledge into COIN operations
- Providing support to civil administration, as required, to bolster host-nation government capability or capacity.
- Building and/or mobilizing civil networks to support stable governance.
- Conducting military government operations until the host-nation government has the capacity to conduct required governance activities.
- Improving host-nation legitimacy through activities such as military civil action.
- Developing, planning, and executing projects that address the humanitarian needs of the populace.
- Providing CAO and CMO training to host-nation and partner security forces and civilian agencies.
- Providing coordination, integration, and liaison between the IPI, interagency, and civil component to support unified action.
- Conducting activities with host-nation authorities, interagency, international organizations, NGO,
- private sector, or international military partners to deny support to the insurgents.

Note. The BCT CAO staff officer (S-9) is the principal staff officer dedicated to all CA-related matters. The S-9 evaluates civil considerations during mission analysis, recommends the establishment of the civil-military operations center (CMOC) in coordination with (ICW) the supporting CA unit commander, and prepares the groundwork for transitioning the AO from military to civilian control. The S-9 advises the commander on the military's effect on civilians in the AO relative to the complex relationship of the people to the terrain and institutions over time. The S-9 is responsible for enhancing the relationship between Army forces and civil authorities and the civilian population in the AO. Popular support provides freedom of maneuver, resources, and information that facilitate friendly operations and preserve combat power and lethality by mitigating the effects of the civil considerations on combat operations. The S-9 position is required at all echelons from a BCT through theater Army and in special operations forces formations at battalion and group. The S-9 prepares Annex K (CAO) to the OPORD. (See FM 3-96 for information on the CAO staff officer.)

Leader and Soldier Engagement

4-62. The actions of leaders and Soldiers are the most powerful components of information activities. Visible actions ICW carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more than either alone. Local and regional audiences, as well as adversaries, compare the friendly force's message and actions. Face-to-face interaction with leaders and Soldiers strongly influences public perception. Leaders' meetings with key communicators, civilian leaders, or others whose perspectives, decisions, and actions affect mission accomplishment and even mission success. These meetings serve as the most convincing venue to convey positive information, assuage fears, and refute rumors, lies, and misinformation. Useful for discussion purposes, three primary means of disseminating a unit's message include word of mouth, announcements, and town hall meetings. Regardless of the venue, any engagement with locals should be predicated on one guiding principle: Under-promise, and

over-deliver. Even the perception of a promise creates expectations, and a seemingly unfulfilled promise is one of the fastest ways to lose trust.

Word of Mouth

4-63. Word of mouth is the most basic form of sending and receiving information and the evolutionary end of every other method. It is the quickest and most common, inaccurate, and uncontrollable means of disseminating information but remains arguably the best way to send a message. Rumors, spins, casual conversations, and table discussions—whatever form it takes, word of mouth travels like wildfire. It spreads out of control, and the story grows and changes with each conversation. The locals discuss and the enemy spins everything they observe a unit doing. Units remain prepared to counter false information. Patrols continue with public interaction. They listen for rumors, correct the ones they hear, but do not waste time arguing about them. Units spread a positive image and reinforce the good things the government is doing in the area to help the community.

Announcements

4-64. Both written and spoken announcements are quick and controlled means of sending messages. Flyers, loudspeakers, and public speaking are useful ways of informing people of progress, incentive programs, civil projects, and operations.

Town Hall Meetings

4-65. Town hall meetings are an effective means of discussing points and counterpoints about coalition or government presence and operations or spreading a unifying message. They tend to draw those people who are most interested in the issues and who have the most legitimate grievances. This type of meeting exposes community leaders and public opinion. These are planned meetings with an open forum, so insurgents ensure those sympathetic to their cause are present and fighting for their interests in the political arena. Units exercise caution and avoid entrapment in arguments that take them off their message.

SHAPING PERCEPTIONS AND UNDERMINING INSURGENT NARRATIVES, EXAMPLE

4-66. COIN efforts rely heavily on coordinated military information support operations (MISO) and counterterrorism (CT) activities to shape perceptions and undermine insurgent narratives. Influencing foreign populations and adversary decision-makers is a key aspect of COIN within irregular warfare (IW). Similarly, CT supports COIN by targeting (both lethal and nonlethal targeting) terrorist networks that often overlap with insurgent groups, helping to disrupt their operational capabilities and reduce their influence. COIN continues to evolve as part of IW, it remains an indispensable approach for achieving strategic objectives by influencing populations, neutralizing insurgent forces, and fostering resilient governance structures.

Military Information Support Operations

4-67. In terms of U.S. Government COIN efforts, MISO forces are employed in support of nation assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), SFA, security cooperation (SC), combating terrorism, and peace operations. COIN is primarily political in nature and requires credibility of words and deeds to achieve mission objectives. The use of MISO is essential for publicizing the narrative and delivering information to target audience and populations to counter insurgency. MISO forces—

- Reduce the insurgent's capability to influence populations.
- Contribute to efforts to counter adversary information with timely, credible information to establish credibility.
- Publicize HN COIN efforts to maintain/build popular support for the HN and establish credibility of HN words and deeds.
- Assist in the development of the HN's information capability.

4-68. MISO forces in support of a joint force conduct MISO in direct and indirect support of the U.S. Government and HN COIN efforts. In direct support, MISO forces deployed to American Embassies plan and deliver information to influence in support of military operations and conduct interagency-intergovernmental support through the U.S. Department of State or other U.S. Government agencies to

publicize the narrative and establish credibility of words and deeds. Direct support is provided to stabilize the situation until the HN can assume responsibility for the COIN effort. Indirect support is provided to establish a HN's information capability by assisting, advising, and training the HN's government to assume responsibility for conducting operations. This shift of responsibility to the HN is necessary to increase credibility among the population that its government and the COIN effort are legitimate. Interagency-intergovernmental support and military information are employed to gain, hold, and reinforce the HN's legitimacy and COIN efforts.

4-69. U.S. COIN efforts contribute to achieving regional stability and the enhancement of relations with regional nations. The successful outcome of COIN operations is identified by the—

- Affected populace's consent to the rule of the established government.
- Popular support to the insurgent movement ceases.
- HN government constructively addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency.

4-70. MISO are critical in defeating insurgents by separating them from the population. Unless the population supports the HN government and its COIN effort, attempts to defeat the insurgency will likely fail. (See FM 3-24 for additional information.)

Counterterrorism

4-71. CT operations are actions taken directly against terrorist networks, and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. A U.S. Government department other than Department of Defense (DOD) will lead CT activities, both domestically and abroad. The Department of State is the primary agency to address threats and acts of terrorism within other countries. The Department of Justice is the primary agency within the United States. DOD capabilities augment and support other U.S. Government agency activities as part of a unified action. Joint force commanders and their staffs plan and execute operations in close coordination with those other agencies and affected HN institutions to achieve unity of effort. CT is part of the DOD's overall combating terrorism efforts; and CT operations are the offensive component of bilateral or multilateral antiterrorism programs established by the U.S. Government and HNs designed to preempt the actions of violent extremist organizations (VEOs). The ability to conduct MISO and other information-related capabilities, such as Soldier and leader engagement, is critical in CT operations. MISO are used to shape the environment so as not to be conducive to VEOs, their activities and support. Interagency intergovernmental support is conducted in support of Department of State and other agency efforts in CT. Military information is conducted as part of military efforts in combating terrorism. Following approved overarching themes at the interagency level, military information is coordinated and synchronized with interagency intergovernmental support to ensure the delivery of consistent, effective messages and actions across the departments. (See JP 3-26 for additional information.)

4-72. MISO forces conduct military information in both the direct and indirect approaches to combating terrorism to counter the terrorists' ideology, support moderate alternatives, establish an information capability with HNs, build their CT capacities, and attack VEOs and their infrastructure and networks. The direct approach focuses on protecting U.S. interests while attacking the VEOs. The indirect approach consists of actions to set conditions for others to achieve success, if necessary, with U.S. assistance. MISO forces conduct influence efforts, to include military information, in support of offensive measures conducted by special operation forces. MISO forces support Department of Army operations that target (lethal and nonlethal) VEOs and their supporters. Interagency-intergovernmental support includes influencing local populaces to decrease support for VEOs, and to provide time-sensitive, actionable intelligence to target VEOs. Tactical deception is conducted to influence desired actions (or inactions) from an enemy or adversary. Soldier and leader engagement is critical to ensuring relationships are leveraged to similarly influence actions or inactions, supporting desired U.S. outcomes.

4-73. CT is an activity of IW, which is focused on the population and not military platforms or armed forces as in traditional warfare. Influence and MISO are essential in applying the indirect approach. MISO forces—

- Advise commanders on the psychological effects of operations on VEO decisionmakers and supporters.
- Advise commanders on the psychological effects of VEO actions and networks.
- Advise commanders on counter adversary information strategies in conjunction and coordination with public affairs.

- Train HN to integrate and conduct information activities in CT operations.
- Isolate VEOs from population support.
- Target VEOs to achieve specific psychological effects.
- Publicize the narrative to increase credibility of words and deeds.
- Obtain local populace cooperation and support for HN and U.S. Government combating terrorism strategies and efforts.

SECTION III – CONCEPTUAL AND DETAILED PLANNING

4-74. The commander and staff conduct conceptual and detailed planning to facilitate the activities of the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The commander personally leads the conceptual component of planning. Though engaged in some parts of detailed planning, the commander often leaves the specifics to the staff. Conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning. For example, the commander's intent and operational approach provide the framework for the entire COIN operation. This framework leads to a concept of operations and associated schemes of support (for example, schemes of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection). In turn, the schemes of support lead to the specifics of execution, including tasks to subordinate units and detailed annexes and appendixes to the OPORD (for example, appendix 15 of Annex C [Operations]). However, this dynamic does not operate unidirectionally; conceptual planning responds to detailed constraints. This section addresses conceptual and detailed planning (respectively, the Army design methodology and the military decision-making process [MDMP] at BCT and battalion echelons and troop leading procedures [TLP] at company and below echelons). (See FM 3-96 for information on the operations process.)

Note. Inherent to a COIN situation are complex and competing narratives, typically based on cultural, religious, historic, tribal, regional, ethnic, economic or political divides. If planners neglect to fully understand these complexities in their analysis and outputs, subsequent planning efforts will likely be flawed from the outset. Planners must account for potential biases whether from themselves, insufficient breadth of analysis, or from an overreliance on the HNSF.

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

4-75. The *Army design methodology* is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). It is particularly useful in thinking conceptually about unfamiliar problems and in deepening understanding of the OE. To produce executable plans, the commander integrates this methodology with the detailed planning typically associated with the MDMP.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

4-76. The commander and staff conduct conceptual planning (Army design methodology [see ATP 5-0.1]) to understand, visualize, and describe the OE (see chapter 1) and develop the best operational approach (see paragraphs 3-6, 3-12, and 3-42 through 3-43) to the problem. The commander and staff use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an OE specific to their AO in support of the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). When developing an operational approach, the commander considers methods to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. That analysis informs the appropriate combination and sequencing of offense, defense, and stability for the operation while conceptual planning activities lead to prioritization of defeat and stability mechanisms.

Defeat Mechanism

4-77. Defeat has a temporal component and is seldom permanent. A *defeat mechanism* is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). All echelons within the BCT use a combination of four defeat mechanisms—destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate—relating to offensive and defensive operations. Commanders consider more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously to produce complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results relative to how much effort is expended. Using defeat mechanisms in

combination creates enemy dilemmas that magnify their effects significantly. Commanders describe defeat mechanisms by the three types of effects they produce:

- Physical effects are material.
- Temporal effects occur at a specific point in time.
- Cognitive effects pertain to or affect the mind.

4-78. The commander conceptualizes an operational approach to attain the desired end state by formulating the most effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Some example methodologies follow:

- Physically defeating an insurgency deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve their aims.
- Temporally defeating an insurgency anticipates insurgent reactions and counters them before they can become effective.
- Cognitively defeating an insurgency disrupts decision making and the insurgent will to fight.

4-79. To *dislocate* is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant (FM 3-0). For example, the commander may achieve dislocation by placing forces in locations where the insurgency does not expect them. In COIN operations, dislocation may be achieved by denying enemy forces freedom of movement or access to their primary operational areas, for instance a particular urban area.

4-80. To *disintegrate* is to disrupt the enemy's command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations (FM 3-0). For example, the commander may achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an insurgency's command structure and communications systems.

4-81. To *isolate* is to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). For example, since isolation can encompass multiple domains and can have detrimental physical and psychological effects on accomplishing a mission, a commander may isolate an enemy force in the electromagnetic spectrum, thereby reducing the force's situational awareness and exacerbating the effects of physical isolation upon it.

Stability Mechanism

4-82. The commander's mission, in addition to defeating an enemy, may include performing stability mechanisms related to stability operations, security, and consolidating gains in an AO. A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). The commander employs simultaneous stability mechanisms such as compel and control to assist with seizing initiative. To compel is to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. To control is to impose civil order. Offensive operations reveal and exploit insurgent weaknesses by defeating, destroying, or neutralizing threat forces. These actions disrupt threat forces, prevent them from negatively influencing the civilian population, and provide opportunities to continue exploiting weaknesses, but they are not decisive by themselves. The design of these actions responds to what they will compel the civilian population to do, how, and whether their results are likely to support the population positively, neutrally, or negatively in the long and short terms. (See chapter 7 and FM 3-96 for information on the four stability mechanisms—compel, control, influence, and support.)

Conceptual Planning Outputs and Activities

4-83. Outputs of conceptual planning include a problem statement, draft mission statement, draft commander's intent, a broad concept sketch, initial decision points, commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), and initial planning guidance. Conceptual planning activities include the initial framing of branches and sequels to the plan and of the ideal end state or posture. (See FM 3-96 for information on each output and activity.)

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

4-84. The commander's staff uses the outputs of conceptual planning (either theirs, or their higher HQ) to begin detailed planning (MDMP at the BCT and battalion levels). The *military decision-making process* is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP establishes procedures for analyzing a mission;

developing, analyzing, and comparing COAs against MOEs and MOPs and each other; selecting the optimum COA; and producing an order. It helps to organize the thought processes of commanders and staffs. Tactical COIN forces use this process to organize large amounts of information and orchestrate the appropriate sequence of action to defeat an insurgency.

4-85. Depending on the situation's complexity, the commander may initiate the Army design methodology before or in parallel with the MDMP. When the problem is hard to identify or the operation's end state is unclear, the commander may initiate the Army design methodology before engaging in detailed planning. The Army design methodology serves to assist the commander and staff in understanding the OE, framing the problem, and considering an operational approach to solve or manage the problem. The developed understanding and resulting products from Army design methodology inform more detailed planning during the MDMP.

4-86. When staff members use the Army design methodology and MDMP in parallel, the BCT commander may direct some staff members to conduct mission analysis while engaging others in Army design methodology activities before COA development. Results of both mission analysis and the Army design methodology support the commander in developing the commander's intent and planning guidance. Under time constraints or for simple problems, the commander may conduct the MDMP without incorporating formal Army design methodological efforts. During execution, commanders may use the Army design methodology to refine their understanding and visualization as well as to support their assessments and adjustments to the plan. (See FM 6-0 for information on the Army design methodology.)

LONG-RANGE PLAN DEVELOPMENT

4-87. The process of developing long-range plans involves the MDMP. (See FM 3-96 for information on the basic doctrine on the MDMP.) The following are points in the development of the COIN plan:

- Perform IPOE, incorporating the insurgency and population throughout the process.
- Analyze the mission using the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time).
- Analyze the mission using the variables of METT-TC (I) (which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations) and further considerations:
  - Conduct complete discrete analysis on all known or suspected enemy groups or sub-groups.
  - Use the categories of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) to understand the civil considerations.
  - If not clear from higher, determine the problem, which may be an iterative process.
- Determine end state and conditions along nested LOE.
- Determine preferred defeat and stability mechanisms.
- Determine an operational approach.
- Determine objectives:
  - Specified objectives (directed objectives and missions).
  - Implied objectives (direct approach to insurgents, indirect approach to insurgents for addressing prerequisites and root causes, supporting higher HQ's objectives and intended end state).
- Organize objectives along LOEs, adjust LOEs, and further define conditions.
- Identify a potentially decisive LOE.
- Refine each objective and develop the following:
  - Decisive points.
  - MOEs.
  - MOPs.
  - Supporting objectives.
  - Targets.
- Frame the time and resources for near-term planning into the following:
  - Events.
  - Ability to predict or analyze.
  - Combat power.
  - Operating tempo.
  - Phasing or timing.

- Pay attention to balanced development across all LOEs.
- Prioritize supporting objectives and targets to resources.
- Develop order with tasks and information collection plan.
- Make current line of operations and LOE plans.
- Execute near-term missions.
- Assess current operations, new intelligence, or new missions.
- Use this assessment to drive the process through another cycle.

4-88. Commanders modify the process as needed to fit the situation. While typical modification of the MDMP is driven by the need to save time, the COIN force has two key reasons to modify the process. First, the end product of long-range planning is not an OPORD prepared for execution in the traditional sense. The long-range plan provides a focus for short-range planning and ensures that the operations currently being conducted are having the desired effect on the end state. Second, each planning session within a COIN is interrelated to all preceding planning. Units conduct an initial but thorough MDMP and then build continuously on those products and their situational understanding as they progress through successive planning cycles. Units throughout their rotations continue to learn and adapt. Through assessment, the commander focuses the staff on areas that require further detailed analysis, limiting effort on areas with sufficiently conducted analysis already.

4-89. Staffs capture the results from this analysis in their running estimates. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). This, along with the commander's assessment and those of subordinate commanders, contributes to deepening understanding of the unit's AO, allows the unit to modify the MDMP, and enables the rapid yet accurate defining of problems and solutions.

4-90. Insurgencies are inherently complex and dynamic; they cannot be fully understood through a single cycle of the MDMP. It is the cumulative effect of analysis and planning that allows one to build and refine one's knowledge of the unit's AO. This, then, the running estimate captures over the course of many successive planning cycles toward the successful defeat of the insurgency.

4-91. Each staff section maintains a running estimate within its specific area of expertise (for example, intelligence, fires, logistics, personnel). When building and maintaining a running estimate (see FM 5-0 for an example running estimate format), staff sections monitor current operations, and they continuously consider the following in context of the operations:

- Facts.
- Assumptions.
- Friendly force status, including location, activity, and combat power of subordinate units from two echelons down.
- Enemy activities and capabilities.
- Civil considerations.
- Conclusions and recommendations, with associated risk.

4-92. While developing a comprehensive and iterative plan, the COIN force follows the conventional MDMP steps (see FM 3-96 for details on each step). However, fighting an insurgency—or, more precisely, conducting COIN operations—is not a conventional military operation. As such, the OE of COIN introduces unique considerations to the conventional MDMP steps (see figure 4-2 on page 116). These considerations primarily affect four of the MDMP steps—step 1 (Receipt of mission), step 2 (Mission analysis), step 3 (COA development), and step 4 (COA analysis [wargaming]).

Input	Steps	Output	COIN
Mission received from higher or developed internally *	**Step 1: Receipt of Mission**	Commander's initial guidance * WARNORD	Mission developed internally
		WARNORD	
HHQ's order / plan HHQ's IPOE Staff estimates	**Step 2: Mission Analysis**	Related mission * Initial commander's intent and planning guidance * Initial CCIR (PIR and FFIR) and EEFI * Updated IPOE and running estimates Initial IPOE products Initial information collection plan Preliminary movement	Use PMESII-PT to analyze the OE Use the mission variables of METT-TC (I), specifically civil considerations, to develop a better understanding of the AO Account for HNSF, multinational paramilitary, and all U.S. Forces and agencies Account for multiple enemy, multinational, and paramilitary forces
		WARNORD	
Restated mission * Initial commander's intent, planning guidance, and CCIR (PIR and FFIR) * Updated running estimates Initial IPOE products	**Step 3: COA Development**	Updated running estimates and products COA statements and sketches Refined commander's intent and planning guidance *	Use components and manifestations of the insurgency in IPOE Develop COAs for HNSF
Refined commander's intent and planning guidance Enemy COAs COA statements and sketches	**Step 4: COA Analysis (Wargaming)**	War game results Decision support templates Task organization Mission to subordinate units Recommended CCIR (PIR and FFIR)	Wargame with four groups: Enemy / population HNSF / U.S. COIN forces Modeling may be an appropriate wargaming tool
War game results Criteria for comparison	**Step 5: COA Comparison**	Decision matrix *	
Decision matrix	**Step 6: COA Approval**	Approved COA * Refined commander's intent * Refined CCIR (PIR and FFIR) and EEFI * High-payoff target list *	
		WARNORD	
Approved COA and any modifications Refined commander's intent and guidance Refined CCIR (PIR and FFIR) and EEFI Updated assumptions	**Step 7: Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition**	Approved operation order Subordinates understand the order	Ensure balance between LOEs Ensure unity of effort Using two languages increases the time required to produce and brief the order and to conduct combined rehearsals

* Commander's activity or decision

LEGEND

AO	AREA OF OPERATIONS
CCIR	COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
COA	COURSE OF ACTION
COIN	COUNTERINSURGENCY
EEFI	ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION
FFIR	FRIENDLY FORCE INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
HHQ	HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
HNSF	HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES
IPOE	INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
LOE	LINE OF EFFORT
METT-TC (I)	MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN AND WEATHER, TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE, TIME AVAILABLE, CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS, AND INFORMATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
OE	OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
PIR	PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT
PMESII-PT	POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, INFORMATION, INFRASTRUCTURE, PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT, AND TIME
U.S.	UNITED STATES
WARNORD	WARNING ORDER

Figure 4-2. Counterinsurgency military decision-making process

STEP 1—RECEIPT OF MISSION

4-93. As with any military operation, the MDMP begins upon receiving a mission, anticipating a change in mission, or seizing an opportunity in the AO. As in conventional operations, the MDMP steps during this phase—alert the staff and other key participants, gather the tools, update running estimates, conduct initial assessment, issue the commander's initial guidance, and issue the initial warning order—remain largely unchanged. Units account for additional time when working with HNSF and continue to refine their mission analysis, especially the civil considerations, using the ASCOPE analytical framework.

4-94. Two basic considerations apply during this step of receiving the mission. First, the strategic mission of defeating the insurgency applies to all levels at all times. Hence, all operational or tactical missions, activities, and tasks nest within the mission and can have a direct, lasting impact on its success or failure. Second, it is here that the commander begins to understand, visualize, and describe the operation (see paragraphs 4-74 through 4-83). The commander's development of a comprehensive vision of the end state is critical. From the desired end state, the staff develops LOEs to support the attainment of the commander's vision. All LOEs focus on their own end states; those end states nest within the commander's overall end state for the operation; and that desired end state nests within the overall mission of defeating the insurgency.

STEP 2—MISSION ANALYSIS

4-95. The tasks of mission analysis differ little from those of conventional operations (see table 4-4, continued on page 118).

Table 4-4. Staff tasks during mission analysis for counterinsurgency

Tasks	*Additional Guidance*
Analyze higher headquarters' plan or order	In addition to analyzing the information provided by the order, the staff uses the operational and mission variables to analyze their operational environment and area of operations. Staff members pay special attention to civil considerations in their area of operations, using the ASCOPE analytical framework (see chapter 1, section III).
Perform the initial IPOE	See appendix A for information on IPOE in a COIN environment.
Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks	The staff may find identifying the implied tasks more difficult for the ambiguous, complex COIN environment than for a conventional operation. They may have to conduct the military decision-making process many times as situations change.
Review available assets and identify resource shortfalls	The staff must remember to account for all host-nation security forces and for U.S., coalition, and host nation enablers (see paragraphs 4-46 through 4-65 for information on identified resources).
Determine constraints	The staff reviews the rules of engagement.
Identify critical facts and develop assumptions	The staff ensures the given facts and assumptions include U.S. security forces, host-nation security forces, population groups, and the insurgency.
Begin risk assessment	Same as for conventional operations.
Develop initial commander's critical information requirement (priority intelligence requirement and friendly force information requirement) and essential elements of friendly information	Same as for conventional operations.
Develop the initial information collection plan	The staff considers all host-nation security forces assets.

Table 4-4. Staff tasks during mission analysis for counterinsurgency (continued)

Tasks	*Additional Guidance*
Update the plan to correspond with the available timeline	An effective technique for determining what time will be available is to use the higher, operational, planning, enemy, light/weather (HOPE-LW) format (see ATP 3-21.8). Specific to COIN, leaders analyze variables with potential impact upon their operations. For example, they may use the higher, operational, planning, enemy, populace, light/weather (HOPE-P-LW) format to develop a timeline.
Develop initial themes and messages	See paragraphs 4-49 through 4-65.
Develop a proposed problem statement	Same as for conventional operations.
Develop a proposed mission statement	Although challenging to incorporate within the context of a COIN environment, the staff must use tactical mission tasks as the verbs in the mission statement.
Present the mission analysis briefing	Same as for conventional operations.
Develop and issue the initial commander's intent	Same as for conventional operations.
Develop and issue initial planning guidance	Same as for conventional operations.
Develop course of action evaluation criteria	Same as for conventional operations.
Issues a warning order	The staff must account for any additional time needed to translate and brief a warning order in two languages.
Legend: ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events COIN—counterinsurgency IPOE—intelligence preparation of the operational environment U.S—United States	

STEP 3—COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

4-96. The staff develops a COA to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission. For all types of plans, the brigade and battalion must construct a COA that accounts for tasks across all COIN LOEs. In a time-constrained environment, leaders may be only able to craft one COA. The six steps of COA development remain the same. However, the staff must complete the steps in paragraphs 4-97 through 4-104.

Assess Relative Combat Power

4-97. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). The staff compares friendly combat power in a troop-to-task analysis. They determine relative combat power by comparing available resources to specified and implied stability or COIN tasks, including those of the HN, all enablers, and the insurgency's combat power. The staff must account for the impacts of known mission requirements such as maintaining force protection or shortfalls due to a rotational leave policy—these are typically not available forces. The staff must also account for pro- and anti-government populations and determine the combat power necessary to conduct essential stability tasks.

Generate Options

4-98. Generating options starts with an understanding of the operational approach. This includes understanding the commander's intent for defeat or stability mechanisms, the balance of offensive or defensive operations, the selection of LOEs and determining what the decisive points are. The staff also considers the desired tempo; for example, planning for simultaneous versus sequential operations. To this understanding, the staff assesses areas where the commander is, or is not, willing to take risk. For example, assuming an economy of force with regards to a certain threat. Generating options in a COIN environment may seem very different than planning traditional combined arms maneuver. For instance, the main effort might be a CA team for the delivery of a non-lethal effect, while a maneuver unit is a supporting effort. The

staff ensures that they cover all options, including additional LOEs and HN actions. Based on the commander's guidance and the initial results of the relative combat power assessment, the staff generates options. A good COA can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks. In an unconstrained environment, planners aim to develop several possible COAs. Options focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their probable adoption or on those stability tasks that are most essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. Essential stability tasks require the ability to provide a level of civil security, civil control, and certain essential services. In addition, the staff considers the potential capabilities of attachments and other organizations and agencies outside military channels.

Array Forces

4-99. The staff arrays all enemy forces such as different insurgent groups as well as all friendly forces, to include HNSF. Small units may also have to develop plans to employ special teams such as military working dog teams, tactical site exploitation teams, or Army aviation (manned and unmanned) and/or organic or tasked echelon-specific unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) platforms. Staffs also determine relative combat power with regard to civilian requirements and conditions that require attention, and then, they array forces and capabilities for stability tasks. During this step, staffs do not assign missions to specific units; they only consider which forces are necessary to accomplish their task. In this step, staffs also array assets to accomplish essential stability tasks. The initial array identifies the total number of units needed and identifies possible methods of dealing with the insurgency and stability operations tasks.

Develop a Broad Concept

4-100. The staff describes the operation from start to finish. In developing the broad concept of operations, the commander describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission within the commander's intent. The broad concept concisely expresses the how of the commander's visualization and will eventually provide the framework for the concept of operations and summarizes the contributions of all warfighting functions. The staff develops the initial concept of operations for each COA expressed in both narrative and graphic forms along with a list of essential stability operations tasks. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability or COIN activities that, when accomplished, help set end state conditions of an operation within a comprehensive approach. A sound COA is more than the arraying of forces. It presents an overall combined arms idea that will accomplish the mission. Extremely important is the construction of operational graphics, including any objectives, phase lines, building numbers, and target reference points. Establishing these early is important in ensuring those subordinate units who are doing parallel planning understand and use the correct graphic control measures.

Assign Headquarters

4-101. After determining the broad concept, the staff creates a task organization by assigning headquarters to groupings of forces. The staff assigns headquarters, including those for HNSF and joint and coalition forces. The number and types of units assigned to a headquarters for COIN operations vary based on the METT-TC (I) variables. If staffs need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. Task organization covers the entire operational organization. It also addresses the special command requirements for operations (for example, passage of lines, cordon and search, raid, air assault).

Develop COA Statements and Sketches

4-102. The brigade and/or battalion operations staff officer (S-3) develops statements and sketches that clearly show how the COIN force will accomplish the mission and explains the concept of operations. The COA statement briefly expresses how the COIN force will conduct the combined arms concept. The sketch provides a picture of the movement and maneuver aspects of the concept, including the positioning of COIN forces. Together, the statement and sketch cover the who (generic task organization), what (tasks), when, where, and why (purpose) for each subordinate unit.

Conduct a COA Briefing (Optional)

4-103. COA statements and sketches include LOEs, rationale for public impact, and accounts for mission-essential stability or COIN tasks.

4-104. Select or modify COAs for continued analysis. This step is the same as for conventional operations.

STEP 4—COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WARGAMING)

4-105. It is during COA analysis (wargaming) that the most significant and unique considerations apply. COA analysis (wargaming) includes rules and steps to help commanders and staffs visualize the flow of the operation. Wargaming focuses a staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction (see figure 4-3). However, the standard wargaming methods—belt, avenue-in-depth, or box—may not capture the complexity of the COIN environment and, therefore, may prove inadequate to commanders and staffs planning COIN operations. (See paragraphs 4-106 through 4-109 for the three recommended wargaming methods modified for long-term operations dominated by stability operations tasks.) The box method is the traditional method that serves best for facilitating COIN wargaming.




Figure 4-3. Course of action analysis (wargaming)

Visualization of the Flow of the Operation

4-106. To wargame an operation, the staff visualizes it from start to finish, evaluates insurgent actions, and then modifies the COIN plan. With only one COA, this step often serves to synchronize the plan across the warfighting functions. Analyzing a COA through wargaming deepens the staff's understanding of the complex and adaptive OE of COIN and how particular actions affect it. For example, the information activities officer assesses the information activities (see paragraphs 4-48 through 4-65) concept of support against the ability of the information-related capabilities to execute the tasks in support of each wargamed COA and the effectiveness of integrated information-related capabilities to impact various audiences and populations inside and outside the AO. The information activities officer, ICW the EW officer, integrates information activities with cyber electromagnetic activities (see FM 3-96 for information on cyber electromagnetic activities).

Wargaming Process

4-107. Wargaming is a disciplined process with rules and steps to guide visualization of the operation's flow, given the force's disposition, force strengths, insurgency capabilities, possible COAs, public impact, civilian requirements in the AO, and other situational aspects. The simplest form of wargaming is the manual method, often using a tabletop approach with enlarged copies of matrixes and templates. The most sophisticated form is computer-aided modeling and simulation. Regardless of the form, each critical event of a proposed COA

undergoes wargaming, using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of COIN and insurgency forces and public interaction.

4-108. Within the wargaming process, a *decision point* is a point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). Decision points may be associated with the COIN force, the status of ongoing operations, and CCIRs (priority intelligence requirement [PIR] and friendly force information requirement [FFIR]), the latter of which is the requisite information for the commander to make the anticipated decision. A decision point requires a commander's decision. It does not dictate what the decision is, only that the commander makes one and when and where it would have maximum impact on COIN forces, insurgent COAs, or stability operations tasks within LOEs.

4-109. Throughout the wargaming process, planners continue to develop or refine options for potential enemy action and friendly opportunities. In anticipating potential events, planning promotes flexibility and rapid decision-making during execution. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the enemy can act or before situations deteriorate. In addition to decision points, two other tools are available to the commander and planners to assist in adapting to changing circumstances. These tools include the following:

- *Branch*—the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 5-0).
- *Sequel*—the subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase (JP 5-0).

Nine Steps of Course of Action Analysis

4-110. Conduct the wargaming process with the nine procedural steps in figure 4-3—gather the tools; list all the friendly forces; list assumptions; list known critical events and decision points; determine evaluation criteria; select the wargame method; select a technique to record and display results; wargame the operation and assess the results; and conduct a war game briefing (optional). These steps remain valid and essential. Analysis of a COIN operation requires some step modifications. For example, public reaction could affect operations, or essential stability operations tasks might require significant asset allocation.

4-111. Different groups may conduct specific LOE modeling sessions prior to a larger group conducting a larger scale modeling session. For some LOEs, wargaming is more appropriate. Unlike wargaming, modeling is not a one-time event. Modeling sessions are rerun as operations, events, and changes to the OE transpire.

4-112. Steps 1 through 4 (see figure 4-3) remain unchanged. Step 5 (that is, determine evaluation criteria) can be complicated. Here, commanders and staffs develop the operation's MOEs and MOPs. These measures derive from the commander's desired end state and the conditions leading to that. They define success for a unit and affirm the achievement of the desired end state. Additionally, they indicate when commanders gain influence among the key audiences—the local populace and COIN and insurgency forces.

4-113. The number of insurgent attacks can mislead; MOEs are more accurate when multiple supporting measures are looking at similar issues with the intent of seeing the whole. In COIN operations, the three major areas to measure are governmental strength, popular support, and insurgent strength. By applying a variety of quantifying measurements to these three areas (for example, the ability to provide an essential service, the number of tips reported to the police, the volume and type of insurgent propaganda), the commander is more likely to develop intuition for what would define success and for workable MOEs.

Wargaming Method Selection

4-114. Three recommended wargaming methods exist—belt, avenue-in-depth, and box. Each considers the area of interest (AOI) and all enemy forces capable of affecting the operation's outcome. Staffs use the methods separately or in combination and modify them for long-term operations dominated by stability operations tasks.

4-115. The belt method divides the AO into belts (zones) running the width of the AO. The shape of each belt is based on the METT-TC (I) variables. The belt method works best when conducting offensive and

defensive tasks on terrain divided into well-defined cross-compartments, during phased operations (such as cordon and search or search and attack operations), or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined belts or echelons (see FM 6-0 for information on the belt method). In COIN operations, the belt method can divide the COA by events, objectives (as in goals, not geographic locations), or events and objectives in a selected slice across all LOEs (see figure 4-4). The belt method consists of wargaming relationships among events or objectives on all LOEs in the belt.




Figure 4-4. Modified belt method using lines of effort, example

4-116. The avenue-in-depth method focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This method is good for offensive COAs or in the defense when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support (see FM 6-0 for information on the avenue-in-depth method). During COIN, staffs can modify the avenue-in-depth method. Instead of focusing on a geographic avenue, the staff wargames an LOE. This method focuses on one LOE at a time, beginning with the decisive LOE (see figure 4-5). The avenue-in-depth method includes not only wargaming events and objectives in the selected LOE, but also wargaming relationships among events or objectives on all LOEs with respect to events in the selected LOE.




Figure 4-5. Modified avenue-in-depth method using lines of effort, example

4-117. The box method involves a detailed analysis of a critical area such as a cordon, census, humanitarian assistance, or consequence management. This method works best under time constraints such as those occurring during a hasty attack. It is particularly useful when planning operations in noncontiguous AOs (for example, area security). When using this method, the staff isolates the area and focuses on critical events occurring within it. Staff members assume friendly units can handle most situations in their AOs and can focus their attention instead on essential tasks. (See FM 6-0 for information on the box method). During COIN, analysis under the box method focuses on a specific objective along an LOE, such as the development of local security forces as part of improving civil security (see figure 4-6).




Figure 4-6. Modified box method using lines of effort, example

Selection of a Technique to Record and Display Results

4-118. War game results provide a record from which to build task organizations, to synchronize activities, to develop decision support templates, to confirm and refine event templates, to prepare orders, and to compare COAs. Two common techniques exist for recording and displaying results—the synchronization matrix and the sketch note. Both techniques have staff members record any remarks regarding discovered strengths and weaknesses. The amount of detail depends on the time available. Unit SOPs detail methods of recording and displaying war game results.

4-119. For the step to select a technique to record and display the results, the recording method must capture the depth of the lessons gained from the analysis, and there must be a method for refining certain critical products. There are four areas on which the staff focuses to capture new information. The staff must—

- Capture any greater depth of understanding for each of the METT-TC (I) variables.
- Record any new understanding of the variables and how they relate.
- Update the rules of behavior for each variable.
- Update the collection matrix.

Synchronization Matrix

4-120. The synchronization matrix (see table 4-5 on page 125 through page 130) is a technique the staff uses to record the results of wargaming and to synchronize a COA across time, space, and purpose in relation to potential enemy and civil actions. The first entry in the left column contains the time, event, or phase of the operation. The second entry records the most likely enemy action. The third entry records the most likely civilian action. The fourth entry provides the decision points for the friendly COA. The remainder of the matrix focuses on the selected warfighting functions, their subordinate tasks, and the unit's major subordinate commands.

Note. The following examples in table 4-5 on page 125 through page 130 and figure 4-7 on page 131 of a synchronization matrix and a sketch note, respectively, represent (for discussion purposes) one way the Infantry battalion might employ forces during the conduct of COIN operations, specifically an area security mission. These two techniques serve to explain how a battalion and one of its companies conduct tasks and activities within the battalion on any given day during the course of area security operations. In the examples, the Infantry battalion's area security operation spans an AO approximately 45 kilometers wide and 35 kilometers long (28 miles wide by 22 miles long).

Table 4-5. Synchronization matrix, example

Time/Event/Phase	*H–24 (or Event or Phase)*	*H-hour (or Event or Phase)*	*H+24 (or Event or Phase)*
Insurgent Action	Identify and finalize information on attempted and actual criminal activity on a group or individual, enemy IED activity, enemy weapon and ammunition caches, and insurgent COAs.	Within proposed, isolated target areas, identify activities and locations to capture or destroy enemy forces and contraband. Identify enemy actions to clear or area reconnaissance based on the availability or fidelity of intelligence.	Identify enemies or enemy materiel from the search. Exploit material of evidentiary or intelligence value to the execution of future operations and criminal prosecutions.
Population or Civilian Action	Identify and finalize information on displaced person, refugee, or evacuee camp facilities.	Identify civilian influences and actions, in the objective area, that limit or prevent friendly operations and enable targets to escape from the cordon.	Identify, based on the nature of the target area, the requisite resources for the desired end state as regards the target area population.
Host-nation Action	Identify coordination efforts with host-nation security forces. Identify appropriate precautions to prevent insider threats.	Identify select host-nation security forces attached within the battalion task-organized to align with the appropriate counterpart.	Identify and assess host-nation security forces capability areas against desired capabilities and established measurements to help the FSF build capacity and capability.
Decision Point(s)	Identify decision points to focus the staff's monitoring activities and prioritization of the collection efforts.	Identify decision points and branches that anticipate the options that would enable forces to adapt as the operation unfolds.	Identify decision points for the continued commitment or the decommitment of unit operations based on rates of effectiveness and the updated enemy situation.
Control Measures	Identify measures for controlling speed and rate of movement. Common control measures include start point, release point, checkpoints, critical points (for example bridges, major cities and towns), and traffic control posts.	Identify and track control measures within phases of the operation. The minimum control measures for a cordon and search operation are an AO, a target area, target reference points, objectives, checkpoints, contact points, an attack by fire, and an axis of advance.	Once units consolidate and reorganize, identify the necessary control measures for follow on missions. For example, as the situation develops, further decentralized operations can require the establishment of additional fire support coordination measures to provide responsive fires to subordinate units.

Table 4-5. Synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Time/Event/Phase		*H–24 (or Event or Phase)*	*H-hour (or Event or Phase)*	*H+24 (or Event or Phase)*
Movement and Maneuver	Battalion 1 MAIN	Monitor and track progression of battalion scout and sniper elements conducting R&S missions and security operations tasks in support of battalion and company stability-focused tasks. Position battalion mortars and other allocated fire support assets where they can most effectively influence the AO.	Assist host-nation security forces. Provide persistent surveillance to subordinate AOs for a specific timeframe. Ensure coordination of subordinate unit movement and maneuver to prevent bottlenecks and allow friendly freedom of movement and maneuver. Monitor and track target (lethal and nonlethal) progression and the allocation of fire support assets.	Identify and monitor follow-through (defeat in detail, consolidate, reorganize, and transition) activities, the consolidation of gains, and site exploitation: • Company A—Cordon and Search. • Company B—Cordon and Search. • Company C—Combat Operations (Ambushes).
	Battalion 1 TAC	Not established.	Identify and monitor proposed unit changes (branches and sequels) to the array of forces and missions to meet changes in the threat.	Not established.
	Company A	Finalize information collection from the local populace regarding possible enemies in the area. Identify suspected weapons staging and cache sites that enable smuggling into the eastern side of the AO.	Identify cordon and search variation (cordon and knock or ask) due to the permissive nature of the threat.	Provide humanitarian aid to the local village by handing out blankets and having health care personnel screen children for possible illnesses.
	Company B	Finalize information collection effort and targeting from assigned area in the northwestern AO of the battalion.	Identify cordon and search variation (cordon and enter or kick) due to the nonpermissive nature of the threat.	Identify and disseminate information, criminal facilitators, and additional search locations based on enemy activities in the area after the operation.
	Company C (–)	Establish Combat Outpost 1. Third platoon—locate Base Gecko, conduct battalion reserve mission.	Execute operations south of Route Ford. Conduct clearance of NAI 5 and NAI 6, and overwatch NAI 10 and NAI 11 to deny the enemy lines of communication, access to cache, and access to enemy indirect fire locations.	Establish small kill teams and ambushes, strictly adhering to ROE practices. Engage any enemy who attempts to influence friendly operations.

Table 4-5. Synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Time/Event/Phase		*H–24 (or Event or Phase)*	*H-hour (or Event or Phase)*	*H+24 (or Event or Phase)*
Movement and Maneuver	Company D	In coordination with IBCT MAIN, establish IBCT response force.	Conduct response force mission in Infantry Battalion 2's AO, under IBCT control.	Upon completion, return to Battalion 1 control.
	Battalion Scout Platoon	Establish a screen to provide early warning to the east of Company A.	Overwatch Company A. Identify enemy indirect fire teams attempting to influence the cordon and search operation, humanitarian aid operations, and fires from the battalion mortars.	Continue to overwatch Company A. Identify any enemy attempting to influence humanitarian aid operations.
	Battalion Mortar Platoon	Response force role—operate in split sections to allow for two simultaneous employments in the battalion's AO as necessary.	(For example) Secure explosive ordinance detachment elements. Retrieve detainees. Provide security for casualty and medical evacuations. Augment combat power through fire support and maneuver as appropriate.	Continue to augment combat power through fire support and maneuver as appropriate.
	Third platoon, Company C—locate Base Gecko, prepare to conduct battalion reserve mission.	Maintain readiness to augment combat power through fire support and maneuver as appropriate in the battalion's AO.	Upon the achievement of the end state, return to Company C control.	
Information Collection		Identify HUMINT collection requirements from the local populace regarding possible enemy in the area. Identify suspected weapons staging and cache sites that enable smuggling.	Identify persistent surveillance and information collection requirements and assets for the AO.	Identify and monitor the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information. Identify and examine the insurgency's captured documents and material.
Lethal Effects		Identify and finalize specific targets and NAIs likely to benefit ongoing operations through lethal means	Identify areas restricting the application of lethal fires and areas employing timelines for fire support coordination measures (for example, free fire areas, no fire areas, restrictive fire areas).	Identify recommendations for the targeting cycle working group sessions from objective site exploitations and continuous R&S collection efforts available to the battalion.

Table 4-5. Synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Time/Event/Phase		*H–24 (or Event or Phase)*	*H-hour (or Event or Phase)*	*H+24 (or Event or Phase)*
Protection / Mobility / Countermobility / Survivability	Engineer	Identify route reconnaissance missions along Route Chevy to support the main supply routes, civilian lines of communication, and routes from Base Gecko to objective areas. Position route clearance package from the engineer assets in Combat Outpost 1.	Identify ground lines of communication to keep open for both civilian and military activities. Identify lines of communication to reduce the threat of mines and other unexploded ordnance. Identify the locations and classifications of bridges and culverts to enable scheme of maneuver for rifle companies.	Identify available engineer forces to address the survivability needs of Combat Outpost 1. Identify priorities during combat operations—normally countermobility first and then mobility—inside and outside Combat Outpost 1. For example, restrictive terrain that impedes friendly movement may require the commander to reverse priorities.
	Area Security	Identify known or potential dislocated civilian movements requiring control or monitoring.	Identify requirements for traffic control such as chokepoints, congested areas, confusing intersections, or built-up areas along Route Chevy.	Identify points where military police may assist with traffic regulation and area, route, and convoy security for movement into and out of the objective areas.
	Air Defense	Identify all forms of air defense security measures (for example, battle drills to minimize vulnerability to enemy air attack). Identify and effectively integrate the schemes of maneuver and fire support plans (for example, C-UAS) with attached or supporting air defense assets.	Identify battery sensor timelines to detect incoming rockets, artillery, and mortar shells and Group 1 and 2 UASs. Identify predicted flight paths of incoming rockets and shells, prioritize targets, and activate the supported AO warning systems according to established ROE.	Continue to identify and update air defend threats (for example, UAS activity). Adjust passive and active air defense measures from past UAS activities. Continue to identify and monitor air defense asset coverage areas and locations in support of movement and maneuver elements.
	CBRN	Assess CBRN threat and conduct a vulnerability analysis. Assess dispersion, use of terrain and overhead cover. Identify and implement CBRN defense measures that support CBRN principles (assess, protection, and contamination mitigation). Assess implementation of continuous CBRN monitoring and appropriate MOPP level to conduct future operations in CBRN environment. Rehearse unit CBRN battle drills. Coordinate support with designated CBRN forces.	Reassess proper protective measures, including dispersion, use of terrain; overhead cover; continuous CBRN monitoring with organic detection equipment; and MOPP level.	H+6 to H+24: Conduct CBRN battle drill to include immediate decontamination, report and mark CBRN hazard, and conduct MOPP gear exchange as required. Coordinate with supporting CBRN decontamination platoon for thorough decontamination as required.

Table 4-5. Synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Time/Event/Phase		***H–24 (or Event or Phase)***	***H-hour (or Event or Phase)***	***H+24 (or Event or Phase)***
Protection / Mobility / Countermobility / Survivability	EW	Identify and integrate EW activities into the mission through cyberspace electromagnetic activities.	Identify operations in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to maintain freedom of action in both. Identify electronic attacks, electronic protections, and EW support activities for each mission.	Identify and continue to set favorable conditions for cyberspace operations by stimulating networked sensors, monitoring and denying wireless networks, or other related actions.
	Personnel Recovery	Identify and finalize contingency planning and coordinate appropriate actions for responding to personnel missing.	Identify avenues an enemy may use to flee with kidnapped friendly personnel. Identify clearing operations to clear an area of known enemies. Facilitate locating missing personnel.	Coordinate and communicate tasks outside the unit to expedite recovery.
Sustainment		Identify preparations and actions to optimize means (force structure and resources) to support operational planning (branch and sequel development) and the targeting (lethal and nonlethal) process.	Identify contingency resupply, maintenance, and supplies or equipment during temporary and long-term area security commitments.	Identify resupply requirements and resources currently accessible.
Command and Control		Identify when Battalion 1 MAIN begins transitioning primary command and control to Battalion 1 TAC.	Identify when Battalion 1 TAC begins transitioning primary command and control to Battalion 1 MAIN.	Identify when Battalion 1 MAIN receives primary command and control for the steady state operation.
Site Exploitation		Identify and finalize requisite technical expertise or equipment to provide to the unit conducting the cordon and search operation.	Identify activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and materiel found during the conduct of operations.	Identify, synchronize, and integrate the application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements and facilitate subsequent operations.
Intelligence		Identify and finalize specifically planned requirements and assess collection to enable relevant, predictive, and tailored intelligence in an AO.	Identify search procedures and tasks, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning, and the use of R&S assets to conduct exploitation.	Identify and exploit the gathered information from the conduct of operations that transpired earlier in the day for future operations.

Table 4-5. Synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Time/Event/Phase	*H–24 (or Event or Phase)*	*H-hour (or Event or Phase)*	*H+24 (or Event or Phase)*
Nonlethal Effects	Identify and finalize specific targets and named areas of interest likely to benefit ongoing operations through nonlethal means.	While participating in the targeting process, use information activities to identify and synchronize a range of nonlethal capabilities and thereby to produce nonlethal effects that advance the desired end state.	Identify, update, and purge the following: nonlethal targeting files; measures of performance and effectiveness; reframing criteria; target lists and matrixes; and products for targeting working groups.
Interagency Partners	Identify mechanisms for interagency tactical integration, linking the execution of discrete, requisite tasks for establishing the end state conditions that will define success across the instruments of national power.	Identify planned and performed tasks (carefully sequenced activities that complement and reinforce desired effects). Identify appropriate information management plans and tasks for SFA in coordination with interagency partners.	Identify and update tasks performed in one sector that inevitably create related effects in another sector. Identify subordinate tasks, performed under the six stability operations tasks, that directly support the broader stability efforts of the unified action.
Nongovernmental Organizations	Identify networks (including local allies, community leaders, local nongovernmental organizations, and other friendly or neutral non-state actors) and any assigned tasks in the AO, and with the media.	Identify tasks to satisfy needs in the community (villages and neighborhood). Then, follow up by meeting those who will receive aid. Identify public interests and mobilize popular support to satisfy the true main effort (that is, the desired end state); everything else is secondary.	Identify accomplishments and actions that help build trusted networks to serve the desired end state. Identify accomplishments and actions—even killing high-profile targets—that would undermine the trust within or otherwise disrupt those networks beneficial to the enemy.

Note: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit the information needs.

Legend:

AO	area of operations	MAIN	main command post
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear	MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
COA	course of action	NAI	named area of interest
C-UAS	counter-unmanned aircraft system	PMO	provost marshal officer
EW	electromagnetic warfare	R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
FSF	foreign security forces	ROE	rules of engagement
HUMINT	human intelligence	SFA	security force assistance
IBCT	infantry brigade combat team	TAC	tactical command post
IED	improvised explosive device	UAS	unmanned aircraft system

Sketch Note

4-121. The sketch note technique (see figure 4-7) uses brief notes regarding critical locations, tasks, and purposes. These notes either refer to specific locations or relate to general considerations covering broad areas. The commander and staff mark locations on the map and on a separate war game worksheet. Staff members use sequential numbers to link the notes to the corresponding locations on the map or overlay. Staff members also identify actions by placing them in sequential action groups, assigning a separate number to each subtask. They use the war game worksheet to identify all pertinent data for a critical event. They assign each event a number and title and use the columns on the worksheet to identify the events and list them in sequence. Given the dispersed and decentralized nature of ongoing COIN operations, a sketch note is more applicable to discrete traditional short-duration combat operations, such as a cordon-and-search.

CRITICAL EVENT	**Main effort—cordon and search northeastern area of operations**
SEQUENCE NUMBER	**1**
ACTION	**Company A conducts cordon and knock due to the permissive nature of the threat**
REACTION	**High-value individuals (HVIs) attempt to blend in with the civilian population**
COUNTERACTION	**Third platoon utilizes entity description, within the context of targeting, to identify HVIs**
ASSETS	**Company A+ (1/A, 2/A, 3/A, and 3/C Platoons and Engineer Section)**
TIME	**H-hour sequence (H+30 to H+2)**
DECISION POINT (DP)	**DPs 1, 2, and 3 (cordon established)**
COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENT	**Confirmation of HVI locations**
CONTROL MEASURES	**Axis of advance and blocking positions**
REMARKS	**Follow established rules of engagement—avoid undermining the trust of the host nation—disrupt networks that tend to help the insurgency**

Figure 4-7. Sketch note, example

Expanded Synchronization Matrix

4-122. In COIN operations, an expanded synchronization matrix (see table 4-6 on page 132 through page 137) captures the actions of U.S. Forces, HN forces, insurgents, and the civilian population, as well as the warfighting functions. It also presents the population groups across political, economic, and social categories. A synchronization matrix's display of these factors reveals the complexity of the OE over time. Upon the commander's deeper understanding of the system, new critical information requirements will arise for the collection matrix to address.

Table 4-6. Expanded synchronization matrix, example

Unit—BN 1 (Area Security Mission)			
	Week 1	***Week 2***	***Week 3***
Note: Within the short-range planning cycle (see table 4-3 on page 94) for Battalion 1's mission.			
U.S. COIN Force			
Command and Control	Identify actions of U.S. Forces, HN forces, insurgents, the populace, and warfighting functions. Identify the problems in coordination and cooperation due to the joint, interagency, and multinational nature of COIN operations.	Identify COIN operations in concert with partner participants toward a unified effort. Identify liaisons that enable unity of effort between partner elements and the coordination centers established by higher HQ.	Identify apportionments of combat power and resources to COIN operations based on an analysis of the operational environment, mission, and desired end state, the likelihood of enemy action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations.
Movement and Maneuver	Identify area security movement and maneuver operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive movement and maneuver, though with an extensive emphasis on security and engagement skills (for example, negotiation, rapport building, cultural competence, critical verbal phrases).	Identify movement and maneuver in the BN's AO (normally decentralized to the company, platoon, and squad levels) through the economy of force and the right mix of forces to transition quickly between operations as the situation requires.	Identify future movement and maneuver in the BN's AO and in adjacent AOs as required. Identify lethal capabilities for the execution of COIN operations (for example, cordon and search). Identify the shifting of priorities when the need arises, yet even when the probability of combat is remote.
Intelligence	Identify unconventional operations that demand greater attention to civil considerations than do conventional operations. Identify (BN intelligence cell and knowledge management elements and those within higher HQ) events and procedures for sharing collected intelligence data and products, both vertically and horizontally, throughout the force.	Identify (expanding the IPOE process beyond geographical and force) capability considerations, information collection (for example, by HUMINT teams), and plan requirements. Assess information collection efforts for enabling relevant, predictive, and tailored intelligence in an AO.	Identify HUMINT operations that emphasize the CCIRs—those information requirements identified in coordination with subordinate commanders—as being critical to facilitating timely decision making of the lower echelon.
Fires	Identify constraints during the targeting cycle that typically determine the lethal or nonlethal effects employed and the targets engaged to attain the desired effects. When identified correctly, the constraint increases the legitimacy of the organization using it, while potentially damaging the opponent's legitimacy.	Identify fires that preclude fires on protected targets, unwanted collateral damage, and the political ramifications of perceived excessive fire. Identify and input, in addition to lethal effects, nonlethal effects into the information collection plan and the targeting work groups at the BN and higher HQ. Identify, analyze, and assess second- and third-order negative effects during the conduct of fires.	Identify fire support coordination measures for fires conducted in noncontiguous AOs to mass and shift fires and to determine clearance of event-driven fire procedures. Identify key terrain based more on political, cultural, and social considerations than physical features of the landscape. Identify the use of fires that would defend key sites rather than seize them.
Protection	Identify various assessments to support the protection prioritization list (namely, threat, hazard, vulnerability, criticality, and capability) in the BN's AO, along with measures to counter them. Identify vulnerability assessment methods, including the review of site-specific characteristics, mission, threat analysis, security plans and procedures, and any specific command concerns.	Identify measures to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities, and accommodations, including the construction of obstacles, protective bunkers, fighting positions, and shelters. Identify and practice alert procedures and develop drills to occupy positions. Include enabling forces such as any available engineer force to enhance survivability needs.	Identify, prior to the conduct of any area security mission, leader briefs on the latest IED threat types, usage, and emplacements in the AO (for example, along mounted and dismounted movement or march routes). Identify alternate routes and coordinate new routes and vary times to avoid chokepoints and to reduce risk.

Table 4-6. Expanded synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Unit—BN 1 (Area Security Mission)			
	Week 1	***Week 2***	***Week 3***
Note: Within the short-range planning cycle (see table 4-3 on page 98) for Battalion 1's mission.			
U.S. COIN Force			
Sustainment	Identify area security responsibilities, including support areas and extending to the self-protection of BN assets who are operating outside the BN's echelon support area(s) in Base Gecko. Identify those area security operations, including generating and maintaining combat power, designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations in support of main and supporting efforts.	Identify and develop protection for subordinate units and detachments located in and away from the BN's support area. Identify all support area security plans and the information collection plan to support intelligence operations, reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations in the BN's support area. (The BN operations staff officer is responsible overall for the development of these plans, assisted by the BN intelligence staff officer.)	Identify, through the IPOE and METT-TC (I) variable analysis, the effects (specifically, resupplying, maintaining, and issuing of supplies or equipment) on sustainment operations. Identify the repositioning of sustainment assets during the conduct of COIN operations.
HN COIN Force			
Note: The same U.S. COIN force considerations (above) apply to the HN COIN force.			
Command and Control	Identify the appropriate mix of military forces, the civilian development workforce, and civilian personnel and contractors through deliberate decisions based on a thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements.	Identify the important factors to consider in these decisions, including the nature of the enabling forces to the HN forces, the nature of the skills and competencies required by the HN force, and the nature of the situation and environment into which the enabling U.S. Forces will deploy.	Monitor the current situation for unanticipated successes, failures, or enemy actions. Assess the progress of HN COIN force operations and identify possible second- and third-order effects of these operations.
Movement and Maneuver	Identify and address changes to operations and the feeding of assessments of progress or regression back into the planning process. Identify HN forces' and U.S. Forces' timelines for working together, including interactions with local, political and cultural leaders, to ensure better overall chances of mission success.	Identify and establish MOEs that provide benchmarks against which the commander assesses progress toward accomplishing the mission. Identify and establish MOPs that aid in the determination of whether the performance of a task or action was to standard.	Identify and position HN forces, U.S. advisor teams, and other actors operating in the AO with foreign area officers of local or regional expertise. Identify details that would enable steady progress in fighting threats, meeting political milestones, and standing up security forces.
Intelligence	Identify intelligence assessments of HN and potential adversary capabilities and capacities. Identify shortfalls in understanding of sociocultural factors, information and intelligence sharing, and intelligence training. Assist in the examination of captured documents and material of an insurgency. Develop R&S plans and timelines with the HN and other partners.	Identify information for sharing between the HN and U.S. COIN forces during partner operational planning. Identify continuous intelligence efforts that gauge public reaction, determine the effects of host-nation efforts on the infrastructure, and evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of the opposition groups in the area.	Identify and disseminate intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within BN HN and U.S. partners and applicable higher, lower, or adjacent units or agencies as operations progress. Monitor the implementation of the information collection plans, including updating the CCIRs, conducting area assessments, and coordinating for additional intelligence support.
Fires	Identify, within task organizations, designated HN and U.S. fire support assets and tasks (in support of HN and U.S. BN response forces) for defeating Level I and II threats and for shaping Level III threats until a tactical combat force or other capable response force can defeat them.	Identify no later than in position times for mortars and other allocated fire support assets when they can most effectively influence the scheme of maneuver in company AOs. Identify clearance of fire procedures for those portions of the BN's AO not assigned to subordinate units.	Identify counter-rocket and artillery batteries' and counter-mortar firing elements' locations in or near the HN and U.S. BN's AO to support area security missions. Identify timelines for battery sensor detections and coverage against incoming rockets, artillery, and mortar shells, which can aid in detecting Group 1 and 2 unmanned aircraft systems.

Table 4-6. Expanded synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Unit—BN 1 (Area Security Mission)			
	Week 1	***Week 2***	***Week 3***
Note: Within the short-range planning cycle (see table 4-3 on page 98) for Battalion 1's mission.			
HN COIN Force			
Note: The same U.S. COIN force considerations (at the top of table 4-6) apply to the HN COIN force.			
Sustainment	Identify U.S. BN sustaining activities that successfully sustain HN activities, as well as the HNSF's ability to sustain their capabilities independently over the long term.	Identify those area security operations designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations that support main and supporting efforts by generating and maintaining combat power.	Identify area security operations that serve as the predominant method of protecting the HN and U.S. echelon support areas that facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of the requisite resources for sustaining, enabling, and controlling forces.
Protection	Identify and maintain understanding of the threat environment in the AO to assess threats accurately and employ measures to safeguard host-nation and U.S. personnel and facilities. Identify planning considerations for additional support requirements of the response force, emergency procedures, personnel recovery, or mandatory U.S. personnel integration into the HN protection plan.	Identify insider or green-on-blue attack threats and the protection plans and countermeasures for these types of attacks.	Identify activities that ensure military forces, the civilian expeditionary workforce, and civilian personnel and contractors are trained to identify behavioral indicators of possible insider threats. Identify the means to apply prevention tools that mitigate this type of threat (for example, eliminating or minimizing insider threats through proper preparation and training of forces).
Population			
Command and Control	Identify public perception inside and outside the BN's AO. This goes beyond defeating the enemy. Identify activities that would foster public trust and confidence through the means of information activities (for example, those integrating and synchronizing information-related capabilities to generate effects in the information environment that would influence enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly audiences).	Identify Soldier and leader engagements, civil affairs operations, and psychological operations, among other information-related capabilities (that is, interaction at all echelons with audiences targeted to understand the objectives and motives of the HN, U.S. BN, and higher HQ and the scope and duration of area security actions).	Identify broad efforts that would build partner capacity (for example, essential SFA and information activities for achieving the decisive results of a stable HN government and a peaceful civilian populace). A comprehensive approach requires the COIN to identify actions that would secure the populace and areas remaining loyal and actions that would reclaim the populace and areas supporting the insurgency.
Movement and Maneuver	Identify public messaging that ensures public understanding of BN roadblocks as not just restricting traffic for security purposes, but also for movement control of critical cargo (for example, generators for electric power restoration to a given area; essential items for public needs in the BN's AO).	Identify mobility activities that allow civilian traffic and commerce to continue or resume. For example, one important objective for COIN-focused area security operations is to resume normal civilian activities in the BN's AO. Identify countermobility activities that indirectly support COIN-focused area security operations with offensive and defensive tasks.	Identify activities that build public confidence in the HN government's legitimacy and in the HNSF. For example, supporting HN ownership in the SFA effort facilitates a public sense of sustainability for capacity building or for security in the BN's AO.

Table 4-6. Expanded synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Unit—BN 1 (Area Security Mission)			
	Week 1	***Week 2***	***Week 3***
Note: Within the short-range planning cycle (see table 4-3 on page 98) for Battalion 1's mission.			
Population			
Intelligence	Identify information collection tasks that and collection forces and assets who would collect timely and accurate information on the civilian populace. For example, civil reconnaissance patrols, in coordination with the provost marshal, collect data on and develop a readily searchable database, including any biometric data, of potential insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in the BN's AO.	Identify information collection efforts that serve to satisfy the CCIRs, in addition to other information requirements, regarding the civilian populace. For example, the BN's IST's information collection efforts from the BN intelligence cell (specifically, the intelligence staff officer) to the higher HQ intelligence cell serve to improve situational understanding prior to and during the information collection efforts among the civilian population.	Integrate information collection efforts that serve the COIN's mission to develop clear understanding of all potential threats and the populace. Cultural capability is necessary to gauge the public reaction (inside and outside the BN's AO) to a conducted course of action, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the BN's execution of that course of action. Changes in public behavior may suggest a need to change tactics, techniques, procedures, or even strategy.
Fires	Avoid assuming the suitability of lethal capacities, even though they are highly effective for their intended purposes. For example, during stability-focused tasks, great restriction on the application of lethal fires is normal, rendering the use of nonlethal capabilities the dominant feasible option. Identifying activities and considerations for the use of nonlethal capabilities in targeting does not pertain to specific phases or missions only. Integrate them throughout the AO.	Identify those activities and measures that, when conducted during an escalation of force, identify hostile intent and deter potential threats against civilians. For example, checkpoints, entry control points, and convoys remain distinct from other guidance regarding the use of force such as fire support coordination measures; their purpose is to protect the force, minimize the use of force against civilians, and avoid interfering with self-defense upon attack by adversaries.	Use information activities as one of the primary mechanisms for employing nonlethal capabilities and generating nonlethal effects. During the targeting process, identify and synchronize information activities efforts that engage nonlethal capabilities to produce nonlethal effects that advance the desired end state. Identify areas (for example, rural areas) that would allow for the application of full military combat power by the COIN operations to accomplish the mission.
Sustainment	Identify the combination of tasks to conduct during operations through which the HN can best support public well-being. Identify those tasks the HN is unable to provide; work through HN authorities to meet those needs. Identify and use civil affairs operations to mitigate the impact of the military presence on the civilian population and vice versa.	Identify those activities and services provided by the HN to relieve the BN of the need to provide equivalent capabilities to the civilian populace, effectively reducing the BN's sustainment requirements and footprint in the AO. Identify efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions for sustainable development.	Identify support activities and coordination, when operating in a failed state, that support public well-being and that work with civilian organizations to provide or restore essential services and basic capabilities. The BN identifies and uses these civil affairs operations to establish the necessary trust between Army forces and civilian organizations for an effective, working relationship.
Protection	Identify known or potential civilian and refugee movements requiring control or monitoring, specifically during the conduct of operations. Identify those activities and systems established or reestablished by the HN to provide effective and stable governance. Identify host-nation actions that continuously secure citizens to sustain and build legitimacy.	Maintain criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability as some of the most significant considerations when identifying those protection priorities and tasks to become the subject of the commander's guidance and the focus of area security operations. Identify actions that effectively isolate the insurgency and manage and meet public expectations.	Use the protection prioritization list (see ADP 3-37 for an example and ATP 3-21.20 for information) to identify and integrate all protection tasks appropriately, for use by subordinate units, and any base and base cluster operations that the BN's area security operation anticipates establishing.

Table 4-6. Expanded synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Unit—BN 1 (Area Security Mission)			
	Week 1	***Week 2***	***Week 3***
Note: Within the short-range planning cycle (see table 4-3 on page 98) for Battalion 1's mission.			
Insurgency			
Command and Control	Identify and prioritize activities such as information activities against sources of instability within the insurgency (for example, insurgents forming a shadow governmental structure; highly empowered individuals disrupting legitimate governance; ineffective or corrupt HNSF, specifically those with ties to the insurgency). Identify information activities to exploit inconsistencies within insurgent propaganda and insurgent intimidation or excessive use of force.	Identify and coordinate those information themes and messages (among the U.S. Forces and HN government), their presentation, and their availability to the civilian population that can limit or mitigate the propaganda efforts of insurgents or other hostile forces. These themes and engagements serve to mitigate the destabilizing influences of insurgents, hostile forces, and criminal elements from their own propaganda about friendly security force efforts, which ultimately damage the HN government's credibility and legitimacy.	Identify insurgent activities that leverage sources of instability to create conflict, exacerbate existing conditions, or threaten to collapse failing or recovering states. Identify the means for disrupting the insurgency's command and control systems to degrade its ability to conduct operations and to collapse rapidly the insurgency's capabilities or insurgent will to leverage those sources of instability. For example, COIN forces can achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an insurgency's communications systems.
Movement and Maneuver	Identify guerrillas, along with their actions, who may continue in their normal positions in society while leading clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Identify guerrilla organizations based on the activity they conduct, whether they operate individually or in small cells. Identify guerrilla bands, along with their actions (for example, raids), who historically operate and live in remote areas.	Identify insurgent actions that influence friendly subordinate small-unit leaders so as to maintain the vigilance and discipline of Soldiers and to preclude the obtaining by insurgents of positions of advantage. Identify guerrilla actions that concentrate activities against counterinsurgents and that attain victory over small elements of government forces.	Identify auxiliary forces and active sympathizers who provide important logistical services but do not directly participate in combat operations. Identify their activities and where they work (full-time or part-time) for the insurgency, with the understanding that they generally conduct safer activities than the underground elements and often include women, children, and other individuals who undergo a lesser level of scrutiny by COIN forces.
Intelligence	Identify insurgent leaders who attain positions within the government and work to undermine the government. Analyze insurgent leader activities for information on how effectively the leaders mobilize the populace and use resources to undermine the HN.	Identify areas wherein the lack of insurgent activities causes friendly forces to develop a false sense of security. The intelligence cell maintains the assumption that the enemy is observing friendly operations, routines, weak points, and lax security for the opportunity to strike with minimum risk. The intelligence cell identifies those critical areas as well.	Identify and examine (intelligence cell) captured insurgency documents and material; then, gather and disseminate reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all unit operation assets. Identify R&S activities and develop briefs and debriefs for U.S. patrols and HN counterparts operating as part of the BN's R&S effort.
Fires	Identify efforts to isolate the insurgency through nonlethal and lethal effects, with the understanding that, during the sustainability fostering phase, the multinational force will work with the HN in an increasingly supportive role and will turn over responsibilities as appropriate. For example, some areas may still need fire support capabilities while HN forces perform more functions along all LOEs with the assistance of multinational advisors.	Identify direct enablers to find, fix, and finish insurgency forces in insurgency-controlled areas, where COIN forces will not want to maintain a permanent presence. For example, targeted threat infrastructure is a method for destroying an insurgency force's physical infrastructure. Direct enablers integrated into ongoing counterinsurgent efforts include indirect fires and direct air and space enablers.	Identify fires into an insurgency-controlled or a contested area through speed and surprise to provide a significant advantage to the COIN forces conducting operations. Identify targets against escaping insurgency forces to block their routes or areas not secured by ground forces. Mortar and artillery fires, close air support, Army aviation attack, and air assault forces support ground pursuit to destroy or capture insurgency forces attempting to flee.

Table 4-6. Expanded synchronization matrix, example (continued)

Unit—BN 1 (Area Security Mission)			
	Week 1	***Week 2***	***Week 3***
Note: Within the short-range planning cycle (see table 4-3 on page 98) for Battalion 1's mission.			
Insurgency			
Sustainment	Identify external support that can affect the legitimacy of the insurgency since the act of accepting support implies the inability to sustain oneself. Additionally, the entities providing support attach their legitimacy to the insurgent groups they support. Identify the events and consequences affecting the programs in a supportive nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation.	Identify insurgent sanctuary support (for example, secure sites for training, sustainment, rest, and refitting), which provides insurgents with an opportunity to rebuild and reorganize without fear of HN or counterinsurgency interference. Identify neighboring countries or remote areas difficult to access and the actions in these areas.	Identify sanctuary areas in an HN, including neighborhoods in which HNSF cannot or will not conduct operations. Identify events and actions on which insurgents draw (for example, internet-based sanctuaries, global financial systems, international media).
Protection	Avoid insurgent detection activities (counterreconnaissance) and deceive insurgents about friendly positions and intentions (deception operations) as the situation dictates for local security. Local security may also include finding any insurgency forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much as possible about their activities and intentions to maintain the initiative during area security.	Identify guerrilla actions, specifically simple techniques of speed, surprise, maneuver, and especially infiltration near critical target areas where small guerrilla elements often mass to conduct a larger scale operation. For example, with baited ambush, guerrillas create incidents that employ arson, bombs, or hoaxes as bait. These baited ambushes lure small HN forces of all types into a mechanical or human ambush.	Identify insurgent attempts to increase friction between different groups in a society and thereby to gain support from any group who shares common elements with the insurgency. The COIN protects against these alignments along racial, ethnic, religious, or social lines. Language similarities or shared traditions also induce alignment. Religious influences play a major role in the sociological factors affecting the insurgency.

Legend:

AO	area of operations	IST	intelligence support team
ATP	Army techniques publication	LOE	line of effort
BN	battalion		
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement	METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
COIN	counterinsurgency		
HQ	headquarters		
HN	host nation		
HNSF	host-nation security forces		
HUMINT	human intelligence	MOE	measure of effectiveness
IED	improvised explosive device	MOP	measure of performance
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment	R&S	reconnaissance and surveillance
		SFA	security force assistance
		U.S.	United States

Wargaming Execution and Results Assessment

4-123. Wargaming the operation and assessing the results compose the modeling session. The focus during the application of the modeling method is on deepening understanding of the complex system of an insurgency and accurately forecasting how actions will affect the system. The war game focuses not so much on the tools participants use but on the participants themselves. The staff members participating in a war game are those individuals deeply involved in developing the COAs. Intelligence staff section members who can provide alternative points of view also provide insight on each COA. In COIN, subject matter experts in areas such as economic or local governance also help assess probable results of planned actions, including unintended effects.

4-124. The war game follows an action-reaction-counteraction cycle. Actions are those events initiated by the side with the initiative. During steady state COIN operations, the insurgents typically retain the initiative; however, discrete individually planned operations, for instance a particular clearance mission, gives the initiative to the security forces. Reactions are the opposing side's actions in response. For COIN, war games test the intended and unintended effects of actions as they stimulate anticipated responses from civilians and

civil institutions. Counteractions are the first side's responses to reactions. Analysis of the enemy's reactions or counteractions requires a significant depth of understanding and substantial time to draw accurate conclusions. This sequence continues through the completion of the critical event or until the commander uses another COA to accomplish the mission.

4-125. As in wargaming, many different techniques for conducting the actual modeling session exist. This publication demonstrates the turn-based technique using four groups. During each turn, each group states their actions followed by the next group's actions. The four groups are the U.S. COIN force, the HN (which includes other friendly forces), all neutral elements (for example, civilians, civil institutions, NGOs), and the insurgents. Before beginning, the group clearly explains the concept, rules, and limitations of the modeling session, including specific guidance to key individuals. Two key parts of COIN modeling are the individual LOE and the entire affected area or sector. In a typical staff, the battalion operations staff officer (S-3) plays the role of U.S. Forces and HN forces, the S-9 plays the neutral elements, and the battalion intelligence staff officer (S-2) plays the insurgents. The XO facilitates. The staff members play their respective parts to portray their group as accurately as possible in the modeling session.

4-126. As with war games, the staff needs a visual reference (for example, sand table, map) to conduct the modeling method. Most of the items composing this visual board come from mission analysis. More items than just the hills, roads, and other normal military aspects of terrain require inclusion. A successful model sets the stage for the other planners to see the world through their group's eyes. That means the visual board is to include significant cultural sites and key social infrastructure sites. The more detailed the board, the more accurate and meaningful the modeling session proves to be.

4-127. As operations unfold and more intelligence is developed, the staff updates the rules of behavior and capabilities for each group. As the knowledge of the individual groups grows and the whole system improves, so increases the staff's ability to identify how to influence the system more effectively. This planning tool does not stop at OPORD issuance. Modeling remains effective for deepening understanding of the COIN system and ongoing operations.

War Game Briefing (Optional)

4-128. Time permitting, the staff delivers a briefing to all affected elements to ensure everyone understands the results of the war game. The staff uses the briefing for review and ensures that it captures all relevant points of the war game for presentation to the commander or XO. In a collaborative environment, the briefing may include selected subordinate staffs. A war game briefing format includes the following:

- Higher HQ's mission, commander's intent, and military deception plan.
- An updated IPOE.
- Assumptions.
- The employed wargaming method.
- The wargamed friendly and enemy (insurgent) COAs, including the following:
  - Critical events.
  - Possible enemy actions and reactions.
  - Possible public impact.
  - Possible media impacts.
  - Modifications to the COAs.
  - Strengths and weaknesses.
  - Results of the war game.

War Game Rules and Responsibilities

4-129. Wargamers need to—

- Remain objective, not allowing their personalities or their perceptions of what it is the commander wants to influence them.
- Avoid defending a COA just because they personally developed it.
- Record advantages and disadvantages of each COA accurately as they emerge.
- Continually assess the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of each COA, rejecting a COA when it fails any of these tests.

- Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts that exclusively support such conclusions.
- Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game since this activity occurs during step 5 of the MDMP.

STEP 5—COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

4-130. A COA comparison is an objective process to evaluate COAs independently and against set evaluation criteria approved by the commander and staff. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs, enable selecting a COA with the highest probability of success, and further developing it in an OPORD. The commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to key outputs. (See FM 6-0 for information on COA comparisons.) Key processes include those following:

- Conducting advantages and disadvantages analysis.
- Comparing COAs.
- Conducting a COA decision briefing.

4-131. As in all operations, staffs analyze and evaluate advantages and disadvantages of each COA, and they identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely insurgent COA. The S-9 ensures each wargamed COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the letter C of METT-TC [I]). The CAO officer considers not only tactical issues but also sustainment issues. This officer assesses how operations affect civilians and estimates the requirements for essential stability operations tasks commanders might have to undertake based on the ability of the HN or other unified action partner. In COIN operations, host-nation support and care of dislocated civilians are of particular concern and may be the weighed criterion which determines COA selection. The CAO officer's analysis considers how operations affect public order and safety (or their perceptions thereof), the potential for disaster relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation operations, emergency services, and the protection of culturally significant sites. This officer provides feedback on how the cultures in the AO affect each COA. If the unit lacks an assigned CAO, the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member.

4-132. Additional COIN evaluation considerations may include those following:

- Effects on or role of the HN government.
- Effects on or role of the HNSF.
- Effects on groups of the population.
- Impacts on information-related capabilities.

STEP 6—COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

4-133. After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA to accomplish the COIN mission or one specific to a particular LOE. When the commander rejects all the COAs, the staff recommences COA development. When the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff wargames it and presents the results with a recommendation to the commander.

4-134. After approving a COA, the commander issues final planning guidance, which includes the following:

- Any refined commander's intent.
- New CCIRs to support execution.
- Any additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation.
- Priorities for the necessary resources to preserve freedom of action and to ensure continuous sustainment.

4-135. The commander also includes the acceptable risk in the final planning guidance. However, the commander still obtains the higher commander's approval to accept any risk that might imperil the accomplishment of the higher commander's mission.

4-136. Based on the commander's decision and final planning guidance, the staff issues a warning orders to subordinate headquarters. The warning order issued after COA approval normally contains the following:

- AO.
- Mission.
- Commander's intent.
- Updated CCIRs (PIR and FFIR) and essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs).

- Concept of operations.
- Principal tasks assigned to subordinate units.
- Preparation and rehearsal instructions not included in the SOPs.
- A final timeline for the operations.

STEP 7—ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION

4-137. Units in COIN operations issue a warning order and, after the commander selects a COA, a written OPORD. However, they require additional time for orders production when they must translate the order into another language. To ensure nothing is lost in translation and to ensure success in multinational operations, the staff keeps orders and rehearsals simple.

Note. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process is a decision-making and planning technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution under limited available planning time. While the MDMP seeks the optimal solution, the rapid decision-making and synchronization process seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander's intent, mission, and concept of operations. (See FM 3-96 for information on the rapid decision-making and synchronization process.) The rapid decision making and synchronization process is not a substitute for MDMP, but a way to modify an existing plan while in execution.

TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

4-138. *Troop leading procedures* compose a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). TLP extend the MDMP conducted at the battalion level with its coordinating staff to the company level. (See ATP 3-21.10 for information.) These procedures enable company-level leaders to maximize available planning time when they are developing effective plans and preparing the company for a mission. TLP comprise eight steps; the step sequence is not rigid and supports RM. The commander modifies the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some steps are executed concurrently while others may go on continuously throughout the mission. The TLP steps follow:

- Receive the mission.
- Issue a warning order.
- Make a tentative plan.
- Initiate movement.
- Conduct reconnaissance.
- Complete the plan.
- Issue the order.
- Supervise and refine.

4-139. TLP in a COIN environment differ little from those described in ATP 3-21.10. This section on TLP (including figure 4-8) provides an overview of the additional considerations for TLP (company and below echelons) during COIN operations.




Figure 4-8. Counterinsurgency considerations for troop leading procedures

STEP 1—RECEIVE THE MISSION

4-140. Receiving a mission may occur with a written or spoken warning order, FRAGORD, or OPORD. Due to ambiguity in COIN operations, companies or platoons often start planning after identifying an insurgent vulnerability, after receiving human intelligence (HUMINT), or after leader and Soldier engagement with a local leader.

4-141. Upon receiving a mission, commanders and subordinate leaders must rapidly assess the situation using the METT-TC (I) variables. By their nature, COIN operations require additional emphasis on analyzing civil considerations using the ASCOPE analytical framework (see chapter 1, section III).

4-142. Under time constraints, an ongoing assessment of the AO using the METT-TC (I) variables provides relevant information to accomplish the mission. Based on current information, leaders estimate and allocate one-third of the available time to plan and prepare for the mission, including time to accommodate the language barrier with HNSF; and the remaining two-thirds of the available time for subordinates' planning and preparations. This remains relevant in a COIN environment.

STEP 2—ISSUE A WARNING ORDER

4-143. Once done with the initial assessment, leaders issue the best possible warning order, often called warning order 1, with the information at hand. They also draw relevant information from their ongoing assessment of their AOs using the METT-TC (I) variables. The commander may issue three warning orders, but at company and below, one or two warning orders are typical. Each order builds upon the previous one. Normally, a warning order comprises the following:

- Mission.
- Time and place of the OPORD.
- Units participating in the operation.
- Specific tasks.
- Timeline of the operation.

STEP 3—MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

4-144. In response to the issuing of the initial warning order, leaders build a tentative plan by combining mission analysis and COA development, analysis, comparison, and approval. These steps retain less structure within companies and platoons, so leaders often complete them mentally. A tentative plan develops through a leader's completion of specific tasks (see table 4-7).

Table 4-7. Leader tasks during plan development for counterinsurgency

Mission analysis	
Leaders use the METT-TC (I) variables to conduct mission analysis as they expand upon their hasty analysis conducted in step 1 (that is, receive the mission). Leaders issue an updated warning order, often called warning order 2, after completing mission analysis. In a COIN environment, the METT-TC (I) variables require special considerations.	
Mission	Units create their restated mission statements after analyzing higher headquarters' mission or their related problems. They may need to conduct mission analysis multiple times to grasp the problem fully.
Enemy	Units use the tools (that is, insurgent components [elements, dynamics, strategies] and manifestations [tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities]; see chapter 2) for further identification of any insurgent groups they may encounter. Then, they define the insurgency's composition and disposition, recent insurgent activities, and both the most probable and most dangerous insurgent COAs.
Terrain and weather	Same as for conventional operations.
Troops and support available	Leaders determine the amount and type of available friendly forces, especially HNSF, coalition forces, and nonmilitary enabler personnel. In considering available combat power, leaders are careful to account for those not available, such as on protection missions, environmental leave, or other known requirements.
Time available	The HOPE-P-LW format is useful for identifying the various timelines within counterinsurgency operations.
Civil considerations	Leaders use the ASCOPE analytical framework to analyze areas controlled by various demographic groups and thereby to obtain a better understanding of their areas of operations.

Table 4-7. Leader tasks during plan development (continued)

COA development	
Leaders use COA development to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission. In a time-constrained environment, leaders may be able to craft only one COA, though leaders ideally look at (conceptualize) an initial framing of branches and sequels to that COA and the desired end state or posture. For long-, mid-, and short-range plans, companies need to develop tasks along all lines of effort. The six steps of COA development in counterinsurgency do not change, but the following receive special considerations.	
Assess relative combat power	Leaders compare the combat power of friendly, including host nation, enablers to that of the insurgency. Leaders often incorporate analyses of pro- and anti-government populations.
Generate options	Options always consider employing HNSF and the host nation government.
Array forces	Array all enemy forces such as different insurgent groups, as well as all friendly forces, including HNSF. Small units may also need to develop plans to employ special teams such as military working dog teams, tactical site exploitation teams, unmanned aircraft systems, or attack, reconnaissance, and assault aviation. Depending on the type, nature and number of tasks assigned, the commander may have to plan to achieve them sequentially. If unable to achieve directed tasks, the leader goes back to the higher echelon for relief or additional resources.
Develop a concept of operations	Leaders describe the operation from start to finish. Especially critical is the creation of graphic control measures such as phase lines and building numbers to assist with command and control and to clarify roles and tasks. The COA must achieve unity of effort across all organizations.
Assign responsibilities	Assign responsibilities for each task, including those for the HNSF.
Develop a COA statement and sketch	Leaders prepare a COA statement that describes all significant actions from start to finish, as well as a sketch.
COA analysis (wargaming)	
To wargame, leaders visualize an operation from start to finish, evaluate enemy actions, and then modify their plans. With only one COA, which may include the initial framing of branches and sequels, this step is often useful for synchronizing the plan across the warfighting functions.	
COA comparison and COA approval	
The leader normally completes these two steps mentally during troop leading procedures. (Otherwise, same as for conventional operations.)	
Legend: ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events COA course of action HNSF host-nation security forces HOPE-P-LW higher, operational, planning, enemy, populace, light/weather METT-TC (I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations	

STEP 4—INITIATE MOVEMENT

4-145. As in any military operation, leaders may choose to initiate movement necessary for enabling mission preparation or positioning the unit for execution. In COIN, this may mean U.S. Forces move to an HNSF patrol base to conduct combined planning and movement. As another example, a unit planning operation may be relieved of force protection requirements by another to generate maximum combat power.

STEP 5—CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE

4-146. Whenever time and circumstances allow, leaders personally observe their AOs for the mission since nothing substitutes for firsthand information. Leaders also consider using a map or Army attack reconnaissance aviation (manned and unmanned) and/or organic or tasked echelon-specific UAS platforms to conduct reconnaissance when time, OPSEC, or other considerations preclude personal reconnaissance. Unlike large scale combat operations, leaders in COIN may conduct reconnaissance throughout the depth of

their AO; however, they must be careful not to do so in a way enemy forces can identify, such as too-close attention to an objective, patterns, different vehicle types, different uniforms, and so on.

STEP 6—COMPLETE THE PLAN

4-147. Leaders incorporate the results of reconnaissance, update information, refine their products, coordinate with adjacent units (including HN units), and issue the final warning order or the OPORD. Translating the order into the HN's language may require extra time.

STEP 7—ISSUE THE OPERATION ORDER

4-148. Leaders issue verbal or written orders to their subordinates by the standard five-paragraph field order format. In addition, leaders use maps, overhead imagery, or terrain models to enhance subordinates' understanding of the mission. When HN forces are participating in the operation, the OPORD brief may require additional time to accommodate its presentation in two languages. Units who have experienced OPSEC issues with HNSF may choose to issue the OPORD to the HN unit just prior to crossing the line of departure.

STEP 8—SUPERVISE AND REFINE

4-149. Throughout TLP, leaders monitor preparations, refine the plan, coordinate with adjacent units, and conduct rehearsals. COIN operations use the standard types of rehearsals. These include the confirmation brief, the backbrief, the combined arms rehearsal, the support rehearsal, and the battle drill or SOP rehearsal.

4-150. Conducting rehearsals in two languages may require additional time. Units who have experienced OPSEC issues with HNSF may choose to have the HN forces conduct generic rehearsals (for example, clear a room, establish a checkpoint) instead of the actual, complete operation.

SECTION IV – TARGETING

4-151. *Targeting* is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). It is conducted during all COIN operations to consider all available capabilities for creating lethal and nonlethal effects that support the logical LOOs. It can support information-related capabilities, CMO, and even meetings between commanders and host-nation leaders. It also links intelligence, plans, and operations across all levels of command. It encompasses many processes, all linked and logically guided by the targeting cycle, for continuous analysis, identification, development, validation, assessment, and prioritization of targets for engagement with the goal of achieving the commander's objectives and desired end state.

Note. In combat operations, targeting identifies the capabilities or resources the maneuver commander must have available for operations to succeed and then attacks them with fires. *Fires* is the use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target (JP 3-09).

THE PURPOSE, CYCLE, AND PRINCIPLES OF TARGETING

4-152. The purpose of targeting is to create specific effects in the OE to meet commander's objectives through the integration and synchronization of offensive capabilities. Targeting in COIN is a unified action that involves participation from all appropriate unified action partners. Commanders and staffs integrate capabilities and synchronize the execution of appropriate fires and activities through the joint targeting cycle to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects. The joint targeting cycle provides an iterative, logical method for developing, planning and preparing for, executing, and assessing targeting, weapons, and capabilities effectiveness. The principles of joint targeting apply in multinational operations and to the participation of other agencies, departments, and organizations throughout all phases of an operation. Adherence to these four principles (focused, effects-based, interdisciplinary, and systematic) throughout the targeting cycle creates desired effects while diminishing undesired collateral effects.

FOCUSED PRINCIPLE

4-153. The function of targeting is the efficient achievement of the commander's objectives through target engagement within the set parameters of the concept of operations, the order's operational limitations (including FRAGORDs), the rules of engagement (ROE), the law of war, and any agreements concerning the sovereignty of national territories. Every engagement of a *target*—an entity that performs a function for the adversary or enemy considered for possible engagement (JP 3-60)—contributes to the achievement of the commander's objectives. An *entity*, within the context of targeting, facilities, individuals, virtual features, equipment, and organizations (JP 3-60). Any unit conducting counterinsurgent operations has finite resources, and non-lethal targeting may consume them for a long time. The commander must focus targeting efforts through a clear prioritization and allocation of targeting assets.

EFFECTS-BASED PRINCIPLE

4-154. To contribute to the achievement of the commander's objectives, targeting focuses on creating specific effects through target engagement. Target analysis considers the means to create effects, drawing from all available capabilities, and determines the risk of undesired effects. The art of targeting creates desired effects while balancing the risk and the expenditure of time and resources. Every action the unit conducts should be planned to achieve an effect. If the unit is doing things that do not contribute to achieving an effect, for example, changing a targeted segment of the population's mindset, then the commander should reconsider why they are doing it.

INTERDISCIPLINARY PRINCIPLE

4-155. Targeting is a command function that requires the participation of many disciplines. It entails participation from all elements of the commander's staff, subordinate commanders and staffs, and other agencies, departments, organizations, HN, and multinational partners. Detailed, dynamic threat and country assessments, IPOE products, and other intelligence products (for example, threat situation templates, event templates, civil considerations overlays and assessment) provide critical information for target system analysis and detailed, entity-level target development. These elements should be involved throughout the targeting cycle from assessment, and they should be trained to think in terms of delivering effects through the nomination and execution of focused targeting.

SYSTEMATIC PRINCIPLE

4-156. Targeting systematically analyzes and prioritizes entities (persons, places, or things) for possible engagement or action. It matches appropriate capabilities to those entities to create specific effects while accounting for operational constraints and restraints and the results of previous assessments. Targeting links desired effects to activities and tasks involving specific fires or non-lethal assets or activities. This work contributes to the creation of the effects necessary for achieving the commander's objectives and desired end state. Targeting emphasizes the identification of the following:

- The resources and activities the enemy can least afford to lose (for example, the supply route—or the source of supplies—used by an improvised explosive device [IED] cell).
- The resources and activities that provide the greatest advantage to the enemy (for example, a high-value target [HVT]).
- The resources and activities whose loss would significantly contribute to the success of the friendly COA (for example, a high-payoff target [HPT]).
- A person of interest who is identified, surveilled, tracked, influenced, or engaged (for example, a high-value individual [HVI]).
- Populations who can be swayed, and how to do so (for example, influencing fence-sitters to move into the pro-government camp).
- Public opinions and sentiments that can be modified (for example, improving public opinion of HNSF professionalism or to reject insurgent violence).
- Targeting actual or potential schisms or divisions between insurgent factions (for example, driving a wedge between local insurgents and foreign fighters).
- Targeting local, regional, or national health, security, economics or governance to deliver improved capability or capacity to local nationals who are within the sphere of governance.

TARGETING CYCLE

4-157. The joint targeting cycle is a rational, iterative process of methodical analysis, prioritization, and assignment of assets against targets. Its purpose is to create effects in a systematic manner. It provides helpful steps, which may occur concurrently, toward successfully conducting joint targeting. An effective, disciplined targeting cycle serves to minimize undesired effects and reduce inefficient actions during COIN and, when optimized, can drive steady state operations with an AO. When the steps fail to create the desired effects, leaders reengage targets or select another method to create the appropriate effects through the targeting process. Determining whether the effects have been realized can take days, weeks, or months. Realizing second- and third-order effects can take even longer.

4-158. While the targeting tasks may be labeled differently at the joint level, the same targeting tasks are accomplished in the Army's decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting methodology (see paragraphs 4-172 through 4-186). (See table 4-8 for a crosswalk between the operations process, joint targeting cycle, D3A methodology, and MDMP; see FM 3-60 for information on the targeting cycle.)

Table 4-8. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, decide–detect–deliver–assess methodology, and military decision-making process

Operations Process		*Joint Targeting Cycle*	*D3A*	*MDMP*	*Targeting Task*
Continuous Assessment	**Plan**	1. The End State and Commander's Objectives	**Decide**	Mission Analysis	• Perform target value analysis (for example, HPT/HVI) to develop fire support (including cyber electromagnetic and information-related capabilities) for high-value targets. • Provide fire support, information-related capabilities, and cyber electromagnetic activities input to the commander's targeting guidance and desired effects.
		2. Target Development and Prioritization		Course of Action Development	• Designate potential HPTs/HVIs. • Deconflict and coordinate HPTs/HVIs. • Develop an HPT/HVI list. • Establish target selection standards. • Develop attack guidance matrix. • Develop fire support and cyber electromagnetic activities tasks. • Develop associated MOPs and MOEs.
		3. Capabilities Analysis		Course of Action Analysis	• Refine the HPT/HVI list. • Refine target selection standards. • Refine the attack guidance matrix. • Refine fire support tasks. • Refine associated MOPs and MOEs. • Develop the target synchronization matrix. • Draft airspace control means requests.
		4. Commander's Decision and Force Assignment		Orders Production	• Finalize the HPT/HVI list. • Finalize target selection standards. • Finalize the attack guidance matrix. • Finalize the targeting synchronization matrix. • Finalize fire support tasks. • Finalize associated MOPs and MOEs. • Submit information requirements to S-2.
	Prepare	5. Mission Planning and Force Execution	**Detect**		• Execute the information collection plan. • Update information requirements as answered. • Update HPT/HVI list, attack guidance matrix, and targeting synchronization matrix. • Update fire support and cyber electromagnetic activities tasks. • Update associated MOPs and MOEs.
	Execute		**Deliver**		• Execute fire support and cyber electromagnetic attacks in accordance with the attack guidance matrix and the targeting synchronization matrix.
	Assess	6. Assessment	**Assess**		• Assess ongoing/recurring targeting efforts. • Assess task accomplishment (as determined by MOPs). • Assess effects (as determined by MOEs).

Legend:
D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess
HPT high-payoff target
HVI high-value individual
MDMP military decision-making process
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

4-159. The targeting process identifies options for creating effects that support the achievement of the commander's objectives. COIN targeting on nodes (people, places, and things) and the friendly, neutral, and threat networks represent several potential targets that can link objectives with effects in COIN. Some targets are best addressed by the means to create lethal effects; other targets are best engaged by different means. For example, during stabilization, humanitarian aid, disaster recovery, SC, and other deterrence activities, creating lethal effects is normally greatly restricted, rendering the capabilities that create nonlethal effects the dominant feasible option. The consideration of capabilities that create nonlethal effects remain part of effects estimates, target development, and weaponeering analysis (*weaponeering* being the process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target [JP 3-60]). Their use in targeting does not pertain solely to specific phases or missions but can be integral throughout an operation. (See FM 3-60 for information on the targeting process.)

Note. IAW joint doctrine on threat networks, a *cell* is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a headquarters (JP 3-33), while a node is an element of a network that represents a person, place, or physical object. In this context, these support the visualization of the organization as a network. In terms of organizational structure, the primary purpose insurgencies have for creating cells is to achieve security and secrecy through compartmentalization. When a specific organizational function requires these qualities, a cellular structure is the logical and historical choice. For example, IED employment, financing, recruiting, intelligence, logistics, and cell leadership are examples of functions requiring compartmentalization. Cells can be organized to accomplish a variety of workflows. Their arrangement may be in series or in parallel. The IED threat is inherent to most COIN operations. Normally, IED employment involves actors whose relationship is not hierarchical but based on means and opportunity. To employ IEDs, threat networks may be complex and often compartmentalized series of nodes, including personnel who: conduct reconnaissance; procure and supply IED materials; build IEDs and teach others to build IEDs, emplace the IEDs; trigger certain IEDs; assess the IEDs' effectiveness; and make recommendations on new TTP and IED types. Network analysis and identification of nodes are critical tools in defeating an IED network.

FUNDAMENTALS OF INSURGENT NETWORKS

4-160. A network is a group of elements comprising interconnected nodes and links in relationship or association with one another. A cell is a smaller network within a larger network and is formed around a specific process, capability, or activity. Nodes represent tangible elements within a network or OE that can be targeted for action. Links establish the interconnectivity between nodes that allows them to work together as a network to accomplish a task or perform a function. Nodes and links are useful in identifying centers of gravity (COGs), networks, and cells the commander and staff may wish to influence or change.

node – An element of a network that represents a person, place, or physical object. (JP 3-0)

link – A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. (JP 3-0)

CRITICAL NODES AND DECISIVE POINTS

4-161. When insurgents organize into networks, they require certain elements, characteristics, bonds, and conditions to operate and survive. A network is a series of direct and indirect ties from one entity to a collection of entities. A central point of communication or influence (for example, critical nodes or decisive points related in time and space to an objective) may provide a critical vulnerability for targeting against the network. An insurgency's networks extend the range and variety of insurgent military and political actions. Networks of communication, people, and activities exist in all populations and have a measurable impact on the organized governance of a population and, consequently, military operations. These networks tend to heal, adapt, and learn rapidly. They may be a combination of insurgency, criminal, regular, or irregular forces, as well as foreign-government-sanctioned forces. These networks exist within a population, and such an existence enhances the insurgency's abilities to sow disorder, to survive, and to protract the struggle,

presenting particularly difficult problems for COIN forces. Successfully identifying and attacking any network requires critical thinking and a willingness to think outside of the box. It also requires redundancy and the ability to anticipate and respond to enemy reactions.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FOR TARGETING

4-162. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). This integrated intelligence and operations function provides relevant information about all aspects of the OE. It directly supports information activities by defining targets in detail and by helping assess the effectiveness of friendly and adversary information activities.

4-163. The COIN force's information collection effort answers CCIRs (specifically PIR and FFIR) and EEFIs. This and other chapters and the appendixes use the following key doctrinal terms and definitions. See the referenced publications and FM 3-96 for information on any of these terms:

- *Commander's critical information requirement*—specific information identified by the commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making (JP 3-0).
- *Friendly force information requirement*—information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0).
- *Priority intelligence requirement*—the intelligence component of commander's critical information requirements used to focus the employment of limited intelligence assets and resources against competing demands for intelligence support (JP 2-0).
- *Essential element of friendly information*—a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0).

4-164. *Intelligence synchronization* is the art of integrating information collection; intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED); and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently fight for intelligence in support of decision making (ADP 2-0). Collection plan synchronization analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets both internal and external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends organization-controlled assets to collect on the CCIR; and submits requests for information for adjacent or higher collection support. Collection tasks linked to decision points play a critical part in the targeting process and the COIN operation as a whole.

4-165. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations aid in confirming or denying insurgent COA statements, HVTs, and guerrilla capability and combat effectiveness estimates. Reconnaissance and surveillance outcomes confirm or deny assumptions about the OE and threat that came out of the MDMP. Staffs carefully focus information collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance efforts on the CCIR (PIR and FFIR) while maintaining their ability to retask units and assets quickly as the situation changes. This ensures the enemy situation drives information collection operations. The S-3 and S-2 play critical roles in this challenging task. Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces. They collect, process, and disseminate timely and accurate information, combat information, and intelligence to satisfy the CCIR and other information requirements.

Notes. The S-3 is responsible for the information collection plan and is the tasking authority for collection assets within the unit, respectively at the BCT and battalion echelons. Close collaboration among the entire staff (led by the S-3) is important to ensure the full synchronization and integration of information collection activities into the overall OPORD.

Depending on personnel availability, the commander may designate an operations and intelligence working group. The S-3 and S-2 direct and manage the efforts of this working group to achieve a fully synchronized and integrated information collection plan. (See FM 3-96 for information.)

4-166. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan ensures the information tied to decision points reaches the commander and staff in time to support the decision. It also ties directly into the targeting process. During the D3A methodology phases of deciding and detecting, the collection assets undergo identification, prioritization, and planning to detect certain targets (see paragraphs 4-167 through 4-171). The collector's information, when it meets the established criteria, may trigger the deliver function of targeting. After delivery, the collectors, identified during the decide phase, provide information to assess the attack. These may be the same collectors; if not, a different asset would be tasked to do this. One tool to manage information is a daily information collection and operations synchronization meeting. The information collection synchronization plan is an output of this meeting and coordinates and synchronizes the collection plan.

EXPANDED USE OF THE TARGETING PROCESS

4-167. The expanded use of the targeting process in COIN operations provides the staff with two key benefits—prioritization and synchronization. Because the COIN force often faces multiple objectives, many without clear positional references, friendly COAs may not be easily represented in terms of various forms of maneuver. Each may instead portray a series of targets that the unit is to influence over a specified time.

4-168. The targeting process focuses operations and their use of limited assets and time. Commanders and staffs use the targeting process to achieve effects that support the objectives and missions during COIN operations. Of further importance to understanding is that targeting is done for all operations, not just attacks against insurgents.

4-169. The synchronization of information collection assets with available combat power is targeting's greatest contribution to the COIN force. The indirect nature of IW often creates limited opportunities to strike or influence targets. Integrating processes (specifically, IPOE, information collection, targeting, and RM) within the operations process ensure COIN forces strike the planned targets (deliberate targeting) at the right time or remain prepared to strike targets of opportunity (dynamic targeting).

Note. *Dynamic targeting* is targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting (JP 3-60). It occurs during the D3A methodology phases of detecting, delivering, and assessing. A target of opportunity may emerge or a change in the situation may necessitate a change to a planned target. These targets still require confirmation, verification, validation, and authorization, but in a shorter timeframe than deliberate targeting affords. (See FM 3-60 for information.)

4-170. Targeting may require the creation of a targeting board or working group (see FM 3-96 for information), though, in many cases, the targeting staff is similar to the fire support cell. When one is established, the XO or S-3 typically chairs it, and it generally includes the fire support officer and representatives from across the staff, including S-2, S-3, the battalion or brigade signal staff officer (S-6), S-9, air liaison officer, information activities officer, EW officer, PSYOP staff planner, and staff judge advocate. As they require, the staff includes additional members beyond these. The goal is to prioritize targets and determine the means of engaging them that best support the commander's intent and concept of operations. The general focus of the targeting board or working group in a COIN environment is to target people (see paragraph 4-176)—both the insurgents and the members of the general population.

4-171. Effective targeting identifies the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal, to achieve effects that support the commander's objectives. Operations to capture or kill normally employ lethal assets against targets. Nonlethal assets are normally employed against targets best engaged with CMO, PSYOP,

negotiation, political programs, economic programs, and social programs. (See figure 4-9 for examples of potential targets.)

PERSONALITY TARGETS

- LETHAL
  - INSURGENT LEADERS TO BE CAPTURED OR KILLED
  - GUERRILLAS
  - UNDERGROUND ELEMENTS
- NONLETHAL
  - PEOPLE SUCH AS COMMUNITY LEADERS AND THOSE INSURGENTS WHO SHOULD BE ENGAGED THROUGH OUTREACH, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, AND OTHER INTERACTION
  - INSURGENT LEADERS
  - CORRUPT HOST-NATION LEADERS WHO MAY HAVE TO BE REPLACED

AREA TARGETS

- LETHAL
  - INSURGENT BASES OR CACHES
  - SMUGGLING ROUTES
- LETHAL AND NONLETHAL MIX
  - POPULATED AREAS WHERE INSURGENTS COMMONLY OPERATE
  - POPULATED AREAS CONTROLLED BY INSURGENTS WHERE THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES OR HOST-NATION PERSONNEL PROVIDING SECURITY COULD UNDERMINE SUPPORT TO INSURGENTS
- NONLETHAL
  - AREAS LACKING ESSENTIAL SERVICES (SWEAT-MSO) THAT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT

LEGEND

SWEAT-MSO	SEWAGE, WATER, ELECTRICITY, ACADEMICS, TRASH, MEDICAL, SAFETY, AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Figure 4-9. Lethal and nonlethal targeting

TARGETING METHODOLOGY

4-172. The purpose of the targeting method is to integrate and synchronize all available capabilities with maneuver operations. Effective targeting first identifies the desired effects, and then the targeting options, both lethal and nonlethal, that support the commander's objectives. The D3A method facilitates the engagement of the right target with the right asset at the right time. Thus, it undergoes continuous conducted throughout COIN operations. Targeting methodology provides an effective method for matching the friendly force capabilities against enemy targets. Either lethal, nonlethal, or a combination of lethal and nonlethal effects address targets.

4-173. Targeting methodology is an integral part of the MDMP. Targeting begins with receiving the mission and continues through the execution and assessment phases of the operations process. Like the MDMP, targeting is a commander-driven process. As the MDMP progresses, targeting increases in focus based on the commander's guidance and intent. (See figure 4-10 on page 152 for an illustration of the relationship between the targeting methodology [decide, detect, deliver, and assess] and the MDMP, along with products generated during targeting; see FM 3-96 and FM 3-60 for information on targeting methodology.)




Figure 4-10. Targeting method and the military decision-making process

4-174. The commander's guidance drives the targeting method. Commanders issue targeting guidance during the decide function. Actions during the detect function yield the necessary intelligence for commanders to refine their guidance. Target identification can prove difficult once a COIN operation begins. The focus of the deliver function remains on decisive points commanders can engage. Immediately after the deliver function, units assess the effect.

4-175. The unit S-2 is aware the targeting process depends on the effective and timely use of the intelligence process and on the exploitation of the objectives and detainees. Target development against insurgents results from complete and accurate situation development during peacetime, contingency planning, and analysis of the OE in conflict. The IPOE (see appendix A) supports the target development process and provides the commander with the necessary intelligence to select valid target nodes for engaging.

Decide Function

4-176. The decide function focuses and sets priorities for information collection on both lethal and nonlethal plans. Intelligence and operations personnel, with the commander and other staff members, decide when a target is developed well enough to engage. Continuous staff integration and regular meetings of the intelligence cell and targeting board or working group enable this function. Specifically, intelligence analysts identify individuals and groups to engage as potential COIN supporters, targets to isolate from the general population, and targets to eliminate.

4-177. During the decide function as well, any targeting board or working group produces a prioritized list of targets and a recommended COA associated with each target. Executing targeting decisions may require the operations section to issue FRAGORDs. Each of these orders is a task that nests within the higher HQ's plan and the commander's intent. Targeting decisions may require changing the intelligence synchronization plan. Any targeting board or working group participates in COA analysis and collaboratively develops the following decide function products:

- HPT list:
  - This is a prioritized list of HPTs by each phase of the operation.
  - An HPT is an HVT that must be acquired and successfully engaged for the success of the friendly commander's mission.
- HVT list:
  - The intelligence staff and targeting officer (fire support officer or S-3 staff member) evaluate and integrate the relevant mission and operational variables of the OE that affect both friendly and enemy operations.
  - This coordination helps to develop the intelligence summary, which contains a prioritized list of HVTs by the phases of the operation.
- Intelligence synchronization plan:
  - The intelligence officer uses this plan and staff input to synchronize the entire collection effort, including all the assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units, and higher echelon units, organizations, and intelligence.
  - The intelligence officer also uses this plan and staff input to answer the CCIRs.
- Target selection standards:
  - These standards serve to establish those criteria, including accuracy, that must be met before an attack.
  - For the use of lethal means in attacking targets, requirements might include a picture, address, 8-digit grid, and enough information to prosecute planned targets and targets of opportunity.
  - For the use of nonlethal means in attacking targets, requirements might include background information on an HVI, meetings the HVI may attend, and known associates.
- Attack guidance matrix, which includes targets or target sets approved to act on by the commander, how and when to act on them, and the desired effects.
- Target synchronization matrix:
  - This list combines data from the HPT list, intelligence synchronization plan, and attack guidance matrix.
  - This list includes HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the attacks.
- Targeting FRAGORD, which tasks units with executing the lethal and nonlethal plans.

high-payoff target – A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (JP 3-60)

high-value target – A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)

Note. The decide function is useful when building the information collection plan. HPTs are nearly always a PIR.

Detect Function

4-178. The detect function locates HPTs accurately enough to engage them. Target detection occurs through maximum use of all available assets. The S-2 focuses the intelligence acquisition efforts on the designated HPTs and PIR. Situation development information, through detection and tracking, accumulates as collection systems satisfy PIR and information requirements. Tracking is an essential element of the detect function. Tracking priorities are based on the commander's concept of operations and targeting priorities. Tracking is executed through the collection plan since many critical targets move frequently.

4-179. Detection at the tactical level occurs through a variety of means such as a HUMINT source, an anonymous tip, UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms, reconnaissance or combat patrol, signals intelligence (SIGINT), document and media exploitation (DOMEX), U.S. Army aircraft, U.S. Air Force aircraft, or military working dog teams. The best way to detect a target during an insurgency is through

HUMINT. As such, the detect function requires a detailed understanding of social networks, the insurgency's networks, insurgent actions, and public attitude toward the COIN force.

4-180. For target engagement by nonlethal means, the detect function may require patrols to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of leaders' residences and determine whether they are on site, to assess a potential project, or to attend a greeting to meet with a leader.

Deliver Function

4-181. The deliver function begins in earnest with execution. Targeting provides speed and efficiency to the delivery of lethal or nonlethal fires on targets IAW the attack guidance matrix or the targeting FRAGORD. The deliver function employs the system or combination of systems selected during the decide function.

4-182. For target engagement by lethal means, units may eliminate the target using direct or indirect fires. However, on many occasions, capturing the target is more important, so commanders choose to execute a raid or a cordon and search. For target engagement by nonlethal means, a commander may use an information operation to convince a local leader or may conduct a project to garner popular support through money or employment.

4-183. Target exploitation in the COIN environment is similar to that in law enforcement. An exploitation plan not only facilitates the gathering of collected exploitable material for future court cases but may lead to follow-on targets after successful exploitation. To ensure legitimacy, U.S. security forces must be prepared to comply with elements of the HN's rule of law. (See chapter 5 for details on tactical site exploitation.)

Assess Function

4-184. Commanders use assessment to envision a series of timely and accurate snapshots of their understanding of the insurgency and populace. Their assessment yields an estimate of the insurgency's combat effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions, as well as their accurate understanding of the populace. All this information helps commanders determine if and when their targeting efforts were accomplished. The assess function of targeting relies heavily upon MOEs and MOPs (see paragraphs 4-11 through 4-15).

4-185. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions. The commander's need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions links CCIR to the assessment process. Planning for assessment serves to identify the key aspects of the operation the commander wants closely monitored and where the commander wants to make decisions.

4-186. The actual production of the assessment is primarily an intelligence staff responsibility but requires coordination with operations, fires, CA, public affairs, information activities, PSYOP, and other relevant participants. As part of the targeting method, the assess function determines the necessity of another engagement of the target.

FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT, ANALYZE, AND DISSEMINATE

4-187. The find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) methodology enables maneuver leaders at all levels to organize resources and array forces. While the targeting aspect of the F3EAD methodology is consistent with that of the D3A methodology, the F3EAD methodology provides the maneuver commander an additional tool to address certain targeting challenges, particularly those found in a COIN environment. The F3EAD methodology is not a replacement for the D3A methodology, nor is it exclusive to targeting. Rather, it is a technique that works at all levels for leaders to develop understanding about their OEs and to visualize the effects they want to achieve. (See FM 3-60 for information on the F3EAD methodology.)

Engaging Targets

4-188. In COIN operations, target engagement with nonlethal effects is frequently more important than with lethal effects, and the F3EAD methodology is equally applicable for both. Effective targeting identifies options to support the commander's intent and objectives. For nonlethal effects, those options include CMO,

cyber electromagnetic activities, information activities, PSYOP, and political, economic, and social programs. Target engagement by lethal means is most typically designed for area denial, suppression of enemy indirect fires, or to kill.

High-value Individuals

4-189. The F3EAD methodology is especially well suited to and the primary means for engaging HVIs. A *high-value individual* is a person of interest who is identified, surveilled, tracked, influenced, or engaged (FM 3-60). An HVI may become an HPT who must be acquired and successfully attacked (exploited, captured, or killed) for the success of the friendly commander's mission. In this role, the F3EAD methodology features massed, persistent reconnaissance or surveillance that is cued to a powerful and decentralized all-source intelligence apparatus to find the exact location of an HVI among the general population. A precise location enables surgical finishing effects (lethal or nonlethal) that emphasize speed to catch a mobile target. The emphasis on speed is not only to remove a combatant from the AO, but also to gain more information on the threat enemy advisory. The exploit and analyze steps are often the main effort of F3EAD because these steps provide insight into the enemy's network and may open new targeting efforts. The information accumulated during the exploit and analyze steps frequently starts the cycle over again by providing observable or traceable leads or start points into the network.

The Process Within the Process

4-190. To understand the F3EAD process, it is instructive to see how the D3A methodology incorporates and uses the F3EAD methodology and to realize the F3EAD process can begin during any phase of the D3A methodology. The process still begins with the decide function, which yields decisions on priorities and resource allocation. Performance of the decide function is continuous and requires extensive, persistent analytical work by operations and intelligence personnel. They analyze large quantities of all-source intelligence to determine the following:

- Threat validity.
- Actual importance of potential targets.
- Best means to engage the target.
- Expected effects of engaging the targets (which inform the appropriate actions to mitigate any negative effects).
- Necessary changes to the exploitation plan.

4-191. The detect function is broken into two parts—find and fix (see figure 4-11 on page 156). The find step identifies the HVI and maps and analyzes the target's network. The fix step identifies a specific location and time to engage the HVI and confirms the validity of the target.




Figure 4-11. High-value individual targeting process

4-192. In COIN operations, target sets often include HVIs whose treatment requires special care or caution because a failure to engage them or an improper engagement of them would yield adverse consequences. As a result, the find step may require a considerable amount of time, from days to weeks, for target identification and the mapping and analysis of the target's network.

4-193. The finish step of the F3EAD methodology mirrors the deliver function of the D3A methodology when the action planned against the target is initiated and completed. Where the finish step differs from the deliver function is the method the commander employs against identified target sets. In addition to systems typically associated with delivering effects in the D3A methodology, the means a maneuver commander uses in COIN operations include actions such as sniper, counter-sniper, tactical callout, vehicle interdiction, and small ambush teams.

4-194. The exploit, analyze, and disseminate steps amplify the assess function. The engaging unit gathers additional information during the exploit step, determines the implications and relevance of the information during the analyze step, and publishes the results during the disseminate step.

4-195. The conduct of targeting occurs continuously. For any given target, the process tends to follow a certain flow (see figure 4-12). Yet, at any given time, a unit may be conducting the find step for some targets, the exploit step for several other targets, and the fix, finish, analyze, or disseminate step for yet other targets. Similarly, the unit may disseminate information pertaining to a target's location prior to the finish or exploit step. Even though the process does generally follow the depicted flow, the process is not to inhibit what must happen next.




Figure 4-12. Targeting cycle and battle rhythm

Note. Additional groups and boards may include assessments working group, subordinate/supporting working groups, and targeting board. The commander will decide/approve during the targeting board prior to publishing the order.

TARGETING WORKING GROUP SESSIONS—BRIGADE AND BATTALION BATTLE RHYTHM

4-196. The BCT and battalion battle rhythm integrates targeting working group sessions. The sessions nest within the higher HQ targeting cycle to ensure targeting focuses, rather than disrupts, operations. Thus, information collection plan modifications, target nominations exceeding organic capabilities, air support requests, and task organization, HPT list, specified fire support, information operation, and EW task changes remain sensitive to the time available to prepare and execute. This cycle is a continuous process for the working group throughout the operation.

4-197. The timing of targeting working group sessions is critical. While the time focus for BCT-level sessions is normally 24 to 36 hours out, the BCT employment of reachback assets and certain targeting decisions such as target nominations and air support requests undergo advance planning in conjunction with the division, corps, theater Army, and joint air tasking cycle. For these reasons, the BCT targeting focus is 24, 48, and 72 hours. The BCT and battalion fire support officers schedule internal fire support cell targeting meetings, so fire support, information activities, and EW-activities-related target nominations arrive within the higher echelon target nomination windows. However, commanders choose a targeting cycle based on the pace of operations.

4-198. During COIN operations, BCTs and battalions typically use a one- or two-week targeting cycle and battle rhythm. The target cycle drives the tactical unit's daily and weekly operations. (See figure 4-12 for an example targeting cycle and battle rhythm.)

4-199. Another important facet of the battle rhythm is the daily information collection and operations synchronization meeting. Due to the air tasking order cycle, this meeting traditionally synchronizes operations from 96 hours to 24 hours in the preparation to hand over to current operations. In COIN operations, this meeting needs to synchronize all actions along the unit's LOEs. Especially critical is planning and requesting higher echelon assets such as U.S. Air Force aircraft, jamming, UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms, information collection, and aviation ahead of the higher HQ decision cycle. Three outputs result from this meeting—a 96-hour synchronization matrix, a 96-hour information collection plan, and a daily FRAGORD.

4-200. During this process, commanders and staffs create shared situational understanding. Fusion cells are important to creating this understanding. Whenever possible, fusion cells include unified action partners. The intelligence portion of a fusion center typically comprises intelligence representatives from different tactical echelons, interagency partners, multinational organizations, HN organizations, and NGOs operating in the AO. The mixture of personnel and expertise allows for the integration of information and analysis. This is an effective means of understanding the OE from multiple perspectives. Fusion cells aid understanding of intelligence and information collection operations that they may avoid unintended consequences. (See FM 2-0 for information on fusion cells.) Possible higher HQ intelligence products include those following:

- *Target folder*—a folder, hardcopy or electronic, containing target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target (JP 3-60).
- *Target intelligence*—intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance (JP 3-60).
- *Identity intelligence*—the intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest (JP 2-0).

4-201. Targeting in COIN uses tactical actions and either MDMP or TLP to ensure units achieve desired end states over time. Throughout the COIN targeting process, tactical units synchronize and employ developed LOEs to achieve unity of effort, task accomplishment, populace control, and increased public perception of the HN government's legitimacy.

EXAMPLE LONG-TERM TARGETING CYCLE—BRIGADE

4-202. The brigade will typically drive the targeting cycle but will solicit target nominations from battalions, and battalions from companies. The brigade normally opens a targeting cycle with an assessment working group under the direction of the brigade XO, in which the assembled team will discuss the status of active targets. The team differentiates between lethal and non-lethal targets and assesses whether the desired effects have been achieved or not, and whether targets should be re-attacked, refined, or stopped. At the end, the XO issues any new guidance. The targeting cycle continues through the efforts of various working groups. This may be as simple as lethal or non-lethal targeting, or with a working group per LOE. These working groups consider how to revise efforts on existing targets, or how to implement new guidance from the commander, or to develop new target nominations. The working groups also hear nominations from subordinate units. Near the end of the targeting cycle, the XO will convene the targeting working group who will collectively review the efforts of the working groups, ensure they are in compliance with the commander's intent and with the command's ability to execute. The targeting team presents a targeting board for the commander's decision and then publishes a targeting FRAGORD.

4-203. The following is an example recreation (used for discussion purposes only) of a long-term targeting effort:

- Desired effect—Improved public perception of, and trust in, the local HNSF
- Targets developed/delivered sequentially:
  - Information activities—Survey local populace to understand their perceptions on HNSF proficiency and what would improve them (assessed and subsequent targets developed and delivered over months).
  - HNSF cell—Designs a training program to improve proficiency.
  - Operations cell—Operational partnership with HNSF cell.
  - BCT staff judge advocate—Develop a partnership with local judicial authorities.
  - CA—Develop a project to refurbish police station.
  - Logistics staff officer (S4) cell—Procures new uniforms and equipment.
  - HNSF and partnered forces—Develop an external evaluation.
  - Key leaders—Engagement with local mayor and HNSF leaders to validate/legitimize the local forces.
  - Information activities/public affairs—Publicize HNSF successes.
  - Information activities—Additional survey of populace to determine change in perceptions.

Chapter 5
Offensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency

Tactical units conduct offensive operations during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to destroy, defeat, disrupt, interdict, deny, or neutralize insurgent elements and thereby to support the lines of effort (LOEs). Tactical units may be tasked to conduct offensive operations as part of shape-clear-hold-build-transition operations (see paragraphs 3-117 through 3-150), strike operations (see paragraphs 3-152 through 3-157), or populace and resources control (PRC) operations (see paragraphs 3-163 through 3-166). Units may be tasked to isolate, disrupt, or fix insurgent leaders, guerrillas, underground elements, auxiliary forces, and a mass base within the general population (see paragraphs 2-6 through 2-15). This chapter addresses offensive operations in support of COIN LOEs.

Note. COIN forces conduct offensive operations to defeat and destroy insurgency forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive actions impose the commander's will on the insurgency. They also capitalize on accurate and timely intelligence and other relevant information regarding insurgency forces and weather, terrain, and civil considerations. (See FM 3-96 for information on the doctrinal conduct of conventional offensive actions.)

SECTION I – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

5-1. An *offensive operation* is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. COIN forces conduct operations according to the capabilities and limitations inherent in their organizational structure and the knowledge of the situation (insurgency) or the advantage relationship to the insurgency. This section addresses the characteristics of the offense, offensive operations, and planning considerations specific to COIN when transitioning to tactical operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

5-2. Successful offenses share the following characteristics: surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity. Offense characteristics, when used in concert, create the foundation for an effective offense in any operational environment (OE). The tactical vignette on pages 152 through 153 is an example of this foundation and illustrates the need of the U.S. force capability to transition from one type of military action (COIN) to another (close combat) seamlessly and rapidly.

5-3. The close combat experienced by Russian forces in Grozny and U.S. Forces in Fallujah illustrates two approaches for conducting the offense in urban terrain. In each case, noncombatants received guidance to evacuate in advance of the attack. Anyone left was in effect an enemy fighter. These geographically remote cities underwent besieging and then storming with attacks supported by massive firepower. The result was high casualties on both sides and the destruction of cities. The 2008 battle for Sadr City offers a different approach. The challenges during that battle were, in some cases, even more formidable than the challenges posed by Grozny and Fallujah.

The Battle for Sadr City

Sadr City is part of Baghdad and has an estimated population of 2.4 million. Forcing noncombatants to evacuate was not an option: there was nowhere for them to go. However, the approach to ridding Sadr City of Jaish al-Mahdi fighters was quite different from that used in Grozny or Fallujah. The operation [in Sadr City] . . . focused on enemy fighters and their capabilities, rather than taking and clearing the city . . . .

The trigger for the battle was Jaish al-Mahdi's response to the Iraqi government's offensive against insurgents in Basra. Jaish al-Mahdi launched its own offensive, overrunning Government of Iraq security forces and firing rockets and mortars into the International Zone, also known as the Green Zone.

In response, a U.S. Army brigade and Iraqi security forces (army and police), featuring Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and Strykers, along with engineers, civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel and other support troops, took on Jaish al-Mahdi. Importantly, the command and control arrangements gave the brigade commander direct access to crucial joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and fire support, including attack helicopters, fighter aircraft, armed Predator unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and Shadow UASs. This arrangement gave the brigade commander a short decision-response time that enabled him to react promptly to Jaish al-Mahdi operations.

An early priority was to stop the rocket and mortar attacks on the International Zone. Jaish al-Mahdi could launch these attacks quickly and almost at will. It simply required pulling a vehicle into a firing position, unloading the rocket and its firing rail, firing off the rocket, and driving back to a hide position: the work of minutes. U.S. forces quickly realized that the International Zone was at the extreme end of the 107-millimeter (mm) rocket's range. The solution was to push Jaish al-Mahdi fighters out of their firing positions and back into Sadr City. This approach did not stop Jaish al-Mahdi infiltration. The brigade then employed an innovative but straightforward approach: It walled off two neighborhoods south of Sadr City, including the one containing the Jamilla market where Jaish al-Mahdi got much of its resources. The wall consisted of T-wall sections, each twelve feet tall and weighing 9,000 pounds. The wall became an impenetrable, nearly five-kilometer barrier that denied Jaish al-Mahdi what had been terrain and avenues of movement crucial to its operations. The fighting was particularly intense and required the brigade commander to commit Abrams tanks and Bradleys to dislodge Jaish al-Mahdi fighters and protect the soldiers building the wall.

As soon as the wall started to go up, Jaish al-Mahdi instantly recognized the threat posed to its operations and launched numerous attacks to stop its construction. The wall, in the words of one U.S. commander, became a "terrorist magnet." U.S. forces fought from a position of advantage and defeated the Jaish al-Mahdi assaults.

While the construction of the T-wall ultimately squelched the rocket attacks, by defeating Jaish al-Mahdi's fighters, U.S. forces waged an intense—and instructive—counter-fire campaign. Key to that campaign was giving the brigade commander direct access to [joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets that he could direct almost immediately to identified firing locations without having to go through another headquarters. He could also pass intelligence rapidly and by secure communications down to the company level. He could attack enemy firing points around the clock with a formidable array of assets, including Apache helicopters, Air Force fighter aircraft, and armed Predator UASs. Brigade intelligence analysts honed their techniques over time and learned to follow Jaish al-Mahdi rocket teams to their source rather than attack them immediately. Then they could strike ammo dumps and more senior leaders, thus having a much more profound effect than they would be destroying a vehicle and a few foot soldiers.

The Battle for Sadr City (continued)

The overall results impress. In about two months, U.S. and Iraqi forces crushed Jaish al-Mahdi, killing an estimated 700, won back significant numbers of the population, and re-established control of what had been an insurgent stronghold. U.S. [forces] killed in action numbered fewer than ten. Furthermore, the Multi-National Division Baghdad exploited the success of the combat gains in Sadr City with an intensive campaign of providing local security and reconstruction, all complemented by information operations.

In addition to the key lessons highlighted above, other key lessons emerged. First, persistent [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, security operations], and responsive precision strikes are crucial to success, but they must be integrated at low levels. Second, ground maneuver was essential. It forced the enemy to react and enabled U.S. forces to seize control of the terrain south of Sadr City and to erect the barrier. Finally, capable indigenous forces were decisive in securing gains. Their presence signaled that Iraqis were in charge, not coalition forces who would eventually leave.

SURPRISE

5-4. As in the above vignette, the brigade combat team (BCT) commander achieves surprise by striking the enemy at a time or place the enemy does not expect or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. The commander assesses the enemy's intent to prevent the enemy from gaining situational understanding. The BCT identifies and avoids enemy strengths while attacking enemy weaknesses.

5-5. The BCT strikes the enemy either where and when the enemy least expects (for example, night attacks, infiltrations, rapid insertions of airborne or air assault forces) or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared (for example, in mass, leading with tanks). These types of strikes force the enemy to deal with multiple forms of contact, or they take advantage of the enemy's lack of preparedness for a specific type of contact or at a specific time and place.

5-6. The BCT focuses assigned or attached reconnaissance and security forces and information collection efforts and exploits echelon above brigade enablers (for example, space and cyberspace capabilities) to collect accurate and timely information about the enemy. It then capitalizes on this information by maneuvering forces to advantageous positions in the OE. It also imposes lethal and nonlethal effects that undermine the integrity of the enemy's tactical plan. This latter feat manufactures an advantage by presenting a tactical problem for which the enemy is unprepared or by limiting the enemy's ability to react.

CONCENTRATION

5-7. As in the above vignette, concentration is the massing of overwhelming effects of combat power to achieve a single purpose. During the offense, the BCT commander avoids setting patterns or obvious movements that would indicate the timing or direction of an attack. The commander designates, sustains, and shifts the main effort appropriately. The BCT concentrates combat power against the enemy using company-level enhanced digital communications and information systems. Simultaneously, it synchronizes information from adjacent units, higher headquarters (HQ), and unified action partners. Synchronizing allows the BCT to develop understanding of the terrain and threat forces in its area of operations (AO) and to concentrate assigned or attached and echelon above brigade information collection capabilities toward the commander's specific information requirements.

5-8. The division commander assists the BCT commander to achieve concentration by task-organizing additional resources from augmenting units or forces within the division. Through the division artillery headquarters, the division commander may provide additional artillery support from the division artillery (when task-organized) or a field artillery brigade. For example, when lacking external resources, the division commander might direct the organic field artillery battalion of the reserve BCT to reinforce the fires of the organic field artillery battalion of the BCT conducting the main effort until the reserve is committed. Another

example would have the division commander direct the division artillery target acquisition platoon radars (when task-organized) to provide coverage while the BCT radars are moving.

TEMPO

5-9. *Tempo* is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). Commanders build the appropriate tempo to provide the necessary momentum for successful attacks that achieve the objective. Controlling or altering tempo, as the vignette on pages 162 through 163 demonstrates, by the commander's direct access to crucial joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets proved essential to retaining the initiative and maintaining the rapid tempo of the operation. During an offense, rapid tempo focuses on key pieces of information and terrain at the tactical level. A rapid tempo entails a small number of tasks and allows attackers to penetrate barriers and defenses quickly to destroy enemy forces in depth before they can react. It allows the BCT to deliver multiple blows in depth from numerous directions to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Blows from multiple directions and multiple domains cause a multidimensional and multi-domain dilemma for the enemy.

5-10. Commanders adjust the tempo to achieve synchronization. Speed serves to keep the enemy off balance. Establishing the conditions for offensive actions may require slowing the tempo while the pieces are set in place. Once ready, the tempo increases, and the action takes place rapidly.

5-11. The BCT operations staff officer (S-3), in coordination with (ICW) the commander, ensures combat operations flow smoothly during phases or transitions (sequels) between offensive and defensive operations. The right mix of available forces to transition combat operations quickly between the offense and defense affords the requisite tempo for maintaining momentum.

AUDACITY

5-12. As in the vignette on pages 152 through 153, a simple but boldly executed plan of action, effectively walling off the two neighborhoods south of Sadr City, demonstrated audacity through action to seize the initiative and press the battle. Offense favors bold executions of plans. The BCT commander exercises audacity by developing inventive plans that produce decisive results while violently applying combat power. The commander compensates for any lack of information to develop the plan by developing the aggression toward seizing the initiative and then continuously engages in combat to exploit arising opportunities.

5-13. Audacity is a willingness to take bold risks. The BCT commander displays audacity by accepting risk commensurate with the value of the BCT's objective. The commander calculates when and where to take risks and avoids hesitation when executing the plan.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-14. The conduct of COIN offensive operations usually occurs either in insurgency-controlled or contested areas. COIN operations may use offensive operations such as movement to contact (specifically cordon and search and search and attack), attack (specifically raid, ambush, and hasty and deliberate operations), exploitation (for example, site exploitation), pursuit, or combinations of these.

PURPOSE OF OFFENSE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

5-15. Offensive operations employ purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control, and hasty or deliberate deployment of combined arms formations. Their purpose may be to—

- Harass insurgents to prevent the buildup of personnel and logistical resources.
- Isolate insurgents from the general population and their support.
- Prevent crime.
- Demonstrate support for the government and for the populace in the local area.
- Secure the populace.
- Expand controlled areas.
- Disrupt, interdict, deny, neutralize, defeat, or destroy the insurgency force and its base complexes.
- Integrate with and support host-nation security forces (HNSF).

FOUR TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-16. During COIN, civil security may require offensive operations against insurgents to seize the initiative and neutralize the threat. Even carefully targeted offensive operations against insurgents can create public risks. In some contexts, populations have tolerated increased civilian casualties resulting from aggressive offensive operations against insurgents when those operations produced a significant improvement in civil security. In other contexts, every civilian casualty resulting from COIN operations undermined popular support for the government and its allies. The COIN force carefully assesses the political, cultural, and security contexts from the public perspective to develop an effective approach for managing this dilemma. Normally, counterinsurgents use rules of engagement (ROE) to minimize loss of life. Sending the right message is often as important as creating lethal effects. The four primary offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. (See FM 3-96 for information on offensive operations.)

Movement to Contact

5-17. A *movement to contact* is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation (FM 3-90). This operation employs purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control, and the hasty deployment of combined arms formations from the march to create favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. No matter how the COIN force makes contact, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative. The prompt execution of battle drills at platoon level and below and of standard actions on contact (react, develop the situation, choose an action, and execute and report [see ATP 3-21.8 for information]) provides that initiative to the COIN force. The fundamentals of a movement to contact are to—

- Focus all efforts on finding the insurgency.
- Make initial contact with the smallest force possible, consistent with protecting the force.
- Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive engagement of the main body on ground chosen by the insurgency and to afford the commander maximum flexibility for developing the situation.
- Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction.
- Keep subordinate forces within supporting range and distances to facilitate a flexible response.
- Maintain contact regardless of the adopted course of action (COA) once contact is made.

5-18. The commander considers requirements for maneuver (fire and movement) upon contact. The commander develops decision points to support changes in the force's movement formation or a change from an approach march to a movement formation. Using both human and technical means to validate decision points and basing the decision on the mission, the commander determines the acceptable degree of risk. The commander's confidence in the products of the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) process and the acceptable risk then determines the unit's movement formation and scheme of maneuver. Increasing the distance between forward elements and the main body in a high-risk environment is usually better than slowing the speed of advance. Once the unit makes contact with the enemy, the commander or subordinate leader has five options: attack, bypass, defend, delay, withdraw. Cordon and search and search and attack are subordinate variations of a movement to contact (see section II).

Attack

5-19. An *attack* is a type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or secures terrain (FM 3-90). Although an attack may be either a deliberate or hasty operation, both synchronize all available warfighting functions to defeat the insurgency. The main difference between a hasty and a deliberate operation is preparation and planning time.

5-20. The key difference between a movement to contact and an attack is the amount of information known about the insurgency. The information available in an attack enables the commander to have more control, to better synchronize the operation, and to employ combat power more effectively than in a movement to contact. The commander has the advantage of being extremely deliberate and refined in task organization, tactical mission task assignment, and the scheme of maneuver.

5-21. The unit executes variations of the attack to achieve different results. These variations include ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack, and each has a special purpose. The commander's intent and the variables of METT-TC (I), which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations determine the specific attack. The commander can conduct these special purpose attacks (with the exception of the raid) as a hasty or deliberate operation. (See ATP 3-21.20, ATP 3-21.10, and ATP 3-21.8 for echelon-specific information on an attack [hasty or deliberate operation], raid, or ambush.)

Exploitation

5-22. An *exploitation* is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-90). It is the bold continuation of an attack designed to increase success and take advantage of a weakened or collapsed operation by the insurgency. Its purpose varies, but generally, an exploitation capitalizes on a temporary advantage. Failure to exploit may allow the insurgency to egress, reposition, or disappear into the general population.

5-23. Exploitation can occur regardless of the point along the range of military operations at which it needs to occur. All units, regardless of size, conduct exploitation. For example, during COIN operations, a company could conduct a raid on a particular civilian residence during the night to exploit the information gathered during its conduct of a cordon and search operation earlier in the day. In this example, effective search procedures, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning, and the use of reconnaissance and surveillance assets are keys to the company's ability to conduct exploitation effectively. (See section III for information.)

Pursuit

5-24. A *pursuit* is a type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (FM 3-90). The commander orders a pursuit when the insurgency force can no longer maintain its position and tries to escape. Normally, the commander does not organize specifically for pursuit operations ahead of time, though the unit staff may plan for a pursuit mission as a branch or sequel to the current order. The plan must be flexible for subordinate elements of the unit to react when the situation presents itself. Subordinate elements are made as self-sufficient as resources permit.

5-25. In conventional warfare, the enemy's transition to retrograde operations leaves them vulnerable to loss of internal cohesion and complete destruction. Yet, the insurgency's transition to retrograde operations may increase the difficulty for counterinsurgent units to engage, capture, or kill them. The successful pursuit of insurgents during irregular warfare (IW) relies on maintaining contact through reconnaissance and surveillance assets, patrols, and HNSF. Usually, dispersed irregular forces use preplanned routes of withdrawal or, when pressed, scatter among and blend into the general population to rally later at a predesignated point. Due to this, any pursuit is undertaken immediately, both on the ground and in the air. Boundaries do not prevent the pursuit of irregular forces into an adjacent unit's AO. Operation orders (OPORDs) or other means of coordination provide for this contingency.

5-26. Leaders recognize the potential for insurgents, engaged in IW, to conduct a baited ambush during their retrograde operations. Critical to mitigating risk to COIN forces during a pursuit is maintaining one of the eight forms of contact (visual; direct; indirect; nonhostile; obstacles; aircraft; chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear [CBRN]; and electromagnetic warfare [EW]). Positioning adjacent units may include crewed aircraft, UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms, HNSF, observation posts, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, other ground forces, and quick reaction forces. The conduct of COIN operations most often involves using the visual, direct, and indirect forms of contact.

Planning Considerations When Transitioning from Offensive to Other Tactical Operations

5-27. Operations may be conducted in remote or rural areas, where a decentralized array of forces can be most effective. Ground or water entries into these areas are common, but air assault or parachute operations remain options. Operations in remote areas are generally conducted in insurgency-controlled or contested areas to establish pockets of popular support for the host nation (HN) government and to deny support to insurgents. They may be conducted to establish bases in unpopulated areas in which insurgency forces have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistic facilities, or command posts (CPs). Units operate in remote areas to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas, and demonstrate the HN government has not ceded control to the insurgents.

5-28. To the maximum extent possible, COIN forces include resident personnel in their AOs. The type of force employed, along with its HN counterpart (regular forces or paramilitary), depends on the objectives, area characteristics, public attitude, political considerations, and available equipment and logistic support. The insurgent influence over the populace and the government's ability to recruit and develop an adequate local force partly determine the HN unit's size and composition. When the unit employs recruits from local inhabitants, the leaders also tend to be local, despite the possible limits to their military abilities. Employing advisor-assisted local leaders potentializes better control and motivation. Employing local leaders also facilitates the training, indoctrination, and incorporation of the local force (see chapter 7, section III) into the governmental structure.

SECTION II – OFFENSIVE VARIATIONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY

5-29. When Infantry forces are involved in operations such as peace operations, IW, and military engagement, it is normal for unit offensive actions to relate closely to the subordinate variations of a movement to contact (cordon and search or search and attack) or of special purpose attacks (specifically, ambush and raid). These subordinate variations normally employ restrictive ROE throughout the mission, regardless of the elements of offense, defense, and stability currently dominant at any specific moment. The conduct of these operations predominantly emphasizes the stability element over the defensive element. (See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.8 for information on ambushes and raids.)

CORDON AND SEARCH

5-30. *Cordon and search* is a variation of movement to contact where a friendly force isolates and searches a target area (FM 3-90). It may be thought of as a movement to contact, the clear tactical mission task, or the perform area reconnaissance action, based on the availability or fidelity of intelligence.

5-31. While the primary purpose of the cordon and search variation is to find the enemy or materials, often parallel is the search for and exploitation of material of evidentiary or intelligence value to use in the execution of future operations and criminal prosecutions. Additional individuals with the requisite technical expertise or equipment may supplement the unit conducting the cordon and search. Information gained from site exploitation adds to the existing information the commander is using to identify and target enemy personnel and materials. (See paragraphs 5-164 through 5-193 for details on site exploitation.) Paragraphs 5-32 through 5-115 provide the doctrinal basis for cordon and search operations conducted by the Infantry battalion and rifle company of the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT).

PRINCIPLES OF CORDON AND SEARCH

5-32. The principles of the cordon and search variation are comprehensive and fundamental rules to guide COIN forces in the conduct of cordon and search operations. They are not a checklist. They do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of successful cordon and search operations. The value in these principles lies in assisting commanders while they analyze pending operations, synchronize efforts, and determine when the current situation calls for them to deviate from the principles. The nine principles of the cordon and search variation follow in paragraphs 5-33 through 5-41.

Principle of Speed

5-33. Cordons and movement to a target area occur rapidly to gain and maintain initiative and momentum. The cordon and search force commander carefully considers time and speed factors, especially as they relate to enemy reactions. When the target of the cordon and search force is personnel or sensitive material, the force must achieve greater relative tempo than that in response to the threat of a preclusion to the enemy's escape or the material's destruction. Strong reconnaissance, complete with guides, can greatly ease the cordon and search force's maneuver burdens and increase the speed of relative movement.

Principle of Surprise

5-34. All efforts in tempo and deception target denying the enemy the opportunity to react. Combining foot and vehicular movement can increase speed and stealth. Air mobility, by itself or with other types of movement, can provide a cordon and search force with considerable speed, some elements of surprise, and

the ability to introduce or remove resources, detainees, and caches. While waterborne movement can canalize a cordon and search force to specific avenues of approach, it can also provide relative speed, surprise, and the abilities to deliver resources and remove detainees and caches. Special operations force capabilities significantly enhance the speed and surprise of mission execution, decreasing the probability of compromise and enabling operational tempo.

Principle of Isolation

5-35. Effectively sealing off the target and target area is necessary to defeat enemy reactions and free the cordon and search force to conduct actions on the objective. When possible, the COIN force isolates the objective, using stealth and rapid movement to surprise the enemy and ensure complete control of the area, before making contact with the enemy. When isolating, the commander acts to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat. The commander employs all available direct and indirect fire weapons consistent with the ROE. Isolating the objective is a key factor in facilitating the assault and preventing casualties.

Principle of Proper Target Identification

5-36. Cordon and search forces remain properly tasked and trained to identify, capture, and exploit target enemy personnel and material. During the execution of a cordon and search operation, specially trained special operation forces can facilitate sensitive site exploitation of an objective. Sensitive site exploitation may provide further intelligence for follow-on operations. Informants can provide positive identification of locations and personnel who are high-payoff targets (HPTs). The use of special aircraft systems enables fire support of friendly forces—the continuous monitoring of friendly ground forces with simultaneous sweeping of the inner and outer perimeters for threats to the operation and identification of hiding and fleeing personnel.

Principle of Timeliness

5-37. Time is a driving force in cordon and search operations. The commander balances combat information, target activities, desired end state, and execution of the operation to gain the initiative and deny the enemy the ability to reposition or escape. While sudden opportunities may arise with little planning time, the nature of a search and what it may uncover can result in significant amounts of time spent in the objective area. Commanders remain prepared to execute cordon and search operations with very little notice and to spend many hours, even days, conducting the operation. The size of the objective area most directly affects the size of the security element and the requisite time to emplace inner and outer cordons.

Principle of Accountability

5-38. Accountability is critical throughout the operation since cordon and search elements and sub-elements often operate dispersed. In addition to all the actions associated with the target and target area, search and site exploitation, detainee handling, casualty evacuation, and public interaction, actions on the objective require internal accountability from arrival to withdrawal. Cordon and search forces reinforce accountability procedures to mitigate possible risks associated with multidirectional egress.

Principle of the Minimization of Collateral Damage

5-39. *Collateral damage* is a form of collateral effect that causes unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (JP 3-60). While cordon and search operations focus on eliminating threats, excessive collateral damage may violate both the law of war and Title 10, United States Code, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Such violations create public resentment, embolden enemies, and damage the friendly force's credibility and good standing with the local populace. A key consideration when executing a nonpermissive cordon and search variation is the collateral damage to property in the vicinity of the target and target area. Proportionality requires the anticipated collateral damage not exceed the expected concrete, direct military advantage.

Principle of a Detailed Search

5-40. The mandatory search of target areas ensures the capture of all enemy assets. Effective searches require proper training, coordination, marking procedures, and adherence to tactical standard operating procedures (SOPs). All cordon and search force members differentiate clearing and searching. The tactical mission task to clear requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area, while *search*, in personnel recovery, is a systematic reconnaissance of a defined area (JP 3-50). With limited time, narrowing the scope of the search and increasing the force devoted to the search retain the detail and quality of the search process. (See section III for information on search operations.)

Principle of Legitimacy

5-41. The conduct of cordon and search operations remains in accordance with (IAW) the law and rules of war. Regardless of who is in charge and where the operation occurs, U.S. Forces execute and participate in the operation in such a way as to underscore the operation's propriety and the associated security and government forces' legitimacy. When possible, the presence of effective local police or the approval of respected local officials lends the operation legitimacy and furthers the rule of law.

PHASES OF A CORDON AND SEARCH

5-42. A *phase* is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADP 3-0). Phasing typically serves to distinguish the moment when the main effort changes its tactical or operational focus. The phasing of a cordon and search operation refers to the commander's vision for how the overall operation will unfold. The five phases of a cordon and search operation are reconnaissance, movement to the objective, cordon establishment, search (actions on the objective), and retrograde. These phases of a cordon and search are descriptive and not prescriptive.

Reconnaissance

5-43. The reconnaissance phase initiates upon receipt of the mission and continues throughout planning and preparation. The planning process begins with initial actions to develop the task, purpose, and tentative scheme of maneuver and to conduct IPOE (the identification of the target and target area). Support forces external to the COIN force are task-organized, and warning orders are issued. As planning focuses the information collection effort by identifying what to seek and where to seek it, reconnaissance during preparation refines the planning process by answering, through collection, the information requirements and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Although the plan undergoes continual updating and reconnaissance and surveillance continue throughout the operation, the reconnaissance phase ends upon the issuance of the completed order, conduct of final rehearsals and inspections, and line of departure crossing.

5-44. While the COIN force plans, the commander assesses which of the two basic methods of executing a cordon and search variation to use: cordon and knock or cordon and enter. The two methods vary by degrees of aggressiveness toward the target location's occupants. Based on the enemy situation template and identified risk, actual cordon and search operations modulate between these two extents.

5-45. A gradation spans the levels of entry for cordon and search operations (see table 5-1). For both methods, units establish the cordon with as much speed and surprise as possible to isolate the objective. The two differences are the level of aggressiveness the cordon personnel display and the actions of the search personnel. Under every method, the potential for combat still exists, so all units remain prepared to react to contact or a changing situation IAW the ROE.

Table 5-1. Sample variations in executing a cordon and search

CORDON AND KNOCK (PERMISSIVE)				*CORDON AND ENTER (NONPERMISSIVE)*			
Invited In	Ask	Dictate	Demand	Just Enter	Kick In	Shoot In	Explode In
ESCALATING LEVEL OF VIOLENCE							

5-46. The nature of the threat, the amount of force necessary to enable the search, and the size of the target and target area dictate the method (permissive [cordon and knock] or nonpermissive [cordon and enter]) for executing the cordon and search variation. Forces prepared to use force but planning to use other techniques

such as requesting or dictating entry conduct permissive searches. Key considerations for permissive searches are methods of approaching and communicating, contingency plans for denied entry or encountered resistance, and search (or assault) element training. Forces prepared to use force to clear the target area and enable the search conduct nonpermissive searches. The commander considers the effect on neutral and noncombatant occupants, neighbors, and bystanders, the overall risk to friendly forces, the training level of the search (or assault) element, the impact on follow-on missions, collateral damage, and public perception. Method changes may occur throughout planning due to the intelligence gained during planning. Contingency planning is imperative to streamlining execution when changes occur.

5-47. Conducting a cordon and search operation is an effort to search for a target. The nature of the target dictates the requisite resources and logistics for achieving the desired end state. For example, the search for an individual in a single-family residence would require a smaller search team than if the person could be found in any one house in a block. Similarly, the requisite logistics for evacuating three detainees from a target area differ from those for a large ordnance cache. Key questions for the commander when analyzing the nature of the target follow: Is the mission to detain, evacuate, seize, or destroy the target? Where is the target? Is the target a person? More than one? An object? Multiple objects? Both a person and an object?

5-48. The size and nature of the target area depend on the nature of the target. The presence of multiple targets in an area, their geographic relationship, and the surrounding environment are considerations for the employment of the inner cordon and search elements, which undergoes analysis during the reconnaissance phase. Regardless of the target area and its composition, the cordon and search force establishes dominance and control to enable a successful search.

5-49. The size and nature of the objective area derivate from the natures of the target and target area. The objective area contains both the target area and the target, and it can vary in size depending on the environment in which the cordon and search takes place. In a densely populated urban area, the objective area may be only slightly larger than the target area. The commander considers the terrain in which the cordon and search is conducted and analyzes observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment. While considering terrain, the commander assesses the impact of weather on the operation and how it may degrade or provide opportunity during the cordon and search. (See ATP 2-01.3 for information on the IPOE.)

5-50. During the development of the plan, the commander analyzes the anticipated threat and threat actions in and around the objective and how the enemy will react upon the arrival of the cordon and search force. Key questions for the commander when analyzing the nature of enemy activity follow: What is the enemy likely to do as a cordon and search force arrives? What may the enemy do upon the approach? What may the enemy do while the cordon and search operation is ongoing? What may they do when the force leaves?

5-51. The commander focuses on the physical resistance but also considers all types of reactions. Some possible reactions are fleeing, destructing, hiding incriminating items, and eliciting public interest.

5-52. Cordon and search operations are susceptible to impact from time. Planning time may be short due to urgency to exploit a fleeting opportunity. The time on the objective may be considerably longer than planned.

5-53. The commander develops a plan and fleshes out the scheme of maneuver. The latter translates into action the commander's decisions regarding the target and target and objective areas by determining how available forces will accomplish the chosen cordon method (that is, who goes where and when). The commander determines the initial scheme of maneuver and then refines the plan throughout the reconnaissance phase as additional information becomes available. The commander determines the following:

- Order, route, and method of delivery to and from the objective (including landing zones and insertion and extraction sites).
- Timing and phasing.
- Target location and area and how the search (or assault) element will arrive there.
- Where and how the security element will deploy inner and outer cordons.
- Where the support element will locate and the criteria regarding its reserve functions.
- The commander's location to conduct command and control.
- Battlespace geometry (that is, where elements are located in relation to each other, civilians, and sensitive sites), the effects of fires, the risk assessment, and the collateral damage estimate.

5-54. Through developing the scheme of maneuver, the commander identifies the contingency plans that may require consideration to ensure the preparedness of the COIN force for potential changes to the plan. This may involve resupply, assault (in the case of planned permissive operations), communications, alternate routes, alternate delivery options, actionable combat information requiring immediate follow-on operations, transitions from offensive to defensive operations, minimum force for go/no-go criteria, and bump plans.

5-55. As information becomes available during the reconnaissance phase, a requirement for additional enablers may prove evident to execute cordon and search operations effectively and efficiently. Because some resources may require a request process and significant lead time—such as crewed aircraft, UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms, CA teams, public affairs, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCTs), the planning process prioritizes early identification of critical enablers for incorporation into the unit formation to maximize efficiency. Specific enablers requiring linkup procedures such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) or a quick reaction force may also require coordination before the operation. The members of these teams are subject matter experts, and the commander directly consults them regarding their methods of employment, strengths and weaknesses, and requirements. (For example, for their best performances, some military working dogs require climate control.)

5-56. A cordon and search may use any manner of movement and may blend types of movement to deliver Soldiers onto the objective. For example, the security element may deploy in wheeled vehicles while the search (or assault) element conducts an air assault in the target area. The terrain, environment, and capabilities of the threat also dictate methods of movement. As an example, an enemy posing significant air defense assets may force delivery on foot. Methods of movement to a cordon and search include vehicle, foot, air, and water.

5-57. When the cordon and search mission integrates HNSF, the commander identifies their communications, weapon system combat power, training, and rehearsal capabilities necessary to integrate. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation between the HN and the cordon and search force can affect military capability.

Note. Nontraditional threats such as the insider threat undermine cordon and search (and search and attack, covered in paragraphs 5-116 through 5-149) activities, as well as the cohesion of the cordon and search force. (See paragraphs 4-34 through 4-35 and chapter 7, section III for information on insider threats.)

5-58. During this phase, the command element begins gathering information and coordinating. The commander identifies elements and assigns units to them. Tasks and priorities are assigned to the support element. Weapons, personnel, equipment preparation, and contingency plans are identified. Rehearsals of all aspects of the cordon and search are conducted, but the priority of the rehearsals remains actions on the objective, command and control and communications contingencies, and reporting.

5-59. Normally, the commander considers the effective employment of enablers that typically support cordon and search missions. Enablers include information collection assets, aviation, military working dogs, public affairs, and snipers. The commander leverages these enablers by effectively task-organizing them within the formation. Also, the commander considers direct fire control measures, indirect fire coordination measures, and how they will affect supporting enablers such as aviation support. As possible during rehearsals, all enablers are in attendance to deconflict and to ensure understanding of intent regarding search techniques, information activity messaging, and the communications plan.

5-60. During planning, the commander considers the necessary products to plan, prepare, and execute the mission effectively. Prior to mission execution, developing products such as a graphic operating system and a grid reference graphic enable command and control and mitigate the potential of fratricide. The graphic operating system provides a numbering system for a depiction of an urban area, commonly generated using satellite imagery. Typically, the objective building is assigned and marked number one and appears in a highlighted box (see figure 5-1 on page 170).




Figure 5-1. Graphic operating system

5-61. A grid reference graphic (see figure 5-2 for an example) is another technique for effective communication with and control of subordinate elements during a cordon and search operation. The graphic overlays a simple grid system atop a map but provides fidelity and a common operational picture (COP), which is necessary when conducting operations in urban areas. Alphanumeric grid identifiers along the top and side allow for common understanding of location references during an operation. In the example figure 5-2 provides, arrows and circles aid the viewer in identifying a building; building 2 is mostly located in grid square 4G.

Note. The combined use of both the grid reference graphic and graphic operating system mitigates the possibility of confusion between elements. When possible, all supporting enablers and echelons provide the latest and most current versions of all products prior to mission execution.




Figure 5-2. Grid reference graphic

Note. The commander continuously assesses the situation throughout all phases to maintain understanding of current conditions and determine how well the operation is progressing. With continuous assessment, the commander anticipates changes in the circumstances and adapts the force appropriately.

Movement to the Objective

5-62. Movement to the objective begins with the physical movement of the cordon and search force to the target and objective areas. Methods of movement, timing, and scheme of maneuver depend on the METT-TC (I) variables. The cordon and search force may conduct movement as a single element on one route (single point of ingress or egress) or by multiple elements across different routes (multidirectional ingress or egress) and at different times. As reviewed in reconnaissance (see paragraphs 5-43 through 5-61), the crafting of method, order, and synchronization of movement occurs during mission planning and preparation. A cordon and search activity uses any manner of ground tactical movement (dismounted and mounted movement), air movement, or amphibious movement, and it blends types of movement. For example, the security element may deploy in wheeled vehicles while the search (or assault) element conducts an air assault in the target area. Regardless of their delivery to the objective area by air or amphibious means, those forces still use various combat formations and movement techniques to relocate from the point of insertion to their assigned positions, depending on the force's composition, tactical situation, means of movement, and commander's vision. Ultimately, the focus of the movement phase is simple—get the cordon and search forces from their starting point to the positions designated for the outer cordon, inner cordon, and

target area without compromising the operation. The terrain, environment, and threat capabilities also influence methods of movement. An area inaccessible to vehicles and an enemy threat possessing significant air defense capabilities might require dismounted movement. The movement phase includes the following:

- Force organization in order of march and departure from the assembly area.
- Movement to the objective area.
- Element movement along routes to designated release points as the plan requires.

5-63. When organizing the order of march during movement, the commander assesses where the command-and-control element will best be positioned to control the movement. The command element normally nests within one of the platoons. When considering the positioning of the command element, the commander weighs the ability to exercise command and control against mitigating risk to the formation.

5-64. The security element normally leads the movement regardless of whether it is moving as a single force or in multiple elements on multiple routes. The inner and outer cordons are either in place or nearly in place prior to actions by remaining forces.

5-65. Typically, the search (or assault) element moves as either the second or third element of movement in the order of march. When the commander needs to deliver the search (or assault) element expeditiously to the target to achieve speed and surprise, the commander selects to posture them as the second element, so they can move immediately and directly into the target area. When it is paramount that the target area be completely isolated, the search team moves behind the support element.

5-66. The support element moves as either the second or third element of movement in the order of march when resistance is not expected or when speed and surprise are paramount. The commander places the support element as the trail element, so it does not interfere with the movement of the security and search (or assault) elements but is still positioned to support, begin, and continue actions in support of actions on the objective. When resistance is expected or when the support element is to ensure the target area is sealed off, it travels as the second element, which allows it to move into positions of support and security around the target area before the search (or assault) element is committed.

5-67. A commander develops the scheme of maneuver, which translates the commander's decisions regarding the target, target area, and objective area into action. In developing the concept, the commander uses the control measures essential to command and control. The control measures allow for the coordination and execution of the commander's plan. They are normally useful in ensuring the plan is understood as regards assembly areas, assault positions, checkpoints, rally points, and phase lines. The movement phase normally ends when the security element reaches its release point, assault position, or similar control measure.

Cordon Establishment

5-68. A cordon seals off the objective area by containing the enemy in the objective area and isolating the objective area from external attempts to influence events. It comprises outer and inner cordons, emplaced simultaneously or sequentially. Simultaneous or nearly simultaneous occupation of the inner and outer cordons is achievable with any means of movement. Multidirectional ingress lends itself to simultaneous action; the force moves to its position presenting a lower signature and, thus, can move into position simultaneously or near simultaneously. Sequential occupation of the inner and outer cordons allows for ease of control and simplicity of maneuver while accepting some risk of an alert threat in the target area having extra time to react. Single ingress points lend themselves to sequential actions; the force moves as a column along the same avenue of approach to a release point.

5-69. An example cordon phase might have inner and outer cordon sub-elements of the security element move to their cordon positions and establish positive control of movement into and out of the objective area. Then, it might have security and search (or assault) and command and support elements hold at a predetermined position until the cordons are established. Alternatively, they might move directly behind the cordon sub-elements to a release point and, from there, move into the target area on order or by another predetermined initiation method.

Note. The commander considers using a synchronization matrix to ensure isolation is achieved and conditions are established prior to movement into the target area.

5-70. Normally, at the company level for example, the company headquarters element nests within one of the platoons or among multiple platoons as necessary during the cordon phase. For example, the executive officer (XO) may be with the support element while the commander is with the security forces to best coordinate efforts across platoons.

5-71. The search (or assault) element either conducts its movement to the target area simultaneously with the establishing of the cordon, or it conducts a short halt during the establishing of the cordon. The nature and location of the target and the ingress point(s) (single or multidirectional) may determine whether the search (or assault) element moves simultaneously or sequentially.

5-72. The support element conducts its movement to the target area either simultaneously or sequentially with the establishing of the cordon. The nature and location of the target and the ingress point(s) (single or multidirectional) may determine whether the search (or assault) element moves simultaneously or sequentially.

5-73. The security element deploys the inner and outer cordon teams to set up their cordons. The actions of both reinforce each other, creating an environment free of unwanted influences and actions—both from the outside attempting to move toward the target and from within the target attempting to flee the area. As the security element deploys, its actions are dictated by the requirement of the cordons, the methods by which it moves into the objective area, and the way it chooses to occupy the positions composing the inner and outer cordons. The security element may use static positions, patrols, or both to achieve the required effects.

5-74. The outer cordon seals off the objective and prevents enemy or civilian influence. The outer cordon element's primary orientation is outward from the target area. However, the outer cordon performs a secondary function of controlling movement from the objective area as well.

5-75. The inner cordon seals off the target to protect the search (or assault) element from threat activity and prevent escape from the target area. The inner cordon team from the security element, properly armed and equipped to control the ground, conducts it. The inner cordon's primary orientation is inward, toward the target area. However, the inner cordon performs a secondary function of controlling movement into the objective area as well.

5-76. The cordon phase ends when the cordons are in place and the security element has contained and isolated the objective area. Actions on the objective begin immediately after the establishment of the cordon.

Search (Actions on the Objective)

5-77. Search (or actions on the objective) includes all the actions associated with the target(s) and the target area from arrival to withdrawal, from search and site exploitation to detainee handling, casualty evacuation, and public interaction. The nature of the target dictates both operational and logistical considerations—operational in the sense of determining the requisite resources for finding the target, and logistical in the sense of determining the requisite resources for achieving the desired end state as regards the target. Key inquiries when examining the nature of a target ask, is the target a person or object, does the target include both, where is the target, is the target to be detained, evacuated, seized, or destroyed. The size and nature of the target area depend on the nature of the target, the number of targets in that area, the geographical relationship of multiple targets, and the environment of that area.

5-78. The key actions conducted during this phase include the search (or assault) element entering the target site, the support element moving to supporting positions and executing its support and reserve functions, and

the commander moving to the best position for influencing the operation. The target area encompasses that area in which the cordon and search force are to establish dominance and control to enable an effective search.

5-79. During the search (actions on the objective) phase, the security element continues to maintain the inner and outer cordons, ensuring target isolation by providing overwatch of the friendly forces. The security team also provides immediate security of detainees and noncombatants.

5-80. As the actions on the objective occur, the support element executes its assigned task as reserve for the cordon and search force and as support for the search (or assault) element. It establishes a secure position—in or near the target area—in which to secure detainees, collected exploitable material, and casualties safely. The cordon and search force could rally at this position and defend itself from there if it were attacked by an overwhelming threat. The support element also provides detainee and collected exploitable material handling teams for the search (or assault) element, conducts casualty evacuations, and provides internal resupply as elements require. Often, this team has additional, attached enablers (for example, medics, communications assets).

5-81. The search (or assault) element moves to the target area and sets up a permissive environment for a systematic search. The search may target specific people, rooms, or buildings, or it may be comprehensive, covering everything in the given area. Search teams are responsible for entering, clearing, and searching buildings to capture or destroy enemy forces or equipment. They conduct the initial entry into a target area and use the necessary speed and violence of action to move through the target, clear it completely, and seize control of it. Creating the permissive environment for the search normally requires clearing the target of enemy forces, noncombatants, and booby traps before the search begins.

5-82. The techniques for securing the target depend on the nature of the environment (permissive or nonpermissive). Paragraphs 5-83 through 5-85 provide example securing techniques.

5-83. The permissive (cordon and knock) technique is less intrusive than the cordon and search variation. It is useful when the populace seems friendly or neutral, when no resistance is expected, and when the goal is to disrupt and inconvenience the occupants as little as possible. One way to conduct this technique is with a tactical callout whereby ground forces conduct an initial clear of structures or compounds from a standoff distance, first containing and isolating all structures and then directing all occupants to exit. Once the occupants vacate the structures, ground forces then conduct a final clear before continuing with other actions on the objective.

5-84. The permissive (cordon and ask) technique asks permission of the occupants or HN authorities to search a particular location. If they deny permission, no entry occurs. However, the cordon and knock and the cordon and ask techniques require some degree of integration with HN forces to obtain agreement from the targeted occupants of the search.

5-85. The nonpermissive (cordon and enter) technique is intrusive. The intent is to breach barriers rapidly to gain entry to the search area. Typically, units use speed and surprise to gain control quickly. This technique allows units to maintain the initiative over potentially unknown threats. Intrusive entry ranges from a Soldier simply opening a door without occupant permission, to mechanical, ballistic, or explosive breaching. In addition, when mounted assets are present, they can conduct a vehicular breach.

5-86. Once the search (or assault) element isolates and secures the target, it can begin conducting its search. The search may orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. The commander decides whether the unit will conduct a detailed or hasty search, depending on the available intelligence or the reason for the search. Search objectives are to determine the presence of any targeted individuals and groups and to look for items of evidentiary or intelligence value. This phase ends with the issuance of the retrograde order.

Retrograde

5-87. Retrograde is the movement of the cordon and search force from the objective area, regardless of the type of retrograde, method of movement, timing, and phasing. As in a raid, the search (or assault) element departs prior to the security element's displacing. The retrograde phase begins with the order to retrograde. As with movement and cordon phases, the cordon and search force may use a single egress point or execute a multidirectional egress, departing the target and objective areas via one or more routes. The movement may employ a stay-behind force. The retrograde receives proper attention during the reconnaissance phase since

that is when the cordon and search force is most vulnerable to enemy action, accountability missteps, risk of complacency, and other threats. The withdrawal phase consists of the following activities:

- The commander verifies the actions on the objective are complete and orders the retrograde.
- The search (or assault) element departs the target area under the overwatch of the support element and generally serves as the lead element in the withdrawal order of movement.
- The support element, with the command element nested, follows in trace of the search (or assault) element and is the last of the cordon and search force to depart the target area.
- The security element collapses the inner, then outer security cordons and moves to a preliminary release point from which it may link up with the rest of the cordon and search force or continue the retrograde on its own.
- The cordon and search force, when traveling as one element, conducts a brief accountability and security halt at a designated release point near the edge of the objective area.
- Following the designated route and in the proper order of movement, the cordon and search force departs the objective area to the predetermined assembly area along a different exfiltration route from the infiltration route.

5-88. Egress techniques are the reverse of the movement to the objective, establishment of the cordons, and movement to the target area. Their execution may reciprocate the methods used to move into the area, or they may be entirely different. Consideration for the extraction of enablers (for example, snipers, reconnaissance and surveillance forces) is essential in the reconnaissance phase to ensure proper accountability and effective overwatch. Paragraphs 5-89 through 5-92 review typical egress techniques selected by the commander.

5-89. Simultaneous egress emphasizes speed to move rapidly from the area but sacrifices security to some degree. The simultaneous collapse of both the inner and outer cordons can lead to unexpected consequences as well as the degradation of overwatch.

5-90. Sequential egress, while slower, maintains a safer environment for the departure of all the cordon and search force elements. Elements egress sequentially from the target and target area first while under the overwatch of the inner cordon. Once this is complete, the inner cordon collapses under the overwatch of the outer cordon. Finally, the outer cordon, itself, breaks down last.

5-91. Egress through a single point is executed by the cordon and search force to a predesignated release point due to canalization or to simplify movement. Individual elements move to the predesignated release point, which may create some challenges such as moving the cordon itself to reach the egress route.

5-92. Multidirectional egress requires greater coordination and control to gain the associated flexibility, security, and speed of this technique. The cordon and search force maintains accountability, communications, and potential reinforcement plans to mitigate the associated risks of multidirectional egress.

5-93. The retrograde phase ends when all the elements of the cordon and search force return to the designated assembly area(s). This includes any stay-behind reconnaissance and surveillance elements positioned in the objective area.

TASK ORGANIZATION FOR CORDON AND SEARCH

5-94. The cordon and search force comprises a command element, a security element, a search (or assault) element, and a support element, each with a clear task and purpose. Within the Army's operational framework, the search (or assault) element is normally the main effort of the operation. The size and composition of the cordon and search force is based on the size of the area to be cordoned, the size of the area to be searched, and the expected enemy situation. Dependable and competent HNSF, especially police forces, are extremely valuable during search operations in urban terrain. Assets employed during the cordon and search may include those following:

- Interpreters.
- HN or multinational forces.
- HCTs.
- Law enforcement professionals.
- Technical intelligence teams.
- Special advisors.
- Army aviation.

- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) enablers.
- Measurement and signature intelligence enablers.
- Military working dog teams.
- Biometrics collection.
- Tactical PSYOP teams.
- CA teams.

5-95. The cordon and search force (for example, a company) often receives additional assets to assist in a cordon and search operation based on availability and the METT-TC (I) variables. Assets may serve as teams in the security or search (or assault) element, or they may remain independent and on call. Assets may be internal or external to the tasked battalion or company and include military police, engineers, CA, PSYOP, military intelligence, or artillery who form any of the following:

- Mine detection teams.
- Demolition teams.
- Interrogation teams.
- Documentation or biometric teams (use a recorder with a camera).
- Scout dog teams.
- Fire support teams.
- Tactical air control parties.
- CA teams.
- Detainee and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) teams.
- Tunnel reconnaissance teams.
- Crowd control teams.
- Female search teams.
- Escort parties.
- Transportation teams.

Command Element

5-96. The command element (battalion main CP and, when established, a battalion tactical CP) serves as the headquarters of the cordon and search force. The battalion commander applies the same planning and decision-making techniques as those applied in other operations. While sudden opportunities may arise with little planning time, the nature of a search and what it may uncover can result in significant amounts of time spent in the objective area. The commander remains prepared to execute cordon and search operations with very little notice and to spend many hours, even days, conducting the operation.

5-97. The command element considers numerous mission variables when planning and preparing for a cordon and search operation. The commander identifies elements and assigns units to them, along with a clear task and purpose. Ideally, existing base units (platoons and squads) within the rifle company are task-organized into a security element, a search (or assault) element, and support elements for the operation. These elements organize necessary sub-elements for accomplishing the mission. Their command element (company primary CP and, when established, a company alternate CP) normally nests within one other element rather than travel as its own entity.

Security Element

5-98. The security element is responsible for sealing off the objective by emplacing outer and inner cordons. It limits or prevents enemy and civilian influence in the objective area and prevents targets from escaping the cordon. It may receive the bulk of the available combat power due to multiple avenues of approach and a requirement to disperse widely across the objective area in accomplishing its mission. It may have to establish multiple blocking positions and observation posts and conduct patrols to seal off the target area. Whether the cordon and search force travels as a single force (through a single ingress point) or moves in multiple elements on multiple routes (multidirectional ingress), the security element normally leads movement. It must have the inner and outer cordons in place, or nearly in place, prior to actions by other elements.

5-99. As security elements deploy to establish outer and inner cordons, the actions of both reinforce each other, creating an environment that prevents unwanted influences and actions—from both outside the

objective area and inside the target area—from interfering with mission success. Cordon elements (outer and inner) focus both inward and outward for security purposes. The cordon requirements, the security element's method for movement into the objective area, and its chosen manner for occupying the positions that compose both cordons dictate its actions during deployment. The security element leader employs information collection assets, internal and external to the battalion and its companies, to observe the target area before the approach of the security elements. Cordon establishment starts when the first security element reaches its release point position or similar control measure, and it ends as the security element seals off the objective area.

5-100. The establishment of the outer cordon (see figure 5-3) during the cordon phase requires detailed planning and coordination and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the required effects. The outer cordon prevents anyone from entering the objective area and assists the inner cordon in preventing the enemy (insurgency) from escaping the objective area. The element leader of the outer cordon maintains situational awareness and, within the commander's abilities, situational understanding to facilitate the progress of the operation, specifically the inner cordon and search efforts. Tactical tasks associated with the outer cordon security element include those following:

- *Block*—a tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or an avenue of approach (FM 3-90). (The definition of this term is different when the term is referring to an obstacle effect.)
- *Deny*—a task to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities (ATP 3-21.20).
- *Interdict*—a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy's use of an area or route in any domain (FM 3-90).




Figure 5-3. Cordon and search (inner and outer cordons)

5-101. Establishment of the inner cordon requires the same level of planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization as the outer cordon to achieve the desired results. The inner cordon seals off the target area to protect the search (or assault) element from enemy activity. It prevents enemy movement in the target area and prevents enemy entry or departure. The security element is properly armed and equipped to control the ground and mitigate the most likely issues they are to face, as determined during planning and preparation in the reconnaissance phase (see paragraph 5-43 for information on the reconnaissance phase). Tactical tasks associated with the inner cordon security element include those following:

- *Contain*—a tactical mission task in which a unit stops, holds, or surrounds an enemy force (FM 3-90).
- *Fix*—a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents the enemy from moving from a specific location for a specific period (FM 3-90). (The definition of this term is different when used as an obstacle effect.)
- *Overwatch*—a task that positions an element to support the movement of another element with immediate fire (ATP 3-21.10).
- *Suppress*—a tactical mission task in which a unit temporarily degrades a force or weapon system from accomplishing its mission (FM 3-90).

5-102. During the search (actions on the objective) phase, the security element maintains the inner and outer cordons. The inner cordon overwatches the actions on the objective, prevents egress from the target area, and coordinates actions with the outer cordon. The outer cordon prevents external influences from entering the objective area, prevents or controls movement into and out of the objective area, and coordinates with the inner cordon.

5-103. Whether the cordon and search force uses a single egress point or executes a multidirectional egress, the security element is normally the last to depart. The inner and outer cordons and their controls on the objective and target areas provide overwatch for the search (or assault) and support elements. Should the withdrawal be cancelled by design or by enemy action, the cordon remains in place. Once the other cordon and search force elements have committed to the withdrawal and are safely away from the target area, the security element first collapses the inner and then the outer cordon.

Search (or Assault) Element

5-104. The search (or assault) element's mission is to clear, search, and conduct site exploitation on the objective and thereby to locate and seize contraband material and to identify, search, or detain suspected insurgents. The search (or assault) element moves as either the second or third element of movement in the order of march. When resistance is not expected or when speed and surprise are paramount, the commander places the search (or assault) element as the second march element, so it can move immediately and directly into the target area. When resistance is expected or when it is to ensure the target area is sealed off, the search (or assault) element travels behind the security and support elements.

5-105. The search (or assault) element normally divides into three types of teams: search teams, security teams, and support teams (see figure 5-4). Since these teams are most often in direct contact with the local populace and potential threats, these teams train and prepare accordingly. Teams within the search (or assault) element initiate actions once the outer and inner cordons are in place. Paragraphs 5-106 through 5-108 address each team's actions.




Figure 5-4. Cordon and search (target area)

5-106. Search teams focus on the actual conduct of the search and the processes of site exploitation. They are not normally part of the security of the target area but can be when necessary. A search team relies on the support team for secondary tasks such as collected exploitable material and detainee handling.

5-107. Security teams are responsible for gaining access to, clearing, and maintaining security of the immediate objective. They provide immediate security, protection, overwatch, and supervising movement into and out of the objective. Security teams are not tasked with any actions that would detract from security. In most cases, the existence of inner and outer cordons does not constitute local security for the search (or assault) element.

5-108. Support teams are responsible for providing an organized force to conduct continuing actions in the objective area and to provide any necessary direct assistance to the search and security teams. Such actions may include detainee handling, collected exploitable material collection and handling, and casualty evacuation.

5-109. During the establishment of the cordon, the search (or assault) element prepares to execute movement to the target and target area. Such movement may be immediate when arrival at the target and target area has been planned to coincide with the placement of the inner and outer cordons. Conversely, the search (or assault) element executes a short security halt at a designated position while it awaits deployment of the security element. Depending on the ingress point(s) (single or multidirectional), this may or may not occur in conjunction with the support element.

5-110. During the search (actions on the objective) phase, the search (or assault) element moves into the target area and conducts the requisite actions to clear and search the target area. It clears the target area and sets up a permissive environment for a systematic search. The search may be targeted (specific to people, rooms, or buildings) or comprehensive (including everything in the target area). Tactical tasks associated with the search element include those following:

- *Breach*—a tactical mission task in which a unit breaks through or establishes a passage through an enemy obstacle (FM 3-90).
- Clear—a tactical mission task in which a unit eliminates all enemy forces within an assigned area.
- *Defeat*—to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0).
- *Destroy*—a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted (FM 3-90).
- *Neutralize*—a tactical mission task in which a unit renders the enemy incapable of interfering with an operation (FM 3-90).
- *Seize*—a tactical mission task in which a unit takes possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force (FM 3-90).
- *Support by fire*—a tactical mission task [in which a] unit engages the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force (FM 3-90).

5-111. The search (or assault) element departs the target area under the overwatch of the security and support elements and generally serves as the lead element in the withdrawal order of movement. It normally retains that position throughout the rest of the withdrawal to enable command and control ease of withdrawal.

Support Element

5-112. By design, support elements act as a force multiplier during a cordon and search operation and are positioned where they can best accomplish assigned tasks. They may assist the cordon and search force by serving as a designated reserve, providing additional enabling teams to support all elements of the force, and conducting continuing actions such as establishing a temporary defensive position and conducting vehicle recovery, casualty evacuation, or resupply.

5-113. The support element moves as either the second or third element of movement in the order of march. When resistance is not expected or when speed and surprise are paramount, it moves as the trail element—so as not to interfere with the security and search (or assault) elements' movements—but remains positioned in support of actions on the objective. When resistance is expected or when it is to ensure the target area is sealed off, the support element travels as the second element to move into positions of support and security around the target area before the search element is committed.

5-114. As actions on the objective occur, the support element executes its assigned tasks for the cordon and search force. It establishes secure positions in or near the target area appropriate for safely securing detainees, collected exploitable material, and casualties. Position placements are readily accessible to the cordon and search force and defendable against attack. The support element may provide extra detainee and collected exploitable material handling teams to the search (or assault) element, as well as internal resupply, vehicle recovery, and hasty repair capabilities. It may also conduct casualty evacuations. Often, it controls various enablers attached to the search (or assault) element until they are needed elsewhere. Tactical mission tasks associated with the support element include those following:

- *Follow and assume*—a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation and continues mission if lead force cannot continue (FM 3-90).
- *Follow and support*—a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation (FM 3-90).

5-115. The support element, normally nested within the command element, follows in trace of the search (or assault) element and is the last of the cordon and search force to depart the target area, overwatched by the security element. During the withdrawal, depending on tasking, it may transport multiple detainees or large amounts of captured material, and it may tow damaged vehicles.

SEARCH AND ATTACK

5-116. *Search and attack* is a variation of a movement to contact where a friendly force conducts coordinated attacks to defeat a distributed enemy force (FM 3-90). The conduct of this variation occurs when the enemy operates as small, dispersed elements whose locations cannot be determined to targetable accuracy by methods other than a physical search or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move inside a given area. A search and attack is normally conducted by dismounted or mounted Infantry forces, and it may be supported by Stryker and armored, equipped forces. It often occurs during the conduct of IW. However, it may also be necessary when conducting noncontiguous operations during combat operations and the consolidation of gains. These types of search and attack operations are normally characterized by robust reconnaissance and surveillance and by rapidly concentrated combat power to fix and finish (defeat or destroy) the enemy, once located. (See ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.10 for information on the search and attack variation.)

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

5-117. The Infantry rifle company normally conducts search and attack operations as part of a battalion or larger element. However, depending on the METT-TC (I) variables, it may conduct the operation independently. For independent conduct, the company organizes (as would the Infantry battalion) with a reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing force—each with a specific purpose and task to accomplish—and the appropriate level of support from fire support, sustainment, and other combat enablers. As with a cordon and search operation, the commander employs existing base units (platoons and squads) to organize search and attack forces.

Reconnaissance Force

5-118. The company, as part of the battalion search and attack operation, uses information from reconnaissance forces and surveillance assets internal and external to the battalion (for example, scouts, snipers, crewed aircraft, UAS organic or tasked echelon specific platforms, EW assets) to find and potentially to fix a dispersed enemy. The size of the reconnaissance force is based on available intelligence about the size of enemy forces in the AO and the size of the AO in terms of both the geographical boundaries and civilian population inside those boundaries. The less known about the situation, the larger the reconnaissance force. Once the enemy is found, the reconnaissance force determines whether it has the combat power to fix the threat or whether the battalion or company must fix the enemy with its fixing force.

Fixing Force

5-119. The fixing force (usually a company-sized force when conducting as part of the battalion and a platoon when conducting search and attack at the company level) prevents the enemy from moving to or from a specific location until the enemy is engaged and destroyed. It must have enough combat power to isolate the enemy forces once the enemy is located. It positions prior to initiating the search and attack operation. Initial fixing position placements are based on the enemy situation and, more appropriately, pre-positioned where fixing forces would most likely support the finishing force. In preparation for contact made in other areas, fixing forces have procedures in place to facilitate their moving to where they can influence the fight. Once the threat is fixed, a fixing force determines its ability to conduct the attack the finishing force would normally execute. If it is unable, another unit designated as the finishing force would execute the assault.

Finishing Force

5-120. A finishing force engages and destroys the enemy force and is normally the main effort of the search and attack operation. Finishing forces require enough combat power to defeat those enemy forces located in the AO. They are responsive and require synchronization with all support forces to accomplish the desired end state. Procedures remain in place to facilitate the finishing force's quick movement. Otherwise, the enemy can rapidly attrit the fixing force and immediately break contact before engagement by the finishing force. These procedures include graphic control measures, responsive means of transportation, and effective communication with the force in contact.

SEARCH AND ATTACK PLANNING AND PREPARATION

5-121. The search and attack variation is a decentralized movement to contact against an enemy operating in dispersed elements and requires multiple, coordinated patrols at company level and below. The battalion may conduct a search and attack operation as a coordinated, battalion-level operation or as decentralized, independent, company-level operations. Whether conducting a coordinated or decentralized operation, the battalion or company designates a main effort and supporting efforts that enable them to maintain the amount of flexibility the situation dictates.

5-122. During planning and preparation, commanders consider the most influential METT-TC (I) variables to a search and attack mission. The military decision-making process (MDMP) at battalion level and troop leading procedures (TLP) at company level and below provide commanders and subordinate leaders with the framework for planning population-centric, distributed operations. Upon receiving or in anticipation of receiving the search and attack mission, commanders initiate the process by alerting all participants of pending planning requirements. This enables participants to determine the amount of time available for planning and preparation and how to abbreviate the MDMP or TLP appropriately. (See ATP 3-21.20 and FM 6-0 for information on planning in a time-constrained environment.) This process organizes the battalion and subordinate units in purpose and space and serves to focus the search and attack to one or more of the following purposes:

- Destroy the enemy—render enemy units in the AO ineffective for combat.
- Deny the area—prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a given area (for example, in any area the enemy is using for a base camp or for logistic support).
- Protect the force—prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt and destroy friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, and property such as key facilities, headquarters, or polling places.
- Collect information—gain information about the enemy and the terrain to confirm the predicted enemy COA from the IPOE process.

5-123. A commander's situational understanding and knowledge of the higher echelon's concept of operations enables the planning and development of a clear task and purpose for each subordinate force. As planning and preparation continue, the commander establishes control measures that allow for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. Minimum control measures for a search and attack operation are an AO, target reference points, objectives, checkpoints, and contact points. The use of target reference points facilitates responsive fire support once the reconnaissance (and surveillance) force makes contact with the enemy. Commanders use objectives and checkpoints to guide the movement of the subordinate elements. Contact points indicate a specific location and time for coordinating fires and movement between adjacent units. Commanders use other control measures such as phase lines and named areas of interest (AOIs) appropriately.

5-124. Planning for the search and attack, based on the IPOE, combines the battalion intelligence staff officer's (S-2's) pattern and predictive analysis with available higher echelon collected information to determine likely enemy locations, capabilities, patterns, and actions. As developed, this information passes to subordinate units in the form of intelligence products. The scheme of maneuver for the search and attack operation is developed to capitalize on this information and integrates internal and external fire support assets available to the battalion (and as required) down to the company and platoon. Fire support plans provide flexible and rapidly delivered fires to achieve the commander's desired effects throughout the AO. Commanders position fire support assets to support subordinate elements throughout their AOs and establish procedures for rapidly clearing fires. To clear fires rapidly, CPs and subordinate commanders track and report the locations of all the subordinate elements. Due to the uncertain enemy situation, commanders assign clear fire support relationships.

5-125. Synchronization of movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, and sustainment are difficult to achieve in this type of decentralized movement to contact. Distances between units, the terrain, and a vague enemy situation contribute to the difficulty. For these reasons, commanders position themselves where they can best receive information and transmit orders, and they shift and commit forces during the search and attack operation. CPs lie where they can best influence the battle and afford commanders the best vantage point of the battlespace, which may not necessarily exist with the main effort. When attached in a direct support role, air defense assets increase protection for CPs. They may also provide security to maneuver and sustainment units and overwatch key air and ground routes or avenues of approach.

5-126. Fire support officers prepare the fire support plan for each phase of the search and attack operation and contingencies. They recommend the positioning of attached joint fires observers to support the operation and assist in deconflicting company and higher echelon airspace. Tactical air control parties' positions lie well forward (within range of reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing forces) to increase the timeliness and accuracy of close air support. Key to air-ground integration during search and attack operations are the means to develop *combat identification*, which is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision (JP 3-09). Priority of fires for the battalion mortars during the search and attack operation is normally to the main effort of the battalion. Company mortars employ organic fires to support the attack of the finishing force or to block ingress and egress routes, thereby preventing the enemy's repositioning, in support of the fixing force. Finding the enemy may have both echelons initially providing priority of fires to the reconnaissance force.

5-127. The battalion engineer staff officer's expertise helps in the identification of breach points in enemy defenses and in the ensuring of mobility for the battalion and its subordinate units. Engineer assets from the divisional engineer battalion can augment the company to increase combat power and facilitate freedom of action. Engineers can conduct route reconnaissance, determine bridge classifications, and find or make necessary bypass routes. Route clearance engineers detect and neutralizes explosive ordnances and reduces obstacles along routes, enabling force mobility in search and attack AOs. When necessary, a breach squad from the divisional engineer battalion can be task-organized to the route clearance force with mine-clearing line charges. The breach section of the IBCT and Infantry (Airborne) BCT provides mine-clearing line charges.

5-128. While the brigade aviation officer, who leads the brigade aviation element, works directly for the IBCT commander as a permanent member of the IBCT special staff, aviation liaison teams can represent the supporting aviation task force at designated maneuver headquarters for the duration of a specific operation. When co-located with a brigade aviation element, the liaison team normally works directly with the brigade aviation officer as a functioning addition to the brigade aviation element cell. The coordination and synchronization of search and attack operations requires the effective employment of liaison officers. Often, aviation liaison teams coordinate with the brigade aviation element and proceed to a supported ground maneuver battalion conducting the search and attack operation. Aviation units (attack and reconnaissance, assault, and lift) can reconnoiter, guide ground forces to the enemy, provide lift and fire support assets for air movement, direct artillery fires, aid in command and control, and protect exposed flanks. Attack and reconnaissance units can reinforce when antiarmor firepower becomes necessary to block or fix the enemy.

5-129. The essential nature of communication to a battalion search and attack operation (characterized by dispersed, decentralized, independent, company-level operations) hints at an additional planning problem—communications. Their limited range in the type of complex terrain most associated with search and attack missions requires detailed planning and rehearsal to resolve any terrain-masking effects and distances. Relays or retransmission stations may be necessary, and as for the combat multipliers, additional planning is essential. All these considerations undergo a detailed preparation for combat, fleshing out during TLP (and MDMP) and pushing to higher in the form of requests for information or enablers.

5-130. Assault platoons from the Infantry weapons company can augment the rifle company. When assault platoons (heavy weapons) are attached, the rifle company commander and heavy weapons commander coordinate the best use of the heavy weapons assets. Coordination with the battalion S-3 to select medium close combat missile system positions and TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire- or wireless-guided) missile positions—for providing long-range direct fire support—occurs when the Infantry weapons company is operating organically. Based on analysis, the commander can use the MK19 or caliber .50 machine gun in place of or in combination with the TOW missile system. The weapons company can also provide mobility and additional firepower for security missions and the reserve. During limited visibility, the weapons company with advanced optics can augment security forces at key locations, monitoring areas where the enemy is expected to travel at night.

SEARCH AND ATTACK EXECUTION

5-131. During execution, commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions made during planning and preparation into actions. To accomplish the search and attack mission successfully, a commander applies appropriate combat power at the correct time and location for gaining and maintaining a position of relative advantage. To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, commanders ensure the synchronization of

decentralized operations by specifying where each subordinate unit will operate, establishing measures to consolidate units before attacks, and establishing fire control measures for each subordinate unit. Commanders seek the most likely enemy locations, designate the forces most likely to make contact as the main effort, and prepare to shift the main effort appropriately. Search and attack forces, at battalion or company echelon, enter the AO by infiltrating as an entire unit or as smaller units via ground, air, or water. Finally, battalion and company operations do not end at the destruction of the enemy. Units immediately conduct consolidation and reorganization and prepare for follow-on offensive or defensive missions.

Search and Attack—Separate Company Areas of Operations

5-132. For Infantry rifle companies operating in separate company AOs (see figure 5-5), one technique is to organize to find (perform reconnaissance), fix, and finish (destroy) the enemy within their capabilities. The battalion commander may retain a battalion reserve or direct each company to retain a reserve. The battalion's indirect fire support is positioned to respond to all companies as needed. The commander employs the reserve, priority of fire, and other available assets to weight the main effort. Once the company reconnaissance force finds the enemy, the company commander concentrates combat power to fix and finish the enemy quickly.




Figure 5-5. Search and attack (company areas of operations)

5-133. Should the subordinate platoon be unable to destroy the detected enemy, the commander considers means to fix or contain the enemy. The commander may divert another platoon to the task, or the battalion commander might redirect another company or employ the battalion reserve or fires to contain and destroy the enemy. The commander redirects and repositions reconnaissance and surveillance assets to support any change to the plan and to identify enemy counterattack forces entering the AO. As plans change, the battalion commander provides control but allows for decentralized actions and small-unit initiative.

Search and Attack—Battalion Area of Operations

5-134. When the Infantry battalion operates in an AO, the commander may task-organize subordinate units to find (perform reconnaissance), fix, and finish (destroy) the enemy, each with a specific purpose and task to accomplish. Alternatively, the battalion commander may—

- Task units with the reconnaissance efforts in assigned AOs and task individual subordinate elements with performing the fixing and finishing functions based on the situation.
- Direct subordinate companies to conduct reconnaissance and the fixing function in assigned AOs with the commander retaining direct control of the finishing force.
- Rotate subordinate elements through the reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing functions, though rotating roles can require a change in task organization and additional time for rehearsal.

5-135. During execution, the battalion commander ensures fire support and protection assets support the main effort while remaining responsive to the rest of the battalion. When the mortar platoon cannot support the entire battalion's AO, the commander may consider splitting the platoon into sections. The commander considers the size of the area in which to conduct the search and attack operation, the number of available forces, and the time available. As the battalion staff conducts analysis to establish the duration of the mission, the staff assesses the battalion's ability to conduct continuous operations, so they may develop and resource a plan to maintain the battalion's combat effectiveness. Subordinate company and platoon unit tasks or actions, performed during the search and attack operation, may include the following actions:

- Locating enemy positions or those routes normally traveled by the enemy.
- Destroying enemy forces within the unit's capability.
- Fixing or blocking the enemy until reinforcements arrive.
- Maintaining surveillance of a larger enemy force through stealth until reinforcements arrive.
- Establishing ambushes.
- Searching towns or villages.
- Securing military or civilian property or installations.
- Acting as a reserve.
- Developing the situation in a given area.

Find the Enemy

5-136. Ample time is dedicated to determining the pattern of enemy operations. The commander is most effective once the pattern has been identified. However, accurately establishing an enemy pattern may take more time than is available. When conducting a search and attack operation, reconnaissance forces expect to spend significant time reconnoitering in an AO. The commander may consider using one of several techniques to find the enemy and may subdivide an AO into smaller ones. The scout platoon reconnoiters forward of the remainder of the battalion. Snipers and UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms may reinforce the rifle company and scout platoon for this operation. The commander develops a contingency plan to prepare for any compromise of the reconnaissance force and to position the company to support.

5-137. A search and attack operation with the scout platoon (or other security element) forward is one technique the Infantry battalion can use to find the enemy (see figure 5-6). In this illustration, the scout platoon conducting zone reconnaissance in AO Green initiates this method while the remainder of the battalion conducts search and attack operations in AO Blue. Serving as part of the reconnaissance force, the scout platoon attempts to obtain information about the enemy, initially in AO Green and then in AO Red.




Figure 5-6. Search and attack (scout platoon forward)

5-138. At a designated time, the battalion commander may direct the battalion to link up with the scout platoon at contact point 1 to exchange information. As necessary, the scout platoon guides the battalion to sites of suspected or confirmed enemy activity. When a scout platoon successfully locates the enemy, the battalion postures to attack. When the unit has not yet located the enemy, the battalion occupies AO Green and continues to search for the enemy. The scout platoon then moves to reconnoiter AO Red.

5-139. The process continues until the unit locates and destroys the enemy force, the battalion's AO is deemed free of enemy activity, or the commander terminates it. When the area is free of enemy activity, another AO is designated, and the process begins again. The commander may decide to emplace available sensors along the border from AO Red to AO Blue to identify enemy attempts to evade the battalion. An Infantry squad and a sniper team are tasked to emplace and monitor the sensors.

5-140. The successive method of reconnaissance, in which the scout platoon reaches its AO before the remainder of the battalion, affords the scout platoon more opportunities to gain information on enemy activity in the area. It also helps the battalion commander focus the search and attack operation when the battalion moves to the new area. Caches or airdrops most often provide logistic support for the scout platoon.

Note. The Infantry battalion rarely designates the scout platoon as the finding force or a potential fixing force. The scout platoon is organized to find information and the enemy, not to become decisively engaged with the threat. Rifle companies typically serve as finding and fixing forces.

5-141. Enemy operations over a very large area and in a decentralized manner force a battalion to disperse to locate and then mass to destroy the enemy. When possible, a battalion commander may enhance the units' ability to mass combat power by keeping search areas relatively small and minimizing the requisite distance for moving the fixing and finishing force upon enemy contact. (See figure 5-7 for a battalion dispersing units to search and figure 5-8 for a company dispersed in a decentralized manner to conduct a search.)




Figure 5-7. Search and attack (unit dispersing to conduct a search)




Figure 5-8. Search and attack (company dispersing to conduct a search)

Fix the Enemy

5-142. Once the reconnaissance force finds the enemy force, the fixing force develops the situation and executes one of two options, depending on the commander's guidance and the METT-TC (I) variables. The first option is to block identified enemy escape and reinforcement routes. The second option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in its current position until the finishing force arrives.

5-143. When blocking enemy escape and reinforcement routes, the fixing force maintains contact and positions its forces to isolate the enemy, to prevent the enemy from moving to a position of advantage, and to prevent the interdiction of reinforcements. These actions facilitate the conduct of attack by the finishing force. Control measures and communications remain established between closing units to prevent fratricide. UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms can assist in preventing fratricide by observing forward of the moving units and identifying friendly and enemy units as they approach.

5-144. When conducting an attack, the fixing force fixes the enemy in its current position until the finishing force arrives. Sniper fires are useful for disrupting the enemy and containing movement as the finishing force approaches. The fixing force can conduct the finishing attack when it is consistent with the commander's intent with respect to tempo and when the available forces can generate the necessary combat power. Depending on the enemy's mobility and the likelihood of the reconnaissance force's compromise, the commander may need to position the fixing force before the reconnaissance force enters the AO.

Note. When conditions are not right for the finishing force to attack the detected enemy, the fixing force and reconnaissance force can continue to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities to develop the situation further. The fixing force continues to avoid detection and reports the enemy order of battle and activities. It uses stealth in this effort, carefully avoids an enemy ambush, and always retains the ability to fix the enemy.

Finish the Enemy

5-145. Ultimately, the purpose of the search and attack is to destroy the enemy. Reconnaissance forces find the enemy; fixing forces rapidly fix the enemy as finishing forces mass combat power to facilitate the enemy's destruction. Massing combat power incorporates combined arms. To apply combat power decisively, ethically, effectively, and efficiently, the commander makes timely decisions, issues mission-type orders, and communicates with subordinate leaders to gather and disseminate information. During the execution of the search and attack, the commander locates the best position for obtaining information and reacting to subordinate unit contacts with appropriate force.

5-146. A movement to contact anticipates a roughly linear arrangement between moving and stationary forces—that is, movement in one general direction. This may or may not be the case for the search and attack variation. During the conduct of a search and attack operation out of a centrally located CP or base, the commander's control becomes more complex. The commander may remain centrally located with the reserve and mortars to ensure immediate, responsive fire support to any subordinate unit who makes contact with the enemy. Additionally, rather than moving positions with the main effort, the commander's central position may enable a more rapid response to the decisive point where contact is made. Otherwise, the commander may not be in contact or communication with a supporting effort upon enemy contact. Once a supporting effort's search activity finds the enemy, it can quickly become the main effort.

5-147. As the situation develops, decentralized operations may require the establishment of additional fire support positions to provide responsive fires to subordinate units conducting search and attack. Fire support units provide fire support coverage inside a complete, 360-degree circle. This situation requires significantly different control measures and greater planning detail due to the wide variety encountered in observer target and gun-to-target angles. Decentralized operations may drive situations in which finishing forces conduct point or area ambushes and use fires to drive the enemy into those ambushes. Such fires require the establishment of restrictive fire areas, coordinated fire lines, or no-fire areas around or between positions of adjacent ambush units in the AO.

5-148. The commander may move the finishing force behind the reconnaissance and fixing forces or may locate the finishing force at a pickup zone to conduct an air assault into a landing zone near the enemy once the enemy is located. The finishing force remains responsive enough to engage the enemy before the enemy can break contact with the reconnaissance force or the fixing force. The battalion intelligence officer provides the commander with an estimate of the time it will take the enemy to displace from its detected locations. The commander provides additional mobility assets, so the finishing force can respond within that timeframe. When established, the main effort is weighted by the commander by way of priority of fires and assigned priorities of support to available combat multipliers such as engineer elements and helicopter lift support. The commander establishes any necessary control measures to consolidate units and concentrate the combat power of the force before the attack.

5-149. The commander employs the finishing force to destroy the enemy by conducting an attack as a hasty or deliberate operation, maneuvering to block enemy escape routes while another unit conducts the attack, or employing indirect fire or close air support to destroy the enemy (see figure 5-9). The commander may have part of the fixing force establish an area ambush and then have the reconnaissance and remaining fixing forces drive the enemy into the ambush, establish a reserve, and screen the objective area.




Figure 5-9. Search and attack (unit massing to attack)

SECTION III – OFFENSIVE ENABLING TASKS AND ACTIVITIES

5-150. Offensive enabling tasks and activities empower and complement the other COIN LOEs (for example, civil security, civil control, support to HNSF, support to governance). Without the increased security resulting from offensive operations, units may not be able to accomplish any significant tasks in the other LOEs. Establishing civil security promotes a safe environment. Establishing civil control regulates select behavior and activities of individuals and groups. It also reduces risk to individuals and groups and provides security from both external and internal threats. Together, actions along these LOEs in COIN often take the form of unilateral and combined offensive operations against insurgent leaders, guerrillas, underground elements, and auxiliary forces. These offensive actions help establish public order and safety. In addition to effective targeting (see chapter 4, section IV), offensive operations are more successful when key enabling tasks and activities support them. Key enabling tasks and activities include search operations, site exploitation, sniper operations, patrolling, scheme of fires, and UAS employment.

SEARCH OPERATIONS

5-151. A search is the deliberate examination of a person, place, area, or object by Soldiers or animals or with technological sensors to discover something or someone. Searches may be of enemy or detained personnel, military objective areas, personnel or vehicles at checkpoints, and lines of communication.

SITUATIONS FOR AND PURPOSES OF SEARCHES

5-152. The conduct of a search can occur under a wide variety of situations and for a wide variety of purposes. Typically, the purpose of searching an individual, place, area, and object such as a desk is to find whatever they conceal. (See chapter 7 for information on vehicle searches.) Searches through communications from letters, books, computers, smartphones, and other media and signaling tools are for discovering information.

5-153. During a COIN, the ROE and various agreements between the HN and U.S. COIN forces often describe search situations and limit search methods. Informing the local populace, as much as tactically possible, that the search contributes to their safety and security is important. This communication begins during the search, and often, follow-up patrols continue it after the search. Follow-up patrols not only aid in mitigating negative aspects of the search but also check for the return of missed individuals to the searched area. Those including CA teams or tactical PSYOP teams are capable of conducting consequence management, assisting in the achievement of information engagement (often through reinforcing themes), and collecting information for development into intelligence.

TECHNIQUES FOR SEARCH OPERATIONS

5-154. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. Key considerations for conducting a search include the searching and detention of individuals, the searching of subterranean areas, aerial searches, tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning, and detainee processing.

Individuals

5-155. Any individual may be a member of the insurgency, an auxiliary force, or the mass base. However, searchers avoid mistaking all suspects for the enemy. Due to the potential lack of HN personnel identification procedures, correctly identifying a person as an insurgent can prove very difficult. The initial handling of individuals undergoing a search requires the greatest caution. During the search, one member of the search team always covers the other member, who performs the actual search. When females undergo a search, the search team takes every precaution to prevent violating local mores. When the unit can provide no female searchers, it employs the medic to search the female suspects.

Teams

5-156. Soldiers conduct individual searches in search teams. These teams employ the following members: the searcher actually conducts the search, thereby assuming the highest risk; security maintains eye contact with the person the searcher is searching; the observer supervises the search and warns the team of suspicious behavior or actions.

Methods

5-157. The most common search methods for searching an individual are frisk and wall searches. A third, less common method—useful in very select situations—is the strip search. A frisk search is quick and adequate for detecting weapons, collected exploitable material, or contraband. Yet, it is more dangerous since searchers have less control over the individuals they are searching. A wall search affords more safety for the searcher since the suspect is leaning against an upright surface such as a wall, vehicle, tree, or fence. For even greater safety, the kneeling and prone positions afford more control for searching an uncooperative individual. A strip search is an extreme measure conducted only when individuals are suspected of carrying documents or contraband on their persons, only in an enclosed area, and only by qualified personnel. A search with sensors such as metal detectors or thermals reveals hidden items.

Populace Control

5-158. Three basic methods are useful in populace control during a search of an urban area. These are assembling residents in a central location, restricting them to their residences, and controlling the heads of households.

Assemble Residents in a Central Location

5-159. This method moves residents from their residences to a central area. It provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies insurgents an opportunity to conceal collected exploitable material, and allows for tactical questioning. However, this method has the disadvantage of taking residents away from their dwellings and possibly encouraging looting, which, in turn, engenders ill feelings. A specific element is identified to control the centralized populace. A tactical PSYOP team using a loudspeaker can facilitate assembly by giving specific instructions to the residents in the search area.

Restrict Residents to Their Dwellings

5-160. This technique prohibits the movement of civilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The use of a tactical PSYOP team to broadcast the messages for staying indoors aids in clearing the streets of civilians and restricting their movement. The security element enforces this restriction to ensure compliance. The disadvantages of this method are the difficulty it adds to control and to tactical questioning and the time it affords inhabitants to conceal contraband in their residences.

Control Heads of Households

5-161. The head of each household is told to remain in front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to one room. The security element controls the group at the central location, controls the head of each household, and provides external security for the search team. Of great importance when interacting with the head of a household is explaining the purpose of the search; thus, of equal importance is engaging an interpreter in this effort. During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team through the house. This person may open doors and containers to facilitate the search. The head of the household is to see the search team steals nothing.

Houses or Buildings

5-162. The object of a house search is to look for contraband and to screen residents as potential members of guerrilla or auxiliary forces, an underground element, or the mass base. A search party who is assigned to search an occupied building comprises at least one local police officer, a protective escort for local security, and a female searcher. When inhabitants are to remain in the dwellings, the protective escort isolates and secures the inhabitants during the search. Forced entry may be necessary when a house is vacant or an occupant refuses to allow the searchers to enter. When the force is to search a house containing property while its occupants are away, it secures the house to prevent looting. Before U.S. Forces depart, the commander arranges for the community to protect such houses until the occupants return.

5-163. One objective is to leave the house in the same condition as when the search began. In addition to information collection, the search team may use digital cameras or video recorders to establish the condition of the house before and after the search. All sensitive material or equipment found in the house is documented before it is removed to include the date, time, location, name of person from whom it was confiscated, and reason for the confiscation. The use of a digital camera can assist in the documentation process as well. For a detailed search, the walls and floors undergo searching to discover hidden caches.

SITE EXPLOITATION

5-164. *Site exploitation* is the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law (ATP 3-90.15). Tactical leaders plan, resource, direct, and supervise tactical site exploitation efforts during all COIN offensive operations. (See ATP 3-90.15 for information on site exploitation.)

CORE ACTIVITIES FOR SITE EXPLOITATION

5-165. Commanders and staffs use the core activities to understand, visualize, and describe site exploitation. In general, units implement the majority of site exploitation core activities on site. The ability of the unit to use presumptive analysis tools on site allows the commander to comprehend, decide, and react within the threat's decision cycle. Commanders balance the performance of the site exploitation activities against the METT-TC (I) variables to determine the extent and viability of actions on the objective and beyond. Tactical site exploitation activities include those efforts necessary to complete the five core activities to the greatest extent possible within the constraints of time, available personnel, risk management (RM), and Soldier safety. (See ATP 3-90.15 for information on each core activity.) Site exploitation core activities are to detect, collect, process, analyze, and disseminate.

Detect

5-166. Detection entails a Soldier's discovery or notice of pertinent information, materiel, or persons. Commanders and staffs develop and maintain information requirements to establish what information, materiel, or people to detect.

Collect

5-167. Collection activities occur mainly at the site or on the objective. Collection entails gathering, protecting, organizing, documenting, and controlling information and materiel and holding any persons detected at the site.

Process

5-168. Processing involves the protecting of detained personnel, material, and data from the point of collection and for as long as individuals are held and material and data hold intelligence or evidentiary value. Processing may occur for personnel and in the preparation and conversion of materiel and data into a suitable form for analysis.

Analyze

5-169. Analysis studies an object in detail for the purpose of explanation. The analysis of the collected information, materiel, and persons found at the site or on the objective evaluates their relationship to the site and supports deductions as to their probable meaning.

Disseminate

5-170. Dissemination entails the horizontal and vertical sharing of information and intelligence across supported and supporting organizations. This activity includes supporting knowledge management tasks.

SITE EXPLOITATION EXECUTION

5-171. Site exploitation is a systematic action executed with the appropriate equipment to ensure personnel, documents, electronic data, and other material at a site are identified, evaluated, collected, and protected and thereby to gather intelligence and facilitate follow-on actions. It is a means by which tactical units exploit and analyze the insurgent after collecting biometric, physical, digital, and spoken data. In COIN, insurgents who are captured many times are prosecuted IAW the host-nation rule of law, and site exploitation is an excellent means of providing courts with evidence, especially when properly recorded. Site exploitations contribute to the decide, detect, and assess functions of the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) targeting cycle (see chapter 4, section IV). Once collected, analyzed, and assessed, the evidentiary intelligence may lead to future operations. (See figure 5-10 for an example site exploitation sketch.)




Figure 5-10. Site exploitation sketch, example

IDENTIFY, PRESERVE, AND COLLECT EXPLOITABLE MATERIAL

5-172. Leaders ensure Soldiers methodically and effectively identify, preserve, and collected exploitable material while maintaining its integrity. They strive to prevent damage or corruption from foreign materials, undocumented chains of custody, or loss. They mitigate risk by allowing a minimum of personnel to operate in the area, minimizing time on target, concealing the movement of collected exploitable material, avoiding patterns, and maintaining an obvious respect for civilians and their belongings.

5-173. An important site exploitation resource, biometric assets can measure physical details of a human face, fingerprint, hand geometry, handwriting, iris, retina, vein, voice, and deoxyribonucleic acid (also called DNA). Other site exploitation resources include search, detention, and marking tools; collected exploitable material kits; marking materials; photographic, video recording, and voice recording devices; linguists; and artificial sources of light. In addition, leaders—

- Initially evaluate the situation.
- Decide whether the unit must perform an expedient or formal site exploitation.
- Properly bag and tag evidence.
- Record sworn statements from Soldiers and locals for entry into the legal system.

Note. Collected exploitable material kits provide the best and easiest way for leaders to complete the preceding two tasks.

- Photograph captured contraband evidence alongside the suspect for judicial proceedings.
- Ensure the photo documentation of people, materiel, and other items of intelligence interest and collected exploitable material collection occurs on or adjacent to the site.

- Use document and media exploitation (DOMEX) (which includes the hasty analysis of pocket contents), electronic content from mirror imaging, and data evacuation for further, more detailed analysis.
- Process detainees into a detainee holding area (DHA), including the collection of biometric and computer database information by special BCT-level teams.
- Ensure the entry of pre- and post-bomb-blast forensics and signatures from improvised explosive device (IED) factories, which are routinely collected by weapons intelligence teams, into the IED system of record for comparison and analysis with detainee records.

TECHNIQUES FOR SITE EXPLOITATION

5-174. Using proper techniques is crucial during detect, collect, process, analyze, and disseminate activities. Basic site exploitation techniques include search methods, searches of individuals, detention of individuals, tactical questioning, and debriefing.

Methods of Searching Individuals

5-175. Search methods include security provisions for search teams, integrity preservation of the site, the conduct of a methodical search, and coherent documentation for later review. The type of employed search team depends on many factors such as available forces, HN capabilities, and the purpose of the search. The METT-TC (I) variables cover most of these. The following site exploitation on target checklist is not all inclusive:

- Search all rooms, caves, roofs, yards, subterranean areas, and associated vehicles for the following items:
  - Identification cards.
  - Weapons.
  - Computers.
  - Documents.
  - Digital media.
  - Propaganda.
  - Cellular and satellite phones.
  - Large amounts of money.
- Search other likely hiding places such as those following:
  - Appliances (refrigerator, including the ice cube trays and under and inside the back housing).
  - Furniture-related hide spots (inside cushions or hollow legs; taped to the back, sides, or bottom of furniture pieces).
  - Floors (especially those with removable boards or tiles, with rugs, or that are hollow).
  - Gardens, false walls, and chimneys.
- Search all vehicles for weapons and photograph the weapons.
- Positively identify the target.
- Photograph all individuals.
- Complete packets on all individuals.
- Verify individuals by checking identification cards.
- Perform a gunpowder test or other explosive field test on all individuals.
- Photograph each detainee with affiliated collected exploitable material.
- Collect and document all collected exploitable material and take it to the transport vehicle.
- Load all detainees for transit to forward operating base (FOB), combat outpost, patrol base, or detention control point.

Detention of Individuals

5-176. A *detainee* is any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel (JP 3-31). The reasons for the capture or detention and the ultimate disposition and categorization of a detainee depend on the situation. Before detaining someone, a leader first decides what to do with the person afterward. Does the leader want to search, question, process, or release the person?

5-177. AR 190-8, FM 3-63, and international law (including the law of war and Geneva Conventions) cover policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the administration, treatment, protection, security, and custody transference of detainees. They also cover other planning factors, as well as regulatory and legal requirements, concerning detainees.

Detainee Processing Rules

5-178. The six rules for processing detainees follow:

- Search detainees thoroughly and disarm them.
- Silence detainees.
- Segregate detainees by sex and rank.
- Safeguard detainees from harm while preventing their escape.
- Speed detainees to designated detainee collection points.
- Tag detainees by the approved format and with key information such as the date of capture, location of capture (grid coordinates), capturing unit, and special circumstances of capture (how each person was captured).

Protected Status

5-179. Once suspected insurgents are under friendly control, they assume the protected status of detainees. The term *detainee* includes any person captured or otherwise detained by armed forces. Under the law of war, leaders and Soldiers are personally responsible for detainees in their control. Mistreatment of detainees is a criminal offense under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), or the Third Geneva Convention, and Title 18, United States Code, War Crimes, also known as the War Crimes Act of 1996. One of the most conspicuous violations of the GPW is unauthorized photography of detainees.

Note. U.S. Forces avoid photographing detainees for nonmilitary or unofficial purposes. Doing so is unauthorized.

Tactical Questioning

5-180. Units recognize the value of timely information and intelligence during COIN operations and, thus, may tactically question an insurgent on the objective. Units designate or construct a DHA, ensuring detainees are unable to communicate between each other in any manner. Leaders then conduct tactical questioning of priority detainees away from the group. They carefully gather the necessary facts and details to establish consistencies or inconsistencies. Leaders sort detainees into those to be taken off target, those without further value, those no longer of interest, and those who require immediate battlespace interrogation by qualified personnel. Leaders wanting the ability to interrogate personnel during a potential operation request and incorporate qualified interrogators into their mission task organization to facilitate timelier information.

Necessity for Soldier Presence

5-181. The terminology may change, but the need remains for Soldiers at the point of capture or of detainment to ask questions. Trained interrogators are seldom on hand, but Soldiers are always present. Experiences from recent operations show that U.S. Forces using immediate tactical questioning techniques with Soldiers on target find important information that leads to intelligence of immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning never violates the law of war or any legal agreements (status-of-forces agreements and coalition agreements). Typical questions focus on discovering other nearby insurgents, their intentions, their equipment, how they are financed, or their means of support.

Backtracking of Route

5-182. A successful technique for determining where individuals were before they came to the point of capture is to have them verbally backtrack their routes. Detainees are to answer questions about the timing of their arrival, how they traveled (for example, by foot or vehicle) to the point of capture, and from what direction. A general direction and a means of travel are enough to develop a route. Using a map, the Soldier asks leading questions to determine the route. A detainee identifies significant terrain features seen at specific

locations, such as rivers, bridges, key buildings, or hills. Talking jogs a detainee's memory. Gradually, detainees reveal their routes and origin points. Considerations for successful tactical questioning follow:

- Know the linguist and employ more than one to doublecheck the accuracy of the information and the integrity and reliability of the linguist.
- Possess basic proficiency in the detainees' languages.
- Learn to identify physical behaviors and postures, including resistant and defensive, with the employment of multiple observers.
- Study targets before they become detainees on the objective.
- Study the behaviors, values, and interests of others in the OE before conducting tactical questioning.
- Consider placing a uniformed linguist among the detainees and allowing detainees to communicate so the uniformed linguist can collect information (deception collection).
- Conduct the questioning of individuals separately from other detainees in case the detainee maintains plausible deniability with community members.
- Commanders can prepare four to five questions related to information requirements that can then be briefed as part of the patrol order and used by leaders during operations.
- Prepare a tactical questioning plan for information detainees may have.

Aerial Searches

5-183. UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms, close air support, and rotary-wing aircraft (attack and reconnaissance units) serve well as observation platforms. Close air support aircraft and attack reconnaissance aviation can also provide commanders an aerial search capability with different search perspectives and constraints. Rotary-wing aircraft are an effective means of conducting mounted search patrols, specific populace control measures, and security operations.

5-184. Helicopter-mounted patrols may reconnoiter an assigned area or route in search of insurgent elements. They may conduct snap checkpoints on roads to interdict mounted and dismounted insurgent movement. When the element locates a known or suspected element, it may instruct attack aviation teams to engage the insurgent element, or it may land and attack the enemy with a dismounted assault. This technique can be useful in open rural areas unless an air defense threat is present. Operations employ aerial patrols when sufficient intelligence is available to justify their employment or when friendly ground-based operations have become predictable to the insurgents. Such patrols are most effective in conjunction with ground operations.

5-185. In aerial or air-ground search operations, helicopters insert troops in an area suspected of containing insurgents. With helicopters overwatching from the air, Soldiers search the area. Soldiers remount, and the process repeats in other areas. Aerial patrol members maintain training in tracking procedures to follow insurgents to their bases or safe houses, using the terrain, deception, the standoff capability of aviation optics, and ground and other technological assets. Leaders plan for the evacuation of prisoners, casualties, and materials, both by air and ground.

Subterranean Area Searches

5-186. In both urban and rural areas, insurgents remain undetected to survive. Therefore, insurgents use all means of concealment available. Subterranean areas, in both rural and urban areas, reduce the chance of detection and facilitate insurgent movement. Subterranean areas include natural caves, basements, underground bunkers, tunnels, holes, and sewer systems. Underground sewers and tunnels are also useful in the attack of targets and for egress after an attack. (See ATP 3-34.81 for information on tunnel [and subterranean] detection, reconnaissance, maneuver, and destruction.)

Signs of Use of Subterranean Area

5-187. Certain signs reveal the use of subterranean structures by insurgency forces in a specific area. Such indications include the following:

- Movement of insurgents in a specific direction.
- Sniper fire occurring from areas without obvious avenues of withdrawal.
- HUMINT reports of subterranean areas.
- Failure of cordons to prevent withdrawal or infiltration of insurgency forces.

- Turned or managed soil far away from places of habitation or daily labor.
- Operations during which insurgents inflict casualties and withdraw without detection or engaging COIN forces.
- The smell of burning wood or food cooking in an uninhabited area.
- Mounds of dirt and dirt of different colors, both of which might indicate digging.
- Trails to water sources in uninhabited areas, which might indicate personnel requiring water.

Methodical and Coordinated Approach

5-188. Searching an area with suspected subterranean facilities requires a methodical and coordinated approach. The size of the surface area and the suspected size of the subterranean area determine the size and strength of the assigned unit. The unit is task-organized for subterranean search operations and divided into five elements: command and control, security, search, guard, reserve. The command and control element often remains with the reserve element.

Narrowing of the Search

5-189. To detect or locate subterranean facilities, leaders first reduce the geographical AOI to smaller areas of probable locations. Part of the process may entail the following activities: acquiring existing blueprints, maps, imagery, video recordings, aerial photographs, and hydrological analysis tools; actively observing for indicators of probable subterranean access locations; and questioning the local populace as to the existence or their specific knowledge of any subterranean area. Overhead imagery may produce results when the appearance of the surface and vegetation have changed or when deductions about substructures are possible from analysis of existing versus historical terrain.

Security During Area Searches

5-190. Perimeter and flank security are imperative. A slow, methodical search is conducted in the AO, with each search team systematically searching every square meter. The security element moves toward the limits of advance of the search area. Deliberate search techniques emphasize where to look for insurgent locations that would provide insurgents with observation, cover, concealment, and egress.

Signs of Tunnels

5-191. Several visible signs help in detecting the actual tunnels. Visual inspections often disclose the general area of a tunnel, though not its precise location. The keys to finding a tunnel system are thorough terrain analysis and an equally thorough physical ground search.

Rural Visible Indications

5-192. Visible indications in a rural OE include those following:

- Air holes.
- Worn places on trees an insurgent uses as handholds.
- A small trail, much like a game trail, through the brush into a clump of small trees.
- Cut trees and limbs tied near a treetop to conceal the use of a tunnel from aircraft.
- Slight depression in or around a group of small trees.
- A lone individual, especially a female, in the area.
- Freshly cooked food with no one attending the site.
- Fresh human feces in an area.

Urban Visible Indications

5-193. Visible indications in an urban OE include those following:

- Sewer, storm drain, or utility grates or manhole covers.
- Disturbed soil in mature gardens.
- Presence of flooring materials in residences, businesses, and other structures not under construction.

SNIPER OPERATIONS

5-194. Sniper operations are effective for both insurgents and counterinsurgents in the COIN environment. Snipers, when employed correctly, are a COIN force multiplier and provide the commander an immediate means to enter the insurgency's decision-making cycle. (See ATP 3-21.20 and TC 3-22.10 for information on sniper operations.)

Notes. U.S. Army sniper squads and teams provide the commander with precise, long-range, and discriminatory fires. The sniper is especially valuable when fighting an enemy who is attempting to blend into the local population. Sniper targets designated by the commander may include the following: enemy leaders, specialists, and snipers; enemy personnel and other individuals as specified; and key enemy equipment and vehicles. The sniper element's second mission is to collect and report accurate and detailed battlespace information.

ATP 3-21.20 provides the doctrinal framework for the Infantry sniper squad and sniper employment officer (SEO) assigned to Infantry battalions in the IBCT. Appendix E works in conjunction with and complements TC 3-22.10.

SNIPER OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

5-195. During the conduct of offensive operations, through the depth of a COIN force's AO, the primary mission of an assigned sniper element is to deliver precise long-range fire on selected targets. Sniper fires create a marked effect on insurgency forces—create casualties, slow activities, instill fear, influence their decisions and actions, lower morale, and add confusion to their operations.

5-196. The sniper element's observational and navigational skills and specialized equipment help it see the terrain in detail and observe changes. Snipers provide the commander with details about the terrain, obstacles, likely avenues of approach, and other pertinent battlespace information.

5-197. Snipers infiltrate the insurgency's areas to engage the enemy from unexpected directions. Employing snipers in advance of unit movement allows them to move at their own paces and thereby to remain undetected. During movement or from static positions, snipers attempt to identify insurgent positions or movements, provide overwatch, and engage insurgent targets who threaten the overall operation or protected element movement or position. (See paragraphs 6-150 through 6-182 for information on counter-sniper operations.)

SNIPER EMPLOYMENT OFFICER

5-198. The SEO is responsible for advising the commander, subordinate commanders, and staff on the employment and control of assigned snipers in the unit. For example, in the Infantry battalion, the SEO can be the headquarters and headquarters company commander, the XO, the scout platoon leader, or any other officer. In the SEO's absence, either the sniper squad leader or the individual sniper team leader can perform this duty. Paragraphs 5-199 through 5-205 describe the specific duties of the SEO for the Infantry battalion to know, advise, coordinate, train, issue orders, supervise, and debrief (also called KACTIS-D) and provide examples for discussion purposes.

5-199. The SEO maintains knowledge of sniper capabilities. The SEO understands employment considerations and the capabilities and limitations of sniper teams, including movement and camouflage techniques, observation techniques, hide site operations, and marksmanship.

5-200. The SEO advises the supported commander, battalion S-3, and battalion S-2 on how to employ the sniper units (by squad, section, or team). In addition to sniper capabilities and limitations, the SEO ensures the commander sees the sniper as the eyes, ears, and trigger finger in the battlespace for the battalion.

5-201. The SEO coordinates all aspects of the sniper mission. Coordination begins during mission analysis and is continuous throughout the operations process. The SEO coordinates the assignment of sniper teams to missions to support units or as an integrated part of a sniper mission. To prevent fratricide and possible compromise of position and mission, the SEO coordinates AO terrain management with units.

5-202. The SEO maintains realistic, varied, challenging, and mission-oriented training. The SEO assembles the battalion sniper squad, including any snipers assigned to company sniper teams, to standardize training and SOPs. Every requisite skill for a sniper (including information collection) is perishable and takes continual practice. The SEO ensures snipers receive the proper time and resources for maintaining effectiveness in their skills. An experienced sniper squad leader serves as the SEO's primary trainer. Concurrent sniper training at the IBCT level ensures standardized SEO and sniper training and SOPs across the IBCT.

5-203. The SEO issues orders to any sniper squad and team leaders. The SEO issues the order to all applicable sniper squad and team leaders through an OPORD or fragmentary order (FRAGORD).

5-204. The SEO supervises planning and preparation (specific to rehearsals and backbriefs). The SEO provides supervision for the planning of the mission, the preparation of the mission, and mission rehearsals. A good backbrief indicates the sniper squad's or team's readiness for the mission.

5-205. The SEO debriefs all members of the team upon mission completion. The SEO, ICW the battalion S-2, conducts detailed debriefings after mission completion. Any sniper squads or teams bring all pertinent information (for example, their data books, sniper logs, field sketches, digital photos, DA Form 5517 [*Standard Range Card*]) to the debriefing.

COUNTERINSURGENCY TASK, PERSONNEL, AND EQUIPMENT

5-206. Small kill teams (SKTs), small capture teams (SCTs), and small observation teams (SOTs) differ by task, personnel, and equipment. SKTs focus on destroying insurgent elements. SCTs focus on capturing insurgent elements. SOTs conduct reconnaissance. In COIN, more advantage may be gained by capturing than killing insurgents. However, SKTs can provide commanders with a deterrent to insurgent activity.

5-207. Sniper teams, sometimes as part of SKTs, SCTs, or SOTs, are employed in populated urban areas or large rural areas with adequate fields of fire. For mission success, all three teams employ specific point and area weapon systems. All three also rely on redundant communications, marking materials, detailed infiltration plans, exfiltration, mutual support, security, compromise contingencies, and engagement criteria.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SNIPER OPERATIONS

5-208. Careful consideration goes into sniper employment in COIN. The infiltration or exfiltration of snipers, SKTs, and SCTs requires meticulous planning with the understanding of the habits, behaviors, and density of the local population. Besides their basic mission of precision fires and the surgical elimination of individuals, snipers are valuable for information collection, route and area security augmentation, counter-sniper operations, and counter-mortar or counter-rocket operations. Compromise and contingency planning are critical to sniper employment. Commanders base this detailed planning on a thorough mission variable analysis, with specific attention to terrain and civil considerations. Paragraphs 5-209 through 5-211 address the specific METT-TC (I) variables most applicable to a discussion on sniper employment.

Mission and Enemy Considerations for Sniper Operations

5-209. Snipers require clear engagement criteria and develop a thorough understanding of the ROE. Engagement criteria are refined, so the individual sniper can make the correct engagement decision while the target is engageable. Once an engagement area and a sniper position are identified, leaders determine a mutually supporting position for a security team to occupy. The headquarters responsible for the area in which the snipers are operating track the current and planned locations of sniper teams. Often this means designating their locations as a no-fire area that can be tracked by all forces operating in the area to prevent fratricide. Sniper positions need to be defendable in case of compromise by the enemy.

Terrain and Weather Considerations for Sniper Operations

5-210. Sniper teams can aid commanders in denying terrain and freedom of movement to insurgent elements. They can also provide security to sensitive or critical sites in both rural and urban areas.

Considerations Regarding Troops and Support Available for Sniper Operations

5-211. In addition to a robust communications capability, commanders resource these elements with linguists, medical personnel, surveillance equipment, and sustainment resources. The quick reaction force is typically involved in the detailed planning of these operations and can be deployed forward to minimize reaction time. Sniper teams are task-organized with sniper-qualified personnel or squad-designated marksmen and markswomen, weapons squads, and specialty skills personnel.

TECHNIQUES FOR SNIPER OPERATIONS

5-212. Sniper teams are especially valuable when fighting an enemy who is blending into the general population. Commander-designated sniper targets may include enemy leaders, specialists, and snipers; enemy personnel and other specified individuals; and key enemy equipment and vehicles. The sniper team's second mission is to collect and report accurate and detailed battlespace information. All COIN sniper operations consider sniper positioning, security, infiltration (or insertion), and exfiltration (or extraction).

Positions

5-213. Tactical leaders continually analyze the OE for potential sniper team overwatch positions and reconnoiter to determine their suitability. When employing sniper teams, leaders ensure each position provides mutual support against a threat.

5-214. Often, insurgents engage from areas of passive support and from where they have a sense of security. Detailed reconnaissance and accurate knowledge of the OE allow leaders to recognize advantages and disadvantages of different positions and types of areas. Two basic areas for sniper positions exist in an urban environment—residential areas and industrial areas. Both areas include the use of elevated or ground-level positions. Roofs are not always the best place to operate since roofs are not necessarily the highest location in the area and are often wide open with little cover. Successful position selection techniques in COIN follow:

- Rent uninhabited dwellings or other structures.
- Do not establish a pattern or expose the property owner to the insurgency.
- Remain aware that property owners may compromise snipers.
- Obtain permission to take position in locally occupied residences.
- Consolidate the residents in one part of the property with a security element.
- Compensate the property owners upon exfiltrating the residence.
- Take advantage of stay-behind opportunities.
- Take advantage of any opportunity to achieve surprise, such as when insurgents return to areas in which another counterinsurgent unit has already conducted an operation.

Security During Sniper Operations

5-215. Sniper teams move with a security element (squad or platoon) whenever possible. This allows the teams to reach their AOs more rapidly and safely than if they were alone. The security element also protects snipers during operations. When moving with a security element, snipers follow these guidelines:

- The leader of the security element leads the sniper team.
- Snipers must appear to be an integral part of the security element:
  - Snipers carry their weapon systems in line with and close to their bodies to hide a weapon's outline and barrel length.
  - Snipers conceal from view all their unique sniper equipment (for example, optics, ghillie suits).
- Sniper uniforms must be the same as those of security element members.
- Snipers and element members maintain proper intervals and positions in the element formation.

Infiltration (or Insertion)

5-216. The key to sniper infiltration is the undetected occupation of hide positions. An insertion may be as simple as a drop near dismounted movement to the position. It can be as complex as conducting a cordon and search and leaving a stay-behind team. Planning considerations for insertion include the mission variables and a detailed understanding of the terrain and people. Examples are streetlights, barking dogs, nightlife

establishments, insertion vehicle noise (engines, vehicle ramps hitting the ground), and local nationals who may sleep on their roofs or outdoors during the hot season.

Exfiltration (or Extraction)

5-217. Exfiltration is just as important as infiltration; snipers do not want to compromise positions they may want to use again. The amount of time spent in a sniper position depends on the situation. Sniper teams have preplanned emergency exfiltration routes to safe zones, known by all supporting elements. Snipers can withdraw, dismounted and during hours of limited visibility, to a designated rally point where the quick reaction force can retrieve them.

5-218. Some units employ a quick reaction force as a means of reinforcement or emergency extraction and to maintain or regain contact with insurgents engaged by the snipers. When properly employed, the U.S. sniper teams can contribute significantly to the fight by overwatching key areas, serving as an economy of force, eliminating insurgents, and causing uncertainty among the insurgents.

PATROLS AND PATROLLING

5-219. A patrol is a detachment from a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance operation. It may be a fire team, squad, platoon, or company. Conventional patrolling doctrine applies to COIN operations but requires some modification to account for the insurgency's activities and OE. Aggressive patrolling in an area greatly reduces insurgent freedom of movement, disrupts operations, and weakens the insurgents' influence on the local populace. Furthermore, patrolling is more significant to COIN operations due to the difficulty in locating and identifying insurgency forces. This section addresses the important role patrols play in defeating the insurgency force. COIN operations use two types of patrolling: reconnaissance and combat patrols. Patrols are an integral part of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework and of strike and PRC operations. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on conventional patrols and patrolling.)

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR PATROL EMPLOYMENT

5-220. Leaders plan and prepare for patrols using TLP. They identify required actions on the objective, and they plan backward to the departure from friendly lines and then forward to the reentry of friendly lines.

5-221. The patrol leader normally receives the OPORD in the battalion or company CP, where communications are good and where vital personnel are available for coordination. Because patrols act semi-independently, move beyond the supporting range of the parent unit, and often operate forward of friendly units, coordination remains thorough and detailed.

5-222. Patrol leaders may routinely and directly coordinate with elements of the battalion staff. Unit leaders develop tactical SOPs with detailed checklists to preclude omitting vital items for mission accomplishment.

Mission Analysis for Patrol Planning

5-223. During planning and preparation for movement, leaders analyze the enemy situation, determine known and likely enemy positions, and develop possible enemy COAs, including making contact. By considering enemy and terrain, leaders determine the security measures for tactical movement. Paragraphs 5-224 through 5-231 cover planning considerations related to the METT-TC (I) variables and specific to COIN patrols and patrolling.

Mission Considerations in Patrol Planning

5-224. Leaders brief all patrol members on the operation's task and purpose. Every COIN patrol has a task and purpose nested within one of the LOEs. Leaders plan patrol routes carefully and coordinate in detail with higher, lower, and adjacent units, including HNSF, aviation elements, fires, intelligence support teams, and reserve forces. At a minimum, all patrols conduct rehearsals and a patrol brief.

Enemy Considerations in Patrol Planning

5-225. Small-unit patrols are more effective than larger unit patrols against insurgent activities. They cover more territory and are more difficult to track and predict. These capabilities keep the insurgency off balance.

Terrain and Weather Considerations in Patrol Planning

5-226. Patrol leaders learn and know the routes, terrain, and weather implications for the HN population, COIN, and insurgency. For example, urban patrol techniques differ from rural patrol techniques.

5-227. Day and night patrols use similar techniques as other patrols. The main differences are twofold. Day reconnaissance requires greater use of concealment than at night. The day patrol is more likely to be seen and usually not as able to move as close to the objective. Night reconnaissance requires stealth. Sounds carry farther at night, and reduced visibility usually requires a closer proximity to the objective.

Considerations Regarding Troops and Support Available During Patrol Planning

5-228. Communication between patrol vehicles, riflemen and riflewomen, and higher HQ is essential. The patrol may use radios, data transfer devices, voice commands, and visual signals. Vehicle-mounted radios and data systems are usually the best means for communication within the patrol and to higher HQ. Aircrafts can relay radio messages for long-distance patrol communication. Joint Battle Command-Platform and single-channel tactical satellite systems provide excellent means of maintaining beyond line-of-sight communications.

5-229. Tactical units remain involved in patrolling in one of three ways: patrol as a complete unit; provide subordinate units for patrols as directed by higher; or send patrols to support their own operations. Normally, the planned action at the objective determines the type of patrol—usually categorized as either combat or reconnaissance. Patrols may be mounted, dismounted, or a combination of both.

Civil Considerations in Patrol Planning

5-230. A civil reconnaissance patrol is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. It focuses on the civil component, comprising the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). PIRs collect civil information from civil reconnaissance to enhance situational understanding and facilitate decision making.

5-231. Civil reconnaissance also considers the numbers of biometric enrollments accomplished and of people identified with organic biometric devices. Patrols often facilitate the easiest public interaction for tactical units across multiple LOEs.

Mounted Patrols Versus Dismounted Patrols

5-232. Patrols may be mounted or dismounted. Mounted patrols cover greater distances but sacrifice public interaction and more effective information engagements. They can operate in those insurgency-controlled areas too dangerous for dismounted patrols and carry more or heavier equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

5-233. Dismounted patrols, including their contact with insurgents in close combat, can be physically demanding; patrol members maintain physical fitness. The patrol leader ensures patrol members carry only mission-essential equipment.

5-234. A mounted patrol remains prepared in the same manner as a dismounted patrol. Leaders ensure vehicles are mechanically fully mission capable and properly supplied with fuel, oil, ammunition, and water. Drivers and other mounted personnel receive the same patrol brief as dismounted patrol members.

5-235. A mixture of mounted and dismounted patrolling provides greater flexibility. The dismounted element can interact with the populace. The mounted element provides increased firepower and communications and performs casualty evacuations.

Patrols in Urban Versus Rural Terrain

5-236. The basics of patrolling are the same in both urban and rural terrains. However, the differences between urban and rural terrains require specific patrol considerations. Urban areas have high population density, and patrols prepare for population-related incidents. Public interaction with the patrol may take many forms such as requests for medical attention or demonstrations against the patrol's (or military) presence. Basic urban patrolling considerations include those following:

- While contact with insurgents is only likely to happen, contact with elements of the population is certain.
- Available armored vehicles maintain readiness to reinforce urban patrols rapidly and to provide additional firepower.
- Each squad or team dedicates at least one Soldier to scan rooftops and upper-level windows.
- Actions at a halt maintain 360-degree security, and Soldiers seek cover and face outward.
- Cover in an urban terrain may be a streetlight pole, a building corner, or a parked car.
- Urban patrols thoroughly scan the far side of all open areas since insurgents use them to achieve standoff.
- When contact is likely, the patrol moves by bounds with one element overwatching another element, which is just as useful in urban as in rural terrain.
- React to contact in urban terrain often includes the basic elements of a cordon and search operation:
  - The making of contact initiates return fire.
  - Simultaneously, the unit cordons the area to prevent the insurgents' escape.

Partnering Patrols

5-237. Partnering patrols are those conducted with HNSF and U.S. units. They serve to increase the HN government's legitimacy and improve the HNSF's skills.

Mutual Support During Patrolling

5-238. *Mutual support* is that support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces and assigning AOs. Mutual support has two aspects: supporting range and supporting distance.

Supporting Range

5-239. *Supporting range* is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems (ADP 3-0). It depends on available weapon systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit's indirect fire weapons. For small units such as squads, sections, or platoons, it is the coverable distance between two units for their direct fires. When one unit cannot effectively or safely fire in support of the other unit, it may be out of supporting range, even though its weapons have the requisite range.

Supporting Distance

5-240. *Supporting distance* is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation (ADP 3-0). It is a function of terrain and mobility, distance, enemy capabilities, friendly capabilities, and reaction time. During COIN operations, commanders always consider supporting distance. Units maintain mutual support when one unit can draw on another unit's capabilities for support.

TYPES OF PATROLS

5-241. The two types of patrols are reconnaissance and combat. A unit as small as a fire team, but usually a squad or platoon, can compose a patrol. Sometimes for larger combat tasks such as a raid, the patrol is a company. The planned action determines whether the patrols are combat or reconnaissance. Regardless of the type of patrol, the unit needs a clear task and purpose.

Reconnaissance Patrols

5-242. This type of patrol collects information and confirms or disproves the accuracy of received information. It is useful for locating insurgent units and base camps, reconnoitering specific locations, locating leaders, and gathering intelligence. It provides the commander with timely, accurate information on insurgents and the local population and terrain. This information is vital for tactical decision making. Leaders prevent the establishment of any pattern that would allow an insurgency force to ambush reconnaissance patrols. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on reconnaissance patrols.) The further classification of reconnaissance patrols extends into three types: route, zone, area.

Route Reconnaissance Patrols

5-243. This form of reconnaissance focuses along a specific line of communication such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. It provides new or updated information on route conditions such as obstacles and bridge classifications, insurgent and civilian activity, and traffic patterns. It includes any terrain along the route from which the insurgency could influence friendly movement.

Zone Reconnaissance Patrols

5-244. The conduct of these patrols obtains information on the enemy, terrain, people, and routes in a specified zone. The commander may request information on an extended area or on several locations in an area. The patrol obtains this information by reconnoitering the area, maintaining surveillance of the area, or coordinating area reconnaissance of designated locations in the area.

Area Reconnaissance Patrols

5-245. The conduct of these patrols obtains information on a specific location or small area, usually with known or suspected positions or activity. The patrol obtains this information by reconnoitering the location or maintaining surveillance of the location.

5-246. Reconnaissance patrols aim to conduct reconnaissance or surveillance and reach the objective without their being discovered, which requires stealth, patience, and the maximum use of concealment. They remain prepared to fight to protect themselves.

5-247. Continual technological improvements significantly impact reconnaissance abilities. Emplacing sensors and video cameras allows for remote monitoring. Leveraging computer and other electronic technology extracts information from a wide array of technological systems.

Combat Patrols

5-248. Discussions regarding COIN operations often refer to security patrol, yet it remains a combat patrol, which provides security and harasses, destroys, or captures enemy troops, equipment, and installations. It also collects and reports information, related to its mission or not. Combat patrols in COIN include raids, ambushes, and security. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on raid, ambush, and security patrols.)

5-249. A security patrol and a raid or ambush patrol differ in that combat activity is not the primary mission of the former. This remains true even when the patrol expects combat. Security patrols normally seek to control critical roads and trails, maintain contact between villages and units, provide security for friendly forces and in rural areas, and interdict insurgent routes of supply and lines of communication.

Subordinate Variations to Combat Patrols During Counterinsurgency Operations

5-250. All COIN combat patrols share the mission to seek and attack targets of opportunity. Two subordinate variations to combat patrols during COIN operations are saturation patrols and satellite patrols.

Saturation Patrols

5-251. To conduct saturation patrols, units employ numerous combat patrols to saturate an area suspected of insurgent activity by moving over planned and coordinated routes, which undergo frequent changes to avoid establishing patterns. Saturation patrols are extremely effective against insurgents. (See figure 5-11 for an example of saturation patrols in a built-up area.) The employment of saturation patrols results in the following:

- Denial of an area to an insurgency force as it avoids contact with the saturation patrols.
- Ability to harass insurgency forces.
- Opportunity to discover insurgency forces.
- Opportunity to gain intimate knowledge of the AO.
- Opportunity to reassure the populace that the government provides protection and security.




Figure 5-11. Saturation patrols in a built-up area, example

Satellite Patrols

5-252. A satellite patrol adds depth to a patrol, deters ambushes, and provides patrols with a maneuver element on insurgent contact. This patrol technique employs a base unit to control smaller units, or satellites, who leave and return to the base unit. The advantage of this technique is the unpredictability to the insurgents of the patrol's route, size, locations, and overall axis of advance. Satellite patrols receive either an area or an axis of movement. (See figure 5-12 on page 208 for an example satellite patrol moving through a built-up area.)




Figure 5-12. Satellite patrol moving through a built-up area, example

5-253. As with all other patrols, satellite patrols have a specific task and purpose. Units have specific requirements for organization, size, command and control, movement, training, and actions on contact.

Patrol Organization and Size

5-254. At a minimum, the patrol has one base and one satellite unit. Appropriate sizes of the base unit and satellites depend on the METT-TC (I) variables. Normally, a satellite unit consists of either a squad or a fire team. All units maintain their capability to defend themselves until reinforcements arrive.

Patrol Command and Control

5-255. The base unit is under the direct control of the senior leader and requires radio communications with each of the satellite units. This facilitates control and actions when contact is made. The base unit sets the pace and maintains the general direction of the patrol. Controlling multiple, small satellite patrols is difficult and requires an experienced leader and excellent communication.

Patrol Movement

5-256. Units maintain knowledge about the overall route and, when possible, left and right boundaries. Both the base unit and the satellite units move in ways to confuse the insurgency as to the patrol's actual axis of advance. They still use standard movement techniques, though. Satellites move away from the base unit for limited periods of time to inspect potential ambush sites, dead spaces, parallel roads, or other assigned

missions. The time the satellite will be separated from the base unit is prescribed by the patrol leader prior to departure.

Training for Satellite Patrols

5-257. Units may experience initial difficulty with this technique due to the dispersed, unpredictable, and seemingly random movement of the satellite patrols. To properly execute the technique, units train and practice.

Actions on Contact

5-258. The unit in contact reacts normally. All other units move toward the unit in contact. The satellite patrol leader coordinates their routes, actions, and linkup appropriately.

PATROL DEBRIEF

5-259. One of the best ways to turn information into intelligence is to conduct a patrol debrief after every patrol. Just because a patrol is completed does not mean the unit's mission is. The leader ensures the appropriate staff section receives all the information collected during the patrol for evaluation. Additionally, all patrol members undergo debriefing for the collection of any information not already identified. The unit also conducts an after action review (AAR) of the entire mission from start to finish. The unit records the correctly executed operations and those that could have been better executed. When units pass on this information, others can learn from the operation. Finally, unit members account for, clean, and perform maintenance on their equipment to ready it for the next operation. The debrief, at a minimum, includes the following:

- Specifics on the 5 Ws (who, what, when, where, why) and on the how.
- Photos or sketches.
- Answers to PIRs and other information requirements.
- Combat information or intelligence of immediate tactical value.
- Actionable intelligence, as well as tips or actionable information for intelligence.
- Recap of route.
- Reports of insurgent contact.
- Review of conducted engagements that includes appropriate answers to the following:
  - Who engaged the guerrilla force?
  - What concerns have the HN population brought to the patrol's attention?
  - What promises did the United States make in response to these concerns?
- Noteworthy observations (for example, propaganda, graffiti).
- Changes in the HN population, which serve to deepen leaders' understanding of community dynamics and which are detectable in the following:
  - Public attitude toward coalition forces.
  - Local infrastructure.
  - Civilian leaders.
  - Local organizations.
  - Civil institutions.

SCHEME OF FIRES

5-260. Scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to support the commander's objectives (JP 3-09). The march commander and subordinate leaders integrate and synchronize indirect fires, Army attack aviation (manned and unmanned) and/or organic or tasked echelon specific UAS firing platforms, and close air support to support the march. The march commander ensures targets and fire support events are planned for each march unit to counter likely enemy obstacles and ambushes and support planned engagement areas. Depending on what other mission is being supported, the march column or serial may not have priority of fires during movement. Commanders and subordinate leaders always plan for internal fire support regardless of external fire support. They rehearse the scheme of fires to ensure coverage throughout the movement.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT

5-261. When feasible, echelon specific UAS employment provides an information collection (specifically reconnaissance and surveillance) capability prior to the march. UAS employment enables situational awareness during the march and can monitor and track movement in areas of key interest. Commanders use a UAS prior to and during the march—

- To gain knowledge on known or suspected enemy locations.
- To reconnoiter an area, route, or zone.
- To observe or monitor otherwise unobservable areas (such as defilade, cracks, crevices, and other concealed areas).
- To provide security and fires (echelon specific UAS [to include firing] platform).
- Support security for observation posts, combat outposts, raids, and patrols.
- To disrupt enemy radio communications.
- To deceive or divert the enemy through tactical deception.

5-262. UAS capabilities from higher echelons may be available for battalion-level and below operations, though coordination is generally required well in advance. Often these systems are used for preplanned operations rather than opportunity type missions and require 72- to 96-hour pre-coordination. The employment of echelon specific UAS platforms, (for example, organic or tasked to the Infantry rifle company) depends on the situation. Employment advantages and disadvantages at each echelon, as with any capability, determine the system's employment.

5-263. Conditions effecting UAS employment include rain, fog, snow, wind, and other weather-related situations. These systems are easily detected and are prone to interference from enemy jamming. When other aviation assets are operating in the area, ground forces must alert aerial platforms controllers to the current location and altitude of tactically operated UASs. Coordination and communication with higher headquarters ensure aircrews are alerted to airspace restrictions as they arise for UAS use.

5-264. In mountainous terrain, where weather conditions can vary abruptly and easily crash a UAS, commanders may decide risk of loss is too great to warrant their employment. Depending on mission requirements, downed systems may have to be recovered. The recovery of a downed UAS in adverse terrain can be slow and arduous and expose recovery teams to enemy actions. (See ATP 3-04.1 for additional information.)

Chapter 6

Defensive Considerations in Counterinsurgency

Insurgents do not passively allow counterinsurgency (COIN) forces to disrupt their plans and isolate them from the populace. They attack COIN forces when they think they have a good chance of success. Additionally, insurgents choose targets with an eye toward reducing the established government's legitimacy. The conduct of COIN defensive operations is very much like that in a conventional defense. However, in COIN operations, the COIN is concerned with securing the host nation (HN) population, HN government, and infrastructure. This chapter examines defensive operations, defensive operations as they apply specifically to establishing civil security and civil control, defensive operations as they apply to the other lines of effort (LOEs), and security operations.

Note. COIN forces conduct defensive operations to defeat an insurgent attack, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Defensive actions impose the commander's will on the insurgency. Offensive actions capitalize on accurate and timely intelligence and other relevant information regarding insurgency forces, weather, terrain, and civil considerations. (See FM 3-96 for information on the doctrinal conduct of conventional defensive actions.)

SECTION I – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

6-1. A *defensive operation* is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). The three defensive operations are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. COIN forces conduct operations according to the capabilities and limitations inherent to their organizational structure and the knowledge of the situation (insurgency) or the advantage relationship to the insurgency. Section I addresses (specific to COIN) the characteristics of the defense, defensive operations, and planning considerations when transitioning to tactical operations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE

6-2. Successful defenses share the following characteristics: disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security. Defenses are aggressive. Defending commanders use all available means to disrupt insurgency forces. Commanders disrupt attackers and isolate them from mutual support to defeat them in detail. Defenders seek to increase their freedom of maneuver while denying it to attackers. Defending commanders use every opportunity to transition to the offense, even if only temporarily. As insurgent losses increase, the insurgency falters, and the initiative shifts to counterinsurgent defenders. These situations are favorable for subordinate variations on an attack (sometimes special purpose attacks [for example, counterattacks, raids, ambushes]) (see chapter 5, section II). These special purpose attack opportunities rarely last long. Counterinsurgent defenders strike swiftly when the attackers reach their decisive point. Surprise and speed enable special purpose attack forces to seize the initiative and overwhelm the insurgency forces.

6-3. The below vignette is an example of the use of the characteristics of the defense during a COIN operation. Prior to the arrival of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq in June 2006, U.S. Forces failed to establish defensive positions (for example, combat outposts) and therefore did not resource and prepare adequate defensive positions for massing the effects of direct and indirect fires, thereby maintaining the initiative over an insurgency. The positioning in the insurgency's areas provides flexibility, depth, and maneuver in planning, as well as the ability to conduct continuous reconnaissance and security operations to provide information on insurgent activities. Information collection through host-nation security organizations and political partners provides invaluable insight into the values, beliefs, and interests of both

the insurgency and the general population. Close positive relationships with HN partners build trust, which aids in developing an enhanced understanding of the operational environment (OE).

Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework

When 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division arrived in Ramadi, Iraq in June 2006, the situation was dire. Attacks averaged over thirty per day, spiking on some days to over fifty. Less than 100 police out of an authorized 4,000 were present for duty each day. The police that were present each day were forced to stay bunkered in their stations. Attacks bombarded the garrison at the government center several times daily with mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and small arms fire. The population of this provincial capital was terrified of the anticipated full-scale assault on the city to remove the insurgents.

The armored brigade combat team (BCT) of 6,000 U.S. Soldiers and Marines and 3,000 Iraqi Army troops employed a far different strategy. Instead of launching a massive assault to clear the city house by house, the brigade isolated the insurgents. Disregarding the theater emphasis to withdraw to large bases, the brigade pushed out, placing company-sized combat outposts in the worst insurgent areas. These outposts restricted insurgent movement and demonstrated willingness to confront Al Qaeda in their sanctuary. Using the outposts as an example of their commitment to free the city from insurgent control, the BCT and Iraqi partners reached out to the remaining local tribal leaders, offering protection and economic development in exchange for police recruits to clear the city. Frustrated by Al Qaeda's excesses and abuse, the tribal leaders provided over 4,000 recruits over the following six months to fill the dwindling police ranks.

In the meantime, the BCT continued to execute a shape, clear, hold, and build [see chapter 3, section II] framework strategy in the city, emplacing more combat outposts to reduce insurgent control over the city's center. A linked information operations [see paragraphs 4-48 through 4-65] effort began to discredit Al Qaeda in the eyes of the people. Allied tribes provided intelligence that enabled raids; thus, demoralizing the Al Qaeda force. The Iraqi Army and U.S. forces liberated the city's large hospital, freeing access to medical care. Micro- and macroeconomic development projects began in cooperative areas, providing much needed local jobs. Sensing diminishing support and legitimacy among the population, Al Qaeda attempted to retaliate against cooperating tribes through a murder and intimidation campaign. The brigade stood by the tribes, providing air, artillery, and troop support to defend against insurgent attacks when required. This demonstration of solidarity solidified the tribal rebellion, which expanded exponentially.

Returning police recruits provided security in cleared areas and the flexibility to expand and clear the remaining sanctuaries. In addition to sending troops to far away police and army schools, the brigade provided a leadership academy to develop local forces' ability to conduct COIN operations. Soldiers and local security forces inhabited joint security stations throughout the city, working together to provide security. The tribal councils selected mayors and local leaders to rebuild civil society within the city. Violence decreased by nearly 70 percent by February 2007, and by summer 2007, attacks practically ceased in Ramadi. The Awakening spread quickly from Ramadi to the rest of Anbar, changing the course of the Iraq war.

DISRUPTION

6-4. The COIN force disrupts the tempo and synchronization of the insurgency's operation to counter the insurgent initiative, to prevent the insurgency from concentrating combat power against a part of the defense, and to force the insurgency to go where the commander wants. The commander achieves disruption by defeating or misleading insurgency reconnaissance forces, impeding maneuver, disrupting reserves, neutralizing fire support, and interrupting command and control. Defensive techniques vary with

circumstances, but all defensive concepts of operations aim to spoil the attacker's synchronization. Strong security forces defeating insurgency reconnaissance, phony initial positions or dummy positions, and obstacles increase COIN force security in the defense.

6-5. The COIN commander uses subordinate variations of an attack, counterbattery, and counter-mortar fires; electromagnetic attacks (EAs) (see chapter 4); and retention of key or decisive terrain to prevent the insurgency from concentrating overwhelming strength against portions of the COIN force's area of operations (AO). *Decisive terrain* is key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment (ADP 3-90). An analysis of friendly force networks informs the development of critical information and provides a basis for establishing key terrain in cyberspace. Key terrain in the defense comprises those physical and logical entities in friendly force technical networks of such extraordinary importance that any disruption in their operation would have debilitating effects upon mission accomplishment.

FLEXIBILITY

6-6. The COIN commander uses detailed planning, sound preparation, operations in depth, retained reserves, and command and control to maintain flexibility. Flexibility requires the commander to visualize the battlespace to detect the insurgency's scheme of maneuver in time to direct maneuver and activities against it. The commander does not limit information collection efforts only to the forces in contact. The commander does concentrate on formations arrayed in depth and positioning throughout an AO. The insurgency may try to bypass areas where the defense is positioned. Hence, the commander ensures the detection and defeat of the insurgency along all possible LOEs. The commander uses aviation reconnaissance and surveillance assets and cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare (EW) operations to support information collection. The COIN force's plan allows the commander to shift the main effort quickly, as the situation changes, while maintaining synchronization. In addition, alternate and subsequent positions provide the requisite flexibility to execute the defense effectively. Small reserves (or response forces) may position near critical terrain or likely insurgent avenues of activities to enable rapid deployment to those areas. The establishment of blocking positions can deny the insurgency a chance to escape once contact is made.

MANEUVER

6-7. Maneuver allows the COIN commander to take full advantage of the AO and to mass and concentrate resources where required. The COIN force arrays and allocates forces in relationship to likely insurgent courses of action (COAs). It uses allocations based on the results of the relative combat power analysis of the COIN and insurgency forces' assigned tasks and the terrain. The commander accepts risk along less likely avenues of activities to ensure adequate combat power is available for more likely avenues of activities.

6-8. Maneuver also encompasses defensive actions such as security and support area operations. In some cases, the commander accepts gaps in the AO but nevertheless takes measures to maintain security in these risk areas. The COIN force integrates assigned or attached and echelon above brigade enablers (for example, surveillance assets, reconnaissance and security forces, space and cyberspace capabilities, patrols [dismounted and mounted], combat outposts, observation posts, sensor outposts, listening posts). Additional enablers include engineer reconnaissance teams, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance and surveillance forces, fires observers, forward observer or spotter outposts, or other economy-of-force efforts for these areas.

MASS AND CONCENTRATION

6-9. The COIN force masses its combat power to overwhelm the insurgency and regain the initiative. The commander maintains the capabilities to concentrate forces and to mass the effects of fires at the decisive point and time within an LOE. To do so, the commander may economize forces in some areas, retain a reserve or response force, shift priority of fires, and maneuver repeatedly to concentrate combat power. Commanders accept risks in some areas to concentrate for combined arms operations elsewhere. Base camps, obstacles (specifically protective), security forces, and fires assist in reducing these risks as forces economize.

6-10. Depending on the operational framework, the commander designates a main effort to achieve concentration and directs all other elements and assets to support and sustain this effort. The commander may reprioritize forces, designating a new main effort, as the situation changes. The commander directs the tasks and purposes of supporting elements to create the necessary conditions for the main effort to accomplish its

task and purpose. The commander narrows the widths of subordinates' AOs, focusing a subordinate variation of an attack to support the main effort; assigns priority of obstacle preparation to the main effort unit; gives priority of indirect fire to the unit; and positions any reserve and response forces to influence the main effort's area.

6-11. Targets determined during the COIN force's planning process and refined during preparation are described broadly as physical and logical entities in cyberspace, consisting of one or more networked devices used by insurgent and adversary actors. These targets may be established as named areas of interest (AOIs) and target AOIs appropriately.

Note. As part of cyberspace electromagnetic activities, the division staff, in coordination with (ICW) the corps staff, performs a key role in target network node analysis (see chapter 4), supporting the COIN force's (generally at the BCT echelon) cyberspace and EW effort.

6-12. Concealment and deception mask the concentrating forces since concentration increases the risk level of large losses from insurgent fires. The strategy is to concentrate the effects of the forces, not to concentrate the forces themselves physically. Defending COIN forces, when required, uses engagement areas to concentrate combat power from mutually supporting positions. Reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations, organic and external to the COIN force, are vital to gaining the requisite information and time to concentrate the forces and fires of the COIN force.

OPERATIONS IN DEPTH

6-13. *Operations in depth* are the simultaneous application of combat power throughout an area of operations (ADP 3-90). The integration of all combat power throughout the AO, as well as the COIN force's area of influence and AOI, improves the chances for success while minimizing friendly casualties. Quick, violent, and simultaneous action throughout the depth of the COIN force's AO can hurt, confuse, and even paralyze an insurgency force when it is most exposed and vulnerable. Such actions weaken the insurgency's morale and disallow any early successes that would build their confidence. Operations in depth prevent insurgents from gaining momentum in the insurgency. Synchronization of actions within the COIN's operational framework facilitates mission success.

6-14. Alternate and supplementary positions, combat outposts, observation posts, and mutually supporting strong points in noncontiguous AOs (see chapter 7) extend the depth of a COIN force's overall AO. COIN force commanders plan fires throughout their AOs up to the maximum range of the available weapons. Fire support units and observers move and reposition to maintain contact with insurgency forces and observe target AOIs in depth as the COIN operations develop. Commanders plan for the emplacement of obstacles (specifically protective) around critical locations to disrupt the most dangerous and most likely insurgent COAs.

PREPARATION

6-15. The commander maintains familiarity with the insurgency's abilities and limitations to prepare a proper defense. The insurgency's abilities and limitations include its organization, offensive doctrine (tactics, techniques, and procedures [TTP]), weapon systems, and equipment. The means of information collection (for example, reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations) inform the COIN force commander and staff and aid them in developing understanding and multiplying the effectiveness of the defensive efforts throughout the friendly AOs.

6-16. The commander analyzes the terrain in detail from all perspectives and then verifies on the ground to select engagement areas and positions that allow for the massing and concentration of effects at the right time and place. Emphasis lies on the preparation of positions to establish base operations, along with the identification and positioning of routes, obstacles, logistic support, and command and control facilities and networks. The commander plans, coordinates, and prepares military deceptions and information activities and uses rehearsals to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the concept of operations and commander's intent.

6-17. During preparation, aerial (crewed and uncrewed) reconnaissance and surveillance collection efforts (internal and external to the COIN echelon) complement ground efforts by increasing the speed and depth

with which reconnaissance can be conducted over an area. Ground reconnaissance and security forces employ and supplies are located where they can best support the COIN LOEs. Offensive operations to support defensive actions and to place the COIN force in a position of relative advantage over the insurgency are key to retaining the initiative. Prior to their use, all routes for movements are reconnoitered, improved, secured, and rehearsed. Defensive preparations in AOs continue in depth, even as engagements with an insurgency decrease.

SECURITY

6-18. The COIN commander establishes security areas to protect stationary unit positions and the movement of forces in and around friendly AOs. Security operations normally include screen and guard missions. The presence of these security operations does not relieve the stationary units from their own security responsibilities (for example, local security tasks). All units maintain the security (for example, civil reconnaissance, security patrolling) in their assigned areas and contribute to the friendly units' counterreconnaissance effort.

6-19. The COIN force generally defends to economize limited forces and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations that will occur elsewhere and later. The commander secures COIN forces through integrated security operations throughout the depth and breadth of the assigned AO. Long-range reconnaissance and surveillance assets task-organized at echelons above the COIN force conduct information collection to define and confirm insurgent efforts and strategies at extended ranges. At the BCT level, the commander plans for and employs information-related capabilities and cyberspace electromagnetic activities to confuse the insurgency as to the BCT's manner of defense and to aid in securing the force.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-20. As in COIN offensive operations, COIN defensive operations are usually conducted in insurgency-controlled or contested areas. COIN operations use defensive operations such as area defense (specifically perimeter defenses [or base camp operations]), mobile defense (specifically actions of the strike force), and retrograde (specifically when transitioning responsibility). At the tactical level, COIN units focus mostly on executing an area defense, though a mobile defense or retrograde is appropriate in some instances.

PURPOSE OF DEFENSE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-21. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that will then allow COIN forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting defensive operations include those following:

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the insurgency.
- Attriting or fixing the insurgency force as a prelude to offensive operations.
- Countering a surprise action by an insurgency force.
- Increasing the insurgency's vulnerability by forcing it to concentrate insurgency forces.

THE THREE TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-22. During the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework (see paragraphs 3-117 through 3-150) in COIN operations, defensive operations are foremost in the hold phase, though operations occur during all five phases. These operations help establish and maintain civil security and populace control, enabling COIN units to set conditions across several LOEs. Defensive operations in the hold phase primarily deal with securing the COIN force and HN populace and isolating insurgents from the general population. The three types of defensive operations are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde.

Area Defense

6-23. An *area defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). In COINs, both the insurgency and COIN are vying for popular support as though it were terrain. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain in which the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. In COINs, commanders choose an area defense to secure the populace by living among

the population and employing COIN LOEs. Examples of an area defense in COINs are a combat outpost next to a city market, a permanent squad position at an electrical plant, and a checkpoint near a police station.

Mobile Defense

6-24. A *mobile defense* is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). It focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing it to advance to a point at which it becomes exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. Mobile defenses are less common in COINs because insurgents rarely mass. However, strike operations can be useful in destroying guerrilla bases. Another example of a mobile defense at the tactical level is the employment of quick reaction forces to exploit the initiative or relative position of advantage.

Retrograde

6-25. A *retrograde* is a type [of] defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. In COINs, retrograde operations are generally conducted intentionally after a unit is transitioning responsibility of an AO to host-nation security forces (HNSF) or a relief in place with another U.S. unit.

Planning Considerations When Transitioning from Defensive to Other Tactical Operations

6-26. In the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, counterinsurgents simultaneously conduct differing degrees (depending on the situation) of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and tasks. During the clear phase, offensive operations (see chapter 5) are the priority for counterinsurgents. In most cases, the main effort is the measure of effectiveness (MOE) associated directly with impact on insurgent combatants (for example, isolate insurgents from the general population). Offensive operations conducted during the clear include raid, deliberate attack, cordon and search, seize key terrain, and search and attack. Counterinsurgents execute defensive operations as well during the clear phase, including block access routes, establish and secure combat outposts, conduct sniper operations, and secure the populace.

6-27. Much like the clear phase, achieving the hold phase requires counterinsurgents to execute offensive, defensive, and stability operations and tasks. For example, counterinsurgents execute offensive tasks during the hold phase to attack underground elements and auxiliary forces. While achieving the hold phase, defensive operations are the priority. However, to meet the objectives of the hold, the LOE associated with the development of the HNSF is the main effort. Within this framework, counterinsurgents execute defensive operations and tasks, including those to block access routes (both infiltration and exfiltration), establish and secure combat outposts, conduct countermobility, and conduct sniper and counter-sniper operations. Additional examples of defensive operations and tasks during the hold phase include those to counter cache operations, conduct area denial, protect the populace, conduct combined action with the HNSF to secure combined positions, and conduct sanctuary denial and disruption operations. The amount and scope of stability tasks and operations increase during the hold phase.

6-28. To set the conditions to progress through the framework from this point, counterinsurgents execute stability operations and tasks. Stability throughout the framework includes the following: identifying potential government or security leaders; identifying civic capacity requirements from the public; establishing a local security force (in the context of HN systems) and initiating any necessary training programs for it; and identifying the root causes of instability within the AO. Throughout these operations and tasks, the commander must consider securing the populace and building HN capability. The actions taken to achieve the necessary effects of the clear phase should not result in alienating the populace. The messages of information activities (see paragraph 4-48) are particularly important while performing the clear, hold, and transition phases. Responsible use of force is essential. Examples of stability operations and tasks include assembling, equipping, and training the HNSF, which, in turn, includes establishing local governance functions and culturally appropriate rule of law systems within the HN's plan, all while simultaneously defending the populace and COIN forces.

6-29. In strike operations (see paragraphs 3-154 through 3-159) and populace and resources control (PRC) operations (see paragraphs 3-165 through 3-168), the conduct of defensive operations occurs in concert with stability and offensive operations. In strike operations, units conduct defensive operations to establish bases

from which to conduct offensive operations. In PRC operations, units conduct defensive operations to protect the populace and public materiel resources from insurgents, to deny insurgents access to all of these, and to identify and eliminate the insurgents and the insurgent organization, activities, and influence while doing so.

SECTION II – DEFENSIVE VARIATIONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-30. Often when Infantry forces are involved in operations such as peace operations, irregular warfare (IW), and military engagement, unit defensive actions closely engage the two LOEs to establish civil security and to establish civil control. During defensive actions, especially within the clear, hold, and build phases of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, the establishment of bases is the most common method for securing the populace that tactical units employ. Commanders use site selection techniques and protection activities to decide where to locate bases and apply security measures. Section II addresses base site selection, COIN basing, combat outposts, and patrol bases.

SITE SELECTION

6-31. Brigades, battalions, and companies routinely possess enormous AOs during COINs. Inside these large AOs exist hundreds or thousands of essential service structures, governmental infrastructure, economic assets, population centers, and important leaders, all of which or whom the insurgency may target. The conduct of security operations at the tactical level may employ any of an available variety of techniques. Tactical units need a framework to decide how best to secure the HN population and infrastructure. The protection of every asset and every point is not possible. Eventually, the insurgency will attack. Rather, a primary goal is to protect those vital assets and points to such a degree that, should they be attacked, their damage would be minimal while the insurgency's losses would be heavy.

VULNERABILITY PRIORITIZATION MATRIX

6-32. The vulnerability prioritization matrix is a method for units to help the HN government in deciding what HN assets to protect. This matrix considers targets within the HN population, government, and infrastructure. It allows leaders to identify target vulnerability, determine corresponding risk, and then prioritize security assets. The matrix includes seven criteria: criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability, and psychological impact (CARVER-P). (See figure 6-1 for an example CARVER-P vulnerability prioritization matrix for a power generation plant.) This matrix derives from the Army risk assessment process.

VULNERABILITY PRIORITIZATION MATRIX for POWER GENERATION PLANT **at** LOCATION XYZ

CARVER-P	*Why and How*	*Val*	*Controls or Mitigation*	*PRI*
Criticality	PROVIDES POWER FOR ALL OF CITY.	3	1. FULLTIME MILITARY SECURITY: ESTABLISHED 2. FULLTIME POLICE SECURITY: ESTABLISHED 3. BOUNDARY FENCING AND BARRIER PLAN: BUILDING	1
Accessibility	COVERS LARGE AREA; HARD TO DEFEND; FEW OR NO BARRIERS.	2		
Recuperability	SOME REPAIR PARTS ON HAND.	2		
Vulnerability	VULNERABLE TO MEDIUM ANTI ARMOR FIRES AND BULK CHARGES.	3		
Effect	OVERWHELMING PROPAGANDA EFFECT FOR INSURGENTS IF DESTROYED.	3		
Recognizability	EASY TO RECOGNIZE.	3		
Psychological impact	SHOULD SHOW POPULATION THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN CONTROL.	3		
Total Value (Lower is better—max value is 21)		19		

EXAMPLE

LEGEND

MAX	MAXIMUM	VAL	VALUE
PRI	PRIORITIZATION		

Figure 6-1. Vulnerability prioritization matrix, example

CRITERIA EVALUATION TOOL

6-33. The completion of the CARVER-P vulnerability prioritization matrix uses a five-step process. The five steps are identification, evaluation, analysis, facility categorization, and prioritization.

Step 1—Identification

6-34. Identify and continually reevaluate the key structures, capabilities, organizations, and individuals in the AO that or whom insurgents may target. Record a name and location for each target on a separate CARVER-P vulnerability prioritization matrix (see table 6-1).

Table 6-1. Criteria evaluation tool, example

CRITICALITY CRITERION. Criticality refers to *asset value*. It is the primary consideration in targeting. A target is *critical* when its destruction or damage would significantly impact a community's military, political, or economic aspects.		
High effect on output, production, service, or mission ☒ **High Risk**		
Moderate effect on output, production, service, or mission ☐ **Medium Risk**		
Negligible effect on output, production, service, or mission ☐ **Low Risk**		
No significant effect on output, production, service, or mission ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
PROVIDES POWER FOR ALL OF CITY	3	FULL-TIME MILITARY SECURITY: ESTABLISHED FULL-TIME POLICE SECURITY: ESTABLISHED BOUNDARY FENCING AND BARRIER PLAN: BUILDING
ACCESSIBILITY CRITERION. An asset is *accessible* when an insurgency could reach the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish their mission.		
High accessibility: Standoff weapons employed ☐ **High Risk**		
Moderate accessibility: Heavy barriers or protection employed ☐ **Medium Risk**		
Low accessibility: Some barriers or protection employed ☒ **Low Risk**		
No accessibility or only by extreme difficulty ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
COVERS LARGE AREA; HARD TO DEFEND; FEW OR NO BARRIERS	2	LOCAL SECURITY FULL-TIME POLICE SECURITY: ESTABLISHED BOUNDARY FENCING AND BARRIER PLAN: BUILDING
RECUPERABILITY CRITERION. An asset's *recuperability* is measured in time—that is, how long it would take to replace, repair, or bypass a damaged or destroyed target.		
High effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ☐ **High Risk**		
Moderate effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ☐ **Medium Risk**		
Negligible effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ☒ **Low Risk**		
No significant effect on replacement, repair, or substitution ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
SOME REPAIR PARTS ON HAND	2	ESTABLISH CONTRACTS WITH OPEN END DATES
VULNERABILITY CRITERION. An asset is *vulnerable* when the insurgency has the means and expertise to attack the target.		
Vulnerable to small arms and light antiarmor fire and to charges of 5 to 10 pounds ☐ **High Risk**		
Vulnerable to medium antiarmor fire, bulk charges of 10 to 30 pounds, and carefully placed smaller charges ☒ **Medium Risk**		
Vulnerable to heavy antiarmor fire, bulk charges of 30 to 50 pounds, and special weapons ☐ **Low Risk**		
Invulnerable to all but the most extreme targeting measures ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
VULNERABLE TO MEDIUM ANTIARMOR FIRES AND BULK CHARGES	3	LOCAL SECURITY FULL-TIME POLICE SECURITY: ESTABLISHED BOUNDARY FENCING AND BARRIER PLAN: BUILDING

Table 6-1. Criteria evaluation tool, example (continued)

EFFECT CRITERION. The *effect* of an asset attack is a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts on the target and beyond.		
Overwhelmingly positive effects for the insurgency; no significant negative effects ☐ **High Risk**		
Moderately positive effects for the insurgency; few significant negative effects ☒ **Medium Risk**		
Neutral—no significant positive or negative effects ☐ **Low Risk**		
Overwhelmingly negative effects for the insurgency; no significant positive effects ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
OVERWHELMING PROPAGANDA EFFECT FOR INSURGENTS IF DESTROYED	3	INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF INSURGENT ACTIVITIES INFORMATION ACTIVITIES INFORMATION COLLECTION EFFORT
RECOGNIZABILITY CRITERION. An asset's *recognizability* is the degree to which an insurgency or information collection and reconnaissance assets could recognize the target under varying conditions.		
Clearly recognized under all conditions, from a distance, and with little or no training ☒ **High Risk**		
Easily recognized at small arms range and with a small amount of training ☐ **Medium Risk**		
Recognized with difficulty at night or in inclement weather and only with some training, or confused with other targets or target components ☐ **Low Risk**		
Not recognized under any conditions, except by experts ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
EASY TO RECOGNIZE	3	BOUNDARY FENCING AND BARRIER PLAN: BUILDING
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT CRITERION. An asset's *psychological impact* is the degree to which it affects the local populace and their perception of the government.		
Overwhelmingly negative effect on popular perception of the government ☒ **High Risk**		
Moderately negative effect on popular perception of the government ☐ **Medium Risk**		
Slightly negative effect on popular perception of the government ☐ **Low Risk**		
No negative effect on popular perception of the government ☐ **No Risk**		
Why and How	**Value**	**Controls and Mitigation**
WOULD SHOW POPULACE THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN CONTROL	3	FULL-TIME MILITARY SECURITY: ESTABLISHED FULL-TIME POLICE SECURITY: ESTABLISHED

Step 2—Evaluation

6-35. Evaluate this potential target using the criteria evaluation tool (see table 6-1). This tool serves as a simple means to determine risk either with the four generic risk statements of each criterion or by developing or modifying similar statements.

Step 3—Analysis

6-36. In the criteria evaluation tool (see table 6-1) for each criterion, choose an appropriate risk statement corresponding with a risk level. Then, explain why and how the target or asset warrants that risk level for that criterion. Next, assign a numerical value for each of the criteria and identify any applicable controls and mitigations for each assessment. Finally, transfer this information to the matrix and sum the values. This sum represents the assessment of the level of desirability the insurgency harbors for that target. The higher the number, the more the insurgency is likely to attack the target.

Step 4—Facility Categorization

6-37. Using this sum, identify the facilities category. Both the identification and the prioritization of vital assets and key points are ideally the responsibility of the HN. However, U.S. commanders participate in the planning process for assets in their AOs. To assist in this process, it is useful to have a simple method of categorizing the facilities to be considered. (See figure 6-2 on page 220 for one suggested method for categorizing facilities.)

CATEGORY A (15-21 TOTAL VALUE)	ASSETS IN CATEGORY A INCLUDE THOSE WHOSE INTERRUPTION OR DENIAL WOULD SEVERELY RESTRICT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, AND THE MORALE OF THE POPULATION AND ITS CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER.
CATEGORY B (8-14 TOTAL VALUE)	ASSETS IN CATEGORY B INCLUDE THOSE WHOSE INTERRUPTION OR DENIAL WOULD RESTRICT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, AND THE MORALE OF THE POPULATION AND ITS CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER.
CATEGORY C (0-7 TOTAL VALUE)	ASSETS IN CATEGORY C INCLUDE THOSE WHOSE INTERRUPTION OR DENIAL WOULD NOT RESTRICT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, AND THE MORALE OF THE POPULATION AND ITS CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER.

Figure 6-2. Facility categories

Step 5—Prioritization

6-38. Tactical units use this five-step process to decide how best to secure the HN population and the HN infrastructure. Comparing this target to others enables U.S. Forces and the HN decision authority to allocate resources, prioritize tasks and operations, and make tactical decisions during operations and thereby to decide what assets to protect.

COUNTERINSURGENCY BASING

6-39. When U.S. COIN forces operate within an HN, they establish bases from which to operate. Typically, bases try to secure the populace and isolate the insurgency from its support. In this context, a base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported. All bases remain securable and defendable. Bases vary in accordance with (IAW) the size of the unit occupying the base and the mission of the units using the base. All types of bases require clear command relationships. Forward operating bases (FOBs), forward operating sites, base camps, combat outposts, and patrol bases are the common types of bases used during COIN defensive operations. (See ATP 3-21.20 for information on base operations.)

FORWARD OPERATING BASES

6-40. A *forward operating base* is an airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities (JP 3-09.3). Normally, each brigade's or battalion's AO has at least one FOB. The size of the area, its physical characteristics, and the number and sizes of the units operating in the area often require additional operating bases. The FOBs established by a brigade or battalion are often semipermanent and provide deployed units with command and control and communications facilities, sustainment, personnel support, staging areas, and intelligence activities. They also provide units with relatively secure locations from which to plan and prepare for operations. During COIN operations, they aid in limiting nearby insurgent mobility and in providing security to the populace.

6-41. By the nature of the echelon, some differences exist between brigade and battalion FOBs. Brigade FOBs are larger than battalion FOBs, and they provide a rear location for elements of battalions such as forward support companies and engineer companies. Battalion FOBs are normally staffed with the minimum number of personnel for operating and providing security. They maintain two methods for sustainment: road and either air or water. A *forward operating site*—a scalable location outside the United States and its territories intended for rotational use by operating forces (JP 4-04)—is also common at the brigade and battalion echelons.

BASE CAMPS

6-42. A *base camp* is an evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATP 3-37.10). It provides a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power. Operating from base camps is a fundamental tactic of ground-based forces while conducting missions, tasks, and activities to stabilize an OE in crisis or in a vulnerable state (for example, COIN forces). The level of protection afforded by a base camp depends on the threat.

6-43. A *base cluster* (in base defense operations) is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10). Units located in the base or base camp are under the tactical control of the base or base camp for base security and defense. In large echelon support areas, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and accomplishment of mission objectives.

Principles of Base Camps

6-44. Base camps are characterized by four principles, which are incorporated throughout the life cycle. These principles follow:

- Scalability.
- Sustainability.
- Standardization.
- Survivability.

6-45. Commanders and staffs use the base camp principles as a guide for analytical thinking. These principles are not a set of rigid rules, nor do they apply in every situation. They are best applied with creativity, insight, and boldness.

Base Camp Durations

6-46. The classification of a base camp depends on its expected duration (see table 6-2). A contingency base camp is expected to operate 2 to 10 years or for even a shorter duration, while an enduring base camp is expected to operate longer than 5 years. Facilities transition from contingency to enduring standards appropriately—typically anytime during a 6-month to 5-year period. These timelines provide a framework to plan for the transition of standards. The actual trigger for transition is based on conditions and other factors.

Table 6-2. Base camp duration

Phase	*Construction Standard*	*Expected Duration*
Contingency	**Organic**	Up to 90 days
	Initial	Up to 6 months
	Temporary	Up to 5 years
	Semipermanent	2 to 10 years
Enduring	**Permanent**	5 or more years

6-47. Expected base camp duration affects the construction standards for facilities and infrastructure. While enduring construction standards are not typical during the contingency phase of an operation, semipermanent construction standards can apply in place of initial (completed with organic equipment) or temporary construction when site considerations require or when mission parameters render them applicable. The area commander, ICW Service components and the Services, specifies the construction standards for facilities in the theater to optimize the engineering effort expended on any given facility and to ensure adequate facilities for health, safety, and mission accomplishment.

Base Camp Sizes

6-48. Base camps are of five sizes: platoon, company, battalion, BCT, support area. Base camp populations typically include tenant and transient units and organizations—including U.S., multinational, and HN personnel, units, and organizations—and contractors and select noncontractors authorized to accompany the force. (See table 6-3 on page 222 for the affiliation between base camp sizes and associated population number expectancies.) Transient units and organizations come to the base camp for specific services and support, which do not necessarily require their staying overnight. Determining the number of transients whom a base camp might serve and understanding service and support relationships with other base camps are critical for accurately identifying requirements for base camp facilities, infrastructure, services, and support.

Table 6-3. Base camp sizes and approximate populations

Base Camp Size	*Approximate Population*
Platoon	50
Company	300
Battalion	1,000
Brigade Combat Team	3,000
Support Area	6,000 or greater

Base Camp Security Framework

6-49. The framework for base camp security and defense comprises three primary areas (see figure 6-3). These three areas are the outer security area, perimeter zone, and inner security area. This structure provides a means for organizing protection and defense information and requirements and for focusing efforts.




Figure 6-3. Framework for base camp security and defense, example

Outer Security Area

6-50. This is the area outside the perimeter and extending to the limit of the base camp commander's AO. Commanders establish this area to afford early warning and reaction times and to deny enemy reconnaissance efforts and vantage points for conducting standoff attacks. Typically, security elements patrol this area.

Perimeter Zone

6-51. This zone includes the base camp perimeter and area immediately in front of or behind it. It serves for emplacing observation posts, fighting positions, and entry control points. Select base camps may have designated inner and outer perimeters. Larger base camps seldomly employ this double layer of perimeters and rely more on a single perimeter supplemented with inner barriers and access control measures around critical facilities. Creating a double perimeter is extremely resource intensive.

Inner Security Area

6-52. This is the area inside the base camp perimeter. Interior barrier plans are useful around individual unit locations and critical assets and as traffic control measures for adding depth to the base camp security plan and for halting or impeding the progress of threat penetrations of the perimeter zone.

Inherent Responsibilities to Base Camp Areas of Operations

6-53. Collectively, these three areas form the base camp AO. Commanders assigned AOs have inherent responsibilities (see FM 3-96 for descriptions of these responsibilities). Not all commanders who serve as base camp commanders have the organic capabilities within their units to perform all these responsibilities. In those situations, the higher commander clearly articulates in the order those AO responsibilities the base camp commander will not perform and who will perform them, or the higher commander provides the necessary augmented capabilities to perform them.

6-54. Base camp commanders and staffs apply the framework for base security and defense—much like a perimeter defense (one of the three variations of area defense; see FM 3-96 for information on perimeter defenses)—to focus planning activities and ensure all critical elements of base security and defense are addressed. The framework is not intended to be an all-inclusive solution to base security and defense but rather to provide a general template for planning. (See figure 6-3 for an example framework for base security and defense.)

General Planning Considerations for Base Defense

6-55. COIN forces require a secure area to prepare for future operations, recover and refit, and conduct sustainment. They use perimeters and other measures to protect units during offensive, defensive, and stability operations, especially in a noncontiguous AO. While supporting operations in a COIN environment, U.S. Forces use base camps to protect sustainment operations and provide a secure area for the units to recover from and prepare for operations. Regardless of the ongoing operation, the type of base, or the location of a base, the characteristics of the defense do not change. The best technique for base defense is the perimeter defense.

Terrain Considerations in Base Defense

6-56. The proper evaluation and use of area terrain are essential for minimizing the requisite number of additional forces for base defense. Key terrain factors to consider include those following:

- Use of the terrain's natural defensive characteristics.
- Use of artificial obstacles to enhance the terrain's natural defensive characteristics.
- Control of all roads and waterways leading into the base.
- Control of military lines of communication and civilian commerce routes.
- Control of land areas surrounding the base to a range beyond those of enemy mortars and rockets.

Role of Host-nation Security Forces in Base Defense

6-57. The base commander considers the integration of HNSF in the overall base defense effort. The integration of HNSF in patrol and populace control activities receives particular emphasis. Both HNSF and multinational forces provide local security for their own units. However, to ensure maximum benefit, all such local plans undergo coordination and integration with the base master defense plan.

Communication During Base Defense

6-58. Control is the key to a successful base defense. To achieve the necessary control, a communications capability is established between the base defense operations center and sector commanders (or subordinate leaders) leading the perimeter defense (see figure 6-3 on page 222) and between the sector commander and base defense bunkers, towers, and reserves. Bunkers or towers within each section communicate laterally inside the sector, and flank bunkers of one sector can communicate with flank bunkers of adjacent sectors. Commanders and subordinate leaders coordinate their means of communication, which may include radios, phones, and visual signals such as hand and arm signals, panels, lights, flags, and pyrotechnics. Alternate means are established in addition to standard voice messages such as wire and runners.

Resupply Operations

6-59. Depending on the mission and status of the battalion, the type of transport available, the weather, and the terrain, resupply may be by air or ground. The availability of landing zones and drop zones protected from the enemy's observation and fire is the main consideration when selecting locations and organizing for aerial resupply. (See ATP 3-21.20 for information on resupply techniques.)

Base Area Protective Measures

6-60. All units in the base area are responsible for preserving the fighting potential. Protective measures reduce the probability (and the effects) of damage caused by hostile action. Responsibility for the conduct of protective measures is assigned to firefighting, CBRN, medical, and other units. In addition, all units assigned to the base are tasked to conduct activities such as dispersion, camouflage, blackout, field discipline, and use of shelters.

Base Area Security

6-61. Early warning of pending actions ensures the base commander has time to react to any insurgent threat. Outposts, patrols, ground surveillance, counter-mortar radar, military working dogs, and air reconnaissance and surveillance provide early warning. Information provided by civilians and the actions of resident personnel near the base are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions. All-round security is essential (see ATP 3-21.8 for information).

Defense in Depth

6-62. Alternate and supplementary positions, observation posts, and mutually supporting strong points in and forward of the base outer security area extend the depth of the defense. The commander plans fires throughout the assigned AO, up to the maximum range of available weapons (including observed fires; see ATP 3-09.30). Portable obstacles may be placed around critical targets during reduced visibility to disrupt the enemy's plan and add depth to the defense.

Base Area Security Patrols

6-63. Base defense operations to counter small groups of enemy forces include aggressive, frequent security patrols by squads (and platoon-sized forces; see ATP 3-21.8) to detect, capture, or destroy small groups of insurgents. When available, dogs add useful security and detection ability to patrol operations. Populated areas near the base undergo a search, and surprise checkpoints lie along known or suspected routes of insurgent movement.

Maximum Use of Offensive Actions in Base Defense

6-64. Since the objective of the base defense is to maintain a secure base, the defender maximizes the use of offensive actions to engage enemy forces outside the base. On initial occupation of the base site, friendly forces take offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area. The area commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, air attacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy any remaining enemy force. Once the enemy has been cleared from the area, the base can be defended by a smaller force. The base

commander maintains constant liaison with unit commanders in the area to stay abreast of efforts to remove the threat.

Mutual Support During Base Defense

6-65. The positioning of defending forces ensures mutual employment of defensive resources, including fires, observation, and maneuver elements (for example, response forces). Mutual support between defensive elements requires careful planning, positioning, and coordination due to the circular aspects of the base area. The use of surveillance, obstacles, planned targets, and maneuver controls gaps. Mutual support has two aspects: supporting range and supporting distance. (See paragraphs 5-238 through 5-240 for information on mutual support.)

All-round Defense

6-66. In defensive planning, the base commander remains prepared to defend against enemy attack from any direction. Plans are sufficiently flexible, and reserves are positioned to permit reaction to any threat. Base defense forces are assigned primary and alternate positions and sectors of responsibility. All personnel are assigned duty stations or shelters.

Responsiveness

6-67. Attacks against a base may range from long-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fires to suicide bombers or large forces. The insurgency has the advantage of deciding when, where, and with what force they will attack. The defender positions defending forces and plans maneuver to respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. The defender prepares plans, including counterattack plans, and rehearses, evaluates, and revises them appropriately.

Perimeter Security Force

6-68. The perimeter security force occupies observation posts and firing positions along the perimeter and conducts area security tasks inside the base camp's security area. The perimeter security force stands ready to integrate the response force and any other committed reinforcements or response forces into the perimeter defense.

QUICK RESPONSE FORCE

6-69. A quick response force is a dedicated force on a base with adequate tactical mobility and fire support to defeat Level I and II threats and shape Level III threats until a tactical combat force (TCF) or other available response forces can defeat them. The quick response force provides the base camp or cluster commander with depth for security and defense. Once committed, the commander maintains preparedness to reconstitute a quick response force. The base camp commander may assign the quick response force a wide variety of tasks inside both the base camp's outer security area and perimeter for the following purposes:

- To reinforce a threatened area or respond to a penetration of the perimeter.
- To establish contact with potential threats and engage those threats appropriately in the base camp's security area.

6-70. Base camp defense includes the requisite activities for defeating the Level I and II threats to a base camp or cluster and for shaping or delaying the Level III threats until a TCF or other available response forces (that is, part of the higher commander's area security efforts) can defeat them. The three levels of threat categories follow:

- *Level I threat*—a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters (ATP 3-91).
- *Level II threat*—an enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster's defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force (ATP 3-91).
- *Level III threat*—an enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base cluster and any local reserve or response force (ATP 3-91).

6-71. The size and composition of the quick response force is based on a threat assessment and the levels of uncertainty and risk, and they are adjusted based on changes in the situation. The force's level of responsiveness (readiness condition) is adjusted based on threat conditions. The quick response force is mounted to ensure adequate protection and tactical mobility. Typically, Infantry, Armor, military police, and combat engineers are capable of performing quick response force operations.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE

6-72. A *tactical combat force* is a rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to, and capable of, defeating Level III threats, including combined arms (JP 3-10). The TCF is established appropriately at the division and corps levels. The Infantry battalion may receive the TCF mission for the division or corps. The TCF size, composition, and response time are based on the TCF's operation order (OPORD). Depending on the threat, the tactical combat unit's mission may be on call or a unit's only mission. At a minimum, the TCF must—

- Maintain a position that permits their response within the required time.
- Be mounted (generally) or, with helicopter transportation or warranting conditions, be foot mobile.
- Have sufficient ammunition and supplies to accomplish the mission, including any necessary engineer support.
- Maintain communications with the supported base defense operations center, including monitoring the center's command net as required.
- Understand and rehearse the requisite parts of the supported base defense plan.

6-73. A TCF's assigned missions may include the following:

- Reinforce engaged units outside the perimeter.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
- Respond to threats on critical assets, infrastructure, or high-risk personnel.
- Conduct security checks and random patrolling inside the base camp perimeter.

BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

6-74. *Base defense operations* are the combined activities of counterintelligence (CI), security, military police, emergency responders, antiterrorism and force protection working groups, and the commander to deny, disrupt, or counter foreign intelligence entities, insider, and other threats targeting United States bases and facilities (ATP 2-22.2-1). A base or base camp can contain one or more units from one or more Services and typically supports both U.S. Forces and multinational forces, as well as other unified action or interorganizational partners operating anywhere along the range of military operations. A base camp, as seen through a life-cycle construct, includes the development of base camps from preestablishment through transfer or closure, with levels of increasing base camp capabilities.

6-75. A commander designates an area or facility as a base camp and often designates a single commander as the base or base camp commander responsible for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations of the base or base camp. This allows other units to focus on their primary functions. Units located in the base or base camp are under the tactical control of the base or base camp commander for base security and defense. In large echelon support areas, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and accomplishment of mission objectives.

6-76. A *base defense operations center* is a command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). The center plans, directs (in support of the commander), coordinates, integrates, and controls all base security and defense efforts. It comprises two primary sections: the command section and the plans and operations section, with additional sections as required. The center's staff includes representatives of the intelligence, movement and maneuver, and fires warfighting functions, integrating cells, and other functional areas. Its composition reflects the base camp population. The size, composition, and configuration of the center may vary between base camps, based on the following:

- Base camp size.
- Level of base camp services and support.
- Real property asset management requirements.
- Complexity of facility and infrastructure operations and management requirements.
- Span of control, which, in turn, is based on the number and echelons of tenant and transient units or subordinate base camps for base clusters.

6-77. A *base cluster operations center* is a command and control facility that serves as the base cluster commander's focal point for defense and security of the base cluster (JP 3-10). It controls several subordinate base camps; these may group into clusters for mutual support either in sustainment or protection. Commonly found at the BCT level or higher headquarters (HQ), it is similar to the base camp management center in both organization and function.

6-78. Commanders at all levels may form base camp working groups by grouping select staff members who meet to focus on base camp planning or problem-solving. Base camp working groups may conduct the initial base camp development planning until the necessary augmentation for adequate base camp development becomes available. When a base camp working group is established, the commander normally designates a group facilitator to focus the group's efforts and to prevent a duplication of effort. The group facilitator briefs the commander and staff on a recurring basis to maintain visibility and command emphasis on base camps.

6-79. Base camp management centers coordinate, monitor, direct, and synchronize the actions necessary for establishing, operating, sustaining, and managing base camps in an echelon's AO. In smaller camps or when augmentation is unavailable, base camp commanders rely on reachback to technical expertise in higher HQ base camp management centers or other support agencies and centers. (See ATP 3-37.10 for information on base camp operations.)

BASE DEFENSE

6-80. *Base defense* comprises the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10). The base commander is responsible for the local defense of the base and provision of resources for other activities in the overall AO. The base defense force commander executes base defense operations. (See figure 6-4 on page 228 for an example of the organization of a base command.) Conducting operations ensures the continued effectiveness of base facilities and units at fulfilling their missions. The area commander's responsibilities include protecting the resources of the area from interruptions caused by enemy activities.




Figure 6-4. Organization of base command, example

Base Commander

6-81. The mission of the base commander is to exercise command and control, the administration of the base, and any necessary control of resident and transient units not a part of the base command. A base commander may serve as the area commander as well. The base commander's responsibilities include establishing the overall defense organization, as well as planning, preparing, and executing all defense measures.

Base Defense Commander

6-82. A base defense commander is appointed to supervise the preparation of detailed defense plans, including establishing defense sectors, conducting requisite training, providing for or coordinating logistic support, and controlling base defense operations through an operations center. As the base commander's special representative, the base defense commander coordinates the planning efforts and operations of all elements who are to participate in the base defense.

Base Defense Elements (Forces)

6-83. Three categories of elements conduct base defenses (see table 6-4). The term *elements* is more appropriate than the term *units* because the execution of base operations is often improvisational.

Table 6-4. Base defense elements

Permanent	Elements assigned to the base permanently whose primary responsibility is for the defense or security of the base. Sustainment units often operate in this role.
As Required	Units or their elements who normally occupy or operate in or from the base.
As Available	Units or their elements who normally occupy or operate in or from the base.

Key Base Defense Structures

6-84. The key base defensive positions comprise primarily bunkers and towers in the base perimeter zone. Proper positioning of bunkers and towers affords maximum observation and mutually supporting fires over the area forward of the perimeter, including the perimeter barrier and sensor system (see table 6-5). (See FM 3-34 and ATP 3-34.40 for specifics on construction planning and execution.)

Table 6-5. Key base defense structures

Bunkers	Personnel occupies in daylight, darkness, reduced visibility, and increased enemy threat. Personnel in bunkers commonly use night and day vision devices, automatic weapons, grenade launchers, and hand grenades.
Towers	When coupled with the use of night and day vision aids, these elevated platforms—either standard military or locally contracted—enhance the capabilities of detecting perimeter infiltration and determining the locations of insurgent mortar or rocket firing positions.
Shelters	Shelters are constructed throughout the billeting, administration, and maintenance areas to provide individual protection against standoff attacks.
Revetments	Revetment constructs for critical resources provide additional protection against mortar and rocket fragmentation.
Wire	Tactical wire barriers outside and inside the perimeter are useful for limiting and canalizing penetrations by the enemy, either as individuals or in groups.
Camouflage Netting	The placement of netting atop barriers or towers supports counter-sniper and counterobservation activities.

Base Defense Exercises

6-85. All base defense plans require rehearsal, including those for the base defense alarm and communications systems. Diverse elements of the defense force receive training to act in a coordinated effort. These exercises familiarize all the elements of the defense force and base tenant units with their assignments in base defense. The conduct of exercises frequently occurs under various weather conditions during daylight and darkness. Defense exercises include those following:

- Defense of sectors of responsibility, such as the following:
  - Rehearsing counterattacks.
  - Occupying defensive positions.
- Employment of the reserve for counterattacking and for reinforcing the defensive positions.
- Coordination of supporting fires and other means of support.
- Mass casualty exercises.
- Coordination with other forces assigned to a base who may be employed in a ground defense role.
- Command post (CP) exercises.

COMBAT OUTPOSTS

6-86. A *combat outpost* is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations (FM 3-90). In COIN operations, combat outposts are often company- or platoon-sized bases inside insurgency-influenced territory. A cornerstone of COIN operations, they are a means to secure the populace. Located in strategically important areas, they provide security in the immediate area and direct public contact.

These benefits are unavailable from remote bases. Although the strategy carries the potential downsides of increased protection concerns and limited flexibility, the bases provide a huge increase in overall security in the area. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on combat outposts.)

PURPOSE OF COMBAT OUTPOSTS

6-87. Properly placed combat outposts often increase overall security. Emplacing a company or platoon combat outpost in an AO is a deliberate operation requiring detailed planning and additional logistic support. A COIN force first decides the task and purpose of the outpost by analyzing its AO. Outposts may be employed—

- To secure key lines of communication or infrastructure.
- To secure and co-opt the local populace.
- To collect information.
- To assist the government in restoring essential services.
- To force insurgents to operate elsewhere.

PRIORITIES OF WORK

6-88. The initial establishment of combat outposts requires consideration toward the priorities of work. Some possible priorities of work include those following:

- Ensuring the position is free of noncombatants and removing any from the AO before occupying the position.
- Selecting key weapons and crew-served weapon positions to cover likely mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.
- Clearing fields of fire:
  - Preparing loopholes, aiming stakes, sector stakes, and target reference point markings.
  - Constructing positions with overhead cover and camouflage (see ATP 3-21.8).
- Identifying and securing elevated and subsurface avenues of approach such as those along rooftops, sewers, basements, and stairwells.
- Constructing barriers and emplacing obstacles to deny the enemy access to any streets, subterranean passages, and buildings and to slow their movement in general.
- Integrating barriers or obstacles with key weapons.
- Improving and marking movement routes between positions, as well as those to alternate and supplementary positions.
- Stockpiling ammunition, food, firefighting equipment, and potable water.

CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT OUTPOSTS

6-89. Building a combat outpost is a complex task that must be well thought out, with a clear vision from the outset for expansion and development. (See figure 6-5 for a typical combat outpost layout.) It is always best to have trained engineers, either military or civilian, construct the base. The employment of local companies or personnel to construct the base requires due consideration. Doing so benefits the local economy, but it also increases the security risk. The following are critical considerations for the design:

- Enemy:
  - Coverage of dead spaces.
  - Creation of a safety zone to prevent rocket attacks.
  - Emplacement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along routes.
  - Incorporation of areas for observation.
- Security:
  - Positioning of concrete block guard towers at each corner and reinforcing them with sandbags.
  - Installation of chain-link screens to protect positions from rocket-propelled and hand grenades.
- Work and sleep areas:
  - Separate work, sleeping, and eating areas for sanitation and health concerns.
  - Development of a basing strategy to project facility locations.
  - Requisite identification of areas for expansion.

- Standard equipment (for the base):
  - Kitchen sets.
  - Motor pool assets.
  - Gym sets.
  - Power generators.
  - Earthmoving equipment.
  - Material handling equipment.
- Storage:
  - Installation of military van containers to create storage space.
  - Installation of military van containers to serve as bunkers, portable housing, and work units.
- Electrical (during initial development of combat outposts):
  - Layout of proper wiring and zone power grids.
  - Appropriate incorporation of generators for backup provision.
  - Appropriate employment of contract electricians and construction workers, who can assist greatly in this system's development.
- Plumbing:
  - Prioritization of field sanitation for the health and safety of personnel.
  - Provision from locally drilled wells for the main source of water.
- Fuel stands (mandatory) for storing and distributing bulk fuel assets.




Figure 6-5. Combat outpost layout, example

COUNTERINFILTRATION AND EARLY WARNING

6-90. The key to effective combat outpost defense lies in identifying the threats. Among the most dangerous threats are infiltrators. The best defense against this threat is the population surrounding the combat outpost. As chapter 1 explains, internally displaced people, merchants, and shopkeepers are potential sources of information about insurgent attacks on bases. Soldiers from the combat outpost do well to talk to their neighbors.

PATROL BASES

6-91. A patrol base is a security perimeter set up when a squad or platoon conducting a patrol halts for an extended period. The patrol does not occupy the patrol base longer than 24 hours, except in emergencies. Furthermore, a patrol never uses the same patrol base twice. When a patrol halts for an extended period, it takes active and passive measures to provide maximum security. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on patrol base activities.)

SITUATIONS FOR PATROL BASES

6-92. Leaders planning for a patrol base consider the mission and passive and active security measures. A leader selects a tentative site from a map or aerial reconnaissance. Confirming the site's suitability and securing the site are necessary before the unit moves into it. Plans to establish a patrol base include an alternate patrol base site, which serves when the first site is unsuitable or when the patrol must unexpectedly evacuate the first patrol base. Common situations that require the establishment of a patrol base include those following:

- The cessation of all movement to avoid detection.
- Lengthy, detailed reconnaissance of the objective area during which the unit must hide.
- Food preparation, weapons or equipment maintenance, and rest after extended movement.
- Final plan formulations and order issuances for actions at the objective.
- Reorganization after a patrol has infiltrated the enemy area in small groups.
- The conduct of several consecutive or concurrent operations such as an ambush, raid, reconnaissance, or surveillance patrols.

6-93. Patrol bases often locate in the same population centers to enable, at least on a temporary basis, greater coverage of an assigned AO. The consequent, additional purposes for achieving such coverage follow:

- To deny the insurgency access to the local populace.
- To influence and assist the local government.
- To provide security.
- To help HNSF provide their own, unaided security.

METHODS OF ESTABLISHING PATROL BASES

6-94. Either one of two methods is useful for establishing patrol bases in the current fight. The same priorities of work for combat outposts (see paragraph 6-89) apply to patrol bases as well.

Move in with the Local Population

6-95. The advantages of the first method are that Soldiers have more direct public contact, the locals identify combined forces with the emerging HN government, and the construction is less intensive. The disadvantages are that Soldiers may live in unsanitary conditions, the mass base or auxiliary may inform insurgents about outgoing patrols with relative ease, attacks on the base have collateral damage considerations, and houses are often not suited for defense.

Build a New Patrol Base

6-96. Though more isolated from the population, new patrol bases are usually on chosen ground and, therefore, easier to defend. Additionally, they are far more resource and personnel intensive during construction. It is generally advisable to set aside detailed planning time before sending a combined force to occupy the terrain.

OCCUPATION OF A PATROL BASE

6-97. A patrol base is reconnoitered and occupied in much the same way as an objective rally point and an assembly area. In one exception and when appropriate, the patrol plans to enter at a 90-degree turn. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on the three occupation techniques.) Also, when appropriate, the patrol leader leaves a two-Soldier observation post at the turn, and the patrol covers tracks from the turn to the patrol base.

6-98. The patrol moves into the patrol base (see figure 6-6). Squad-sized patrols generally occupy a cigar-shaped perimeter; platoon-sized patrols generally occupy a triangular perimeter. The patrol leader inspects and adjusts the entire perimeter appropriately.




Figure 6-6. Occupation of a patrol base

6-99. After the patrol leader has checked each squad's portion of the perimeter, each squad leader sends a two-Soldier reconnaissance and surveillance team to the leader at the patrol's CP. The leader issues the three reconnaissance and surveillance teams a contingency plan, reconnaissance method, and detailed guidance on what to seek (for example, enemy, water, built-up areas, roads, trails, rally points).

Note. Squad-sized patrols do not normally send a reconnaissance and surveillance team at night.

SECTION III – DEFENSIVE ENABLING TASKS AND ACTIVITIES

6-100. COIN forces conduct enabling tasks and activities within the defense, including protecting the populace, conducting combined action with HNSF to secure combined positions, and conducting sanctuary denial and disruption operations to enable and complement other COIN LOEs. The design of these tasks and activities at a local level is to augment wider COIN operations and thereby to reduce insurgent influence and access within the community. Section III provides a general overview of the threats to COIN forces during operations. (These threats apply equally to defensive and offensive operations and operations in support of stability operations tasks.) It addresses specific defensive actions and activities (for example, counterambush, counter-IED, counter sniper operations, counters to drive by shootings, information activities) and common protection considerations that, together, increase civil security and control since they reduce violence against HN forces and U.S. Forces and the HN population.

THREATS TO COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

6-101. Ground conditions predicate the framework to help COIN forces develop an overall operational approach and thereby to counter an insurgency. An understanding of the AOs and comprehensive threat forms the basis of the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework. While insurgents use a wide range of conventional tactics, they frequently employ ambushes to harass and disrupt. Snipers or sharpshooters serve as an effective means of engaging COIN and HN forces without becoming decisively engaged. Insurgents use indirect fire such as mortar and rocket attacks to harass counterinsurgents or cause them to commit forces who then face attack from IEDs, ambushes, and sniper operations. Within the environment, weapons and munitions undergo frequent modifications to suit insurgent needs for specific targets or missions. Insurgents use direct fire rockets or missiles in an indirect manner to avoid detection. Moreover, insurgents improvise when they lack weapons. IEDs are effective tools capable of integration into many different attack types. They can be inexpensive to produce and, due to the various detonation techniques available, enable the perpetrator to avoid risk. Also, a very effective employment method for insurgents is suicide bombing. Paragraphs 6-102 through 6-118 focus primarily on the IED threat to COIN forces.

THREAT OVERVIEW

6-102. Insurgent explosive devices are a major threat to COIN forces and operations. Commanders brief personnel on the latest assessed explosive ordnance threat types and usage in their AOs, specifically along movement routes. Explosive threats include unexploded explosive ordnances, to include cluster munitions, and deliberately placed ordnance to include mines, and IEDs. All Soldiers maintain situational awareness and look for explosive threats and potential hiding places in their AOs particularly along movement routes. To reduce risk during movements, units vary routes and times, enter overpasses on one side of the road and exit out the other, train weapons on overpasses as they travel underneath them, and avoid chokepoints. Units remain expectant of encountering explosive threats or IED attacks at any time during operations and of an additional attack or ambush immediately after a detonation. Early mornings and periods of reduced visibility are especially dangerous since they afford the enemy opportunities to emplace explosive devices undetected. (See ATP 3-34.20, ATP 4-32.2, and TM 3-34.82 for information on countering explosive hazards.)

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THREATS

6-103. Commanders and staffs identify explosive threats and develop counter-IED plans, consider pattern analysis of past enemy IED attacks, and request supporting counter-IED augmentation to—

- Maintain route status trackers depicting the IED clearance schedule and activities.
- Enable engineer planning, with EOD support, to clear the routes of IEDs.
- Deconflict support requirements and IED sweeps.
- Coordinate counter-IED and route-clearing movement.
- Develop a counter-IED plan ICW the EW officer.
- Recommend movement formations and movement techniques, including battle drills for reacting to IEDs.
- Identify explosive threats and possible IED employment sites.

CATEGORIES OF SUSPECTED THREATS

6-104. Leaders assess the OE to determine appropriate countermeasures:

- Level 1—large amounts of debris on roads in an area with a recent history of explosive threats or enemy IED attacks; however, no evidence of wires, detonation cord, antennae or IEDs are present.
- Level 2—evidence of suspected IED emplacement such as prepared holes (with no device visible, wires, detonation cord, or antennae visible), removed curb stone, suspicious activity, or absence of activity when normally there would be.
- Level 3—suspicious objects, activity, or conditions on roads:
  - Rucksacks, mailbags, animal carcasses, meal bags, mounds in the road, and rock piles can conceal explosive threats or IEDs.
  - However, no obvious IED indicators such as wires, detonation cord, or antennae are present.
- Level 4—clear, verifiable, and easy-to-identify indications of imminent explosive threats or IED activity such as protruding wires, detonation cord, or antennae, or an individual with a command-wire-detonating device.

6-105. The discovery of Level 2 through 4 conditions should be reported immediately. Level 3 reports should be reported IAW the unit standard operating procedure (SOP) since this situation requires engineer or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to clear the route. Level 4 situations also require EOD response or direct action to clear the route and render safe any explosive hazards.

THREAT RECOGNITION

6-106. Leaders recognize explosive threats or IEDs and possible emplacement locations by the following characteristics:

- Construction methods—mortar shells, artillery projectiles, antitank mines, diesel fuel, rockets, black powder, fertilizer, chemical explosives (in other words, limited only by the enemy's imagination).
- Camouflage (see figure 6-7)—disguised with loose trash or debris, trash bags, animal carcasses, soda or milk cans, buckets, and burlap or meal bags.



Figure 6-7. Improvised explosive device concealment, examples

- Detonation—command-wire-detonated, victim-activated, or timed (for example, car alarms, battery-powered remote doorbell devices, remote-controlled light switches, and cordless and cellular phones).
- Communications—insulated wire or detonation cord to connect detonator to explosive.

- Delivery—dropped from overpasses or attached to their undersides.

Note. Soldiers watch for suspicious activity on overpasses and should never stop under one.

- Hiding places (see figure 6-8):
  - Potholes, abandoned vehicles, and animal carcasses.
  - Secured to telephone poles and guardrails.
  - Emplaced along roadsides, shoulders, and medians.

Note. Enemy hide positions usually have line of sight to the kill zone and an easy escape route.




Figure 6-8. Improvised explosive device locations, examples

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTS

6-107. Suspicious activities and objects that may indicate the presence of an explosive threat or IED include the following:

- An abandoned or disabled vehicle parked on or near the route.
- Animal-drawn carts or wagons moving on or near the route.
- Signs of tampering, exposed wires, or fastened objects on guardrails, including the backside.
- Fresh concrete, asphalt, or other repairs on or around route surfaces.
- Suspicious packages, containers, or other foreign objects on or near the route.
- Markings warning locals of IEDs (for example, a blue X painted on a rock).
- External personnel or vehicles attempting to pass or enter friendly movement formations.

Note. The premovement brief provides the latest IED threats, to include indicators and warnings.

VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

6-108. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), also known as car bombs, are vehicles laden with explosives with electromagnetic command wire, wireless remote control, or timed device detonators. Drivers may or may not be present. Any vehicle from sedans to largo cargo trucks are possible (see figure 6-9). Device functions vary. Example indicators of a VBIED follow:

- Vehicles riding low to the ground, especially when they appear empty:
  - The back ends of those vehicles carrying explosives in the trunk are lower to the ground.
  - Those vehicles with explosives in the side panels remain fairly level.
- Large boxes, satchels, bags, or other containers in plain view such as on, under, or near the front seat of the vehicle.
- Wires or ropelike material running from the front of a vehicle to the rear passenger or trunk area.
- A timer or switch in the front of a vehicle, though the main charge is usually out of sight and often in the rear of the vehicle.
- Unusual or strong chemical odors such as the smell of petroleum.
- Moving vehicles with no drivers.
- Vehicles with drivers behaving suspiciously.

VBIED Capabilities	Vehicle Description	Maximum Explosives Capacity	Lethal Air Blast Range	Minimum Evacuation Distance	Falling Glass Hazard
	Compact Sedan	500 Pounds 227 Kilos (in trunk)	100 Feet 30 Meters	1,500 Feet 457 Meters	1,250 Feet 381 Meters
	Full-size Sedan	1,000 Pounds 454 Kilos (in trunk)	125 Feet 38 Meters	1,750 Feet 533 Meters	1,750 Feet 533 Meters
	Passenger Van or Cargo Van	4,000 Pounds 1,814 Kilos	200 Feet 61 Meters	2,750 Feet 838 Meters	2,750 Feet 838 Meters
	Small Box Van (14-foot Box)	10,000 Pounds 4,536 Kilos	300 Feet 91 Meters	3,750 Feet 1,143 Meters	3,750 Feet 1,143 Meters
	Box Van or Water/Fuel Truck	30,000 Pounds 13,608 Kilos	450 Feet 137 Meters	6,500 Feet 1,981 Meters	6,500 Feet 1,981 Meters
	Semitrailer	60,000 Pounds 27,215 Kilos	600 Feet 183 Meters	7,000 Feet 2,134 Meters	7,000 Feet 2,134 Meters

LEGEND
KILOS KILOGRAMS VBIED VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

Figure 6-9. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device capabilities

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AMBUSH INDICATIONS

6-109. Possible indications of an impending IED ambush include those following:

- Unusual absence of women and children.
- Dramatic changes in population from one block to the next.
- Unusual lack of activity.
- Sudden activity within crowds as the unit approaches.

- Dispersion of civilian personnel as the unit approaches.
- Sudden reduction in or absence of civilian traffic.
- Flares fired or lights turned on as the unit approaches.
- Suspicious movement in upper-level windows or on rooftops.

Note. Small IEDs can be thrown.

REACTION TO A SUSPECTED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

6-110. When a unit encounters a suspected IED, the Soldier identifying the IED reports the sighting using the 3 Ds (distance, direction, description):

- Distance—the distance from the Soldier(s) who initially found the possible IED.
- Direction—the direction in which the possible IED is located from the Soldier(s) who found it.
- Description—the initial description of the possible IED.

Note. Soldiers never move closer to the possible IED to retrieve a better description.

6-111. When a unit encounters an IED or the threat of one, the circumstances inform how the unit reacts. When a unit encounters an IED under enemy direct fire, elements seek the nearest covered position, suppress enemy direct fire, establish security, evacuate casualties, and submit an EOD 9-line report (see table 6-6). The unit exits the area appropriately to move to a more advantageous position for initiating follow-on actions. When a unit encounters an IED and is not under enemy direct fire, elements perform the 5 Cs (check, confirm, clear, cordon, control).

Table 6-6. Explosive ordnance disposal 9-line report

Line	*Description*	*Example*
Line 1	Date-Time Group (DTG): DTG of item discovery	131200ZJAN25
Line 2	Reporting Activity Identification and Location: Unit identification code and location (8-digit grid of explosive ordinance).	2/505 IR, A CO, 2 PLT. BS13221433
Line 3	Contact Information: Radio frequency, call sign, POC, and telephone number, email, or chat.	F400. SHOCKWAVE3, Lieutenant Radcliffe
Line 4	Type of Explosive Ordnance: 1. Method of emplacement: Dropped, projected, placed, possible IED, unknown, or thrown. If possible, provide the total number items. 2. Description: Without touching, disturbing, or approaching the item, include details about size, shape, color, and condition (intact or leaking). 3. Method of discovery.	Possible 155MM, wrapped in wires and tape, 1 visual confirmed, multiple suspected.
Line 5	CBRN contamination: Be as specific as possible. (For example, include visible and physiological effects). If CBRN contamination or hazard is suspected, follow up this report with a CBRN spot report.	No
Line 6	Resources Threatened: Report any units, equipment, facilities, or other threatened assets.	Items located 1 meter off MSR SLEEPY
Line 7	Impact on Mission: Provide a short description of the current tactical situation and how the presence of the explosive ordnance affects that status.	Vehicle traffic restricted/stopped
Line 8	Protective Measures: Describe any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment.	Perimeter established, traffic halted.
Line 9	Recommended Priority: Recommend a priority for response by EOD technicians.	Immediate
Incident Priority	Description	
Immediate	Incidents constituting grave and immediate threats. They stop the unit's maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten vital assets. These incidents are to be given priority over all other incidents. EOD procedures are to be started immediately.	
Indirect	Incidents constituting indirect threats. They slow the unit's maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten important assets. Before beginning EOD procedures, a safe waiting period will normally be observed to reduce the threat to EOD personnel.	
Minor	Incidents constituting a minor threat. They reduce the unit's maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten noncritical assets of value. Typically. EOD personnel will deal with these incidents after immediate and indirect incidents. as the situation permits, and with minimum threat to personnel.	
No threat	Incidents constituting no threat at present. These have little or no effect on the unit's capabilities or assets.	

Legend:
CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
CO—Company
EOD—explosive ordnance disposal
IED—improvised explosive device
IR—Infantry regiment
MM—millimeter
MSR—main supply route
PLT—Platoon
POC—point of contact

Check

6-112. Unit personnel check their immediate areas for secondary and tertiary devices by conducting 5/25/200-meter checks from their positions. When Soldiers suspect an IED while performing the 5/25/200-meter checks, they assume it could detonate at any moment, even though the suspected IED may prove false.

Confirm

6-113. Unit personnel confirm the existence of an IED from a safe distance, using any available standoff means (for example, robot, optics). Once confirmed, the unit calls in an EOD 9-line report (see table 6-6 on page 239).

Clear

6-114. For a suspected IED, the unit evacuates all personnel in the hazard area around the device, working from the device outward. For a confirmed IED, the unit must clear the area. Several factors determine a safe distance, such as the tactical situation and avoiding predictability.

6-115. The unit varies the minimum safe distance (though no closer than 300 meters [985 feet] when exposed) from the IED to avoid establishing predictability since secondary or tertiary IEDs may be present. The unit avoids using any communications or electromagnetic equipment (other than crew devices) in the secured exclusion area.

Cordon

6-116. Unit personnel establish a security cordon around the IED by setting up blocking positions to prevent foot and vehicle traffic from entering the danger area. An effective cordon denies enemy observation of the danger area and the IED's effectiveness. To reduce IED effectiveness and personnel exposure, the leader optimizes the number of Soldiers performing the 25-meter search and the entire check for secondary and tertiary IEDs.

Control

6-117. The unit controls the area inside the cordon to ensure authorized access. Since the distance of all personnel from the IED directly affects their safety, Soldiers control the site to prevent entry until the threat has been neutralized.

6-118. In the event the unit is to continue the mission, elements deemed nonessential for cordoning the area use an alternate route to continue the movement. They conduct movement to an assembly area to consolidate and reorganize for the movement appropriately.

COUNTERAMBUSH

6-119. Ambushes are a basic, common insurgent tactic, so COIN forces continually operate under the expectation of encountering ambushes. COIN forces develop specific, localized procedures to react both to ambushes (see battle drill 07-PLT-D9502) and counterambushes. Typical complex insurgent ambushes involve IEDs, small arms fire, mortars, and sniper fire. The goals for tactical units are to identify and attack or disrupt the ambush force before it can initiate the ambush. Additionally, when a unit identifies the insurgents' kill zone before it is in position, the unit ambushers can attack as they move into position.

DISMOUNTED CONSIDERATIONS

6-120. When the unit is dismounted, Soldiers in the kill zone immediately return fire on known or suspected enemy positions and assault through the kill zone. Soldiers not in the kill zone locate and place well-aimed, suppressive fire on the enemy. The unit assaults through the kill zone and destroys the enemy. The unit leader reports the contact to higher HQ. Specific considerations include those following:

- Avoid massing personnel or vehicles.
- Prepare a reaction plan that includes assaulting the ambushers.
- Ensure only part of the element is in a kill zone at the same time (usually means dispersion).

- Maintain control of your immediate tactical space (within 100 meters [328 feet]).
- Wherever insurgents are likely to establish ambushes, establish counterambushes.
- Emplace sniper teams or other forces to overwatch likely insurgent routes to ambush sites.

MOUNTED CONSIDERATIONS

6-121. When the unit is mounted, the vehicle gunners immediately return fire on known or suspected enemy positions as the unit continues to move out of the kill zone. Soldiers on disabled vehicles in the kill zone dismount, occupy covered positions, and engage the enemy with accurate fire. Vehicle gunners and Soldiers outside the kill zone suppress the enemy. Once the unit achieves a position of relative advantage, it assaults through the kill zone and destroys the enemy. The unit leader reports the contact to higher HQ. To reiterate, mounted units—

- Immediately return fire and assume a covered position as possible.
- Leave any kill zone rapidly.
- From outside the kill zone, use fire and movement to destroy the enemy as possible.
- Scan the immediate area and prepare for additional attacks, especially those from the following:
  - IEDs.
  - The enemy moving to flank.
  - The enemy moving to engage with antitank weapons.
- Follow the directions of the vehicle or convoy commander.
- Report the contact to higher HQ.

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

6-122. IEDs are key components of insurgent ambushes. They are generally the most dangerous and effective weapon system faced by COIN forces.

THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD

6-123. The threat from explosive hazards ranging from simple IEDs and unexploded explosive ordnances, to sophisticated conventional mines, pose a real and significant threat to ground mobility, movement, sustainment, and protection. As the United States faces an era of great power competition within large-scale combat operations (also called LSCO), the threat of the IED takes on a greater dimension, as near peer proxies can combine the resources of a nation with the flexibility of non-state actors to produce devastating effects. Even non-state adversaries that employ IEDs today possess greater technological skill and equipment, superior information regarding U.S. Force strength, vulnerabilities and tactics, and access to greater resources than many states had in previous eras.

TECHNIQUES FOR DEFEATING AN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

6-124. Its wide usage, destructive nature, and adverse impact on military operations make the IED a significant factor in COIN. Leaders at all levels consider counter-IED measures. At a tactical level, a unit has three major techniques for defeating IEDs: attack the network; defeat the device; and train the force.

Attack the Network

6-125. This method is useful for defeating the complex network of IED makers, financiers, emplacers, and suppliers before the IED's emplacement. Actions and activities taken against IED support networks interrupt the enemy's IED activities by identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities and enabling COIN operations. Intelligence, reconnaissance, counter-IED targeting, device related technical and forensic exploitation, the disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance, surveillance, including persistent surveillance, and information activities are key to this effort. Search operations and operations to kill or capture network members complete the final, critical step in the process.

6-126. Tactical units use several analytical tools to detect IED network members and to synchronize all the information gained through various sources. These tools are part of the targeting process (see chapter 4, section IV). Correctly synchronizing information collection at all levels focuses combat power on attacking the IED network. Three major tools are imagery and geospatial intelligence analysis, pattern analysis, and link analysis.

Imagery and Geospatial Intelligence Analysis

6-127. The analysis of an AO in which IEDs are being employed is incomplete without the use of imagery and geospatial intelligence. Both aerial and satellite sources produce the imagery. In many cases, tasked aerial reconnaissance platforms, including unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms, respond directly to the commander, thus ensuring timely and focused data collection.

Pattern Analysis

6-128. Units use pattern analysis to discover patterns from selected events or actions over time in a defined location or area. When they conclude an action or event is likely to reoccur in the same location, they predict hazards. Two common methods are coordinates registers and pattern analysis plot sheets (see paragraphs 6-129 and 6-130). For IEDs, commanders and staffs use pattern analysis to determine the—

- Types of IEDs.
- Locations where IED incidents have occurred, including information on the following:
  - IED site characteristics.
  - IED sizes.
  - Distances from roads, structures, natural objects, or other artificial objects.
  - Type of terrain the threat prefers.
  - Other obstacles used in conjunction with IEDs.
  - Routes to and from the IED sites (for example, worn paths).
- Distance from the IED site to the possible cache.
- Munition types and number, or count, of employed varieties.
- IED use or lack of explosively formed penetrators.
- IED use or lack of shape charges.
- Other IED main components such as those following:
  - Main charge (explosive).
  - Casing (materials around the explosives).
  - Initiators.
- Initiation methods such as those following:
  - Command-wired.
  - Remote-controlled.
  - Victim-activated.
  - Timed.

6-129. The coordinates register, also known as an incident map, records cumulative events that have occurred in a specific area and addresses the question of where (not when) an event is likely to occur. (See figure 6-10 for an example coordinates register.)




Figure 6-10. Coordinates register, example

6-130. A pattern analysis plot sheet plots the time and date of each serious incident that occurs in the AO. (See figure 6-11 on page 244 for an example pattern analysis plot sheet.) The rings show the days of the month; the segments show the hours of the day. As described in the legend, the chart records the actual events; identifying each with an alphanumeric designation that directly corresponds to the coordinates register's legend. The legend icons change to show other types of incidents such as those involving VBIEDs and command-wired or remote-controlled IEDs.

Note. A daily entry number is listed on a calendar. In a journal, each incident is cross-referenced to the incident overlay.




Figure 6-11. Pattern analysis plot sheet, example

Link Analysis

6-131. Link analysis reveals contacts, associations, and relationships between persons, events, activities, and organizations. The two most effective types of link analysis tools are the activities and association matrixes and the link diagram.

6-132. With the activities and association matrixes, the analyst pinpoints the optimal targets for further information collection, identifies key personalities within an organization, and deepens understanding of an organization and its structure. (See figure 6-12 for an example activities matrix and figure 6-13 on page 246 for an example association matrix.) The activities matrix is useful in the determination of the connectivity between individuals and any organization, event, address, activity, or other nonpersonal entity. The association matrix is useful in the determination of the nature of relationships between individuals.




Figure 6-12. Activities matrix, example




Figure 6-13. Association matrix, example

6-133. Often, the link diagram is most effective at showing connections between people, groups, or activities. (See figure 6-14 for an example link diagram.) The analyst can easily determine from the diagram that A knows B; B knows C and D; B is suspected of knowing E; and C knows D, B, and E. Although a matrix could display the same information, analysts often understand the information more easily with a diagram. As situations or investigations increase in complexity, the link analysis diagram makes analysis easier. In almost all cases, both matrixes initially depict available information. They then inform the development of the link analysis diagram for deeper analysis.




Figure 6-14. Link diagram, example

Defeat the Device

6-134. In support of commanders' freedom of maneuver for safe operations, those actions taken to defeat the device discover IEDs and their related activities and thereby reduce the effects of IED detonation at the point of attack. These actions include rapid identification, development, acquisition, and delivery of capabilities for route clearance, device neutralization, explosive detection, military EOD, and vehicle and personnel protection. Additional considerations address new technologies, including EW capabilities. Two instances where defeating the device occurs most often are dismounted patrols and route clearance.

Dismounted Patrols in Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

6-135. Dismounted patrols are especially useful in countering IEDs. The employment of dedicated counter-IED patrols, especially along main supply routes, is an effective technique to reduce the threat of IEDs along those routes. Another technique to counter IEDs is to eliminate the popular support for or acquiescence to the IED cell through regular engagements. When that is not possible, dismounted patrols identify and neutralize the kill zones.

6-136. Military working dogs with explosive detector capabilities are versatile resources because of their unique ability to seamlessly transition between patrol and explosive detection. This specialized ability to detect explosives makes the patrol explosive detector dog and patrol explosive detector dog-enhanced valuable assets that provide commanders and other government agencies operational flexibility, a less-than-lethal course of action (COA), and an explosive detection capability. (See ATP 3-39.34.)

Route Clearance

6-137. Route clearance teams thwart ambushes, clear natural and artificial obstacles, and detect IEDs. They comprise engineers, EOD personnel, mechanical devices, and specialized robotics to increase standoff from the IED threat. The purpose of route clearance is to eliminate concealment for IEDs and munitions caches and to conduct systematic detection and deterrence sweeps along the cleared routes.

6-138. Route clearance missions entail two phases: right-of-way clearance and route maintenance and sweep operations. Right-of-way clearance is the removal of rubble, debris, berms, holes, trenches, vegetation, and trash from the medians and shoulders of routes. It can be conducted with special equipment such as an up-armored bulldozer. Clearing the right-of-way in this manner serves multiple purposes: IED detection devices become more effective; IED emplacement becomes more difficult; and COIN forces can more easily identify IEDs should the enemy emplace them again. Another technique is to engage local national labor, which employs the civilian population. Units then conduct deliberate route reconnaissance, identify and record the location of artificial objects (for example, buried pipes and cables), and investigate suspicious areas. Route maintenance and sweep operations conduct systematic, random detection sweeps of the cleared areas and progress to detection and deterrence sweeps along the cleared route. A visual detection sweep focuses on changed conditions. (See ATP 3-90.4 and ATP 4-32 for information on route clearance.)

Train the Force

6-139. Comprehensive training of friendly forces provides situational awareness that protects the force and is a mitigating factor to the effects of enemy IED employment. Examples of such training are multiechelon and multicomponent training, training on new equipment, information management and dissemination, strategic communications, implementing changes to doctrinal and institutional training, and unit mission rehearsals at Service combat training centers. All Soldiers require training in basic techniques and actions while mounted and dismounted.

Individual Techniques

6-140. Counter-IED operations at the Soldier level follow several principles. (See GTA 90-01-001 for information on IEDs.) Units need to know and control their AO and identify unusual objects and activities. Insurgents adapt their techniques based on counterinsurgent unit actions. Friendly counter-IED principles are the following:

- Maintain an offensive mindset.
- Develop and maintain situational awareness.
- Stay observant.
- Avoid patterns.
- Maintain 360-degree security.
- Maintain tactical dispersion.
- Use blast and fragmentation protection.
- Use technology such as EW capabilities or thermals.
- Look for the individual detonating the device or people who look out of place.

Mounted Actions

6-141. Mounted action includes actions both before and after encountering an IED. The two actions, themselves, involve precautionary actions while mounted and reaction to IEDs while mounted.

6-142. For precautionary actions while mounted, units require training to recognize locations and indicators of a possible IED emplacement. For mounted operations, alert all crewmembers of a suspected IED and its location. Never stop a vehicle within 50 meters (164 feet) of a suspected IED. The driver either speeds up or

backs away quickly to exit the danger area. The minimum open area safe distance is 300 meters (984 feet). Watch for approaching VBIEDs. All personnel remain alert for and aware of any vehicles approaching or parked along the route. Address threats with a direction, a short description, and an estimated distance (for example, RIGHT FRONT, MERGING TRUCK, 200 METERS). With limited time, only the direction is necessary (for example, RIGHT FRONT). Keep vehicle commands to the driver short, giving only a direction and a desired action (for example, TURN RIGHT, SPEED UP, SLOW DOWN, STOP). Gunners respond by scanning (with weapons ready) the sector indicated in the threat alert.

6-143. For reaction to an IED while mounted, the available information on the IED threat determines many of the unit's actions. Specific procedures are useful when reacting to an IED while mounted. Battle drills are essential. Immediately establish security and scan for secondary IEDs. Scan the area and remain ready for follow-on attacks, especially any additional IEDs or the enemy moving to engage with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, or antitank weapons fires. When necessary, use obscurants. Look for the individual detonating the device, people who look out of place, or for anyone trying to escape the area. Conduct 5- and 25-meter vehicle perimeter checks. Report the IED to higher HQ. If the IED was found before its detonation, use the EOD 9-line report (see table 6-6 on page 239) for the IED or any unexploded explosive ordnance. Follow the directions of the vehicle or convoy commander.

Dismounted Actions

6-144. Soldiers maintain awareness of the threat presented by IEDs in their units' AOs. Dismounted actions include actions before encountering an IED, actions after encountering an IED, and reactions to a suspected person-borne IED.

6-145. For precautionary actions while dismounted, anticipate the presence of IEDs to isolate and bypass areas of potential emplacements. Otherwise, employ countermeasures such as avoiding convenient/accessible and covered halts along routes with histories of mines or other explosive devices. For dismounted operations, alert patrol members of a suspected IED and its location. Never stop within 50 meters (164 feet) of a suspected IED. Move out of the danger area. The minimum safe distance in an open area is 300 meters (984 feet). Watch for approaching VBIEDs and person borne IEDs. All personnel remain alert for vehicles approaching or parked along the route. Warn others about threats with a direction, a short description, and an estimated distance (for example, RIGHT FRONT, ONCOMING TRUCK, 200 METERS). With limited time, only the direction is necessary (for example, RIGHT FRONT). All Soldiers respond by scanning (with weapons ready) the sector indicated in the threat alert.

6-146. For reaction to an IED while dismounted, units should always expect enemy explosive threats or IED attacks during movement. They also expect an ambush immediately after an IED detonation. Specific procedures are useful when reacting to an IED while dismounted. Battle drills are essential. Establish security and scan for secondary IEDs (5-meter and 25-meter sweeps). Report the IED to higher HQ. If the IED has not been detonated, use an EOD 9-line report (see table 6-6 on page 239). Maintain security in case of an ambush. Follow the directions of the team or squad leader.

6-147. Reaction to a suspected person-borne IED is important because suicide bombing is an effective technique. The following procedures are useful for reacting:

- Alert the unit of the suspect and evacuate the area if possible.
- In a loud and firm voice, issue a verbal command to the suspect to stop.
- Keep weapons trained on the suspect.

Note. After these actions, a high probability exists that the suicide bomber will attempt to detonate the explosive device. Use deadly force IAW the theater rules of engagement (ROE). Physically restraining the suspect from detonating the device requires coordination with other Soldiers and is inherently very dangerous.

- Direct the suspect to make a show of hands with palms up:
  - The suspect must spread apart palms and fingers, so Soldiers can verify whether the suspect is palming a detonator.
  - Be advised that there may be a remote detonator.

- Direct the suspect to ground all carried items and step two paces away from the items.
- Direct the suspect to remove outer clothing and place the garments on the ground.
- Direct the suspect to raise or remove any undershirt and to turn a complete circle with the undershirt raised or removed.
- Direct the suspect to lie face down, with arms outstretched and palms up, and face turned away from Soldiers:
  - Do not approach, even when the suspect is injured.
  - Maintain cover and wait for the arrival of EOD personnel.
- Report the suicide bomber to higher HQ with the EOD 9-line report (see table 6-6 on page 239).
- When the suspect is noncompliant, use deadly force IAW the theater ROE.
- Evacuate the area around the suspect (to a minimum of 300 meters [984 feet] to any cover available, depending on the variables of METT-TC [I], which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations).
- Establish security and scan for secondary IEDs.
- Maintain security in case of possible ambush.
- Follow the directions of the vehicle or squad leader.

COUNTER-SNIPER OPERATIONS

6-148. The first step in countering snipers is for commanders, leaders, and Soldiers at all levels to become aware of the sniper threat. During the early stages of planning, all COIN operations integrate plans to counter the sniper threat and protect friendly forces from insurgent snipers. Enemy snipers in a COIN environment vary from well-trained sniper teams to individuals taking shots of opportunity. The U.S. COIN force remains prepared for both. (See ATP 3-21.20 and TC 3-22.10 for information on sniper operations.)

6-149. Insurgents employ three types of snipers (see table 6-7). Identifying the type in the battlespace aids a commander in deciding what countermeasure to use.

Table 6-7. Three types of snipers in an insurgency

LEVEL I ***Specially Trained Sniper***	The most dangerous sniper is the soldier who has been specially selected, trained, and equipped with an accurate sniper rifle that is, in turn, equipped with a modern scope, night-vision device, and thermal imager.
LEVEL II ***Trained Marksman/Markswoman***	This type of sniper is a trained soldier who is equipped with a standard issue weapon and who is an above average shot.
LEVEL III ***Armed Irregular***	Such a soldier may have little or no formal military training but has urban combat experience or hunting skills.

OVERVIEW OF COUNTER-SNIPER OPERATIONS

6-150. Counter-sniper operations have the same effect in IW as they do in conventional warfare, but the purpose is different. For example, in conventional warfare, a sniper targets leaders to cause confusion in the battlespace and disrupt operations. In an insurgency, a sniper still targets leaders, but more for use in propaganda after a successful attack. Additionally, the insurgent sniper can influence public opinion toward believing the area is not secure and the HN government is powerless to stop insurgent sniper attacks. (See paragraphs 5-194 through 5-218 for information on sniper operations.)

6-151. Commanders avoid using sniper teams when other units are adequate. They do not overcommit sniper teams but rather employ them where they require their specialized skills.

6-152. As the enemy may specifically target snipers, commanders carefully protect their anonymity. Ideally, snipers are held in a central location and employed only as required. Snipers may deploy to hidden observation posts appropriately.

6-153. The sniper team maintains knowledge of its responsibilities and the proper authority for its use of deadly force. The ROE spell out these responsibilities and provide the sniper team with the command authority to carry out the responsibilities. The sniper team understands how to determine when its fires constitute reasonable force.

6-154. Ideally, a sniper team deploys to a location from which it can receive the order to fire from the appropriate commander. This is often difficult during COIN operations. Therefore, all orders, including targets and ROE, are made clear to the sniper team before it deploys. The sniper team rehearses its actions during all possible scenarios. Based on the current ROE and as authorized by the commander, sniper teams may receive the following assignments:

- Engage dissidents involved in hijacking, kidnapping, and holding hostages.
- Engage dissident snipers as opportunity targets or as part of a deliberate clearance operation.
- Covertly occupy concealed positions to observe selected areas.
- Record and report all suspicious activity in the area of observation.
- Assist in the coordination of activities by other elements from hidden observation positions.
- Protect other elements, including auxiliaries such as firefighters and repair crews.

COMPLIANCE WITH SNIPER COUNTERMEASURES

6-155. Since the sniper has the initiative, leaders enforce compliance with sniper countermeasures. Implementing countermeasures halfheartedly invites casualties from snipers who can wait hours for the moment when a unit's guard is down. U.S. Forces have two categories of sniper countermeasures: active countermeasures and passive countermeasures. Each has its place, depending on the METT-TC (I) variables.

Active Countermeasures

6-156. Active countermeasures detect or destroy an insurgent sniper before the sniper fires, or they engage and neutralize an insurgent sniper after the sniper fires. Paragraphs 6-157 through 6-161 review some active countermeasures.

Observation Posts and Observers

6-157. Observation posts have access to powerful spotting telescopes, medium-power binoculars, night observation devices (thermal if possible), and remote-controlled, closed-circuit cameras. Additionally, laser countermeasures are employed, such as laser protective glasses, binoculars with laser filters, and indirect view optics to protect observers. Many electronic detection devices such as acoustic devices are available for detecting snipers. Once detected, snipers can then be neutralized or forced to withdraw. Observers maintain constant surveillance over potential sniper positions and detect snipers as they attempt to move into firing positions. Constantly scanning an area for the minute movements of a well-trained sniper is exhausting. Therefore, personnel on static observation post duty rotate frequently. An observation post plan integrates crewed aircraft and UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platforms to add depth.

Countermeasure Patrols

6-158. Continuous reconnaissance and security patrols around a unit's position hinder insurgent snipers from getting into firing positions undetected. Small-unit patrols are usually more effective than large ones. A moving insurgent sniper whom a patrol has discovered is at a great disadvantage since such a sniper lacks the firepower to fight a long engagement. Small night reconnaissance patrols with night-vision devices can be very effective in disrupting and interdicting a sniper. Reconnaissance patrols move by covered and concealed routes to good observation points, stop and observe, and then move to another position. Patrols vary their routes and times, and a reaction force or supporting weapons maintain readiness in case the patrol makes contact. A variation of the ambush patrol is the stay-behind ambush. A small ambush element moves as part of a larger patrol and occupies its position without being observed. It then observes its kill zone—which can be very large when the element has a sniper team with it—and engages enemy snipers as they attempt to move into position. Small kill teams (SKTs), small capture teams (SCTs), or small observation teams (SOTs) conduct ambushes of likely sniper positions and sniper infiltration and exfiltration routes.

United States Army Sniper Squads and Teams

6-159. U.S. Army sniper teams can be a very effective counter to enemy snipers. Not only do they have expert knowledge of sniping and likely enemy hiding places, but they also normally engage enemy snipers, marksmen, and markswomen at a greater range than the one at which the enemy sniper engages U.S. Forces.

Their precision fires are also much less likely to cause civilian casualties than those from nonprecision weapons.

Suppressive Fire While Maneuvering

6-160. Before a unit encounters an enemy sniper, the unit has not only developed an understanding of the ROE but has also wargamed the ROE to ensure the authorized level of response is sufficient. Although the ROE and the tactical situation determine the response, authorization ideally includes the ability to respond with fires from all the unit's light weapons. When a unit can determine the general location of a sniper, it returns suppressive fire while maneuvering to engage the sniper from close range. This maneuver is not always successful because a well-trained sniper often has chosen a route of withdrawal already. Fires without maneuver are not successful in defeating snipers.

Obscurants

6-161. Projected obscurants (handheld or from an M320 grenade launcher) that build quickly are a good response to enemy sniper engagement for protecting a unit from further casualties. Effective placement of obscurants by the unit leader greatly limits the insurgent sniper's ability to acquire targets. The closer the obscurant is placed to the sniper's location, the more effective it is. When the sniper's location is unknown or cannot be reached by projected obscurants, an obscurant cloud established near the unit can be effective in reducing the sniper's chances of hitting a target and allowing a unit to conduct casualty care under fire. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on tactical combat casualty care.)

Passive Countermeasures

6-162. Passive countermeasures prevent an insurgent sniper from acquiring a clear target and sniper fires from causing casualties. Passive counter-sniper measures are rarely successful by themselves. If passive countermeasures are the only ones enacted, they might create a siege mentality and pass the initiative to the insurgent sniper. Paragraphs 6-161 through 6-165 review some passive countermeasures.

Limiting Sniper Exposure

6-163. Soldiers who limit their sniper exposure can marginalize insurgent sniper operations. Some examples include using covered and concealed routes, avoiding lighted areas at night, moving tactically while using traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch, and staying away from doors and windows.

Wearing Personal Protective Equipment

6-164. Personal protective equipment measures include the wearing of the body armor systems (including the helmet) and protective eyewear. Soldiers wear these whenever they are at risk of exposure to sniper fire. Doing so decreases an insurgent sniper's casualty-producing target area and consequently the sniper's effectiveness. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information on personal protective equipment postures.)

Moving in Armored Vehicles

6-165. Depending on the METT-TC (I) variables, Soldiers move around in the urban area in an armor-protected vehicle with as little exposure as possible. They avoid open-sided cargo vehicles. They requisition or improvise vehicular armor against small arms fire for all unarmored vehicles. This technique limits a unit's ability for public interaction, so Soldiers employ it only when necessary.

Erecting Screens and Shields

6-166. Simple canvas or plastic screens make crossing a dangerous alleyway or street safer for foot traffic. Adapting screens on windows allows for outward visibility while hiding inside personnel. Moveable concrete barriers protect personnel at static positions. Common items such as sandbags or rubble-filled 55-gallon drums provide cover.

Denying Enemy Use of Overwatching Terrain

6-167. Units occupy overwatching terrain with friendly forces, or they modify it to render it less useful to an enemy sniper. Example modifications include removing likely hiding places, clearing bushes and rubble, boarding or bricking up windows, and piling earth and rubble in front of buildings to block lines of sight for snipers. However, units ensure all actions are IAW the laws of war.

COUNTER-SNIPER OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES

6-168. Counter-sniper operations work in conjunction with and complement techniques to eliminate insurgent snipers. During COIN operations, sniper elements are effective primarily because they can deliver selective, precision fires against specific targets IAW the ROE. Due to their skills in observation and their familiarity with their AOs, snipers play a vital role in providing information. Support to COIN-focused operations places an additional strain on the sniper to kill, without the motivational stimulus normally associated with the battlespace. During support to COIN-focused operations tasks, the sniper's ROE may differ from those of the supported counterinsurgent unit.

6-169. Sniper elements supporting COIN operations thoroughly plan any counter-sniper operation. During counter-sniper operations, snipers perform the following steps:

- Determine the threat.
- Gather information.
- Determine patterns.
- Determine the best location and time to engage the enemy.
- Engage the enemy.

6-170. The sniper employment officer (SEO) (see paragraph 5-198) is generally a position within the battalion operations section, and sniper element leader can perform the duties of the SEO. Both these positions receive notification of any report regarding the following:

- Sightings of insurgent members wearing special camouflage uniforms.
- Sightings of insurgent members carrying weapons with long barrels, mounted scopes, or bolt-action receivers or carrying weapon cases or drag bags.
- Key personnel casualties such as commanders, senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), or weapons crewmembers and a simultaneous reduction in enemy patrol activities.
- Reports of reflections off optical lenses.
- Intelligence or reconnaissance units detect small groups of insurgents (one to three personnel).
- Findings of single, spent cartridges in calibers known for use by insurgent snipers.

6-171. When an insurgent sniper is operating in the unit area, the sniper force or any other force uses countermeasures to protect the unit against sniper fire. These countermeasures fall under two categories:

- Unit-level, counter-sniper, active measures:
  - Gather information.
  - Make a plan.
  - Observe likely locations.
  - Locate insurgency forces through observation since stalking and tracking expose the team to higher risk.
  - Kill the insurgent sniper.
- Unit-level, counter-sniper, passive measures:
  - Avoid routines such as consistent mealtimes, ammunition resupply times, assembly area procedures, patrol routes, routes to the objective rally point, or any other day-to-day activities.
  - Gather, meet, and brief under cover or in limited visibility.
  - Cover or conceal equipment such as maps, radios, and antennas.
  - Remove rank and do not salute.
  - (Leaders) Avoid behaving authoritatively.
  - Increase the unit's observation capabilities through such means as observation posts.
  - Inform patrols to look for signs of the presence of a sniper, such as single, spent cartridges and camouflage materials other than those the unit uses.
  - Do not dismiss the potential for a woman to be the sniper.

6-172. Counter-sniper Soldiers apply field craft, camouflage, and movement techniques to infiltrate (or exfiltrate) concealed positions that increase the probability of delivering accurate fires onto a target. Their ability to engage point targets with accuracy, at long range, and with minimal risk of collateral damage makes them useful in the range of military operations. Counter-sniper Soldiers' reconnaissance and surveillance training, long-range optics, and communication skills make them a valuable resource for information collection activities. Counter-sniper actions have two main parts: find the sniper and eliminate the sniper.

Find the Insurgent Sniper

6-173. Once a COIN unit determines it has an insurgent sniper or sniper team in its AO, the unit implements counter-sniper, immediate action drills. Allowing the enemy sniper to fight another day is mission failure. First, the unit must find the sniper or sniper team. Techniques for detecting a sniper include identifying likely sniper locations, focusing observation on sniper movement, and seeking audible or visible signs. Backtracking, which integrates the following techniques in paragraphs 6-174 through 6-177, is useful for finding snipers.

6-174. Identify likely insurgent sniper locations. An insurgent sniper is a line-of-sight asset. The larger the sniper's kill zone, the closer or the higher the sniper position must be to cover it. Smaller sniper kill zones create a narrow, if not linear, line of sight. In such cases, the sniper always chooses a position that offers a line of sight (for example, a road or alley, inside a building, at an opening such as a window or doorway).

6-175. Focus observation on sniper movement. Insurgent snipers typically plan infiltration and exfiltration routes. After identifying possible sniper locations, a unit commander focuses observation on these routes and denies a sniper the ability to reposition. Snipers operate slowly and with calculated movements to avoid detection. Detection of a sniper's movement may not be easy. Units look for movement that does not fit into the environment.

6-176. Seek audible or visible signs. Audible or visible indicators help locate insurgent snipers by sniper fires. Firing a weapon is a sniper's greatest moment of risk; it offers the best opportunity to locate a sniper or sniper team. The acoustic, light, and heat signatures associated with the projection of a bullet from a sniper's rifle are the greatest vulnerabilities. Infrared sensors can detect a muzzle's flash out to 1 kilometer (0.6 miles). Acoustic sensors can detect a muzzle's blast from several hundred meters to farther than 1 kilometer. Often, the muzzle flash and blast throw dust into the air. The bullet's shock wave is a miniature sonic boom. This noise, caused by the bullet travelling at supersonic speed, is audible farther than 1 kilometer (0.6 miles) away.

6-177. Backtrack sounds, sights, and angles. In a city, the backtracking process is complicated by buildings' obstructing the view of the insurgent sniper's position. Backtracking is challenging, but it is how Soldiers relate shot angles, kill zones, movement, and audible and visible signs to the sniper's location. Experience and training make a major contribution to accurate backtracking.

Eliminate the Insurgent Sniper

6-178. Once spotted, the insurgent sniper must be killed or forced to surrender. To succeed in doing so, the unit must rapidly find, fix, and finish (destroy) or capture the active insurgent sniper. Paragraphs 6-179 through 6-182 provide useful techniques for eliminating insurgent snipers.

Avoid the Kill Zone

6-179. Soldiers figure out the insurgents' kill zone and stay out of it. A unit may also want to eliminate or at least reduce the insurgents' available targets. When a unit removes insurgent targets, it curtails insurgency mission success; the insurgent sniper will need to move or at least adjust position to remain effective.

Move Rapidly

6-180. When contact is made, on-scene commanders rapidly calculate the dispositions of their own forces, the quick reaction forces, and adjacent friendly forces and the factors in time and space considerations to determine how to neutralize threats. Because of the fleeting nature of snipers, it is often preferable for on-scene commanders to begin to maneuver against hostile snipers with unengaged portions of their own forces rather than wait for quick reaction forces.

Consider Sniper Hunting with Another Sniper

6-181. Throughout history, many units, engaged in urban combat, have employed direct and indirect supporting arms, close air support, or large numbers of ground forces to counter urban snipers. However, the Russian and German forces of World War II found the best solution to a sniper threat to be the employment of their own snipers in a counter-sniper role. Advantages to using a trained sniper to counter enemy snipers include those following:

- A sniper team has relative ease of movement over the urban battlespace compared to that of a larger ground formation.
- Counter-snipers know the habitual methods of their enemy counterparts.
- The ability to deliver precision fire results in a reduction in civilian and friendly casualties and collateral damage.

Confirm the Enemy Sniper is Neutralized

6-182. In this context, neutralization means the killing or capture of the sniper. A captured enemy sniper can be a valuable source of information.

COUNTERING DRIVE BY SHOOTINGS

6-183. A drive by shooting is the firing of small arms by vehicle occupants as the vehicle passes an area, followed by the vehicle's immediate departure of the area. It is an effective technique for an insurgency because it allows rapid infiltration and exfiltration, requires little logistic support, has a chance of success, and has little chance of resulting in a decisive engagement. Any structure or location near a roadway is a target for a drive by shooting. Usual targets for drive by shootings are vulnerable, easily escapable locations. Attackers avoid well-defended locations.

6-184. Establishing static checkpoints or closing roads near an area of heightened threat often prevents further drive by attacks along a specific avenue of approach. However, the insurgents are not eliminated, and they then seek new or different ways to attack. Timely and accurate reporting by subordinate units can allow higher HQ to integrate Army aviation (manned and unmanned) and/or organic or tasked echelon-specific UAS (to include firing) platforms to track vehicles after a drive by attack. Aerial surveillance enables COIN forces to target insurgents.

6-185. One technique is to conduct mobile checkpoints. These can disrupt the ability of insurgents to transport weapons in vehicles. Random snap checkpoints may encourage drive by shooters to seek elsewhere for targets.

INFORMATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN DEFENSIVE TASKS

6-186. Information activities are deliberately integrated into defensive tasks to complement and reinforce the success of overall operations. The successful exploitation of violent insurgent tactics, harsh insurgent behavior toward the HN population, and failures of the insurgents to achieve their goals requires precise timing and coordination. Some units choose to prepare an information engagement plan and, thus, their readiness to provide an immediate response to insurgent attacks or propaganda. For example, they may plan to send a field grade officer to an insurgent attack site to talk to local media and thereby to disseminate the correct story. Such efforts may go far, along with reward or anonymity, toward influencing the populace to provide information that may break apart the insurgency's networks. Information supplied specifically by the populace is critical in countering ambushes, IEDs, snipers, and drive by shootings by interrupting the insurgency's decision-making cycle. (See paragraphs 4-48 through 4-65 for details on conducting information activities.)

ADDITIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

6-187. Protection considerations are the same in concept between conventional operations and IW, specifically COIN operations. However, one aspect of a greater degree for COIN forces is their responsibility for protecting local civilians in their AOs. By securing the populace, COIN forces increase their effectiveness in all LOEs and gain allies who will provide information and cooperation from within specific LOEs.

Information sharing serves to increase the security of those tactical units conducting COIN operations, as well as the local populace. Paragraphs 6-188 through 6-198 address protection considerations.

ANTITERRORISM MEASURES

6-188. One means for disrupting insurgent attack plans is to implement antiterrorism measures. These consistently change the look of a security posture to defeat surveillance attempts and introduce uncertainty to a site's overall security plan, thereby making it difficult for the insurgency to predict friendly actions accurately. Examples of antiterrorism measures follow:

- Moving prefabricated barriers, vehicular barriers, Class IV (construction materials) supplies, or objects in other supply classes to route traffic around base.
- Starting random security patrols in the surrounding blocks.
- Installing floodlights that operate at random times.
- Changing guard shifts at random times.
- Changing access times for entry points.
- Changing access procedures at random.
- Changing methods for searching personnel on a random basis.
- Observing surrounding areas with crewed aircraft and UAS organic or tasked echelon specific platforms at random times.

SURVIVABILITY

6-189. Defensive operations typically demand the most effort and resources for survivability. Activities in the defense include constructing survivability positions for CP, artillery, air and missile defense, and critical equipment and supplies. Soldiers prepare individual and crew-served fighting positions and combat vehicle fighting positions. Survivability efforts must consider conventional threats (direct and indirect fires) and unconventional threats (suicide bombings, VBIEDs, CBRN hazards). The relative amount of survivability effort placed against these threats depends on the threat analysis and the available resources. Paragraphs 6-190 through 6-192 address additional survivability considerations.

Vehicle and Personnel Armor Protection

6-190. Vehicle and personnel armor protection saves lives and makes it more difficult for an insurgency to conduct a lethal attack. However, the added weight causes vehicles, especially the engine, to wear out much more quickly than normal. Individual body armor increases Soldier load and degrades maneuverability and endurance. Additional protection measures to make insurgent attacks more difficult include those following:

- Hardening static sites to increase protection and to defeat or negate the effects of an attack.
- Using natural or artificial materials to protect personnel, equipment, or facilities, such as those following:
  - Concrete or expedient barriers.
  - Sandbags, walls, shields, berms, or other types of physical protection.
- Protecting resources from blast, direct and indirect fire, heat, radiation, or EAs.

Combat Identification

6-191. Combat identification is the process of attaining accurate and sufficient enough characterizations of detected objects in the OE to support an engagement decision. Rapid categorization of these objects as friendly, enemy, or neutral addresses their equal potential as targets. Combat identification ensures enemy forces can be destroyed, friendly entities can be identified and prevented from becoming fratricide victims, and neutral entities can be identified to prevent collateral damage. (See paragraph 5-126 for information on combat identification.) Common combat identification techniques include the use of the following:

- Glint tape.
- Infrared lights and strobes.
- Heat sources.
- VS-17 signal panels.
- Flares.
- Arm bands.

Insurgent Targeting

6-192. Individual and small groups of Soldiers, leaders, and civilians are targets for insurgents. This type of targeting is not only for lethal operations such as attacks against an individual but also for nonlethal operations such as kidnapping, subversion, or character attacks. Established individual protection measures remain the first line of defense. Basic site protection operations are a key building block to secure the populace.

CRITICAL SITE SECURITY (STATIC POSTS OR BASES)

6-193. Each static post or base requires a full-time detachment at the location of the vital asset. The size of the vital asset, the threat, and the distance to the nearest available reserve or response force determines the size of the detachment. Employing surveillance devices and intruder alarms satisfies the mandatory consideration for conserving labor.

OBSERVATION POSTS

6-194. An *observation post* is a position from which observations are made or fires are directed and adjusted (FM 3-90). Although an observation post has too little combat power to secure a vital asset, it can immediately notify the asset or call for support. Also, leaders can incorporate Javelin command launch units and small UASs as surveillance tools (day or night), depending on the METT-TC (I) variables. (See ATP 3-21.8 for information.)

VEHICLE PATROLS

6-195. Vehicle patrols are useful for providing periodic coverage to many low-categorized vital assets. Timings for patrols vary to prevent the likelihood of ambush and to retain the element of surprise. Patrols are strong enough to deal with anticipated threats, and they are supported by a local reserve. (See ATP 3-21.10 for information.)

DISMOUNTED PATROLS

6-196. Dismounted patrols provide periodic coverage to low-categorized vital assets. Foot patrols are particularly valuable at vital points of congested movement, difficult observation, and easily afforded concealment to insurgency forces, such as those in busy city blocks. (See paragraphs 5-219 through 5-259 for information on patrols and patrolling.)

SECURITY DURATIONS

6-197. Clearly articulating the durations of security operations allows security elements to establish associated time requirements that drive security operations planning. Examples are the method for establishing observation posts (either mounted or dismounted); battle positions; the length of crewed aircraft or UAS organic or tasked echelon-specific platform rotations, supplementary support to mounted or dismounted patrols, or service over extended distances; and the necessary logistic and communications support to execute the mission.

6-198. Security durations are either short (shorter than 12 hours) or long (longer than 12 hours). Duration can also apply to depth, especially in an observation post, since proper deployment into an area to achieve the requisite coverage in the security objective area takes time. Commanders and subordinate leaders consider tasks, commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), the latest time information is of value, tactical risk, movement techniques, reconnaissance methods, and formations when articulating the security duration.

Note: Observation posts, vehicle patrols, dismounted patrols, and security durations enable local security.

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Chapter 7

Stability Considerations in Counterinsurgency

The requirement for military formations to conduct stability-focused operations is not new. Section I covers the doctrinal foundation, stability environment, and Army's six stability operations tasks for operations focused on the stability element of combined arms operations. Sections II and III focus on the challenges confronting commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders in accomplishing stability-focused missions or tasks, specifically area security operations and security force assistance (SFA).

Notes. The involvement of the U.S. Army in military conflict from the Revolutionary War to Operation Enduring Freedom comprises eleven conventional military operations. Conversely, that same military history reveals hundreds of stability-focused operations, with recent history proving no different. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States led or participated in over fifteen operations in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While the magnitude of violence may not match conventional operations, history often measures the duration of stability operations in decades. This fact, combined with the disturbing spread of international terrorism, the number of fragile states affording safe haven to terrorist organizations or possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the endless array of humanitarian and natural disasters, illustrates the increasing requirement for stability-focused operations.

Military formations conduct stability-focused operations to transition the security and governance of the populace to legitimate civilian authorities. The brigade combat team (BCT) lacks the organic capability to stabilize an assigned area of operations (AO) independently. Its central role in those counterinsurgency (COIN) operations focused on stability is to establish and maintain unity of effort toward achieving the operation's political objectives. To do this, it employs combined arms formations that execute offensive and defensive operations and stability operations tasks to identify and mitigate critical sources of instability. Essentially, the BCT unifies military operations with the activities of government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and elements of the private sector to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and to consolidate gains.

SECTION I – STABILITY OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

7-1. Stability ultimately aims to establish conditions the local populace regards as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. Stability operations tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and building the capacity of local institutions. COIN forces accomplish stability missions and perform tasks across the range of military operations in coordination with (ICW) other instruments of national power. Stability missions and tasks are part of broader efforts to establish and maintain the conditions for stability in an unstable area before or during hostilities or to reestablish enduring peace and stability after open hostilities cease.

FUNDAMENTALS OF STABILIZATION

7-2. COIN forces apply the fundamentals of stabilization to offense, defense, and stability-focused operations to achieve political and military objectives. (See ADP 3-07 and FM 3-24 for information on the fundamentals of stabilization.) The following fundamentals of stabilization lay the foundation for long-term stability:

- Conflict transformation.
- Unity of effort.
- Increased host nation (HN) capacity and capabilities.
- HN ownership and public perception of the HN government's legitimacy.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

7-3. Conflict transformation is the process of converting the actors and conditions that motivate violent conflict into a governmental process to address the causes of instability. It sets the HN on a sustainable, positive trajectory along which transformational processes directly address the dynamics causing instability. The employment of COIN forces in a combat role serves as a temporary solution until the situation is stabilized and HN forces are able to provide security for the populace. In all cases, the combat role supports the HN's ability to provide for its internal security and external defense.

UNITY OF EFFORT

7-4. COIN operations typically demand unity of command. The challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability-focused operation. Achieving such a state is the essence of *unified action*—the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1). Unity of effort (see paragraphs 3-13 through 3-15) is fundamental to successful incorporation of all the instruments of national power into a collaborative approach when conducting stability operations tasks during military operations.

7-5. When countering insurgency, one example of unity of effort is a military commander and a civilian leader ensuring the governance and economic lines of effort (LOEs) are fully coordinated with military operations. Unity of effort among nationally, culturally, and organizationally distinct partners is difficult to maintain, given their different layers of command. Achieving unity of effort requires participants to overcome cultural barriers and to set aside parochial agendas. It also requires each organization's understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the others.

HOST NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES

7-6. Building HN capacity and capabilities is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements enhancing partners' abilities to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The institutional force advises and trains partner army activities on building institutional capacity for professional education and force generation and sustainment. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating forces and the institutional force to support interorganizational efforts toward building capacity and capabilities, primarily through security cooperation (SC) (see paragraph 7-195) interactions. COIN forces apply a comprehensive approach (see paragraphs 7-14 through 7-16) toward sustained engagement with foreign and domestic partners to codevelop mutually beneficial capacities and capabilities and to address shared interests.

7-7. Unified action is an indispensable feature of building HN capacity and capabilities. In operations characterized by stability operations tasks, unified action to enhance partners' abilities to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions exemplifies the building of HN capacity and capabilities. During SFA (see section III), the primary focus of security force assistance brigades (SFABs) is normally building the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. On occasion, the unit as a whole or select units of the unit (for example, the BCT) may support SFA activities. SFA encompasses various activities related to the organizing, equipping, training, advising, and assessing of FSF and their supporting institutions. SFA activities that SFABs and BCTs conduct build HN capacity and capabilities to defend against internal, external, and transnational threats to stability. (See FM 3-22 for information on building HN capacity and capabilities.)

HOST NATION OWNERSHIP AND HOST NATION GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

7-8. Ownership and legitimacy are conditions rooted in specific audiences' perceptions of the legality and morality of a set of actions and of the propriety of the individual or organizational authorities in taking those actions. Legitimacy enables HN ownership by building public trust and confidence. Ownership and legitimacy affect every aspect of operations from every conceivable perspective. The HN government's legitimacy and ownership of the mission enable successful operations characterized by stability operations tasks.

Note. *Security sector reform* involves a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). Security sector reform may be an activity conducted during SC (see paragraph 7-195).

7-9. The COIN force's primary role in security sector reform is to support the reformation, restructuring, or reestablishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations. The overall objective is to support in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate HN government and its ownership of the mission and that is transparent, accountable, and responsive to civilian authority. (See ADP 3-07 for information HN ownership and HN government legitimacy.)

STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK

7-10. A stabilization framework, based on conditions in the AO, of initial response, transformation, and sustainability fostering helps COIN forces determine the requisite training and task organization of forces before initial deployment and serves as a guide to actions in an operation focused on stability operations tasks. A force deployed into an AO with a nonexistent local government may conduct a set of tasks while another force may conduct another set of tasks in an AO with a functioning local government. Paragraphs 7-11 through 7-13 describe the three phases that facilitate the identification of lead responsibilities and the determination of priorities. (See FM 3-07 for information on the stabilization framework.)

INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE IN STABILIZATION

7-11. Initial response actions generally reflect the activity executed to stabilize a crisis state in the AO. COIN forces typically perform initial response actions during or directly after a conflict or disaster in which the security situation prohibits the introduction of civilian personnel. Initial response actions aim to provide a secure environment in which relief forces can attend to the immediate, local humanitarian needs. They reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to participate safely in relief efforts.

TRANSFORMATION PHASE IN STABILIZATION

7-12. Stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity building are transformation actions performed in a relatively secure environment. Transformation actions occur either in crisis or in vulnerable states. These actions aim to build HN capacity across multiple sectors. They are essential to the continuing stability of the environment and foster sustainability in the COIN's AO.

SUSTAINABILITY FOSTERING PHASE IN STABILIZATION

7-13. Actions that foster sustainability encompass long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity building and reconstruction. Their successful accomplishment establishes conditions that enable sustainable development. Usually, military forces perform sustainability fostering only when the security environment is stable enough to implement the long-term programs committed to the viability of the institutions and economy of the HN. Often military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN STABILIZATION

7-14. A comprehensive approach toward achieving unity of effort during stability operations tasks requires contributions from a variety of partners outside the United States and the U.S. Government. These partners include foreign military and police forces, NGOs, international organizations, HN organizations, news media,

and businesses. Many partners have no formal relationship with U.S. Army units but are, nevertheless, instrumental in achieving the desired outcomes. COIN units interact with these partners effectively to exchange information and strive for unified action. COIN units demonstrate to the HN and international community through action their character, competence, and commitment to adhering to and upholding the Army Ethic.

7-15. When developing an operational approach, commanders consider methods to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms (see paragraphs 4-77 through 4-82). Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations (see chapters 5 and 6). Stability mechanisms relate to stability operations tasks, security, and consolidating gains in an AO. Planning operations related to stability mechanisms employed by the COIN force require a comprehensive approach, as well as an in-depth understanding of the stability environment (see paragraph 7-17). Planning nests within policy, internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy, the campaign plan, and any other higher echelon plans. Continuous and open to change, planning includes identifying how best to assist the FSF and developing a sequence of actions to change the situation. Planning also involves anticipating consequences of actions and developing ways to mitigate those and thereby to attain conditions that engender lasting, stable peace.

Note. IDAD focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to societal needs. Ideally, IDAD is a preemptive strategy. However, when an insurgency or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. To support the HN effectively, U.S. Forces, especially planners, consider the HN's IDAD strategy.

7-16. Considering the elements of operational art (the cognitive [conceptual in nature] approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skills, knowledge, experiences, creativity, and judgments [see ADP 3-0]) provides the commander and staff with a combination of conventional forces while leveraging the unique capabilities of special operations forces to assist in achieving stability-focused operations. Planning for and selecting the appropriate mix of military forces, the Expeditionary Civilian Workforce, civilian personnel, and contractors are deliberate decisions based on thorough mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. Important considerations in these decisions include the nature of the HN force, the skills and competencies required by the HN force, and the situation and environment into which the COIN force will deploy.

STABILITY ENVIRONMENT

7-17. Stability-focused operations range across all military operations and offer perhaps the most diverse set of circumstances the COIN faces. The objectives of stability-focused operations are conditions regarded as acceptable by the local populace in terms of violence; functioning government, economic, and societal institutions; and adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. During unified land operations, the COIN provides the means for seizing and retaining initiative through its partnership with associated enabling organizations better suited for bringing stability to the operational environment (OE). To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and to consolidate gains in stability-focused operations, the COIN identifies and mitigates sources of instability, understands and nests operations within political objectives, and achieves unity of effort across diverse organizations.

IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

7-18. The COIN conducts information collection to gain a detailed understanding of the sources of instability and the capabilities and intentions of key actors in its AO. Sources of instability are actors, actions, or conditions that exceed the legitimate authority's capacity to exercise effective governance, maintain civil control, and ensure economic development. The insurgency leverages sources of instability to create conflict, exacerbate existing conditions, or threaten to collapse failing or recovering states. Examples of sources of instability follow:

- Ungoverned areas.
- Religious, ethnic, economic, and political differences among the local populace.
- Natural disasters.
- Resource scarcity.
- Individuals disrupting legitimate governance.

- Degraded infrastructure.
- Economic strife.
- Immature, undeveloped, or atrophied systems.
- Ineffective or corrupt host-nation security forces (HNSF).

7-19. Commanders and staffs apply the same fundamental planning processes in the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the integrating processes—intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) process to identify the tactical problem. They conduct information collection to fulfill priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) or to fill identified information gaps. Commanders and staffs use three additional integrating processes: targeting (see chapter 4, section IV); risk management (RM) (see paragraph 4-16); and knowledge management (see paragraph 4-10). When identifying sources of instability, commanders and staffs find assistance in critical thinking, innovative problem-solving, and leveraging different tools to address these tactical problems. Thorough analysis, local leader interviews, public engagement, unified action partner leverage, and research are standard methods for identifying sources of instability. Commanders and staffs consider operational variables (ICW division and corps staffs) and the variables of METT-TC (I), which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations—with an emphasis on civil considerations, to deepen their understanding of the interests and motivations particular to different groups and individuals and to enhance their situational understanding.

7-20. Interactions of various actors affect the COIN's OE in terms of operational variables and the METT-TC (I) variables. Some of these actors include those following:

- Unified action partners.
- NGOs.
- Private volunteer organizations.
- International and private security organizations.
- Media.
- Multinational corporations.
- Transnational criminal organizations.
- Insurgents.
- Violent extremist organizations.
- Tribes, clans, and ethnic groups native to the AO.
- Regional influences such as other nation-states.

7-21. Commanders and staffs consider alternative perspectives and approaches to those used in offense and defense. COIN forces analyze sources of instability from local public perspective and from the U.S. military's perspective to understand the differences between the viewpoints. During the IPOE, the COIN force identifies key actors and their interests or agendas. Additionally, the force analyzes how these key actors influence the local civil capacity; this analysis drives the force's planning effort for the accomplishment of stability operations tasks. Staffs conduct preparation with the aim to understand the unique aspects of stability-focused operations. For example, at the BCT level, the brigade assistant engineer might assess the local electrical grid system of an assigned AO, or the brigade surgeon or medical planner might assess HN medical facilities and their capacity before employment in an assigned AO. This staff-specific assessment further enables the conduct of the six stability operations tasks (see paragraphs 7-47 through 7-49) and renders the BCT's planning effort during stability-focused operations more informed and efficient.

7-22. Once commanders and staffs understand the OE, the COIN force applies a mixture of stability mechanisms (see paragraph 4-76) to set conditions to retain and exploit stabilizing factors. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians to attain conditions that engender lasting, stable peace. Stability mechanisms relate to stability operations, security, and consolidating gains in an AO. The four stability mechanisms are to compel, control, influence, and support. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing outcomes that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms alone.

7-23. COIN forces simultaneously use stability mechanisms such as compel and control to seize initiative. To compel is to use or threaten to use lethal force to establish control and dominance, to effect behavioral change, or to enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. To control is to impose civil

order. Offensive operations reveal and exploit enemy weaknesses by defeating, destroying, or neutralizing threat forces. These actions disrupt threat forces, prevent them from negatively influencing populations, and provide opportunities to continue exploiting weaknesses, but they are not decisive by themselves. In designing these actions, COIN forces consider how they will compel the population, what they will compel them to do, and whether the action will result in positive, neutral, or negative public support in the long and short terms. (See FM 3-96 for information on the MDMP and the integrating processes.)

UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

7-24. Political objectives frame the unique operations necessary for conducting stability operations. General political objectives are broad and conceptual in nature, but they offer contextual guidance that informs the expanded purpose of the echelons above the COIN commander's intent. They may shift and change as the OE changes. That same guidance unifies or alienates partners who may fall outside the military chain of command.

7-25. Given the inherently complex and uncertain nature of political objectives, the commander and staff use the Army design methodology (see chapter 4) to determine the root cause of instability and approaches to solve problems. The Army design methodology entails framing an OE, framing the problem, and developing an operational approach toward solving the problem. It results in an improved understanding of an OE. From this improved understanding, the commander issues planning guidance, including an operational approach, for more detailed planning using the MDMP (see chapter 4).

7-26. Incorporating political objectives into the planning process (see chapter 4) is a shared task among the COIN staff members. For an assigned stability-focused operation, each staff officer understands the general and specific political objectives and the commander's intent two levels up. They consider the implications and effects of those political objectives when presenting the commander with running estimates, courses of action (COAs), and other decision support staff products. The staff understands how to communicate general and specific political objectives into the themes and messages delivered in the operation order (OPORD) and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) that Soldiers are to display through their actions. These political objectives must translate across the entirety of the OE yet be understood by subordinate units, allowing the units to shape public perception.

ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT ACROSS DIVERSE ORGANIZATIONS

7-27. COIN commanders and staffs understand how to build relationships with many diverse organizations in their AOs. These relationships allow the COIN force to nest operations with both their higher headquarters (HQ) and the overall U.S. effort in the joint operational area. A whole-of-government approach in collaboration and cooperation with unified action partners (see paragraph 3-13) is the key component of stability-focused operations. The staff incorporates personnel from these organizations into the operations process as soon as possible.

7-28. By building relationships, COIN forces reinforce the COIN operation's legitimacy. Legitimacy is of great importance to stability operations. Military activities sustain the operation's and the local emerging or HN government's legitimacy. Having a just cause and earning and sustaining trust affect several relationships: trust with U.S. residents; trust within the unified force; trust with allies, government organizations, NGOs, and coalition partners; trust with the HN government; and trust with HN citizens. Restraint through the disciplined, ethical application of lethal force significantly influences those trust relationships and the operation's legitimacy. A direct relationship exists between restraint, the protection of noncombatant civilians, and legitimacy in any military operation, especially in stability operations.

Military Police

7-29. Mission-tailored military police support to COIN forces integrates police intelligence operations (see ATP 3-39.20 regarding police intelligence operations) throughout offensive, defensive, and stability-focused operations. Police intelligence operations address the reality that, in some OEs, the threat is more criminal than conventional in nature. In those environments, it is not uncommon for members of armed groups, insurgents, and other belligerents to use or mimic established criminal networks, activities, and practices to move contraband, raise funds, or further their goals and objectives. Police intelligence can provide relevant, actionable police information or police intelligence to COIN forces for integration into the operations process

and fusion with other intelligence data. The Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division and provost marshal staffs provide police intelligence to COIN commanders and staffs that identifies indicators of potential crimes and criminal threats against facilities or personnel.

Special Operations Forces

7-30. During COIN operations, the BCT typically coordinates with a special operations task force or a joint special operations task force. Army special operations forces operating in a BCT's AO coordinate their activities with the BCT regardless of command or supporting relationships. To best support integration efforts and to generate and sustain interdependence, the BCT and the special operations unit exchange a variety of liaison and coordination elements. Doing so for the intelligence and fires warfighting functions is especially important. These range in size from individual liaisons to small coordination elements. Whatever their size or location, these elements coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict missions in the other unit's AO. Exchanging liaisons creates conditions that foster interdependence. The exercise of interdependence facilitates shared understanding between the BCT and special operations forces and provides a conduit by which the two units can provide each other relevant, useful, and timely information during the operations processes. Liaisons attend and participate in all planning efforts, update briefs, and working groups. (See ADP 3-05 for information on special operations forces.)

7-31. Civil affairs operations (CAO) are essential to the conduct of stability-focused operations. The full capability of the civil affairs (CA) force manifests in the conduct of stability operations tasks in every environment across the range of military operations. CA support to stability operations tasks includes the execution of all five CA core tasks, employment of CA functional specialists, and continuous analysis of the civil component of the OE in terms of both operational and mission variables by CA staff elements. CA activities are civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil-military operations center (CMOC), civil information management, and CAO staff support. CA forces also conduct military government operations—including transitional military authority and support to civil administration—and provide support to CA-supported activities such as populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian aid, and civil foreign assistance.

7-32. CA support to stability-focused operations depends on the nature of the operation and the condition of the affected civilian population and institutions. The CA staff continually monitors the condition of the HN throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian population, and recommends the necessary functional skills for supporting this critical phase of the operation. CA supports the BCT, U.S. Government agencies, and HN civil administration in transitioning power back to the local government. During the transition from offensive or defensive to stability-focused operations, CA units place greater emphasis on infrastructure, economic stability, and governance expertise. (See FM 3-57 for information on CA.)

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

7-33. A provincial reconstruction team can be a valuable part of a long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economy to provincial governments. It is a potential combat multiplier for maneuver commanders performing governance and economy functions and providing expertise to programs designed to strengthen infrastructure and the institutions of local governments. A provincial reconstruction team leverages the principles of reconstruction and development to build HN capacity while speeding the transition of security, justice, and economic development to the control of the HN. Depending on the situation, a provincial reconstruction team retains between 60 to 90 personnel members. It may employ the following complement of personnel:

- Provincial reconstruction team leader.
- Deputy team leader.
- Multinational force liaison officer.
- Rule of law coordinator.
- Provincial action officer.
- Public diplomacy officer.
- Agricultural advisor.
- Engineer.

- Development officer.
- Governance team.
- CA team.
- Bilingual cultural advisor.

Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations

7-34. COIN forces recognize the value of intergovernmental and NGOs and build effective relationships with these actors. These organizations may have the most extensive amounts of resources to conduct stability operations tasks in the COIN's AO. Intergovernmental organizations and NGOs are the primary sources of subject matter expertise in many essential services and governance topics. They are also the primary provider of humanitarian, infrastructure, and essential services in immature OEs. They often have experienced and detailed knowledge of the civil environment. Usually, they have a better understanding of the civil considerations than any other actors besides HN personnel. Their insight can assist the COIN force in the continual processes of developing understanding of and shaping the environment.

7-35. Building relationships with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs is unique, as opposed to doing so with HN forces and interagency actors who often have different mandates and alternative perspectives to stability-focused operations. COIN commanders and staffs utilize these differences to see the OE and tactical problems from different perspectives. Additionally, understanding where intergovernmental organizations and NGOs are in the AO and the nature of their activities helps develop a common operational picture (COP). This COP enables the COIN force to anticipate changes to the OE, the effects of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs on stability operations tasks and COIN operations, and future friction points between the organization's and the COIN's interests.

7-36. Building relationships with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs is sometimes difficult because these organizations are reluctant to establish associations with U.S. Forces. The COIN force remains cognizant of this and establishes these relationships on benefits to all involved parties. Intergovernmental organizations and NGOs bring valuable resources, information regarding the civilian population and the OE, and alternative perspectives to the COIN operation. Examples of interagency personnel capable of providing valuable information to COIN forces are U.S. embassy's country team members, chiefs of stations or bases, defense attachés, and subject matter experts from other Government departments (for example, the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, or the Treasury).

7-37. Humanitarian organizations avoid any blurring of the distinction between neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian and developmental aid derived from political engagement, as the latter is potentially linked to security concerns or biased support. The COIN force often works through civilian representatives from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations, or HN when coordinating with NGOs. The force avoids publicly citing NGOs as information sources since that might jeopardize their neutrality and invite retaliation by adversaries. COIN forces primarily use CMOCs operated by CA units to coordinate with NGOs. (See ATP 3-07.5 for information on intergovernmental organizations and NGOs.) COIN forces operating with NGOs follow these guidelines:

- Military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities.
- Military personnel make prior arrangements before visiting NGOs.
- Military personnel do not refer to NGOs as force multipliers or partners or other similar terms.
- U.S. Forces respect an NGO's decision not to serve as an implementing partner.

SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

7-38. The enduring theme of seizing the initiative is as applicable in stability-focused operations as in offensive and defensive operations. The significant difference is the context in which the operational framework occurs. Stability-focused operations have fewer specific applications of tactics and procedures. The COIN commander requires study, critical thinking, and creativity to address the tactical problems in a complex environment. Stability-focused operations have broader temporal considerations; this operational framework occurs before, during, and after conflict, as well as simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations. The commander considers the effects of the temporal aspect and manages them appropriately.

7-39. Stability-focused operations are conceptual by nature. The COIN commander develops understanding of how each action affects the other elements in the complex system of HN government institutions, civil society, and local economies. Success in seizing the initiative from a stability-focused perspective is critical in preventing conflict, setting conditions for success during the offense and defense, and securing hard-won successes in a post-conflict environment.

RETAINING THE INITIATIVE

7-40. Retaining initiative gained through the offensive and stability-focused operations requires the COIN to anticipate and act on civil requirements while actively averting threat actions. Shaping public perception to recognize the civil authority's legitimacy is critical in retaining the initiative. In many circumstances, security is the most influential element affecting the population beyond their basic needs of food, water, and shelter. A secure environment fosters a functioning economy, which provides employment and gradually transfers the population's dependence from military to civilian authorities and HN governments.

7-41. COIN forces execute defensive and stability-focused operations to retain key terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities that inhibit threat actions while fostering conditions to increase the impact of stabilizing efforts. Often, the COIN commander assigns these tasks as an economy of force to conduct offensive operations and those focused on stability operations tasks. These tasks take form in such actions as partnership with other domestic security forces but are executed to prevent instability. The objective is the public perception of the level of security as promoting evolving and often sequential growth and stabilization. HN actors are often the best and most informed sources on the local environment.

Example of an Economy of Force Battle

The 1st Battalion, 35th Armor (Task Force Conqueror), fought an economy of force mission for most of the Battle of Ramadi during the summer and fall of 2006. . . . Through a combination of partnering with Iraqi Security Forces (also called ISF), tribal engagement, aggressive Iraqi Police recruiting, and targeted U.S.-led operations, the task force was able to—

- Reestablish the Iraqi Police in Ramadi.
- Increase the capability of our partnered Iraqi Army battalion.
- Link the sheiks of Anbar with the government of Iraq fostering the Anbar Awakening.

The Battle of Ramadi had a clear beginning but no clear-cut end, and it was a battle fought on two main fronts. The first front was an incredibly lethal fight to wrest control of Ramadi back from Al-Qaeda; the second was a battle to link the population with the government of Iraq. In the end, it was a victory for the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division (Ready First Combat Team). The battle proved to be a blueprint for the emerging counterinsurgency doctrine, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, [2006 version (obsolete),] which was being developed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While many of the actions of the Ready First now seem like simple application of doctrine, at the time, the following concepts ran counter to the prevailing conventional wisdom:

- Living in small combat outposts.
- Focusing on protecting the population.
- Investing in the Iraqi Security Forces.
- Working with tribal leaders.

EXPLOITING THE INITIATIVE

7-42. A secure OE enables unified action partners to capitalize on their unique capabilities, thus exploiting the initiative gained in earlier operations. Government agencies, NGOs, and other actors remain unified in purpose to maintain the effect. Effective civilian-military teaming starts with the development of shared goals, aims, and objectives and unity of purpose and leads to a relationship of shared trust and unity of effort.

The COIN commander's responsibilities include creating and fostering this dynamic and culture among organizations.

7-43. Unity of effort is more than shared work across U.S. Government agencies. A COIN force works with multivarious HN actors (for example, political leaders, government agencies, security forces, local businesses) during stability-focused operations. The COIN leverages relationships with HN actors to deepen understanding of the information environment and to answer information requirements.

7-44. HN and interagency personnel may not be the only actors among the unified action partners. The COIN's AO may include allied and multinational forces. Understanding other forces' capabilities, constraints and limitations, and command relationships facilitates mission preparation and execution of operations in a constantly changing OE. COIN forces cannot conduct successful stability-focused operations without building relationships. Each actor brings expertise, perspective, resources, and capabilities necessary for accomplishing stability operations tasks and achieving the desired end state for the overall operation.

STABILIZING THE ENVIRONMENT

7-45. Stability-focused operations seek to stabilize the environment enough for the HN to begin resolving the root causes of conflict and state failure. During consolidation of gains, these operations focus on security and stability operations tasks to establish conditions that support transition to legitimate authorities. Initially, the minimum performance of essential stability operations tasks provides security, food, water, shelter, and basic medical treatment. Once conditions allow, these tasks become the legal responsibility of U.S. Army forces. However, the commander may not need to have the COIN force conduct all these essential tasks. Other military units or appropriate civilian organizations may be available to perform these tasks adequately. As the OE and time allow and as appropriate, the effort involves the more deliberate execution of the six stability operations tasks within the COIN force's LOEs. Within the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework (see paragraphs 3-117 through 3-150), each phase addresses the stability operations tasks at differing degrees since LOEs vary within the framework.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

7-46. A *stability operation* is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). COIN forces (for example, the BCT) execute operations focused on stability operations tasks against destabilizing factors by establishing unity of effort among diverse organizations. It then task-organizes and partners with other elements to mitigate sources of instability. (See ADP 3-0, ADP 3-07, FM 3-07, and ATP 3-07.5 for information on stability operations.)

SIX STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

7-47. U.S. Army forces often seek to stabilize their AOs by performing stability operations tasks. A single action taken by a U.S. COIN force or partner element can support multiple stability operations tasks because they are interrelated and interdependent. Each stability operations task carries unique considerations, but actions taken affect each differently. The COIN force plans, prepares, executes, and assesses operations to categorize impacts on its AO as positive, negative, or neutral, as regards both long-term and short-term effects. In stability-focused operations, planning and assessment require significant analyses supported by information collection activities (see paragraphs 4-162 through 4-166). These activities focus on identifiable indicators inside or outside the COIN force's AO. To plan for the next operation, the COIN commander considers each stability operations task LOE within the context of the stability principles, and the staff analyzes measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) during assessment (see paragraphs 3-53 and 4-11 through 4-15). Together, they are asking what is needed to accomplish the intended outcome. The Army's six stability operations tasks are to—

- Establish civil security.
- Conduct SC.
- Provide support to civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Provide support to governance.
- Provide support to economic and infrastructure development.

7-48. The combination of stability operations tasks conducted during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the HN can meet most of or all public requirements. In those cases, Army COIN forces work with and through HN authorities. Commanders employ CAOs to mitigate how the military presence affects the population and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support public well-being. That situation requires Army forces to work with civilian organizations to restore basic capabilities. CAOs are essential for establishing the trust between Army forces and civilian organizations necessary for effective, working relationships.

7-49. Six Army stability operations tasks (see figure 7-1) correspond directly to six joint stability functions. The tasks directly support the broader efforts within the joint stability functions. Together, the tasks and joint stability functions provide a mechanism for interagency tactical integration, linking the execution of discrete tasks to the requisite instruments of national power for establishing the end state conditions that would define success. Tasks performed in one function inevitably create related effects in another function. When planned and performed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce those effects. The subordinate tasks performed by the BCT under the six stability operations tasks directly support the broader efforts executed as part of joint stabilization activities.




Figure 7-1. Mechanism for interagency tactical integration

7-50. Over time, to sustain safety and security, unified action partners perform numerous tasks across all joint stability functions. As part of a joint team with these partners, the BCT often performs related tasks among the six stability operations tasks to achieve a specific objective or set certain conditions. An example is the necessary effort to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Compared to the outcomes of a single task focused on a local populace, safety and security are broad effects. The BCT helps achieve them by performing related tasks that assist in ending hostilities, isolating belligerent or criminal elements, demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order and safety.

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

7-51. Civil security provides for the safety of the HN population, including protection from internal and external threats. The BCT coordinates operations to restore order, to halt violence, and to support, reinstate, or create civil authority by establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment for the local populace supporting the overall stability operation. (See ATP 3-07.5 for information on civil security.) Subtasks for establishing civil security include those following:

- Enforcing the cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Determining the dispositions and compositions of HN armed and intelligence services.
- Conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conducting border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Supporting identification programs.
- Protecting key personnel and facilities.
- Clearing explosive and other hazards.

Task Organization and Actions to Establish Civil Security

7-52. The BCT conducts operations that directly support subtasks—enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements; conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement; support identification; and protect key personnel and facilities. It has limited capability to support, to determine the dispositions and compositions of national armed and intelligence services, to conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and to clear explosives and other hazards. The stabilization framework—initial response, transformation, and sustainability fostering—enables the BCT to determine the requisite task organization and actions to create a safe, secure, and stable environment.

Initial Response—Establish Civil Security

7-53. During the initial response phase, the BCT often executes subordinate tasks because the HN lacks the capability. BCT subordinate units occupy their AOs in accordance with (IAW) geographical, political, socioeconomic, task, or supported actor boundary considerations. Information collection activities further support the development of understanding of the boundaries, requiring the BCT to shift unit assets and resources to better align with unified action partners and to mitigate sources of instability. BCTs may need to identify, segregate, search, and safeguard combatants and noncombatants and to move them out of the immediate AO. The BCT commander establishes priorities for the protection of civilian and military personnel, facilities, installations, and key terrain in the AO and initiates the stability principles of conflict transformation, unity of effort, and the building of partner capacity during the initial response.

7-54. The BCT conducts operations that safeguard the local populace and prevent factions or actors from contributing to sources of instability. Ultimately, these operations convince rival factions and actors to secure their interests through negotiation and peaceful political processes rather than violence, intimidation, coercion, or corruption. BCT units are to remain neutral during this period. Supporting one or more factions or leveraging one faction against another can contribute to instability. The ideal local public perception views U.S. Forces as neutral, seeking public interests, providing security to the area, and allowing for further development.

7-55. Identifying actors and their intentions during this phase through information collection allows the BCT to seize the initiative. The BCT commander and subordinate leaders reach, through engagements, binding agreements, and understandings with unified action partners, a determination of the best way to divide labor and to deconflict efforts, so partners are not working redundantly. Actor agendas or intents are not known or understood in their entirety during this phase. Psychological operations (PSYOP) staff planners and intelligence staff sections develop indicators that commanders and leaders can clearly understand and identify to reveal actor agendas or intents. Information collection, with and without unified action partners and along with continuous assessment, supports the commander in developing understanding of unity of effort and unity of purpose.

Transformation—Establish Civil Security

7-56. In the transformation phase, HNSF and potentially intergovernmental organization peacekeepers begin to contribute. The BCT focuses more on SFA, particularly on the requisite systems to professionalize HNSF. It continues in partnership with unified action partners IAW the legitimate government binding agreements. Information collection serves to develop further understanding of boundaries, requiring the BCT to shift unit assets and resources to better align with unified action partners and to mitigate sources of instability. The BCT advises and assists the security force leaders, empowering them to assume as much of the security effort as possible.

7-57. HNSF prominently work on security efforts, so local populations do not perceive the BCT as an invading force to resist. HNSF stay involved to promote their government's legitimacy and their progress with unified action partners. The BCT assists HNSF information activities, sustainment in support of the HN, protection, and area security operations appropriately.

7-58. As soon as possible, the BCT transfers HN infrastructure security to HN organizations. HN military units may temporarily be committed to securing public infrastructure, but eventually police forces or dedicated security organizations conduct this function. The BCT continues coordination between unified action partners to help mediate any disagreements among them.

7-59. The BCT ensures HN forces act with respect to human rights; failure to do so undermines popular support for the HN government and can quickly revert conditions back to those experienced during the initial response phase. Partnered security operations that place HN forces in the lead and those security operations conducted independently of the BCT are the most credible among the civilian population and consequently build the government's legitimacy through ownership.

7-60. Initially, the BCT may simply be a support apparatus, or contrastingly, the BCT may make most of the security-related decisions and perform most of the tasks. Nevertheless, HN actors support and increasingly take ownership of such matters. The BCT develops clear MOPs and MOEs that shift security efforts from the BCT to the HN forces in the lead. It also develops indicators of the HN units' actions and conduct, as well as local public sentiment, that their units can identify while conducting actions in partnership.

Sustainability Fostering—Establish Civil Security

7-61. In the sustainability fostering phase, the BCT transitions to a steady state posture focused on advisory duties and SC. The BCT commander implements additional peace measures, depending on further negotiations. During this phase, the BCT enables the HN to sustain the peace.

Creation of a Safe, Secure, and Stable Environment

7-62. BCT forces (which, in this context, are the COIN) seek to create a safe, secure, and stable environment for the local populace. Key to the stability operations task to establish civil security is the development of security institutions or, in their absence, the performance of their normal duties until those capabilities are developed or transitioned to the HN, United Nations, or other U.S. agencies. Commanders and staffs determine the dispositions and compositions of HN armed and intelligence services early in the process. Ultimately, the HN needs to secure its own people. Civil security involves protecting areas, resources, and the populace from both external and internal threats. Ideally, COIN forces focus on the external threats while police and security elements address internal security threats from criminals and small hostile groups. However, during an insurgency, the COIN also addresses the internal security threats from criminals and small hostile groups—notably the armed insurgents.

Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace Agreements, and Other Arrangements

7-63. These tasks aid in providing security and stability after an armed conflict while, at the same time, setting the necessary conditions to start disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. These tasks are critical to providing effective security for the local populace by reducing their exposure to the threat of violent conflict. The tasks help military forces establish a sustained peace by focusing on processes and activities fundamental to conflict transformation. In COIN, most efforts focus on identifying and neutralizing potential adversaries.

For instance, in Iraq from 2003 to 2005, U.S. Forces fought a Sunni insurgency comprising many members of the former regime's security apparatus. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Enforcing cease fires.
- Supervising disengagement of belligerent forces.
- Identifying and neutralizing potential adversaries.
- Providing security for negotiations.

Conduct Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

7-64. These tasks are fundamental to establishing stability and lasting peace. They include physically disbanding guerrillas and reintegrating them into society. Other elements do not carry weapons, yet they support the guerrilla forces. Their communities and families perceive them as part of the insurgency. Together, the tasks of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration reduce the likelihood of resurgence of insurgency. These tasks provide a means for these individuals and groups to reenter society as contributing members. Some of these tasks also aid in the demobilization of HN paramilitary forces. (See chapter 8 for more information on HN paramilitary forces.) Essential tasks may include those following:

- Negotiating arrangements with insurgents.
- Establishing and enforcing weapons control programs, including collection and destruction.
- Providing reassurance to and incentives for disarmed groups.
- Establishing a monitoring program.
- Ensuring adequate health care, food, and security for former insurgents.
- Disarming former insurgents or HN paramilitary forces.
- Reducing the availability of unauthorized weapons.
- Reintegrating former insurgents, HN paramilitary forces, and dislocated civilians into society.
- Securing, storing, and disposing of weapons.
- Developing HN arms control capacity.

Establish Border Control, Border Security, and Freedom of Movement

7-65. A central component of civil security is the ability of the HN to monitor and regulate its borders. Generally, border and coast guard forces secure national boundaries while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals, and goods across state borders. These border controls are necessary for regulating immigration, controlling the movements of the local populace, collecting excise taxes or duties, limiting smuggling, and controlling the spread of disease vectors through quarantine. The COIN force's successful control of the borders reduces the effectiveness of the external support for the insurgency. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Establishing border control and boundary security.
- Establishing and disseminating rules relevant to movement.
- Dismantling roadblocks and establishing checkpoints.
- Ensuring freedom of movement.

Support Identification

7-66. This task complements efforts to vet HN personnel, encourage participation in representative government, resolve property disputes, and validate professional credentials. Though vital to other programs for rebuilding a functioning civil society, identification programs are equally important to civil security. After the collapse of an authoritarian or hostile regime, these programs ensure potential adversaries do not inadvertently reintegrate into society, thus depriving them of the ability to sow the seeds of a future insurgency. It is a key part of PRC operations. Tactical units often do this by conducting a census with biometric assets. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Securing documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, professional certificates, birth records, and driving licenses.
- Establishing an identification program.
- Ensuring individuals have personal forms of identification.

Protect Key Personnel and Facilities

7-67. In COIN, military forces may extend protection and support to the HN population to ensure their continued contribution to the overall stability operation. In the interest of transparency, military forces specifically request and carefully negotiate this protection. Similarly, the long-term success of any COIN often relies on the ability of the security force to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN government can resume that responsibility. Essential tasks include those following:

- Identifying, securing, protecting, and coordinating the following:
  - The disposition of stockpiles of munitions.
  - The disposition of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materiel and precursors.
  - Facilities.
  - Adversaries with technical expertise.
- Protecting the following:
  - Government-sponsored, yet civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
  - Contractor and civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel and resources.
- Protecting and securing the following:
  - Places of religious worship and cultural sites.
  - Critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, and property ownership documents.
  - Strategically important institutions (for example, government buildings; medical and public health infrastructure; the central bank, national treasury, and integral commercial banks; museums; religious sites).
  - Military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps, and means of communication.
- Building HN capacity to protect the following:
  - Civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
  - Infrastructure and public institutions.
  - Military infrastructure.

Clear Explosive and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards

7-68. To an HN combatting an insurgency, the presence of explosive hazards (including minefields, improvised explosive devices [IEDs], and other unexploded explosive ordnance) and CBRN hazards (resulting from intentional or accidental release) inflicts stress that the surviving institutions cannot bear. These hazards restrict freedom of movement, hinder international trade, and detract from the HN government's ability to secure its populace and borders. Military forces clear unexploded explosive ordnance to facilitate capacity-building activities. Removing these hazards ensures public safety, security, and well-being. (See ATP 4-32.2 for additional information.) Essential tasks may include the following:

- Establishing an explosive hazards coordination cell.
- Conducting the emergency clearing of mines, IEDs, unexploded explosive ordnance, and other explosive hazards.
- Mapping, surveying, and marking mined areas, and other explosive hazards.
- Remediating the remaining hazards from the release of CBRN hazards and radiological fallout, as well as providing decontamination support.
- Creating HN capacity to conduct demining.
- Building HN capability to export demining expertise.

Note. *Unexploded explosive ordnance*—explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action and that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause (JP 3-42).

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIVIL CONTROL

7-69. Civil control centers reinforce the rule of law by promoting efforts to rebuild HN judiciary and corrections systems, such as providing training and support to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Civil control tasks focus on building temporary or interim capabilities to pave the way for the HN or international

organizations to implement permanent capabilities. (See ATP 3-07.5 for information on civil control.) Subtasks in providing support to civil control include those following:

- Establishing public order and safety.
- Establishing an interim criminal justice system.
- Supporting law enforcement and police reform.
- Supporting judicial reform.
- Supporting a civil property dispute resolution process.
- Supporting criminal justice system reform.
- Supporting corrections reform.
- Supporting war crimes courts and tribunals.
- Supporting public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

Task Organization and Actions to Provide Support to Civil Control

7-70. Establishing security and rebuilding judicial institutions help develop the necessary climate for reconciliation, public confidence, and economic growth. The BCT supports civil control tasks directly by conducting operations that support subtasks for establishing public order, safety, and outreach and rebuilding communities. It also supports the remaining civil control subtasks indirectly.

Initial Response—Provide Support to Civil Control

7-71. During the initial response phase, the BCT conducts area security to protect the populace, to facilitate access to critical resources for endangered civilians, and to secure vital resources and infrastructure for the interim and future criminal justice institutions. These actions also serve to strengthen the operation's legitimacy and public trust of the HN government. The BCT initiates the principles of conflict transformation and unity of effort to begin the establishment of civil control.

7-72. The BCT conducts operations that safeguard the local populace and prevent factions or actors from contributing to sources of instability, such as actors or groups enacting their own forms of justice. The legal and justice systems are usually in disarray during the initial response from the interim and HN governments. The BCT respects and implements laws established by the HN in support of political objectives and that directly address sources of instability. The BCT staff analyzes these laws to recommend COAs and develop rules of engagement (ROE) or other mission parameters.

7-73. The BCT conducts information activities related to the development of judicial systems that are outside the interim or established government and that disrupt the organizations that control them. Ultimately, these operations convince rival factions and actors to secure their interests through negotiation and peaceful political processes rather than violence, intimidation, coercion, or corruption.

7-74. The BCT develops plans for coordinating the security, safety, and care of displaced communities in camps and settlements. These plans include moving displaced people, screening returnees at checkpoints, protecting relief convoys, and ensuring public safety in returnee communities lacking local law and order.

7-75. The BCT requests partnerships with the U.S. Army and other unified action partners for the initial establishment of civil control. For example, it requests military police forces with the technical skills to conduct investigations, collect and handle collected exploitable material and undertake correction reform. (See ATP 3-39.12-1 and ATP 3-39.12-2 for information on law enforcement investigations.) It seeks judge advocates since it lacks the legal personnel to assist the HN in judicial reform and to support war crime courts and tribunals.

Transformation—Provide Support to Civil Control

7-76. During the transformation phase, the BCT continues to conduct operations with unified action partners but shifts its effort toward building the HN government's legitimacy, HN ownership, and partner capacity. In the transformation phase of the stabilization framework, HN police forces and interorganizational entities take the lead, with Army units focusing on SFA, particularly the professionalization of HNSF.

7-77. Legitimate political authorities pass laws and orders that are binding to the local populace during this phase. The BCT continues its operations and partnership but develops knowledge of these laws and orders

to mentor and guide its partner properly toward building the HN government's legitimacy. These laws and orders may also cause an adjustment to the ROE and conduct of operations.

7-78. Building partner capacities to protect military and public infrastructures and to facilitate emergency response is the primary goal for civil control during the transformation phase. Broader programs that foster good order and discipline, including personnel accountability, property accountability, and maintenance, integrate security measures. The BCT continues its engagements with unified action partners to establish timelines and measurable standards as capacity develops for conditions improving or regressing.

Sustainability Fostering—Provide Support to Civil Control

7-79. In the sustainability fostering phase, the BCT transfers all public security responsibilities to HN forces while monitoring and reporting on progress and identifying modernization needs and the means to achieve them. Through engagements, it ensures political authorities do not abuse their institutions and do maintain civil control.

Select Behavior and Activity Regulation

7-80. Support to the stability operations task of civil control regulates select behaviors and activities of individuals and groups. Civil control reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. It channels the population's activities to allow the provision of security and essential services and to coexist with a military force conducting operations. A top priority for military forces conducting stability operations during a COIN is the reestablishment of legal and justice systems to aid with security sector reform. Units may find themselves involved with corrections activities, the establishing of public order and safety, property dispute resolutions, and support for reconciliatory efforts. Most military efforts focus on building temporary or interim capabilities until either the HN or U.S. and international agencies put more permanent capabilities in place.

Establish Public Order and Safety

7-81. These tasks provide a broad range of activities to protect the populace, provide interim policing and crowd control, and secure critical infrastructure. These essential tasks represent actions that must occur during and after an insurgency to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reformational efforts. The speed and effectiveness in performing these tasks directly correlates with the length of time it takes to defeat the insurgency. Executing these tasks as soon as practical after intervening reduces the time required for related efforts and allows the mission to be accomplished far sooner. However, the military's legal authorities for all activities in the justice sector, particularly involving enforcement and adjudication of the law, must be clear. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Securing the populace.
- Ensuring humanitarian aid and security forces reach endangered populations and refugee camps.
- Performing civilian police functions, including investigating crimes and making arrests.
- Locating and safeguarding key witnesses, documents, and other evidence related to ongoing or potential investigations and prosecutions.
- Controlling crowds, preventing looting, and managing civil disturbances.
- Securing facilities, records, storage equipment, and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions.
- Building HN capacity to protect military infrastructure.
- Building HN capacity to protect infrastructure and public institutions.
- Building HN capacity for emergency response.
- Fostering sustainability wherein military forces identify modernization needs and the means to achieve them.

Establish Interim Criminal Justice System

7-82. Often, establishing or reestablishing an interim justice system is a prerequisite for COIN. This restoration requires a wide range of skilled professionals working under a clearly defined legal authority—judges, prosecutors, court administrators, defense lawyers, corrections personnel, law enforcement personnel,

and investigators. These personnel—and the institutions they represent—provide a temporary respite that allows the HN to restore its legal system. Initially, military forces may need to—

- Assess laws for necessary modifications or their adoption of internationally accepted codes.
- Assess HN capacity to combat crime.
- Deploy interim justice personnel to complement the HN criminal justice system.
- Establish mechanisms to review the legality of detentions and minor cases and thereby to minimize pretrial detention.
- Enact interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law.

Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform

7-83. U.S. military forces provide support to law enforcement and policing operations. This support is integral to establishing civil control. HN police may provide this capability when the security environment permits. Usually in insurgencies, the HN police have succumbed to corruption or have failed altogether. In failed states, especially during and immediately after conflict, military police forces are the only organizations able to fill this void. At times, HN police augment military forces rather than the other way around. The preferred providers of civilian law enforcement services are HN police, augmented appropriately by military and paramilitary police units with policing capabilities. Civilian agencies typically provide training and capacity-building support for law enforcement services. In the interim, however, U.S. and HN military forces may need to perform these services until the situation permits transitioning the function to civilian agencies or organizations. Essential tasks may include the following:

- Identifying, securing, and preserving collected exploitable material of the following:
  - War crimes.
  - Crimes against humanity.
  - Corruption.
  - Transnational crime such as terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, and narcotics.
- Identifying and detaining perpetrators of these offenses.
- Supporting the vetting, credential checking, and accounting for HN police forces.
- Inventorying and assessing police facilities and systems.
- Training and advising HN police forces.
- Rehabilitating or constructing necessary facilities.
- Establishing police academies.

Support Judicial Reform

7-84. The reform of judicial bodies is integral to the rule of law and provides the necessary framework for broader security sector reform. The provided support to judicial institutions parallels efforts with police and security forces to enhance the state's capability to maintain civil control and security. Under most circumstances, other agencies and organizations typically support the development of the judicial branch of government. In a failed state, however, military forces may perform these functions initially until their transition to an appropriate civilian agency or organization. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Identifying HN legal professionals.
- Educating criminal justice personnel on interim legal codes and international human rights standards.
- Inventorying and assessing courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations.
- Deploying judicial advisors and liaisons.
- Rehabilitating or constructing necessary facilities.
- Supporting the vetting of HN legal professionals.

Support Property Dispute Resolution

7-85. A vital service of the judiciary branch is to resolve property disputes. One of the causes of an insurgency may be old disputes over property ownership and control. Authorities implement dispute resolution mechanisms. These prevent the violence that can occur in the absence of law and order when people seek resolution on their own terms. Typically, the military's role in resolving disputes is limited to transitional

military authority, under which these mechanisms undergo implementation in the absence of a functioning HN government. Essential tasks during an initial response by military forces may include those following:

- Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized occupation or seizure of property.
- Publicizing the dispute resolution process.
- Coordinating the dispute resolution process to deter violence and retribution.

Support Corrections Reform

7-86. When the goal in COIN is to criminalize the insurgency and prosecute insurgents in the HN court system, corrections reform is an integral component of broader security sector reform. Corrections reform tasks focus on building HN capacity in the penal system, restoring the institutional infrastructure, and providing oversight of the incarceration process. Another task is to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the prison populations to reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Identifying and registering all detention, correction, or rehabilitative facilities.
- Preserving and securing penal administrative records and reports.
- Inventorying and assessing prison populations and conditions.
- Implementing humanitarian standards in prisons.
- Providing emergency detention facilities.
- Vetting corrections personnel.
- Deploying penal trainers and advisors.
- Refurbishing prison facilities at key sites.
- Coordinating jurisdiction and handover.
- Facilitating international monitoring.
- Rebuilding corrections institutions.
- Training and advising corrections personnel to internationally accepted standards.
- Developing reconciliation, parole, and reintegration mechanisms.

Support Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs

7-87. These programs are central to the reconciliation process in a COIN and to the promotion campaign for public respect for the rule of law. They provide the HN populace with a means to form a cohesive society. While these programs generally do not involve substantial military involvement, some activities require the force's support to achieve success. Essential tasks during an initial response by military forces may include establishing broad public information programs to promote reconciliatory efforts and assessing the needs of vulnerable populations.

Host Nation Partnership Enablement

7-88. When acting directly to enable HN partnerships, COIN operations seek to reduce the level of violence and human suffering and to create conditions wherein other actors can safely participate in the ongoing efforts to stabilize an OE. Paragraphs 7-89 through 7-103 address two operations (establish a checkpoint and conduct vehicle searches) for establishing public order and safety by limiting insurgent freedom of movement.

Establish a Checkpoint (Traffic Control)

7-89. A checkpoint is a staffed position, usually at a chokepoint on a main thoroughfare, that controls all vehicular and pedestrian traffic passing along that road. Checkpoint staff stops and checks all vehicles or only a select few. A checkpoint is not a roadblock. A roadblock prevents all vehicular or pedestrian traffic along a thoroughfare.

7-90. Checkpoints may be temporary, semipermanent, or permanent. A common distinction between a temporary and semipermanent checkpoint is its personnel requirements. A temporary checkpoint has no shift requirements—the same individuals establish, operate, and then break down the checkpoint. A semipermanent checkpoint requires at least one additional shift of personnel to operate it for the requisite length of time. Over time, a semipermanent checkpoint may turn into a permanent checkpoint. A permanent checkpoint usually has no set end time. Most nations have permanent checkpoints, especially at international

border crossings or at key access control points. Common reasons for establishing a checkpoint during COIN operations include those following:

- Demonstrating the presence and authority of the HN government.
- Checking vehicles for explosive devices.
- Maintaining control of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
- Apprehending suspects.
- Preventing smuggling of controlled items.
- Preventing infiltration of unauthorized civilians into or through a controlled area.
- Serving as an observation post.

7-91. Checkpoints cause considerable public inconvenience and sometimes fear. Therefore, public perception of checkpoints as a preventive and not a punitive measure is highly important. Employing a tactical PSYOP team to broadcast instructions and explanations and to disseminate handbills to civilians waiting at a checkpoint helps mitigate negative public reaction to the control measure and ensure compliance.

7-92. The rapid establishment of a temporary checkpoint can support a host of COIN operations. The two types of checkpoints are snap checkpoints and enduring checkpoints. (See figure 7-2 and figure 7-3 on page 280 for example setups for snap [or rapidly established] and enduring checkpoints.) Snap checkpoints are rapidly established and temporary. When time allows, a designated, mobile unit is trained and resourced for this mission, and then, with little warning, this unit establishes a checkpoint almost anywhere. Enduring checkpoints are often initially established as a snap checkpoint. As the site undergoes further development, the checkpoint becomes semipermanent.




Figure 7-2. Snap checkpoint layout, example




Figure 7-3. Enduring checkpoint layout, example

7-93. Insurgency forces often target traffic checkpoints with harassing sniper or indirect fire. A plan to locate and react quickly to these threats often reaps great benefit. Additionally, insurgent snipers or scripted traffic incidents often target checkpoints. The insurgency's goal is to induce the COIN to overreact, so it can then exploit the overreaction in the media.

7-94. The precise location and degree of visibility of a checkpoint suggest its purpose. The location of a highly visible checkpoint is often where traffic can avoid it. This works well for entry control points and border crossings. The location of a concealed checkpoint is often where traffic cannot avoid it by bypassing, retreating, or getting off the road without being observed and, when ordered, detained.

Conduct Vehicle Searches

7-95. Any unit may be tasked to conduct the routine search of vehicles. Whenever vehicles wired with explosives are highly probable, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team leads the search effort. All vehicles undergo screening before entering the search area. Usually, screening occurs at the initial barrier and IAW local screening criteria. Vehicles are then directed either through the search area or to one of the search sites. Normally, passenger vehicles are segregated from commercial vehicles as part of the screening process.

7-96. Determine the specific purpose of the checkpoint. The purpose informs the checkpoint location, degree of individual checks, and requisite lengths of time, resources, and personnel. The key steps in establishing a checkpoint follow:

- Define the parameters of searches:
  - Determine whether to search all pedestrians and all vehicles.
  - For vehicles, determine whether to search the vehicle, the occupants, or a combination of both.
  - Determine the search method and level of search detail.
  - Distribute any available list of vehicles for which or individuals for whom personnel should be on the lookout.
- Establish the screening criteria for searches and the method of screening.

Note. These can reduce time, personnel, and labor requirements.

- Determine the time duration the checkpoint will be in effect.

Note. Checkpoint durations exceeding 12 hours require shifts. Shift rest areas placed near the search area are useful as a reserve force.

- Establish near and far security:
  - Near security protects the checkpoint force.
  - Far security, often concealed, prevents the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn back after sighting the checkpoint.
  - Plans must include actions for responding to this situation when it happens.
- Establish and brief the ROE and escalation of force procedures, including warning signs.
- Rehearse checkpoint operations, especially escalation of force procedures.
- Design the checkpoint layout and gather the required materials before the arrival of personnel.
- Determine the personnel requirements.
- Emplace in positions that traffic cannot easily bypass.
- After the HNSF can operate on its own, determine whether the HNSF should staff the checkpoint.

7-97. Examples of appropriate material and equipment for a checkpoint follow:

- Equipment designed to slow and canalize vehicles, such as speed bumps or filled barrels.
- Concertina wire to control movement around the checkpoint.
- Long-handled mirrors for inspecting vehicle undercarriages.
- Logs and checklists for inspectors and supervisors.
- Caution flags and unit signs.
- Protection items, which may include both lethal and nonlethal munitions.
- Sandbags and wood for defensive positions or bunkers.
- Binoculars, night-vision devices, and flashlights.

7-98. Examples of personnel positions for a checkpoint follow:

- Command element.
- Security element.
- Search element.
- Linguists and HN representation.
- Military police.
- Medical personnel.
- Communications personnel.
- Tactical PSYOP team.
- Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCTs).
- Military working dogs.
- HNSF personnel.

7-99. Example techniques for the effective use of combat vehicles to deter resistance at a checkpoint follow:

- Position the vehicle off the road but within sight:
  - Keep this vehicle hull down and under the protection of local security.
  - Maintain this vehicle's readiness to engage any vehicles attempting to break through or bypass the checkpoint.
- Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area.
- Establish a bypass lane for approved convoy traffic.
- Consider a controlled bypass lane for HN civilians with medical emergencies, host-nation (civilian) officials, or other HN population exceptions.
- Designate the vehicle search area.
- Establish a parking area adjacent to the search area.
- Designate separate search areas for males and females near the vehicle search area.
- Normally, search women by a female Soldier, an HN female, or a metal detector.
- Consider the public impact, including market times, sporting events, holidays, and collateral damage.
- Establish a reserve as appropriate.

7-100. Screen all vehicles IAW established, preferably written, criteria. Establish observation for vehicles or occupants attempting to avoid the checkpoint. Such behavior may present as—

- Occupants exiting a vehicle and walking away from or around the checkpoint.
- A lead vehicle signaling a following vehicle (to avoid the area).
- A distraction to allow a vehicle or occupants to slip away.

7-101. In addition to any basic, published list of criteria, other screening techniques include those following:

- Note the number of occupants.
- Note the type or color of the vehicle.
- Observe all vehicles and all occupants.
- Devise a method for managing important changes or alerts.
- Maintain some element of randomness.

7-102. The three basic levels of vehicle searches are initial, primary, and secondary. (See table 7-1 for descriptions of each level and for the appropriate, yet basic search procedures for each level.)

Table 7-1. Levels of vehicle searches

Level and Description	*Basic Search Procedures for Each Level*
An initial search is a cursory search and is the same for all stopped vehicles. This relatively quick check should take no more than 2 minutes. It may be combined with an initial vehicle screening.	• At least two people conduct the search—one guard of the driver and occupants and one searcher of the vehicle. • Stop the vehicle at the search site. • Instruct the driver to turn off the engine and then to open the hood, the trunk, and all the doors. • Have all occupants exit the vehicle and move to one location. • Question and search the driver and occupants as appropriate. • Continue the search once the above steps are complete. • Begin and end the exterior search at the front of the vehicle, moving in a clockwise direction. • Visually search the exterior and top of the vehicle. • Visually search the underside of the vehicle. • Search the interior starting at the front compartment, moving to the right side, then the rear compartment, then the left side, and ending at the front again. • Complete the search. • Instruct the driver and occupants to continue.
A primary search is a full search of selected vehicles. Vehicle selection may be random in accordance with screening guidelines, or it may be driven by similarities or associations in one vehicle to vehicles from previous events. This search usually checks the interior, exterior, engine and trunk compartments, and, with a mirror, the underside. Overall, a primary search should take 2 to 5 minutes.	• All those (above) procedures of the initial search. • Question or search the driver and occupants. • Check the inside of the front hood. • Check the rear compartment.
A secondary search is a detailed search of a suspect vehicle. Suspicion usually arises around a vehicle upon the discovery of items during a primary search. This thorough search is labor and time intensive. It may include disassembling panels and checking interiors of wheels among other more invasive search techniques.	• At least four people conduct the search—two covering the driver and occupants and two covering the vehicle. • Assume the driver, occupants, and vehicle itself are suspect. • Have the driver stop the vehicle in a safe and secure location whenever possible. • Instruct the driver to turn off the engine and open the hood, trunk, and all the doors. • Obtain the keys from the driver. • Move the driver and occupants to a separate location. • Detain and search the driver and occupants while searching the vehicle. • Commence the vehicle search at the front and terminate it at the rear: ▪ One searcher covers the right front, right side, and right rear. ▪ The other searcher covers the left front, left side, and left rear. • Visually search the exterior and top of the vehicle. • Visually search the underside of the vehicle. • Without entering, visually search the interior of the vehicle, checking the interior left and right sides. • Ensure the engine is off and the hood, the trunk, and all the doors are open. • Check the inside of the front hood. • Check the rear compartment. • Complete the search. • Return the keys to the driver. • Instruct the driver and occupants to continue.

7-103. Vehicle categories are generally of four types: automobiles (cars), motorcycles and bicycles, buses, and heavy goods vehicles (trucks). Paragraphs 7-95 through 7-102 and table 7-1 on page 283, regarding basic vehicle considerations, cover search procedures for automobiles. The following search procedures are for the remaining three vehicle categories:

- Basic motorcycle and bicycle search procedures:
  - Ensure at least two personnel conduct the search—one for the driver and passenger and one for the vehicle.
  - Instruct the driver or passenger to turn off any equipped engine and all riders to dismount.
  - Visually inspect the vehicle and any space in or item on the vehicle that is designed for carrying or stowing, such as an under-the-seat compartment or a handlebar attachment.
  - Complete the search.
  - Instruct the driver and passenger to mount and continue.
- Basic bus search procedures:
  - Ensure at least four personnel conduct the search—two for the driver and passengers and two for the vehicle.
  - Designate an area to search the vehicle due to buses' greater lengths and passenger and luggage capacities.
  - Instruct the driver only to turn off the engine and open all exterior compartments.
  - Initially, board the bus, check all the passengers' identifications, note the seating arrangements, and check all the cabin baggage and carry-on personal items.
  - For a full search, direct all the passengers to exit the bus with their baggage; then, detain them during the bus and baggage searches.
  - Complete the search.
  - Instruct the driver and passengers to reload and continue.
- Basic heavy goods vehicle search procedures:
  - Ensure at least three personnel conduct the search—one for the driver and passengers and two for the vehicle.
  - Designate an area to search the vehicles due to their longer lengths and their potential for carrying cargo.
  - Instruct the driver only to turn off the engine, open the hood, and open all the doors.
  - Check the driver's credentials and the cargo manifests.
  - Inspect to the appropriate degree for the cargo in each instance.
  - Complete the search.
  - Instruct the driver and passengers to secure the load and continue.

RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

7-104. Restoring essential services addresses those basic public needs beyond the provision of security. The BCT normally supports subtasks to restore essential services (for example, those related to civilian dislocation, food relief, and public health programs) in its AO. (See ATP 3-07.5 for information on restoring essential services.) Subtasks for restoring essential services include those following:

- Providing essential civil services.
- Performing tasks specific to addressing civilian dislocation.
- Supporting famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
- Supporting relief programs for needs other than food supplies.
- Supporting humanitarian demining.
- Supporting human rights initiatives.
- Supporting public health programs.
- Supporting education programs.

Task Organization and Actions to Restore Essential Services

7-105. The BCT works to transfer responsibility to a transitional intergovernmental organization, an NGO, or an HN authority as quickly as possible. However, it maintains responsibility for security in its AO, so the transitional authority can best meet public needs. It prioritizes the restoration of essential services to mitigate unnecessary suffering. The BCT commander and staff consider the location, security, and quantity of

distribution of humanitarian aid, as well as who is distributing the aid and how. The BCT staff interprets public perception, mitigates corruption within a partnered element, and ensures these actions mitigate instability for the short and long terms.

7-106. The BCT continuously coordinates with unified action partners through the joint task force headquarters. The BCT using a CMOC integrated with unified action partners enables the coordination and delivery of essential services to the vulnerable population. Example unified action partners may include HN ministry of health and agriculture, and relief organizations such as the USAID and United Nations World Food Program to ensure the population has access to food and water. Partnership with special operations forces may also augment the BCT by providing additional geographic and cultural knowledge and by sharing intelligence to address potential sources of instability.

Initial Response—Restore Essential Services

7-107. The BCT primarily focuses on essential services to alleviate unnecessary suffering among the populace. These services include providing basic public needs such as food, water, and shelter, along with providing support for displaced civilians and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. Efforts to restore essential services in any operation contribute to public well-being. The BCT supports governmental efforts to establish or restore essential services, including the provision of food, water, shelter, and medical support, with actions such as those following:

- Conducting area and zone reconnaissance to identify areas that require immediate assistance.
- Conducting area security to ensure those affected receive the goods, services, and protection.
- Conducting sustainment to deliver water, food, and emergency shelter (for example, tents).
- Conducting engineering operations to assess and repair infrastructure within capabilities.
- Providing medical treatment to civilians at immediate risk of losing life, limb, or eyesight.
- Identifying requirements and requesting enablers, augmentation, or integration of theater assets for specified requirements (for example, infrastructure repair or rebuilding, task organization, force requests, project requests, operational needs statement processes).

7-108. The BCT may provide for immediate humanitarian needs within its organic capabilities by restoring essential services after the conduct of offensive or defensive operations or in response to disaster as part of a humanitarian relief effort. It applies the principles of conflict transformation and unity of effort and sets the conditions to build partner capacity when restoring essential services in the initial response phase.

7-109. Beyond security considerations, the BCT relies on its information collection and sustainment capability to apply conflict transformation. These efforts include operations that identify the sources of instability and support the restoration of essential services as defined in terms of immediate humanitarian needs (for example, food, water, shelter, medical support) to sustain the population until the restoration of local civil services. Contracted services are often a viable option for fulfilling essential services. Therefore, trained contracting officer's representatives and pay agents are critical enablers at the battalion and company levels and ensure any contracted support meets its intended purpose as agreed in contracts or other binding agreements. (See FM 3-96 for information on contracted support.)

7-110. Stability-focused operations require unique sustainment considerations. The support battalion always plans to support the BCT but may also need to plan sustainment beyond the BCT when supporting stability operations tasks. The BCT logistics staff officer (S-4), during the development of the BCT's concept of support, remains mindful that, by design, the support battalion is only to support the BCT's assigned Soldiers and equipment. Prior to the execution of the sustainment plan, the support battalion commander ensures the sustainment estimates differentiate what is supporting internal BCT requirements and what is supporting external support mission requirements. Sustainment during stability-focused operations often involves supporting U.S. Forces, multinational forces, and other contributing partners in a wide range of missions and tasks. (See FM 3-96 for information on sustainment considerations.)

7-111. The BCT remains responsible for achieving unity of effort in all subtasks, but other agencies, including the HN, U.S. Department of State, or NGOs, most often assume responsibility for execution. The credibility of the legitimate authority or illegitimate actors is not the primary consideration during the initial response phase of restoring essential services. Credibility becomes vital later in the initial response phase as actors seize the initiative to influence their political positions upon the establishment of an interim authority

and as the HN begins the transformation phase. The BCT monitors and keeps a record of actions taken by actors to shape public perception regarding their legitimacy. This allows the BCT to credit and discredit legitimate and illegitimate actors through factual information.

7-112. BCTs also focus on maintaining civil security to allow other agencies and HN entities to meet these needs, thus ensuring the BCT builds capacity to transition this responsibility quickly. The activities associated with this stability operations task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center efforts on immediate public needs, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and more holistic public well-being.

7-113. The presence of displaced people in the battlespace can threaten success in any operation. Any number of factors may lead to the displacement of civilians, but regardless of the reasons, their displacement prompts the BCT to assist in meeting their immediate needs until other, better equipped organizations establish control in the BCT's AO. Civilian displacement in any area may indicate the presence of broader population issues such as conflict, insecurity, and disparity. The BCT immediately assesses and addresses the public impact from displacement to establish conditions for the stabilization and rehabilitation of a traumatized population. Local and international aid organizations are most often best equipped to handle public needs but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, military forces enable the success of these organizations by providing a safe and secure environment from which to operate.

7-114. Understanding the locations, dispositions, and compositions of displaced civilians remains a high priority and a primary consideration throughout stability-focused operations. Many displaced people are women and children. Many, and in some contingencies, most displaced people suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. External groups may target displaced civilians as a continuation of earlier conflict, thus escalating the conflict and destabilizing the environment. Public unrest among displaced civilians can encourage actors of destabilization as well. Thus, the BCT coordinates with unified action partners and receives augments of available assets from a higher HQ, such as medical support and security, to establish secure facilities, to conduct any evacuations, and to maintain initiative over destabilizing factors.

7-115. The BCT plans for prevention and mitigation of health threats and regional diseases to provide support for deployed forces and affected civilians in the BCT's AO. Role 1 and 2 medical care assets support force health protection (see ATP 4-02.8 regarding health protection) to prevent, mitigate, and treat the adverse effects of disease and nonbattle injury to protect the health of deployed forces. The BCT conducts area and zone reconnaissance to gain information on sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations (SWEAT-MSO) and to determine potential occupational and environmental health hazards. As necessary, it assesses the existing medical infrastructure, including preventive health services, and temporarily operates or augments operations of existing medical facilities in extreme circumstances. (See FM 3-96, FM 4-02, and ATP 4-02.6 for information on medical support.)

Transformation—Restore Essential Services

7-116. Operations conducted during the transformation phase establish the foundation for long-term development and resolve conflict's root causes that lead to negative effects such as famine, civilian displacement, and human trafficking. The BCT primarily conducts operations that secure the environment to enable other agencies and the HN to meet public needs. The BCT commander and staff assess related activities and missions to achieve unity of effort in the OE and continually identify potential sources of instability. During transformation, the commander and staff apply the principles of unity of effort and for building the HN government's legitimacy, HN ownership, and partner capacity. These principles enable a combined effort toward sustained societal well-being.

7-117. As other organizations, NGOs, USAID, and other interagency partners and the HN assume responsibilities for restoring essential services, the BCT continues its partnership with those organizations. It supports the efforts by ensuring security, identifying overlooked public needs, facilitating other partners' activities, and continuing to provide critically needed humanitarian aid.

7-118. To shape public perception regarding their legitimacy, HN authorities demonstrate their ability to restore essential services. The BCT includes legitimate HN authorities in assessments and when establishing priorities. It transitions its relationship from one of direct support and coordination to coaching, teaching,

mentoring, and facilitating unified action partners, so they can continue to make progress toward restoring essential services.

7-119. The BCT scales activities to local capacity for sustainment. Proper scaling also creates opportunities for the local populace to generate small-scale enterprises that provide services as much as possible. The BCT does not initiate large-scale projects until the necessary infrastructure is in place to support such efforts.

Sustainability Fostering—Restore Essential Services

7-120. Sustainability-fostering tasks ensure the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society. Conditions for sustained societal well-being depend on the ability of the legitimate authority to meet public needs, comply with the right of return, address instances of civilian harm, promote transitional justice, and support peaceful coexistence.

Essential Service Establishment, Restoration, and Protection

7-121. BCT forces (which, in this context, are the COIN) establish or restore essential services and protect them until a civil authority or the HN can provide them on its own. Here, COIN forces work toward meeting basic public needs. Ideally, the military provides only the security for the humanitarian aid effort. Normally, Army forces support other government, intergovernmental, and HN agencies. When the HN or other agency cannot perform its role, COIN forces may provide the basics directly. Tactical units focus primarily on addressing immediate public needs and fostering host-nation efforts at restoring essential services. However, in the absence of HN capability or as the HN develops the capability, military forces may perform these tasks directly. Tactical units generally provide for basic public needs such as food, water, shelter, and medical support. When other agencies are present, close coordination between military forces and those agencies is paramount. (See ATP 3-07.5 for technique considerations.)

Provide Essential Civil Services

7-122. Though closely related to establishing and supporting effective local governance, efforts to provide essential civil services to the HN population involve developing the capacity to operate, maintain, and improve those services. This broader focus contains a societal component of long-range education and training, employment programs, and economic investment and development. At the tactical level, activities of military forces for providing essential civil services are often defined in terms of immediate humanitarian needs—providing the necessary food, water, shelter, and medical support for sustaining the populace until the restoration of local civil services. Once immediate public needs have been met, progress begins on both restoring essential services and transitioning control to civil authorities across LOEs developed in response to the status of SWEAT-MSO capabilities. These LOEs are vital to integrating, firstly, the efforts to reestablish local HN services with, secondly, the similar, related actions to establish a safe, secure environment. Tactical units often support the effort to provide essential civil services by conducting detailed, infrastructure reconnaissance or security for those types of reconstruction projects. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Providing for immediate humanitarian needs (for example, food, water, shelter, medical support).
- Ensuring proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.
- Providing interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services.

Perform Tasks Specific to Addressing Civilian Dislocation

7-123. In the fluid and uncertain nature of an insurgency, civilians often lose access to their residences. The presence and uncontrolled flow of dislocated civilians can threaten the success of any stability operation. The treatment of displaced populations either fosters public trust and confidence—laying the foundation for stabilization and reconstruction among a traumatized population—or creates public resentment and further chaos. Local and international aid organizations are most often best equipped to deal with public needs but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, tactical units can enable the success of these organizations by providing critical assistance to the populace. Nearly 80 percent of all dislocated civilians are women or children. Most suffer from some form of post-traumatic stress disorder, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. Following a major disaster, humanitarian crisis, or conflict, providing adequate support to dislocated civilians often presents a challenge beyond the capability of

available military forces. Therefore, military forces offer vital support, ICW interagency and interorganizational efforts, to provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Assisting dislocated civilians.
- Supporting assistance to dislocated civilians.
- Supporting security to dislocated civilian camps.

Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs

7-124. Famine vulnerability can cause an insurgency, and alternately, an insurgency can lead to food scarcity. The combination of weak institutions, poor policies, and environmental change often results in famine. Famine yields food insecurity and increases in poverty, morbidity, malnutrition, and mortality. Government agencies such as the USAID, numerous NGOs, and the United Nations are instrumental in response efforts in states prone to famine. They oversee the major relief programs that provide emergency food aid to suffering populations. Tactical units conducting these efforts are vital to the overall success of the operation. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Monitoring and analyzing food security and market prices.
- Predicting the effects of conflict on access to food.
- Estimating total food requirements.
- Assessing the adequacy of the local physical transport, distribution, and storage of food.
- Delivering emergency food aid to the most vulnerable populations.

Support Public Health Programs

7-125. Supporting public health programs enables the complementary efforts of local and international aid organizations. The initial efforts of military forces at this task aim to stabilize the public health situation in the operational area. These efforts may include assessments of the civilian medical and public health system, which comprises infrastructure, medical staff, training and education, medical logistics, and public health programs. Achieving measurable progress requires early coordination and constant dialogue with other actors. Later, that longer developed coordination and communication will facilitate the transition from military-led efforts to civilian organization or HN responsibility. Essential tasks may include those following:

- Assessing the existing medical infrastructure, including preventative and veterinary services, physical and mental health care systems, and medical logistics.
- Evaluating the need for additional medical capabilities.
- Promoting and enhancing the HN medical infrastructure.
- Repairing existing civilian clinics and hospitals.
- Operating or augmenting the operations of existing civilian medical facilities.
- Assessing public health hazards in AOs, including malnutrition, compromised water sources, and inadequate sewage and other sanitation services.
- Preventing epidemics through immediate vaccinations.
- Supporting improvements to local waste and wastewater management capacity.

Support Education Programs

7-126. Military activities to support education programs generally focus on repairing or building physical infrastructure such as classrooms, schools, or universities. In some cases, trained personnel with appropriate civilian backgrounds provide additional services such as administrative or educational expertise.

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

7-127. *Governance* is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (JP 3-24). Support to governance subtasks include those following:

- Supporting transitional administrations.
- Supporting development of local governance.
- Supporting anticorruption initiatives.
- Supporting elections.

Task Organization and Actions to Provide Support to Governance

7-128. The BCT's support to governance varies over the range of military operations and AOs. The BCT can provide support to transitional authorities and the development of local governance in a primary or subordinate role with the partnering entities. The BCT's support to anticorruption and elections does not change its role throughout its AO. Instead, it varies depending on how it may be conducted and in consideration of the METT-TC (I) variables. The establishment of civil security and of civil control provides a foundation for transitioning authority to civilian agencies and eventually to the HN. (See ATP 3-07.5 for information on providing support to governance.)

Initial Response—Provide Support to Governance

7-129. The initial response phase sets the conditions for how governance can be supported. Information collection during this phase is continuous and leveraged through Soldier and leader engagements to identify sources of instability, develop understanding of unified action partners' motivations and agendas, and identify local civic leaders. The BCT commander, subordinate commanders, and leaders apply adroit diplomatic and communication skills to build constructive relationships during this phase. The BCT focuses on providing a secure environment for relief forces to meet immediate humanitarian needs.

7-130. The BCT sets the conditions for civic leaders and factions to address public grievances and sources of instability peacefully and openly. It sets conditions by—

- Identifying faction leaders, legitimate authorities, popular and minority support, or alignment with coalition forces' political interests.
- Providing a safe, secure environment in which these leaders may meet and communicate.
- Influencing leaders to participate in political systems and not through violence.
- Influencing local populaces to participate in elections.
- Remaining actively neutral but keeping public interests in mind.
- Allowing leaders to communicate but not tolerating intimidation, violence, corruption, or sources of instability to escalate.

7-131. A thorough information collection plan supports the commander and subordinate units in developing understanding of their AO and in engaging unified action partners from a position of advantage. The commander reaches clear agreements, understandings, or accords to conduct operations that will lay the foundation of governance during the initial response phase. Conducting operations after Soldier and leader engagements confirms or denies unified action partners' motivations and agendas. Assessing the outcomes of unified action partners' operations and actions reveal their relationships to the BCT and provide direction on how to support governance further.

7-132. The initial response phase normally ends with the election of officials and the establishment of a safe and secure environment that is capable of mitigating sources of instability for a longer period of time. Encouraging election participation and responsible behavior around and toward elections may require an increased presence of the BCT and HNSF and additional information-related capabilities. The BCT and HNSF may conduct security and area security for polling sites, political rallies, media centers, international observers, and candidates.

Transformation—Provide Support to Governance

7-133. The transformation phase begins after some form of government becomes operational. It may include oversight by the transitional military authority, but it does include a relatively safe environment with a tolerable level of instability. Transformation ends when the HN can conduct good governance with minimal assistance, when the local population accepts this governance, and when the HN stands prepared for long-term development.

7-134. The BCT supports the operating government during the transformation phase by advising, assisting, supporting, and monitoring other actors. During this phase, BCT commanders, subordinate commanders, and leaders continue to build constructive relationships, despite changes in unit or organizational leaders, and to progress unity of effort, the HN government's legitimacy, HN ownership, and partner capacity.

7-135. The BCT commander, subordinate leaders, and unified action partners advise civil servants during administrative actions. They continue to conduct engagements in their AO and assess actors' agendas or intentions through operations, ensuring unity of effort. BCT subordinate units interact with multiple HN actors, helping them coordinate efforts more effectively.

7-136. The BCT conducts operations to shape public perception of the local government as capable of, willing in, and progressing toward the mitigation of instability sources with little assistance, if not fully independent, from unified action partners. The local populace needs to believe the BCT and HN can sustain this achievement for the duration and not become unstable or corrupt.

7-137. The BCT commander builds partner capacity by leveraging unified action partners who are providing for government needs and who are demonstrating the HN government's legitimacy and capability. The BCT commander and staff identify gaps in capability to address sources of instability through information collection and engagements with the local government. The BCT shares this information between the local population and the government leveraging unified action partners' resources to build capacity, thereby mitigating instability where capability did not previously exist.

Example of Partner Capacity Building

A patrol identifies two villages that are in contention with one another because of a lack of water. One has an abundance of water due to building a levee and the other does not. The patrol shares this information to the company commander. The company commander engages the local government leader about the issue and the local leader does not have the capability to solve the problem. The company commander engages the battalion commander and staff who arranges an engagement with the provincial reconstruction team and unified action partners. An engineer from the provincial reconstruction team coordinates with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and local regional development planners discover that they can provide water to the other village by digging wells that access underground water sources. The provincial reconstruction team provides a proposal for a contract to the company commander and local government leaders. The local government leader reaches a decision to commission a contract to build wells. While the wells are being built, the levee must be lowered to allow some water to flow downstream for certain periods of time. In return, both villages provide labor to the project equally. The company commander coordinates with the provincial reconstruction team, sends patrols with a qualified [contracting officer's representative] and ensures fulfillment of the contract terms. The BCT commander and staff, and subordinate units conduct information operations to show a partnership with the HN.

7-138. The BCT supports good governance by ensuring local governments adhere to the rule of law and to the law established by the higher level of government. The incoming legitimate authority, with public support, establishes (or reestablishes) and supports the rule of law during the transformation phase. The BCT commander and subordinate leaders maintain familiarity with the current state of the rule of law to ensure partnered elements support the rule of law and act accordingly. Operations conducted during this phase support the messages and themes that advocate the rule of law, encourage reports of law violations, and demonstrate government actions addressing law violations as consistent with the rule of law.

Sustainability Fostering—Provide Support to Governance

7-139. The sustainability fostering phase begins when the HN can conduct good governance with minimal assistance, when the local population accepts this governance, and when the HN stands prepared for long-term development. This phase ends with the complete withdrawal of the BCTs interacting with local government on a routine basis. BCT support to governance during sustainability fostering oversees the transferring of responsibility of governance to an enduring HN authority.

Building Toward Effective, Legitimate Governance

7-140. Providing support to governance aids the overall effort to build toward effective, legitimate governance. Specifically, it focuses on restoring public administration and services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. In every case, for the COIN to develop a long-term solution, unit actions must strengthen the HN government and reinforce its legitimacy among the people (see figure 7-4). The formation of an effective local government is critical to the success of any COIN operation because such governing bodies serve as the foundation for legitimate governance at the national level. Additionally, effective local governments promote societal stability since civilians have a say in their own governance. These governing bodies also increase financial transparency, which deters corruption. At the local level, forming neighborhood councils is an excellent starting point for supporting governance. Units may have to initiate these efforts without external agency support. Neighborhood and district councils are effective because they empower the populace on many levels. They help the populace devise local solutions to local problems, and they help citizens and community leaders build community decision-making skills. All involved parties learn to resolve conflict peacefully and in a transparent fashion. Local councils also help local leaders develop skills for serving at higher levels of government.




Figure 7-4. Qualities of legitimate governance

The Challenges of Governance in Iraq

Perhaps the most volatile site for this [ethnic] conflict was the city of Kirkuk, located in northern Iraq approximately 150 miles north of Baghdad. The city was located in what was historically Kurdish territory, but its population had long been a mix of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrian Christians, and Turkoman. Situated in the heart of Iraq's oil fields, Kirkuk had strategic importance for much of the 20th century. Partly for that reason, in the 1970s and 1980s Saddam attempted to "Arabize" Kirkuk by forcing Kurds to leave and moving Arab groups in. The arrival of Coalition troops in the city in May 2003 opened up the possibility for the Kurdish population to take control once again over an important cultural and economic center.

The 173d Airborne Brigade took responsibility for the city soon after the toppling of the Saddam regime. In May 2003 Soldiers of the brigade found themselves attempting to mediate between groups of armed Arabs moving north to ensure the Kurds did not overwhelm the city and the Kurdish groups that had begun flexing their muscles by forcibly evicting some Arabs. On 17 May this conflict became violent with firefights erupting in the streets of Kirkuk. Colonel William Mayville, the brigade commander, recalled that this event served as the "really big first lesson into, or insight into what some of the social dynamics in this community at play were." He added, "If you did not address (these dynamics), the consequences could be very, very violent." . . .

Instead of finding citizens eager for democracy, the Soldiers of the 173d Airborne Brigade discovered a multiethnic populace interested in removing all vestiges of Baathist power and solving the problems of Saddam's Arabization policies, while also ensuring their ethnic group retained its social, economic, and political position in the city. This presented a complex problem to the Soldiers of the brigade, the large majority of whom had no experience in politics of any type . . . .

One of the first recommendations made by brigade officers was the establishment of a multiethnic city council that could help redress the grievances of the various groups and begin moving the city forward. By the end of May 2003, less than 6 weeks after the brigade arrived in Kirkuk, Mayville and his governance team orchestrated the selection of 300 delegates from the city that in turn elected a 30-seat council, which included 6 representatives from each of the 4 ethnic groups . . . .

Working with civilian [contract] consultants . . . who had partnered with USAID, brigade officers convinced the city council to establish a new structure that included five directorates: employment, public safety, public works, budget office, and resettlement. The employment directorate would play a direct role in enforcing the de-Baathification process and U.S. officers hoped the resettlement office could work with both Arabs and Kurds to defuse the tensions caused by land disputes. [These civilian] consultants and CA officers also assisted the new Kirkuk budget office prepare the city's budget for 2004 and established a citizens bureau to help handle complaints from the public.

Support Transitional Administrations

7-141. When the HN government has collapsed or been deposed, counterinsurgent efforts focus on immediately filling the void in governance. In either situation, the reliability and trustworthiness of local officials are suspect; due care and prudence are necessary to avoid empowering officials whose interests and loyalties are inconsistent with those of the occupying force. For example, a tactical unit may struggle with identifying and emplacing a good neighborhood council leader. Essential tasks may include—

- Vetting host-nation officials.
- Reconstituting leadership at local levels of government.
- Establishing an interim legislative process.

Support Development of Local Governance

7-142. Establishing effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance institutions and processes throughout the HN. Initially, effective local governance depends almost entirely on the ability to provide essential civil services. Most stability tasks require an integrated and synchronized effort across all sectors to achieve the desired end state. Tactical units are often successful when they work with a city, district, or tribal council or with a city manager. Essential tasks may include—

- Establishing mechanisms for local-level participation.
- Identifying, securing, rehabilitating, and maintaining basic facilities for the local government.
- Restoring essential public services locally.
- Providing resources for maintaining those restored essential services.

Support Anticorruption Initiatives

7-143. The corruption of government officials can be a root cause of an insurgency. Providing legal guidance and assistance to the transitional government mitigates the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures ensure lasting success. Corruption and graft can hinder efforts to establish governance, restore the rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhinge reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces create mechanisms to curtail corruption across government institutions. Units must decide whether the level of corruption in the HN society is acceptable. Other essential tasks may include—

- Disseminating ethical standards for civil servants.
- Ensuring transparency in the dispersal of government resources.
- Implementing reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.

Support Elections

7-144. The ability of the HN government and its local subdivisions to hold fair and secure elections is a significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide the enabling support for broad participation by the local populace. Essential tasks may include—

- Providing security for polling places, voters, and ballots.
- Determining identification requirements for voter registration.
- Establishing or verifying voter registry.

Negotiation, Mediation, and Arbitration Support to Governance

7-145. In a COIN, some situations require the COIN force to negotiate, mediate, and even arbitrate disputes. These usually involve minor points of contention between belligerents, or disagreements about the daily routines of the COIN force. Unit leaders maintain awareness of their limitations. They refer larger points of contention or those issues beyond their abilities to resolve to a higher authority. When possible, arbitration is referred to the existing legal system. Negotiations are made from a position of strength while mediation is made from a position of impartiality. In the joint, combined, and interagency environments, negotiations and mediations can be complex. Nonetheless, all negotiations and mediations require tact, diplomacy, honesty, patience, fairness, effective communication, cultural capability, and careful planning. For its purposes, this publication uses the following definitions:

- Negotiation—discussion between at least two parties, with the intent to produce an agreement.
- Mediation—an attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement or compromise between disputants through the objective intervention of a neutral party.
- Arbitration—the process by which disputants submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial person or group appointed by mutual consent.

Usage in a Counterinsurgency

7-146. Unit leaders remain prepared to conduct negotiations or mediations with the leaders or members of various groups. These groups may have political, ethnic, religious, tribal, military, and even familial

affiliations. Understanding group compositions in the AO is vital for effective negotiations and mediations. Analyzing civil considerations using the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) of various groups can be extremely helpful when preparing for these discussions. Furthermore, tensions or hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents. Negotiations and mediations are divided into two categories: situational and preplanned.

7-147. Situational negotiations and mediations allow the immediate discussion and resolution of an issue or problem. For example, members of a ground patrol might encounter two groups arguing at an intersection. To negotiate a resolution to this problem, the patrol would require a thorough understanding of the ROE and rules of interaction. Soldiers apply this working knowledge to the process of discussing and, when possible, resolving issues and problems between opposing parties, which sometimes includes the unit itself. Leaders on the ground remain mindful of when they have exhausted their options under the ROE and rules of interaction, and they then relinquish the discussion to a higher authority.

7-148. Preplanned negotiations allow discussion and resolution for an upcoming, specific issue or problem. For example, a company commander might conduct a work coordination meeting between leaders of the belligerents to determine mine-clearing responsibilities. As with situational negotiations, preplanned negotiations require leaders to know and understand the ROE and rules of interaction. Leaders also maintain as much knowledge as possible about every aspect of the dispute or issue. The negotiator's goal is to reach an acceptable agreement to both sides that reduces antagonism and the threat of renewed hostilities.

Considerations During Counterinsurgencies

7-149. Commanders identify powerful groups both inside and outside their AOs and obtain key information about them as part of their preparations for negotiating and mediating. They use the ASCOPE framework to analyze civil considerations. This preparation proves especially beneficial for conducting the day-to-day situational negotiations and mediations that so easily arise during daily operations. This key information includes—

- Formal relationships such as treaties or alliances between groups.
- Informal relationships such as tolerance or friction between groups.
- Divisions and cleavages between groups.
- Crosscutting relationships between groups, such as schisms between those with differences in religious beliefs, political parties, or business ventures.

Guidelines for Negotiations and Mediations

7-150. Credibility is key to success. As a rule, only necessary information and those actions that authorities and commanders intend to do or have the authority to do are discussed. Successful negotiating often involves communicating a clear position on all issues. This includes visualizing several possible end states while maintaining a clear idea of the best end state and conveying a willingness to bargain on negotiable points. The use of tact to justify standing firm on nonnegotiable points communicates respect for other participants. Having disposable points for concessions is a useful tactic. Several steps are common to negotiations and mediations, especially preplanned negotiations (see paragraphs 7-151 through 7-155).

7-151. The first step is determining the purpose. Before contacting leaders of the belligerent parties to initiate the negotiation or mediation process, participants must know what they are trying to do, as well as the limits of their authority. Participants possess the ability to recommend their superiors ratify the agreement.

7-152. The second step is preparing. Thorough preparation increases the likelihood of the success of the negotiation or mediation process. Commanders familiarize themselves with both the situation and the area in which units will operate. They may select one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to observe a negotiation or mediation and provide advice. This individual watches body language, and other indicators, for whether the process seems effective. As appropriate, this person can coach more effective techniques to the negotiators or mediators. Leaders also develop a meeting agenda and consider the expected conduct, customs, and actions for the meeting.

7-153. The third step is communicating. Participants establish an effective means of communicating with all parties. They do not assume a certain leader or element opposes the main effort without careful investigation. Instead, they ensure facts are correct before forming any opinions. The commander earns the trust and

confidence of any opposing party. This process includes establishing an atmosphere (and a physical setting) that participants will judge to be both fair and safe.

7-154. The fourth step is executing. Discussion leaders always strive to maintain control of the session; they remain firm, yet evenhanded in their roles. At the same time, they remain flexible and maintain a willingness to accept recommendations from the opposing parties and from assistants and advisors. They settle the easy issues first. They remain prepared to proceed issue by issue in a predetermined order. Actions carry different connotations across cultures. Culture shapes how people reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to decision making. Also, nonverbal behaviors such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting are important. If participants cannot reach agreement, they continue dialoguing. At a minimum, they agree on when the parties will meet again.

7-155. The fifth step is stablishing leader and meeting security. Key leaders and important meetings, even in established, nonviolent, peaceful areas of the world, need security. It allows leaders to focus on the meeting's purpose without distractions. During a COIN, security becomes an absolute requirement since all key leaders and important meetings are potential targets for insurgents. Successful COIN operations require active public interaction. Such interaction varies from formal meetings and negotiations to informal engagements with local citizens. Formal meetings and negotiations are significant mission events and undergo thorough planning and proper resourcing. Informal engagements happen with little or no planning, but Soldiers still prepare with thorough training and standard operating procedures (SOPs). In most situations, unit leaders, from team leaders up, are the individuals involved in regular interactions and meetings. These personnel are often placed in exposed positions as they execute their missions. At the tactical level, a protective service detail, military police platoon, or squad typically secures a leader, very important person, or meeting. Leaders and units consider several matters when preparing for meetings or negotiations.

7-156. One consideration when preparing for a meeting or negotiation is for individual Soldier interactions. In a COIN environment, individual Soldiers interact daily with the local populace. While doing so, they maintain situational awareness and remain prepared to react immediately to a range of situations. While one Soldier interacts, another provides security for the first. This is easy under the buddy system.

7-157. Another consideration is for protective service. At least one person remains ready to provide close, direct, physical protection for the leader. However, the leader's security does not interfere with the leader's mission accomplishment, irritate other participants, or include behavior that is perceivable as a threat. During planning, leaders determine any restrictions on people approaching the protected leader and restrict the circulation of people around the leader. If armed at all, the leader carries a sidearm. This choice leaves the leader's hands free to react to close-in threats. Security personnel take positions from where they can observe everything and everyone near the leader.

7-158. Finally, a third consideration in meeting preparation is for security. The planning and preparation of crowd control measures occur prior to a meeting, even when crowds are not expected. The planning of evacuation routes and escalation of force procedures for key personnel also occurs. The planning for outer security includes the coverage of inner and outer cordons. In this context, the inner cordon protects the meeting participants, controls access to the meeting, and controls the immediate crowd. The outer cordon isolates and controls access to the meeting. This cordon may be close in and visible or out of sight of the actual meeting, focusing on external elements trying to gain access.

7-159. Special units or weapons (for example, snipers, shotguns, nonlethal weapons) are employed when available. At least one interpreter, but preferably two, is employed. When two are present, one actively interprets while the other observes body language and listens to side conversations in the audience. All these steps are rehearsed before execution.

7-160. A typical technique for conducting a meeting is to reconnoiter and conduct a pre-site-clearance of the meeting site (before the meeting). Forces also establish outer and inner cordons, secure the meeting, collapse both cordons, and then conduct an orderly movement back to their base or combat outpost. All these actions should be rehearsed extensively prior to execution.

Provide Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

7-161. By establishing a safe, secure environment, the BCT assists HN actors as they begin the process of achieving sustainable economic development. Other U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental

organizations, and civilian relief agencies often have the best qualifications to lead the efforts to restore and help develop HN economic capabilities. Ultimately, the goal is to establish the conditions in which the HN can generate its own revenues and not rely upon outside aid. The desired end state is a robust, entrepreneurial, and sustainable economy in the HN. All economic development actions build upon and enhance HN economic and management capacities. (See ATP 3-07.5 for information on supporting economic and infrastructure development.) Subtasks in providing support to economic and infrastructure development include those following:

- Supporting economic generation and enterprise creation.
- Supporting monetary institutions and programs.
- Supporting national treasury operations.
- Supporting public sector investment programs.
- Supporting private sector development.
- Protecting natural resources and the natural environment.
- Supporting agricultural development programs.
- Supporting general infrastructure reconstruction programs.
- Restoring the transportation infrastructure.
- Restoring the telecommunications infrastructure.

Task Organization and Actions to Provide Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

7-162. The BCT's support toward economic and infrastructure development varies over the range of military operations and AOs. Nevertheless, the efforts toward conflict transformation, unity of effort, and increases in HN government legitimacy, HN ownership, and partner capacity endure through all phases.

Initial Response—Provide Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

7-163. The BCT supports economic and infrastructure development at the local level during the initial response phase by establishing AOs and task-organizing and empowering subordinate units, which it does by allowing them to coordinate with unified action partners. It synchronizes efforts regionally and shifts assets and resources as main efforts change or as opportunities to exploit the initiative arise. The building blocks for broad national recovery and development are set at the local level, and the BCT's information collection effort focuses on identifying microeconomic information such as changes in commodity or service costs or the number of males without employment and with ages between 15 and 45 years old. Though the BCT maintains responsibility for security, secondary efforts include facilitating the emergence of employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through microeconomics, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure to help retain and exploit the initiative.

7-164. The BCT may have to take the lead in responding to immediate economic needs, including assessing the critical micro- and macroeconomic conditions, during the initial response phase. These economic needs may require HN civilians bringing agricultural products and other goods to safe, secure marketplaces or generating jobs that qualified laborers can fill, for two examples. Unity of effort is essential for the BCT to identify and engage all relevant actors from the HN, U.S. civil agencies, and international organizations. These evolving partnerships and assessments significantly enhance the economic development management transition tasks from the BCT to the U.S. Government civil agencies and HN actors. Hostile individuals and groups can take advantage of gaps when the actors do not engage. They can also exploit opportunities for profit, contributing to long-term instability.

7-165. Infrastructure reconnaissance is a multi-disciplinary variation of reconnaissance that collects detailed technical information on categories of national or regional public systems, services, and facilities. It informs situational understanding of the local capability to support public infrastructure requirements or of military operations in a specific area. This type of reconnaissance occurs in stages—the infrastructure assessment and the infrastructure survey. (See ATP 3-34.81 for information on infrastructure reconnaissance.)

7-166. Coordinating with the combat engineer units for an on-site visit, an engineer reconnaissance team can be expected to conduct the initial assessment, with available expertise from the supported unit. The initial

assessment provides information to confirm or deny planning assumptions, update running estimates, determine immediate needs, develop priorities, obtain resources, and refine a plan. As operations continue, general engineer and other supporting technical support elements provide qualified teams to perform an infrastructure survey. These teams use the infrastructure assessments from the engineer reconnaissance teams to prioritize categories and identify those parts of the infrastructure to undergo reassessment in more detail. The requisite technical capabilities for performing comprehensive reconnaissance include robust support from joint Service, multiagency, contractor, HN, multinational, and reachback elements.

Transformation—Provide Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

7-167. The goal of the transformation phase is to establish a firm foundation for sustainable economic development and to begin to transition control of economic development to U.S. Government civil agencies, international civil agencies, and host-nation (economic) officials and entrepreneurs. The collective emphasis is on establishing HN institutions to provide sustainable economic growth during this phase. Once a civilian administration assumes control, the primary economic development role of the BCT is to advise and assist local leaders.

Sustainability Fostering—Provide Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

7-168. The goal of sustainability fostering sustainability is to institutionalize a long-term, sustainable economic development program and to transition control of the economy completely to HN officials, entrepreneurs, and civil society. This phase also includes steps that build on and reinforce the successes of the initial response and transformation phases. Steps taken during this phase support sustainable economic growth based on a healthy society supported by healthy communities and neighborhoods. The primary economic development role for the BCT is to continue to advise and assist HN civilian economic officials.

Host Nation Capability and Capacity Development

7-169. COIN LOEs to develop HN capability and capacity include both short- and long-term aspects. The short-term aspect concerns immediate problems such as large-scale unemployment and the need to reestablish economy at all levels. The long-term aspect involves stimulating domestic, robust, and broad economic activity. The stability a nation enjoys is often related to its people's economic situation and its adherence to the rule of law. However, a nation's economic health also depends on its government's ability to secure the populace continuously.

Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation

7-170. Economic recovery begins with an actively engaged labor force. Insurgencies often gain recruits by offering a wage to those without employment. When a tactical unit occupies its AO, its demand on local goods, services, and labor creates employment opportunities for the local populace. Local projects such as restoring public services, rebuilding schools, or clearing roads offer additional opportunities for the local labor pool. Drawing on local goods, services, and labor presents the force with the first opportunity to infuse cash into the local economy, which, in turn, stimulates market activity. However, this initial economic infusion must be translated into consistent capital availability and sustainable jobs programs. Thus, short-term actions are taken with an eye toward enabling financial self-reliance and the creation of a durable enterprise and job market.

7-171. The local economy requires this stimulus to sustain economic generation and enterprise creation. It includes efforts to execute contracting duties; identify, prioritize, and manage local projects; and implement employment programs. Often, such programs reinforce efforts to establish security and civil order by providing meaningful employment and compensation to the local populace. The assessment of the economic sector includes developing knowledge and understanding of local pay scales; this is essential to establishing jobs programs with appropriate wages. Inflated pay scales may divert critical professionals from their chosen field in pursuit of short-term financial gains from new jobs created by the force. Establishing appropriate pay scales is also significant when the environment includes illicit payment for actions or services in direct conflict with the aims of the force. Adversaries can easily exploit relatively low pay scales and quickly undermine efforts to shape public perception.

7-172. HN enterprise creation is an essential activity whereby local residents organize themselves to provide valuable goods and services. In doing so, they create jobs for themselves, their families, and neighbors that are inherently sustainable after the departure of other actors. HN enterprises provide various goods and services, including essential services such as small-scale sewerage, water, electricity, transportation, health care, and communications. The availability of financing through banks or microfinance institutions is essential to enterprise creation. Essential tasks may include—

- Implementing initiatives to provide immediate employment.
- Creating employment opportunities without age or sex discrimination.
- Assessing the labor force for critical skill requirements and shortfalls.
- Assessing the market sector for labor requirements and pay norms.
- Implementing public works projects.
- Supporting the establishment of a business registry to register lawful business activity at the local or provincial level.
- Providing startup capital for small businesses through small-scale enterprise grants.
- Encouraging the creation of small lending institutions.
- Enabling the development of financial institutions.

Support Public Sector Investment Programs

7-173. Organizations such as the USAID usually manage public sector investment in a fragile state. However, the military force also influences success in these programs. Public sector investment ensures the long-term viability of public education, health care, and mass transit. It also provides for development in resource management and energy industries sourced by mining, oil, natural gas, and hydroelectricity. At the tactical level, units spur investment through grant programs or direct public investment projects. Essential tasks may include—

- Identifying projects that require large amounts of labor.
- Prioritizing public investment needs.
- Developing plans to allocate available resources.

Support Private Sector Development

7-174. Developing the private sector typically begins with employing large portions of the labor force. In addition to acquiring goods and services from the local economy, the tasks that support private sector development infuse much-needed cash into local markets and initiate additional public investment and development. Essential tasks may include—

- Identifying projects that require large amounts of labor.
- Assessing the depth of the private sector and enterprise creation.
- Identifying obstacles to private sector development.
- Facilitating access to markets.
- Strengthening the private sector through contracting and outsourcing.
- Providing investors with protection and incentives.

Support Agricultural Development Programs

7-175. The agricultural sector is a cornerstone of a viable market economy, providing crops and livestock vital to local markets and international trade. Property disputes, difficulty in accessing nearby markets, poor irrigation, animal disease, minefields, and unexploded explosive ordnance can all hinder its development. Therefore, development agencies prioritize and integrate projects with related tasks in other joint stability functions to establish and institutionalize practical solutions to the long-term growth of the agricultural sector. The military contribution to agricultural development parallels related efforts to spur economic growth in local communities. Together, they draw on local labor pools to help reestablish essential services for the agricultural sector. Essential tasks may include—

- Assessing the state of the agricultural sector.
- Encouraging HN enterprise creation to provide goods and services to the agricultural sector.
- Establishing work programs to support agricultural development.
- Establishing transportation and distribution networks.

- Identifying constraints to production.
- Ensuring open transit and access to local markets.
- Securing and protecting postharvest storage facilities.
- Rebuilding small-scale irrigation systems.
- Protecting water sources.
- Assessing the health, diversity, and numbers of animals.

Restore the Transportation Infrastructure

7-176. Even at the local level, the restoration of the transportation infrastructure is central to economic recovery. An underdeveloped or incapacitated transportation infrastructure limits freedom of movement, trade, social interaction, and development. Goods must reach the markets. Military forces often initiate immediate improvement to the transportation and distribution networks of the HN. These networks enable freedom of maneuver, logistic support, and the movement of personnel and materiel to support ongoing operations. Also, they can reduce the risk of IED attacks on security forces. These improvements facilitate the vital assistance efforts of civilian agencies and organizations that follow in the wake of military forces. Essential tasks during an initial response by military forces may include—

- Assessing the overall condition of the local transportation infrastructure (for example, airports, roads, bridges, railways, coastal and inland ports, harbors, waterways), including facilities and equipment.
- Determining and prioritizing essential infrastructure programs and projects.
- Conducting expedient repairs or building new facilities to facilitate commercial trade.

Restore the Telecommunications Infrastructure

7-177. The telecommunications infrastructure exists to support every element of a society, from the government to the financial sectors, and from media to the HN populace. The failure of this infrastructure accelerates the collapse of the HN, isolates the HN government and populace from the outside world, and hampers developmental efforts. Military forces can make only limited contributions to restoration efforts in this area since it contains few essential tasks normally. However, some essential tasks may include—

- Assessing the overall condition of the national telecommunications infrastructure.
- Determining and prioritizing essential infrastructure programs and projects.

Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs

7-178. General infrastructure reconstruction programs focus on rehabilitating the state's ability to produce and distribute fossil fuels, generate electrical power, exercise engineering and construction support, and provide municipal and other public services. Such capacity building spurs the rehabilitation efforts that establish a foundation for long-term development. As with restoring essential services, providing support to general infrastructure programs requires a thorough understanding of the civil considerations using the ASCOPE analytical framework. CA personnel support this information collection to help prioritize programs and projects. Essential tasks during an initial response by military forces may include—

- Assessing the overall condition of the local energy infrastructure.
- Determining and prioritizing essential infrastructure programs and projects.
- Assessing the condition of existing power generation and distribution facilities.
- Assessing the condition of existing natural resources conversion and distribution facilities.
- Assessing the condition of those existing facilities needed to execute essential tasks in other sectors effectively.
- Assessing the condition of existing municipal facilities that provide essential services.
- Conducting expedient repairs or building new facilities to support the local populace.

Use Money as an Enabler of Popular Support

7-179. In the long run, it may not be the key enabler to future success, but past experiences have shown using money to secure popular support can assist in furthering the interests and goals of units conducting COIN operations. Money should be used carefully. In most cases, a higher authority tightly controls funds through

strict accountability measures that ensure the proper use of the money. With effective use and in support of a desired end state, money can be an effective means for mobilizing popular support for the COIN's cause and further alienating insurgents from the civilian population. A COIN force can use money to—

- Fund civic cleanup, other sanitation projects, and the equipment to complete those projects.
- Fund small-scale infrastructure improvements.
- Fund agricultural projects to improve farming practices and livestock health or to help implement cooperative farming programs.
- Repair civic and cultural sites and facilities.
- Repair institutions and infrastructures critical to governance and the rule of law (for example, prisons, courthouses, police stations).
- Purchase education supplies or repair infrastructures critical to public education.
- Pay rewards to citizens who provide information on enemy activities and locations.
- Support the creation, training, and operation of HNSF.
- Fund events and activities that build relationships with HN officials and citizens.
- Repair damage resulting from combined and coalition operations.
- Provide condolence payments to civilians for casualties from combined and coalition operations.

Development and Reconstruction from the United States Agency for International Development

7-180. The BCT staff, ICW division and corps planners, incorporates long-term planning with the U.S. Government, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs who remain in the country to assist in further development. Incorporating the USAID is essential since it assists in long-term development. Many times, when the U.S. COIN force is involved in reconstruction, the military forces look to make as much impact as possible during their current tour of duty. Commanders ensure military projects and programs do not interfere with the long-range vision of the USAID. History has shown that the necessary duration of involvement to support the transition of organizations exceeds the political will of most external actors. This outcome may be due to financial strains or erroneous expectations about the time requirement. In fact, effective transitions can take decades to complete. In most cases, a post-conflict transition continues long after military involvement. The USAID's principles of development and reconstruction are useful to tactical units for project selection and small-scale building projects. (See ATP 3-07.5 for additional considerations regarding development and reconstruction from the USAID.)

Project Selection

7-181. COIN units determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects. The requisite level of effort, the expected duration, the cost, available funding, and the resulting benefit affect priorities. Units help orient various actors, assist them in determining priorities, and assist in monitoring project status. The extent to which the project helps resolve the conflict or contributes to other objectives such as generating employment also affects priorities. Units consult host-nation leaders and other partners regarding such prioritization. Paragraphs 7-182 through 7-190 review the principles guiding project selection and the corresponding use of resources, especially financial resources, in support of COIN operations.

Host Nation Ownership

7-182. Units ensure COIN and HN ownership of any project exists. This principle would have the local populace and the government officials who serve them view any project as their own and not one imposed by outside agencies. A locally conceived, funded, and constructed project legitimizes the government and contributes to stability.

Capacity Building

7-183. This principle involves the transfer of knowledge, techniques, and skills to local citizens, institutions, and governments, so they develop the requisite abilities to deliver essential services to the population. Ultimately, the local officials and institutions who gain capacity are better prepared to lead their regions through political, economic, and security issues.

Sustainability

7-184. By this principle, commanders design and select projects and services most likely to have a lasting effect on the local populace. In other words, the impacts of the projects under consideration would endure after the facility or service is handed off to local authorities and the unit (or contractor) depart from the site. Sustainability implies the local government has the necessary resources to staff and maintain the project. Some commanders have failed to conduct adequate analysis and have built schools or medical clinics only to discover too few teachers or doctors were available to staff these facilities. Other commanders have purchased large generator systems to address electricity shortfalls for neighborhoods in their AOs. However, those commanders failed to address the fuel, maintenance, and service requirements of the systems, so the machines proved an unsustainable solution for the local electrical deficit.

Selectivity

7-185. The development community defines this principle as the allocation of resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests. These strategic characteristics are equally important tactically. Commanders seldom receive all the financial resources they need to implement their essential service, economic, and governance LOEs. Therefore, they must prioritize the allocation of available resources to those reconstruction projects that offer the following advantages:

- The local government strongly supports them.
- They will positively impact the most people.
- They will create the commander's desired effects.

Local Conditions Assessment

7-186. This principle advises the commander and staff to practice care in researching nominations, adopting best practices, and designing for local conditions in their proposed projects. Commanders request or conduct a local conditions assessment before investing financial resources into any potential relief or reconstruction program. Money is not invested in an intelligence vacuum; all available information about local conditions undergoes consideration, such as public requirements, animosities, traditions, capabilities, and economic standings. A detailed assessment of local conditions best advises the commander on a project's potential to deliver its intended effects.

Potential Results Assessment

7-187. This principle relates directly to the principle of assessment and advises commanders to direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, long-term, focused objectives. This development principle is analogous to the military principle of objective, which directs every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. It is equally critical for the commander and staff to assess potential unintended results from their use of money. Many second- or third-order effects from a project may outweigh the benefits from the original intent.

Partnership

7-188. This principle encourages close collaboration with local governments, communities, donors, nonprofit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities. Partnership plays a central role in any relief, reconstruction, or development program since it supports each of the other principles of reconstruction and development. In the context of money as a weapon system, effective partnership ensures the unit's financial resources are well invested and deconflicted with other programs from other agencies.

Programmatic Flexibility

7-189. This principle requires units to adapt to changing conditions, to take advantage of opportunities, and to maximize effectiveness as part of their reconstruction and development programs. Just as the conditions for offensive and defensive operations are often changing and uncertain, so are the relief and reconstruction tasks associated with stability operations. These conditions often require commanders to change tactics to achieve their desired objectives.

Accountability

7-190. Enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or development program. The legitimacy of the commander, unit operations, and local government are reinforced by accountability in all actions, to include the unit's use of money.

Small-scale Building Projects

7-191. Small-scale building projects encompass almost all construction—both permanent and temporary—that is limited in scale. Examples include schoolhouses, clinics, simple irrigation works, farm-to-market roads, or small police stations. These projects can provide immediate, short-term economic stimuli and long-term benefits to a local area. The HN ideally maintains the highest possible profile and participation in all phases of these projects. Before construction begins, leaders remain aware of the second- and third-order effects of the project, such as which groups will profit from or use the project and any resulting conflicts of interest. They also consider the following:

- The local populace should need or want the project.
- The project should support the HN's plan.
- The project should support the unit's COIN mission and long-range plans.
- The project should support HN civilian authority.
- The counterinsurgent unit should develop a sustainability plan.

7-192. Paragraphs 7-193 and 7-194, regarding small-scale building projects, address concept development and project planning. They outline a basic process for conducting each stage.

Concept Development

7-193. Concept development identifies needs and potential projects to fill those needs. Soldiers and leaders at every level of responsibility help in identifying potential projects that could serve to further the unit's and HN's interests in their AOs. Leaders identify potential projects through meetings with local officials, public interaction, and personal observation of their AOs. Concurrently, possible locations are identified, surveyed, and discussed with the local populace and leaders to ensure suitability.

Project Planning

7-194. After site selection, when the project is ready to move forward, the development and implementation of a plan for security occur. The plan incorporates the employment of HN police forces whenever possible. The counterinsurgent unit continually assesses the security situation and adjusts the security plan based on the changing threat. The possibility of sustaining the security forces for the duration of the project receives consideration. Other considerations include those following:

- Create the design and obtain approval of design.
- Determine resource requirements such as those following:
  - Material.
  - Equipment.
  - Personnel (professional, skilled, and unskilled labor).
  - Wages and payment system.
  - Infrastructure needs (SWEAT-MSO).
- Conduct available resource assessment of the following:
  - Local HN civilian resources.
  - National or regional HN civilian resources.
  - U.S. civilian and international resources.
  - U.S. Government and military resources.
- Determine project participants such as the following and a division of responsibilities across them:
  - HN national and regional.
  - Local HN.
  - U.S Government employees and contractors.
  - NGOs.

- Contract the services for the following:
  - Material support.
  - Equipment support.
  - Personnel support (individual labor).
  - Subcontractor support (specific service).
  - Infrastructure support (warehouses and sewage, water, electricity, trash, and safety systems).
- Identify, design, and incorporate information engagement themes and messages.
- Execute the project and establish periodic progress meetings or reviews.
- Complete the project and arrange the following:
  - Ownership handover to HN authorities (preferably local officials).
  - Follow-up visit (for resolving questions or issues and ensuring sustainability).

CONDUCT SECURITY COOPERATION

7-195. *Security cooperation* comprises the Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners (JP 3-20). SC provides the means to build partner capacity and achieve strategic objectives. These objectives include those following:

- Building defensive and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Developing capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Providing U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access to HNs to increase situational understanding of an OE.

7-196. Army forces support the objectives of the combatant commander's campaign plan IAW appropriate policies, legal frameworks, and authorities. The plan supports those objectives through SC, specifically those involving SFA (see FM 3-22) and foreign internal defense (FID) (see ATP 3-05.2). *Security force assistance* comprises the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). FID is the participation of the civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect the populace from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other security threats.

7-197. SFA and FID professionalize and develop security partner capacity to enable synchronized sustainment operations. Army SC interactions enable other interorganizational efforts to build partner capacity. Army forces, including special operations forces, advise, assist, train, and equip partner units to develop unit and individual proficiency in security operations. The institutional army advises and trains partner army activities to build institutional capacity for professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. (See FM 3-22 for information on support to SC.)

Note. SFABs provide SFA to HN FSF. The SFAB provides organic forces to form the basis for the SFAB mission to support FSF. Within the SFAB, the company team is the foundation for the SFAB's mission and augmented with additional personnel and assets to accomplish the mission. (See ATP 3-96.1 for information on the SFAB.)

7-198. On occasion, the BCT as a whole or select units of the BCT may support SFA activities, including potentially supporting multiple FSF organizations in or external to the BCT's AO. Additionally, these FSF organizations may each report through different HN government channels and even to different ministries. To synchronize efforts in this case, U.S. Forces must achieve unity of effort. Similarly, each of the FSF organizational commanders appropriately synchronize efforts with the HN government representatives. (See ATP 3-21.20 for an example of task organization of an Infantry battalion supporting multiple SFA activities, which is useful for discussion purposes.)

7-199. The stability operations task of conducting SC may have the BCT or one or more select subordinate unit(s), depending on the assigned mission, conducting SFA as a subset of SC. SFA offers a means of support for SC activities in building capacity of an FSF. As soon as the FSF can perform this task, the BCT or selected unit transitions this task within civil security to the HN.

Initial Response—Conduct Security Cooperation

7-200. The initial response phase normally occurs during or immediately after a conflict for which the OE has prevented civilian personnel from operating effectively. The OE is deemed nonpermissive. The objectives of this phase are to improve the security situation, reduce the threat to the civilian population, and create conditions in which civilian personnel can safely operate. SFA in the initial response phase is normally required when FSF lack the capability or capacity to provide the requisite level of security. This phase often requires SFA efforts to help generate, train, or assist new and existing FSF. This phase may require a combination of the types of SFA and considerable support, sustainment, and medical resources. BCT activities during the initial response may be conducted with multinational combat operations to consolidate gains, including providing a safe, secure environment for the local populace. SFA efforts during this phase focus on improving FSF capability and capacity, so all security forces—be they U.S. Forces, other security forces, or FSF—provide a secure environment and reduce the threat. As security conditions improve, transition to the transformation phase begins.

Transformation—Conduct Security Cooperation

7-201. In the transformation phase, SFA activities seek to assist FSF to stabilize the OE in a crisis or in a vulnerable state. The OE in this phase is more permissive than in the initial response phase. However, military forces often need to provide security to some actors. Activities in this phase normally include a broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building efforts. The embedded provincial reconstruction team is essential for long-term success. Objectives in this phase include continuing efforts to improve the security situation, reducing the threat to the populace, building HN capacity across the joint stability functions, and facilitating a comprehensive approach toward assisting FSF.

7-202. The transformation phase entails a broad range of SFA activities to support FSF. The initial response phase differs from the transformation phase in the FSF capability to provide a safe and secure environment. More specifically, FSF may have achieved the level of proficiency at which they no longer need a permanent United States and FSF relationship for tactical operations. However, they may still need full-time advisors and support, sustainment, and medical assistance. Embedded provincial reconstruction team members continue to play a vital role in providing support to governance and developmental efforts throughout this phase. The end state of SFA for this phase sets conditions for the host-nation security sector to provide a secure environment with its own security forces.

Sustainability Fostering—Conduct Security Cooperation

7-203. In this phase, the focus of SFA continues to shift toward assisting the requisite institutions for sustaining FSF. This phase encompasses long-term efforts to assist FSF. They conduct independent operations and can provide a safe, secure internal environment. While this phase may initially require SFA activities, their necessity reduces as FSF become more capable and viable. The policies and conditions of the OE determine the timing of the BCT's receipt of a change of mission from SFA. Provincial reconstruction teams and other forces may remain to support a theater SC plan. (See section III for details on the BCT's role in SFA.)

SECTION II – AREA SECURITY

7-204. The BCT engaged in area security operations during COIN is typically organized to emphasize its mobility, lethality, and communications capability. Population-centric area security operations (for example, to consolidate gains) are common across the range of military operations but are almost a fixture during the conduct of stability-focused operations. They typically combine aspects of the area defense and offensive operations (for example, search and attack, cordon and search, raid, ambush) to eliminate the effectiveness of internal defense threats. During the conduct of area security operations, the BCT commander and staff maintain an understanding of the relationship with HN authorities and the civilian population. A clear understanding of the commander's authority is essential in exercising that necessary degree of control for ensuring security and safety to all military forces and the civilian population located in the BCT's AO.

AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS OVERVIEW

7-205. Area security operations protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions in an AO. During the conduct of stability-focused operations, area security operations establish and maintain the conditions for stability in an unstable area before or during hostilities or for enduring peace and stability after open hostilities cease. They are often an effective method of providing civil security and civil control and supporting SC during stability-focused operations. For example, an area security operation may have to be designed around numerous political constraints. Such a design may align units' AOs with the HN's existing political boundaries. Security objectives—regardless of which element of offense, defense, or stability currently dominates—ensure freedom of action over a prolonged period in consonance with the BCT commander's concept of operations and intent. (See ATP 3-91 for information on area security operations.)

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS IN AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

7-206. Civil considerations include the influence of artificial infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations in the OE on the conduct of military operations. Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations by the categories of ASCOPE. (See ATP 2-01.3 for information on these categories.)

7-207. Since civilians are normally present in operations with a dominant stability component, the BCT tends to restrain its use of force when conducting area security operations. However, the commander remains responsible for protecting the force and considers this responsibility when also considering ROE. Everyone receives clear explanation and maintains understanding of the restrictions on conducting operations and using force. Subordinate commanders and leaders and Soldiers remain mindful that their actions, no matter how minor, have far-reaching positive or negative effects. They are aware media (either hostile or neutral) and adversaries can quickly exploit their actions, especially the way they treat the civilian population.

AREA SECURITY AND LOCAL SECURITY

7-208. Area security—a security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions in a specific area—takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their locations in their AOs. Local security includes any local measure units take against enemy actions.

7-209. Area security missions inherently require the maintaining of local security. Units use both passive and active measures to provide local security. Passive local security measures include the use of camouflage, movement control, noise and light discipline, operations security (OPSEC), and proper communications procedures. Measures also include employing available sensors, night-vision devices, and daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around the unit. Active measures, depending on the situation, include those following:

- Using observation posts, combat outposts, combat patrols, and reconnaissance and surveillance patrols.
- Establishing specific levels of alert based on the METT-TC (I) variables.
- Establishing stand-to times.

Note. Unit SOPs detail activities during the conduct of stand-to.

7-210. *Local security* comprises the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy (ADP 3-90). All local security activities link to the broader area's security activities. Local security is closely associated with unit protection efforts. (See ADP 3-37 for information on unit protection efforts.) It includes local measures that prevent or interdict enemy efforts. It is an enduring priority of work, is essential to maintaining initiative, and prevents units from being surprised. It involves avoiding detection and deceiving the enemy about friendly actions, positions, and intentions. It includes finding any enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible.

7-211. Local security can be part of the sustaining base or of the area infrastructure. Local security protection ranges from echelon headquarters to reserve and sustainment forces using active and passive measures. Active patrolling, unit SOPs, and continuous reconnaissance are active measures that help provide local

security. Passive measures include camouflage use, movement control, noise and light disciplines, proper communication procedures, and ground sensor, night-vision device, and daylight sight use.

Economy-of-force Missions

7-212. The BCT, charged with execution, conducts an area security operation as an economy-of-force mission. Area security missions are numerous, complex, and generally never ending. For this reason, the commander and staff synchronize and integrate security efforts, focusing on protected forces, installations, routes, and actions in the BCT's AO. Protected forces within the BCT may be subordinate units and elements, echeloned command posts (CPs), and sustainment elements in the BCT's support area. Protected installations can be part of the sustainment base, or they can constitute part of the area's civilian infrastructure in a rear area. Protected ground lines of communication include the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of tactical and support area movement in the BCT's AO. Actions range from securing key points (bridges and defiles) and terrain features (ridgelines and hills) to large civilian population centers and their adjacent areas.

Offensive and Defensive Activities

7-213. During the conduct of stability-focused tasks, area security missions are a mixture of offensive and defensive activities involving not only subordinate battalions, companies, and platoons, but also those HNSF over whom the BCT has a command relationship such as operational control or other influence. Offensive area security activities include subordinate tasks of movement to contact (search and attack or cordon and search [see ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.10] missions) and combat patrols (see ATP 3-21.8), which are designed to ambush detected enemy forces or to conduct raids in the BCT's AO. Defensive area security activities include establishing base perimeter security (see ATP 3-21.20), establishing combat outposts and observation posts (see ATP 3-21.20), conducting moving and stationary screen and guard missions, and conducting reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance missions (see ATP 3-20.96 and ATP 3-20.97).

7-214. During offensive or defensive operations, area security activities often serve to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations, which support the main and supporting efforts, by generating and maintaining combat power. Area security operations may be the predominant method of protecting those support areas necessary for facilitating the positioning, employment, and protection of the requisite resources for sustaining, enabling, and controlling forces.

Readiness

7-215. During area security operations, forces maintain readiness over longer periods without contact with the enemy. Such periods occur most often when the enemy commander knows enemy forces or insurgents are seriously overmatched in available combat power. In this situation, the enemy commander normally tries to avoid engaging friendly forces unless on terms favorable to the enemy. Favorable terms include the use of mines and booby traps. Area security forces do not develop a false sense of security, even when the enemy appears to have ceased operations in the secured area. The commander assumes the enemy is observing friendly operations and seeking routines, weak points, and lax security to seize an opportunity to strike with minimum risk. Commanders at each echelon influence subordinate small-unit leaders to maintain Soldier vigilance and discipline and thereby to preclude the developments of these opportunities.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR AREA SECURITY

7-216. During area security operations planning, the commander apportions combat power and dedicates assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the OE, the likelihood of threat action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on an initial assessment of the OE, the commander task-organizes subordinate units and elements and assigns security areas in the BCT's AO. Though all resources have value, the METT-TC (I) variables render some resources, assets, or locations more significant for successful mission accomplishment from enemy and friendly perspectives. Throughout the operations process, the commander relies on the RM process and other specific assessment methods to facilitate decision making, issue guidance, and allocate resources (see chapter 4). Criticality, vulnerability, and recuperability are some of the most significant considerations when determining the protection priorities that become the subject of the commander's guidance and the focus of area security operations.

AREA SECURITY COMMAND AND CONTROL

7-217. During area security operations, the BCT commander devotes considerable time and energy to the problems of coordination and cooperation due to the joint, interagency, and multinational nature of stability-focused tasks. The BCT plans and conducts area security operations in concert with partner participants toward a unified effort, often as a supporting organization rather than the lead organization. The commander employs liaisons to enable unity of effort between partner elements and the coordination centers established by the division or higher commander.

Interagency and Multinational Organization Involvement

7-218. One distinguishing factor of the conduct of stability-focused tasks from the conduct of offensive or defensive tasks is the requirement for interagency coordination at battalion level and below. During area security operations with interagency partners, the commander has inherent responsibilities. These include clarifying the mission; determining the controlling legal and policy authorities; and tasking, organizing, directing, sustaining, and caring for the organizations and individuals for whom the BCT provides the interagency effort. The commander also ensures seamless termination of the mission under conditions in which the identified objectives are met and sustainable after the operation.

7-219. When operating within or alongside multinational organizations, the BCT commander and subordinate commanders and leaders expect to integrate foreign units down to the company level. SFA activities within an area security mission require carefully selected and properly trained and experienced personnel (as trainers or advisors) who are not only subject matter experts, but also have the cultural understanding, language skills, and seasoned maturity to relate more effectively to and train FSF. Additionally, commanders and subordinate leaders in the brigade support area and battalion trains with the intention to interact routinely with multinational partners during other area security missions. SOPs at subordinate echelons require modifications to incorporate multinational small units who do not have compatible communications and information systems.

Desired End State

7-220. The BCT commander's definition of the desired end state is a required input to area security operations. While an end state is normally described as a stable, safe, and secure environment during stability-focused operations, this description is insufficient since it does not include the requisite set of conditions for achieving the commander's objectives. The planning process yields the initial MOEs and MOPs that quantify such an environment. (See chapter 3 for more information.) MOPs and MOEs are important in stability-focused area security operations since traditional combat measures such as territory gained, enemy personnel killed or captured, and enemy combat vehicles destroyed or captured do not apply. The commander ensures the desired end state reflects the prolonged time period associated with many stability-focused area security operations.

7-221. Achieving the desired end state requires knowledge of operational design (see chapter 4), the ability to achieve unity of effort, and cultural capability (see chapter 1), all related to the BCT's AO. Through economy of force, the commander identifies a finite amount of available combat power to apply against the essential tasks associated with a given area security operation. Identifying essential tasks lays the foundation for the success of area security operations that seek the future stability of a state. Decisions about combat power use factor in more than the deployed force's size and relative composition and the mission's anticipated nature and duration. Assuring long-term stability depends on applying unity of effort to the tasks that are, in fact, essential.

Information Activities Within Area Security

7-222. The final success or failure of the BCT's area security operation rests with the public perception of those dwelling inside and outside the BCT's AO and goes beyond defeating the enemy. Earning public trust and confidence is the chief aim of information activities, which integrate and synchronize information-related capabilities to generate effects in the information environment necessary to influence enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly audiences.

7-223. Information activities synchronization of information-related capabilities promotes the mission's legitimacy and reduces bias, ignorance, and confusion by persuading, educating, coordinating, or influencing target audiences. Further, it promotes—through Soldier and leader engagement, CAO, and PSYOP, among other information-related capabilities—audience interaction at all echelons so these target audiences understand the objectives and motives of the BCT and higher HQ. Public interaction also speaks to the scope and duration of area security actions and the broad efforts to build partner capacity (for example, SFA [see section III]). Information activities are essential for achieving decisive results—a stable HN government and peaceful civilian population.

7-224. The BCT information activities officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) coordinates with the division (or higher) information activities officer to synchronize information-related capabilities into the BCT's information activities planning. Synchronization requires the BCT information activities officer (ICW the electromagnetic warfare [EW] office) to participate in targeting within the fire support cell, as well as the various working groups and meetings chaired by the current and future operations and other integrating cells within the BCT. Participation allows for the development of a holistic understanding of the information environment within the problem sets facing the BCT staff. Staff-wide understanding helps synchronize the information activities planning and targeting and allows for shifts in priorities. This synchronization, ICW the information activities and civil-military operations (CMO) managed at the BCT or division level, enables the incorporation of united action partners into planning.

Note. Within the BCT, the information activities officer is responsible for synchronizing and deconflicting information-related capabilities employed in support of BCT operations. The BCT information activities officer synchronizes capabilities within subordinate maneuver battalions and squadrons and within subordinate companies and troops who communicate information to audiences, affect both the content and flow of the information supporting the enemy's decision making, and protect friendly information flow. The information activities officer prepares appendix 15 and portions of appendixes 12, 13, and 14 to Annex C (Operations) of the OPORD. (See chapter 4 and FM 3-13 for information on the information activities officer.)

7-225. In the security environment, enemies, adversaries, and other organizations use propaganda and disinformation against friendly efforts to influence various civilian populations inside and outside the BCT's AO, such as the area of interest (AOI). The BCT's public affairs staff officer, ICW the division public affairs officer, works closely with the intelligence staff officer to be proactive, rather than reactive, to such attacks. A coordinated information activities plan informs and counters the effects of propaganda and misinformation. The plan (generally developed at the BCT level ICW the division information activities officer and public affairs officer) establishes mechanisms such as a media center or editorial board to educate and inform local and international media—which, in turn, inform the public—with accurate and timely information. Additionally, CAO and PSYOP are integrated into counterpropaganda efforts at the BCT level through the division or higher HQ's information activities working group.

7-226. The BCT chaplain can play an important role in bridging gaps with religious leaders and set conditions for future, successful key leader engagements and CAO. During planning, the chaplain advises the commander on matters of religion and culture and on key religious leaders in the AO and AOI. The chaplain and the religious affairs NCO provide important, up-to-date perspectives on local, provincial, and national atmospheres not often included or clear in other sources. They always coordinate efforts with the BCT information activities officer and any BCT information activities working group (see FM 3-13).

7-227. Without a detailed Soldier and leader engagement plan, different units and staff elements meet with and engage local leaders with different desired end states, thereby undermining the ability of any or all forces to build capacity and to work toward transition to the HN's leaders. Coordination between staff elements and units within the BCT, when working with the same host-nation representative or office, enables unity of effort and shared understanding of the desired end state for the BCT's area security operation. A detailed engagement plan identifies differences between provinces or between localities in the province and sets out the objectives to reach the desired end state. Host-nation leaders in a city, district, or province have face-to-face meetings with these leaders to advance HN capacity building.

7-228. Soldier and leader engagements have significant public impact during all operations occurring among civilian populations. Human beings capture information and form perceptions based on sensory input. We see actions and hear words. We compare physical gestures and facial expressions to the spoken word. The civilian population weighs presented messages from the Soldiers, the leaders of the BCT, and other sources against the conditions surrounding them. When local and national news media are unavailable or unreliable, people turn to alternative sources such as the internet—wherein information flows freely at unimaginable speeds—or rumor and gossip. Perception so often equates to reality. One way to influence perception is to shape information according to how people absorb and interpret information and to mold messages for broad appeal and acceptance.

7-229. OPSEC is as important during the conduct of stability-focused operations as it is during the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. It contributes to the BCT's ability to achieve surprise during area security missions, thus enabling the missions' chances for success. In the BCT's AO, adversaries and enemies monitor the BCT's normal activities to detect variations in activity patterns that forecast future operations. They monitor the conversations of Soldiers both on and off duty to gain information and intelligence. Adversaries and enemies monitor commercial internet activity and phone calls from BCT operational and recreational facilities. They search BCT activity garbage. The absence of OPSEC about BCT activities contributes to excessive friendly casualties and mission failures in area security operations just like it does in combat operations. The BCT's information collection effort hinges in no small part on effective OPSEC. Therefore, measures to protect essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) are not an afterthought. (See FM 3-13 and ATP 3-13.1 for information on OPSEC.)

Note. The need to maintain transparency of the BCT's intentions during area security operations is a factor when balancing OPSEC with information release. Commanders and staffs within the BCT maintain knowledge of the release authority for information, including foreign disclosure rules (see ATP 3-16.02). The public affairs and information activities officers (see FM 3-61 and FM 3-13, respectively) lead the coordination and synchronization processes within the BCT. Release authority for information rests with the commander at the appropriate level.

7-230. Multinational staffs have additional security concerns. Each nation has different access to U.S. Government information systems. Maintaining OPSEC with multinational staff members is difficult, and sometimes, the security rules restrict the ability of multinational partner staff officers to contribute. The chief of staff and foreign disclosure officer at the division level develop work-arounds appropriately (see ATP 3-16.02). One such work-around is to assign a U.S. assistant to the multinational staff officer who will get on a secure U.S. Government information system to ensure the multinational staff officer has the necessary information. The division assistant chief of staff, signal establishes and maintains two separate sets of information systems when this occurs. (See ATP 3-91 and ATP 6-02.75 for information on maintaining OPSEC with multinational staff members.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER PLANNING

7-231. During the conduct of stability-focused operations, the BCT plans its area security movement and maneuver to occur simultaneously with offensive and defensive movement and maneuver, extensively emphasizing security and engagement skills (for example, negotiation, rapport building, cultural competence, critical verbal phrases). Movement and maneuver in the BCT's AO are normally decentralized to the battalion and company. Through economy of force, the BCT commander determines the right mix of forces to transition quickly between operations as the situation dictates. During area security operations, the commander plans for future movement in the BCT's AO and in adjacent AOs appropriately. The BCT's lethal capabilities make possible the execution of area security operations, even with a remote probability of combat. When new requirements develop, the BCT commander plans for any necessary shifting of priorities.

Fire and Movement

7-232. The application of fire and movement lends itself to several offensive and defensive operations (for example, search and attack, cordon and search, area defense) within the civil security and civil control stability operations tasks. Across the range of military operations, the BCT and subordinate units play a major role in ensuring the outcome of stability operations tasks. The BCT and subordinate units are pivotal in the

conduct of other stability operations tasks (for example, conducting SC) due to their deterrence value and the flexibility and labor the BCT provides to the division-level or higher commander.

Mobility and Countermobility

7-233. Mobility (see chapter 5) and countermobility (see chapter 6) operations are key enablers to area security operations. In stability-focused area security operations, mobility operations allow civilian traffic and commerce to continue or resume. Resuming normal civilian activities in the BCT's AO is an important objective within stability-focused area security operations. Countermobility operations indirectly support stability-focused area security operations in regard to offensive and defensive operations.

7-234. Mobility operations focus on keeping ground lines of communication open for both civilian and military activities and reducing the threat of mines and other unexploded explosive ordnances. During area security operations, the commander and staff develop the countermobility plan concurrently with the fire support plan and defensive scheme of maneuver, guided by the commander's intent. When combat engineer support falls under the mobility and countermobility tasks, it may include those following:

- Constructing combat roads and trails.
- Breaching existing obstacles, including minefields.
- Marking minefields, including minefield fence maintenance.
- Clearing mines and debris from roads.
- Conducting route reconnaissance to support the main supply routes and civilian lines of communication.
- Creating obstacles between opposing factions to prevent easy movement between their positions.

7-235. The BCT employs roadblocks not only to restrict traffic for security purposes, but also to control the movement of critical cargo. Examples of critical cargo are generators for restoring electrical power in a large area or items that support the general population and resources in the BCT's AO.

Area Occupation

7-236. Planning for an area occupation or for a relief in place begins before the BCT deploys or, when the BCT is being relieved, redeploys. Planning includes not only BCT forces and their activities, but also other government agencies, multinational partners, HN agencies, and potential international organizations. The METT-TC (I) variables determine the occupation or relief in place that occurs. Sometimes, occupation, much like occupying an initial AO, is appropriate (for example, when the BCT's stability-focused area security operation occurs with limited intervention or within peace operations). A relief in place may be appropriate during the conduct of an area defense (see chapter 6). However, a stability-focused area security transition by function may be more effective when the relief in place transpires with HN military forces and civil authorities within range of military operations. Some of these functions include medical and engineer services, local security, communications, and sustainment. BCT plans do not remove a provided capability from the AO until the replacement capability is operating.

Surveillance Systems and Reconnaissance and Security Forces

7-237. In restrictive and unrestrictive terrain, the commander relies on crewed and uncrewed surveillance systems and reconnaissance and security forces to collect information in the BCT's AO. Interrupted line of sight and extreme climate and weather variations often affect the operation of ground and aerial surveillance systems in restrictive terrain. Also in restrictive terrain, reconnaissance and security forces in the BCT's AO focus on these areas to assist in collection when crewed and uncrewed surveillance capabilities are degraded. A technique for employing reconnaissance and security forces in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted reconnaissance and security forces from covering the assigned area is to use a combat outpost, which is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations. While the METT-TC (I) variables determine the sizes, locations, and number of combat outposts a unit establishes, a reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat outpost. (See chapter 6 and ATP 3-21.10 for information on establishing a combat outpost.) A combat outpost must have sufficient resources to accomplish its designated missions such as conducting aggressive combat patrolling and reconnaissance patrolling. Combat outposts are

established when an insurgency threatens the observation posts (see chapter 6 for information on observation post activities) or when enemy forces infiltrating the BCT's AO might attack the observation posts.

Note. During the conduct of defensive operations, the commander uses a combat outpost to extend the depth of the security area, to keep friendly forward observation posts in place until they can observe the enemy's main body, or to secure friendly forward observation posts that will be encircled by enemy forces. Mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts.

Army Aviation

7-238. Army aviation attack and reconnaissance units with crewed and uncrewed systems—when deployed early with initial response forces—can be a significant deterrent for the domestic combatants, particularly when factions or insurgencies are not yet organized in the initial response phase. Attack and reconnaissance helicopters may be employed to act as a response force against enemy threats. Along with Army aviation attack and reconnaissance (manned and unmanned) and/or organic or tasked echelon-specific unmanned aircraft system (UAS), to include firing, platforms conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and security over wide areas and provide the BCT with a means for visual route reconnaissance and early warning. Utility helicopters provide an excellent command and control capability to support stability-focused area security operations and to transport patrols or security elements throughout the BCT's AO. Cargo helicopters provide the capability to move large numbers of military and civilian security force personnel and to conduct resupply when surface transportation is unavailable or when routes become impassable.

Note. BCT plans include measures for the effective use of all resources, including exploiting air power for transportation and resupply over extended distances and, where appropriate, tightly controlled close air support.

Reserve and Response Force Operations

7-239. Maintaining a reserve during any operation is difficult. Often, the commander finds the BCT has more tasks than units to perform them, and stability-focused area security operations are no exception. Nonetheless, contingencies or missions may arise that require establishing a reserve. Maintaining a reserve allows the establishing commander to plan for worst case scenarios, exploit opportunities, provide flexibility, and conserve the force during long-term operations.

7-240. The response force differs from a reserve in that it is not in support of a particular engagement. It is a dedicated force on a base—with adequate tactical mobility and fire support—designated to defeat Level I and II threats and shape Level III threats until a tactical combat force (TCF) or other available response forces can defeat them. It answers to the establishing headquarters (see ATP 3-91). Considerations when establishing a response force include those following:

- Threats.
- Communications equipment and procedures.
- Alert procedures.
- Transportation.
- Training priorities.

7-241. The commander employs counterfire radars to locate hostile indirect fire systems and thereby to counter an indirect fire threat. Response forces, attack helicopters, or local friendly forces are ideal for responding to counterfire radar acquisitions since clearance of fire procedures are often time consuming and not necessarily reliable at determining locations for HN forces. Additionally, the indiscriminate use of indirect fire on counterfire radar acquisitions can lead to unwanted collateral damage.

AREA SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

7-242. The conduct of stability-focused tasks demands greater attention to civilian considerations—the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an assigned AO—than does the conduct of conventional offensive and defensive tasks. Using the mission variable of civil considerations and its subordinate categories of ASCOPE, the BCT staff has a standard baseline for analysis to develop understanding. Analyses

conducted by organic and attached forces, such as sociocultural analysis, target audience analysis, intelligence analysis, and population and area studies, augment this baseline. During area security operations, the commander expands the IPOE process beyond geographical and force capability considerations. (See ATP 2-01.3 for information on IPOE for stability missions.)

Information Collection for Area Security Intelligence

7-243. Information collection, specifically plan requirements and collection assets, enables timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence in an AO. (See ATP 2-01 for information on the specific functions for stability missions.) Intelligence cells and knowledge management elements within the BCT and division (or higher) headquarters and battalion and squadron headquarters develop procedures to share collected intelligence data and products, both vertically and horizontally, throughout the force. (See ATP 2-19.4 for information on intelligence techniques for stability missions.)

Understanding of Potential Threats and of the Populace

7-244. Area security operations require the integration of the division and BCT's information collection effort to develop a clear understanding of all potential threats and the populace. Success in the stability environment requires cultural capability to gauge public reaction inside and outside the BCT's AO to a particular COA conducted, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the execution of that COA by the BCT or division. Behavioral changes within the general population may suggest the need for changes to tactics, techniques, or procedures or even to strategy. Biographical information, leadership analysis, and methods of operation within the existing cultural matrix are keys to understanding the attitudes of positional civilian leaders and those with referent power toward influencing the outcome of BCT area security operations, either favorably or unfavorably, as well as their capacity for success.

Indicators of Change

7-245. During area security operations, the commander and staff tie PIRs to identifiable indicators of change in the OE, including civilian inhabitants and their cultures, political beliefs, criminal activities, religions, economic classes, and related demographic factors and any variances within affected people-groups. The commander often focuses on named AOIs to answer critical information requirements, to aid in tactical decision making, and to confirm or deny threat intentions, regardless of which element of offense, defense, or stability currently dominates. During area security operations, PIRs related to identifying enemy and adversary activities are tracked appropriately.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements

7-246. Due to the increased reliance on HUMINT, when conducting area security operations, the commander emphasizes the importance of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) to all personnel within the BCT. CCIRs are information requirements the commander identifies as critical for facilitating timely decision making. Answers to CCIRs come from staff at all levels (see FM 5-0). All personnel receive appropriate guidance to improve the information-gathering capability throughout the BCT. Interpreters speaking to local civilian personnel, security operations, and patrols (combat and reconnaissance) are primary sources of information to assess for economic and health needs, military capabilities, and the political intents of those receiving assistance or who are otherwise a party to the area security operation (see ATP 3-55.4).

7-247. Planners at the division and BCT ensure any HUMINT assets assigned from outside the BCT are employed effectively, which is typically accomplished by integrating HUMINT collectors at the lowest level possible. The gaining unit accounts for HUMINT asset security and establishes tasking priorities and command relationships for temporary and long-term commitments. (See FM 2-22.3 for information on HUMINT collection.)

Note. Army medical units and elements do not have an intelligence collection mission and ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions by avoiding performing such tasks that are inconsistent with their noncombatant status. However, if medical personnel gain information of potential intelligence value through incidental observation while accomplishing their humanitarian duties, they are required to report it to the supporting intelligence staff officer.

Employment and Control of Human Intelligence Collection Teams

7-248. *Human intelligence* is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (ADP 2-0). Commanders consider security when planning for the employment of HCTs (see FM 2-0). Generally, three security conditions exist: permissive, uncertain, hostile.

Note. The success of the HUMINT collection effort depends on a complex interrelationship between command and control elements, requirements, technical control, technical support, and collection assets. Each echelon of command employs supporting HUMINT elements to conduct sustained HUMINT operations under all OEs using only organic HUMINT assets. HUMINT units have specific support requirements to each echelon's commander, though HUMINT units remain flexible, versatile, and prepared to conduct HUMINT collection and analysis operations in support of any echelon of command. A coherent command and control structure within these HUMINT organizations is necessary for successful, disciplined, and legal HUMINT operations. This structure is part of a coherent architecture that includes organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national (for example, Defense Intelligence Agency) and theater organizations and HUMINT organizations not affiliated with Department of Defense (DOD). The corps, joint, division, and brigade and below intelligence staff officer is the primary advisor on HUMINT and counterintelligence (CI) within this structure and is the focal point for all HUMINT and CI activities within a joint task force, an Army component task force, or a BCT. The intelligence staff officer may be organic to the unit staff, or the officer may be from another organization such as the theater military intelligence brigade and attached to or under operational control by the unit staff. (See FM 2-22.3 for information on HUMINT collection.)

Permissive Environment

7-249. In a permissive environment, HCTs normally travel throughout their AOs without escorts or a security element. HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct contact with overt sources, view the activity, or visit the area serving as the subject of the information collection effort. They normally use debriefing and elicitation as their primary collection techniques to obtain firsthand information from local civilians and officials.

Uncertain Environment

7-250. In an uncertain environment, security considerations increase, but risk to the collector is weighed against the potential intelligence gain. An uncertain environment limits the use of controlled sources and requires additional resources. HCTs are still employed throughout the AO but are normally integrated into other ground reconnaissance or other missions. For example, a HUMINT collector might accompany a patrol visiting a village. Security for the team and their sources is a prime consideration. HCTs are careful not to establish a fixed pattern of activity or to arrange contacts in a compromising manner for the source or the collector. Debriefing and elicitation are still the primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct collection at checkpoints, displaced people collection points, and detainee collection points. They may conduct interrogations of detainees within the limits of applicable laws and policies.

***Note*.** Detainees include any persons captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of DOD personnel. They do not include DOD personnel, contractor personnel, or other persons being held primarily for law enforcement purposes, except where the United States is the occupying power. As a matter of policy, all detainees are treated as enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) until their appropriate legal status is determined and granted by a competent authority IAW the criteria established in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), or the Third Geneva Convention. Examples of detainees are actual EPWs, retained persons, civilian internees, and detained persons. Detaining officials respect that detainees, including those who have not satisfied the applicable criteria in the GPW, are still entitled to humane treatment. The inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or deep provocation. (See JP 3-31 for information on detainee operations.)

Hostile Environment

7-251. A hostile environment creates three concerns for HUMINT collection: access to the sources of information; timeliness of reporting; and security for the HUMINT collectors. It requires significant resource commitments to conduct controlled source operations. Prior to the entry of a force into a hostile area, HUMINT collectors are often employed to debrief civilians, particularly displaced people, and to interrogate other detainees who have been in the area. HCTs are normally located with the friendly units to facilitate timely collection and reporting. HUMINT collectors accompany the BCT lead elements or ground reconnaissance and security forces during operations. They interrogate detainees and debrief displaced people and friendly force patrols.

Security Missions

7-252. Due to the possibility of tying forces to fixed installations or sites, security missions may become defensive in nature. When this occurs, the BCT commander carefully balances this requirement with the need for offensive action. Early warning of enemy activity through information collection is paramount in the conduct of area security missions to afford the commander time to react to any threat or other type of identified change in the stability environment. The BCT's IPOE identifies the factors affecting security missions in the assigned AO. These factors may include those following:

- Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
- Existing roads and waterways for military lines of communication and civilian commerce.
- Control of land and water areas and avenues of approach surrounding the area security.
- Management of airspace.
- Proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power generation plants, and civic buildings.

FIRES PLANNING

7-253. The conduct of fires in support of stability-focused tasks is essentially the same as for offensive and defensive tasks. However, constraint is vital in the conduct of fires during stability-focused tasks. Such constraint typically concerns the munitions employed and the targets engaged to obtain desired effects. Constraint increases the legitimacy of the organization who is practicing it while potentially damaging that of an opponent.

Employment of Fires

7-254. Employment of fires provides continuous deterrents to hostile action and a destructive force multiplier for the commander, regardless of which element of offense, defense, and stability currently dominates. For stability-focused tasks, the planning and delivering of fires preclude fires on protected targets, unwanted collateral damage, and the political ramifications of perceived excessive fire. In addition to lethal effects, the targeting functions of the BCT fire support cell include nonlethal effects input to the information collection plan and the targeting working groups at the division and BCT headquarters. (See chapter 4 for targeting functions within the BCT fire support cell.)

7-255. During the employment of fires, just because a commander can employ a weapon does not mean the commander should employ the weapon. In addition to collateral damage, the employment of fires can cause

negative second- and third-order effects. Collateral damage can adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain the COIN's legitimacy and thus impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. For example, excessive force can antagonize any involved friendly or neutral parties. To avoid unnecessarily raising the level of conflict, the use of nonlethal capabilities can fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force. Key considerations for employment of fires in support of stability-focused tasks include those following:

- The conduct of stability-focused tasks in noncontiguous AOs complicates the use of fire support coordination measures, the ability to mass and shift fires, and clearance of fires procedures.
- Key terrain may be more political, cultural, or social in nature than physical; using fires instead of seizing key sites may occur more frequently in defending those key sites.
- ROE are often more restrictive in this context than in combat operations; a commander's guidance for fires requires careful consideration during development and wide dissemination to all levels.
- Precision-guided munitions or employment of nonlethal capabilities may be necessary to limit collateral damage.
- The use of fires can demonstrate capabilities, as a demonstration or during a denial operation (see ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.20 for information).

Note. Mortars at the BCT and below, due to their smaller bursting radii, reduce collateral damage. Mortars are generally more responsive to the small-unit operations common to area security missions. In addition to lethal fires, mortars can provide illumination to demonstrate deterrent capability, observe contested areas, or support area security missions (including patrolling [reconnaissance and combat]).

Application of Lethal and Nonlethal Capabilities

7-256. Though highly effective for their intended purpose, lethal capabilities may not always be suitable. For example, during stability-focused tasks, the application of lethal fires is normally greatly restricted, rendering the use of nonlethal capabilities the dominant feasible option. The considerations for the use of nonlethal capabilities in targeting pertain not only to specific phases or missions but are also integrated throughout the AO. The establishing of escalation of force measures serves to identify hostile intent and to deter potential threats at checkpoints, at entry control points, and in convoys. Such measures remain distinct from other use of force guidance such as fire support coordination measures and are intended to protect the force, to minimize the use of force against civilians, and not to interfere with self-defense to attack by adversaries. One of the primary mechanisms for employing nonlethal capabilities and generating nonlethal effects is information activities. Participating in the targeting process, information activities synchronize a range of nonlethal capabilities to produce nonlethal effects that advance the desired end state.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

7-257. As during offensive and defensive tasks, establishing fire support coordination measures for stability-focused tasks facilitates the attack of high-payoff targets (HPTs) throughout the AO. Restrictive fire support coordination measures provide safeguards for friendly forces and noncombatants, facilities, and terrain. For example, no-fire areas, restrictive fire areas, restricted target lists, restrictive fire lines, and fire support coordination lines not only offer protection to forces but also to civilian populations, critical infrastructures, and sites of religious or cultural significance. Regardless of which element of offense, defense, or stability currently dominates, coordinating ongoing activities to create desired effects and avoid undesirable effects requires coordination measures.

Note. Fire support coordination, planning, and clearance demand special arrangements with joint and multinational forces and local authorities. These arrangements include communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and procedures focused on interoperability. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreements provide excellent examples of coordinated fire support arrangements. These arrangements provide participants with common terminology and procedures.

AREA SECURITY SUSTAINMENT

7-258. The BCT commander's responsibilities during area security include support areas and extend to the self-protection of BCT assets operating outside the BCT echelon support areas. Forces engaged in area security operations protect a force, installation, route, area, or asset. A common purpose for area security operations is to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations, which support main and supporting efforts, by generating and maintaining combat power. Area security operations may be the predominant method of protecting those echelon support areas necessary for facilitating the positioning, employment, and protection of the requisite resources for sustaining, enabling, and controlling forces.

PROTECTION DURING AREA SECURITY OPERATIONS

7-259. BCT activities associated with executing security operations (see FM 3-90), physical security (see ATP 3-39.32), antiterrorism (see ATP 3-37.2), and OPSEC (see FM 3-13) tasks enhance the security of the command in an AO. In large part, the measures within these four tasks are the same or complementary. Stability-focused operations closely resemble the BCT activities for these tasks during the conduct of offensive and defensive operations, though the BCT generally works closer with civilian inhabitants. (See ADP 3-37 for information on protection.)

Establishing and Maintaining Security

7-260. The BCT conducts security operations to ensure freedoms of movement and of action and to deny the enemy the ability to disrupt operations. Commanders combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations tasks, and information collection serves to protect friendly forces, civilian populations, infrastructure, and those activities critical to mission accomplishment. The BCT integrates with partner military, law enforcement, and civil capabilities to establish and maintain security. The ability to establish control is critical to consolidate gains in the wake of successful military operations.

7-261. Security operations prevent surprise, reduce uncertainty, and provide early warning of enemy operations. Warning of enemy operations affords forces the time and maneuver space to react and develop the situation. Security operations prevent enemies from discovering the friendly plan, and they protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security elements focus on preventing the enemy from gathering EEFIs. Security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts. When successful, security operations allow the BCT to maintain the initiative in the stability environment.

7-262. Protection is a continuous activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Effective physical security and antiterrorism measures, like any stability measure, overlap and are employed in depth. For example, military police support enhances a unit's physical security and antiterrorism capabilities by performing area security operations inside and outside an echelon support area. Military police also conduct response force operations to defeat Level II threats against bases or critical assets and delay Level III threats in an echelon support area until a TCF can respond. (See FM 3-39 and ATP 3-39.30 for additional information on response forces.)

7-263. The BCT commander pays attention to physical security and antiterrorism operations throughout the stability environment. This is especially true when subordinate units conduct noncontiguous operations since the success of the BCT mission may depend on protecting support areas from enemy attacks. The commanders address the early detection and immediately destroy enemy forces attempting to attack support areas. Enemy attacks against sustainment and other facilities range in size from individual saboteurs to enemy airborne or air assault insertions targeted against key military and civilian facilities and capabilities. These enemy activities, especially at smaller unit levels, may even precede the onset of large-scale combat and prove almost indistinguishable from terrorist acts. The BCT implements OPSEC and other information protection measures to deny the enemy force information about friendly dispositions.

Note. In the stability environment, deploying battalions and higher echelons have an assigned, trained Level II antiterrorism officer. These officers support the integration of security considerations into base designs and unit operations. They guide units in conducting threat assessment, criticality assessment, and vulnerability analysis to determine each unit's vulnerability to terrorism. (See ATP 3-91 and ATP 3-37.2 for information on antiterrorism officers.)

Assessments to Support Protection Prioritization

7-264. Initial protection planning by the BCT commander and staff requires various assessments to establish protection priorities. Assessments include those of threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, and criticalities. These assessments support the determinations of which assets can be protected with no given constraints and which assets can be protected with available resources. Seldom do sufficient resources exist to provide all assets the same level of protection simultaneously. For this reason, the commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and provides guidance to the staff, so they can employ protection capabilities based on protection priorities.

7-265. Protection planning is a continuous process and includes a development of understanding of those threats and hazards that may impact operations throughout the BCT's AO. Aligning protection capabilities protects critical assets and mitigates effects from threats and hazards. Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, and materials. The protection cell prioritizes the protection of those critical assets that best support the commander's desired end state. Protection prioritization lists are organized IAW the proper alignment of critical assets. The commander's priorities and intent and the impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. For example, communications facilities and utilities deemed important through criticality assessments are those that provide the necessary information for prioritizing resources and for reducing resource allocation to lower priority assets. When a stationary weapon system is critical to the execution of BCT operations, it sometimes receives additional protection. When a critical asset lacks a replacement, its protection sometimes receives top priority.

Protection Template

7-266. The protection template lists and integrates all protection tasks in an appropriate way for use by subordinate units, as well as any base and base cluster operations envisioned for the BCT's or subordinate battalion's or squadron's area security operation. The protection cell, when established within the BCT operations staff officer (S-3) section, augments the staff with a small protection planning cell, who maintains and publishes the template ICW the division protection cell. The template serves as a reference before or during employment. Battalion or squadron and base or base cluster situational modifications to this template, and their regular rehearsal of all the parts of the protection plans, are inspected periodically by the BCT protection working group. During inspections, the protection working group identifies weak areas in subordinates' protection plans, ensures the incorporation of best practices for AO protection into the BCT's plans, and provides protection-related observations, insights, and lessons learned to subordinate units, as well as to any unit relieving the BCT or subordinate units in its AO.

Note. When a protection cell officer or NCO is not designated within or is not attached to a battalion or squadron, protection cell functions and tasks become the responsibility of the battalion or squadron operations officer or NCO. Key protection tasks conducted within the BCT's area security operation include area security, CBRN operations, air and missile defense coordination, personnel recovery, EOD, and detainee operations. (See ADP 3-37 for information on integrating and synchronizing protection tasks.)

Protective Services

7-267. The commander may determine it necessary (or be required) to provide protective services from within the BCT to protect high-value HN civil and military authorities or other select individuals. This requirement usually occurs when HNSF have been so extensively penetrated by hostile elements that they cannot be trusted to provide protective services or when HNSF lack the technical skills and capabilities to provide the desired degree of protection. Elements tasked to perform protective services for designated personnel receive as much training and specialized equipment as possible before the mission. (See ATP 3-39.35 for information on protective services.)

Combat Power Allocation

7-268. The protection of installations or AOs (including route and convoy security) by BCTs requires significant allocation of combat power when a threat beyond organized crime exists. Conducting resupply from one base to another is treated as a tactical action and tracked in the BCT main CP current operations

cell. Any BCT-established response force takes care not to establish patterns when responding to incidents. The establishment of patterns (for example, same route, same movement formation, same configuration and order of vehicles, same response force responding from the same base) allows an enemy to ambush the response force at a point of its choosing.

Note. Depending on the situation, HNSF remain involved as much as possible in the performance of the above protection tasks. Host-nation support is important to the variety of services and facilities that can support security and protection assets in the BCT's AO. HN-provided services relieve the BCT of the need to provide equivalent capabilities, thereby reducing its sustainment and protection footprint. Key criteria in the decision-making process for whether to use host-nation support are the trust in the HN to provide the support and the belief that the HN forces' technical skills and capabilities can provide the desired degree of protection.

Threat Levels

7-269. Threats within the BCT's area security operation are categorized across the three levels of defense for countering them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the BCT's AO. The appropriate emphasis on base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. In the BCT's AO, all elements protect themselves from Level I threats. This includes medical elements, even though they have reduced defensive capabilities and the use of only their nonmedical personnel to provide their local security. Locating medical elements and other support elements on bases with other units mitigates this factor.

7-270. The BCT commander positions response forces to a Level II threat (that is, enemy forces or activities a unit can defeat with response force augmentation) with respect to time and distance factors so as to leave no element outside that distance a response force can support. The commander integrates fire support assets into the response composition due to the speed at which these assets react over the extensive distances involved in area security operations. Whenever possible, host-nation security assets constitute part of the response to smooth public interactions with these forces.

Note. A Level III threat is an enemy force or activity exceeding the defensive capability of any local reserve or response force. The response to a Level III threat is a TCF, which is generally established no lower than division level due to the inability to resource at lower echelons. (See chapter 6 for information on threat levels and responses.)

Survivability

7-271. Precautions are taken to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities, and accommodations, including the construction of obstacles, protective bunkers, fighting positions, and shelters. BCT subordinate units practice alert procedures and develop drills to occupy positions. Engineer forces enable survivability needs. Units maintain proper camouflage and concealment based on the METT-TC (I) variables. Area security forces are vulnerable to personnel security risks from local employees and other personnel subject to bribes, threats, or compromise. Local criminal elements are a constant threat and protection consideration. The most proactive measure for survivability is individual awareness by Soldiers in all circumstances. Soldiers look for anything out of place and for patterns that tend to precede aggression. Commanders and subordinate leaders ensure Soldiers remain alert, do not establish routines, and maintain appearance and bearing. (See ATP 3-37.34 for information on survivability.)

Notes. In stability-focused operations, the enemy sniper poses a significant threat to dismounted (or mounted) movement, or maneuver. Counter-sniper drills include rehearsed responses, reconnaissance and security operations, and the incorporation of cover and concealment. The BCT's ROE provide instructions on how to react to sniper fire, including circumstantial weapon use restrictions. For example, the ROE may permit units to use weapon systems such as a sniper rifle to eliminate a positively identified sniper in a crowded urban setting due to the reduced possibility for collateral damage. (See ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.18 for information on sniper operations.)

Notes (continued). An enemy IED attack is another major threat to dismounted (or mounted) movement, or maneuver. Prior to the conduct of any area security mission, commanders and subordinate leaders brief personnel on the latest IED threat types, usage and locations in an AO or along mounted and dismounted movement routes, or maneuver. All Soldiers maintain situational awareness by looking for IEDs and their hiding places. Early mornings and periods of reduced visibility are especially dangerous since the enemy may be able to emplace IEDs undetected. (See ATP 3-21.18 for additional information on IED attacks.)

Air and Missile Defense

7-272. Offensive and defensive air defense planning considerations continue to apply when the BCT conducts stability-focused operations. However, the air threat trends toward Group 1 and 2 UASs (see ATP 3-01.81) employed by enemy forces in opposing the BCT's effort to provide a stable, safe, and secure environment. Air and missile defense sensors and command and control elements external to the BCT provide early warning against aerial and missile attack, and they populate the BCT's COP. Soldiers train in aircraft recognition and ROE since multiple factions use the same or similar aircraft, including international and private organizations employing their own or charter civilian aircraft. (See ATP 3-01.8 for information on air and missile defense.)

Note. ATP 3-01.15 provides information on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for an integrated air defense system. ATP 3-01.50 provides information on the operations of the air defense and airspace management cell within the BCT fire support cell.

7-273. Counter-rocket and artillery batteries' and counter-mortar firing elements' locations may be in or near the BCT's AO to support its area security mission. Battery sensors detect incoming rockets, artillery, and mortar shells and are useful in detecting Group 1 and 2 UASs. The battery's fire control system predicts the flight path of incoming rockets and shells, prioritizes targets, and activates the supported AO's warning system IAW the established ROE. Exposed elements in the AO can then take cover and provide cueing data that allow the battery's weapon system to defeat the target before the target impacts the area. The commander clearly defines command and support relationships between counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar elements and the BCT during planning. (See ATP 3-01.60 for information on counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar fires and ATP 3-01.81 for information on counter-UAS measures.)

7-274. The BCT commander and subordinate commanders and leaders ensure the proper planning and implementation of all passive and active air defense measures. Passive measures include the use of concealed routes and assembly areas, movement on secure routes, marches at night, increased intervals between elements of the columns, and dispersion. Active measures include the use of organic and attached weapons IAW the OPORD and unit SOP. The air guard duties of specific Soldiers during dismounted (or mounted) movements and marches assign a search area to each. During movements and marches, seeing the enemy first affords the unit time to react. Scanning for long periods decreases a Soldier's ability to identify enemy aircraft. During extended or long movements and marches, Soldiers' air guard duty assignments occur in shifts. (See ATP 3-21.18 and ATP 3-21.8 for information on passive and active air defense measures.)

Countering Unmanned Aircraft System Threats

7-275. Companies and below take the concept of protection developed at battalion and implement it. Their main focus during troop leading procedures is reacting to air contact battle drills. Leaders at company and below conduct rehearsals and examine their unit's active and passive measures. Rehearsals check things such as air guard locations, assigned sectors, UAS reporting procedures, communication plans, air defense warning status, weapons control status (WCS), engagement criteria, and threat UAS identification.

Note. The company commander and its subordinate leaders should assume the company is being observed by the enemy through reconnaissance forces, surveillance assets, and targeting systems, and not assume they are under a protective umbrella of friendly air and missile defense units. UASs (both military and civilian off the shelf) are everywhere and accessible to any one individual or organization. While not all hostile air threats require engagement using air defense measures from air and missile defense units, there is still a requirement to detect, identify and be prepared to counter and defeat all classes of UASs. (See ATP 3-01.81 for classifications and additional information on counter-UASs.)

7-276. Understanding that planning is the first step toward effectively countering UAS threats. Neutralizing the UAS threat requires a combined arms approach that employs capabilities from all the warfighting functions. Effective planning synchronizes activities across echelons and warfighting functions to ensure complementary and redundant capabilities. Planning considerations are part of a coherent planning structure that includes—

- Layered approach.
- ROE.
- Airspace control.
- Air defense warning condition.
- WCS.
- Early warning network.
- Prioritized protection list.
- Warnings.

Layered Approach

7-277. A layered defense provides multiple engagement opportunities, ideally beginning at the maximum range from friendly forces and areas, and before any attacking UAS can release its weapons. A layered defense normally includes support by necessary space, surface, and airborne early warning, detection and tracking assets.

Rules of Engagement

7-278. Commanders have the responsibility to take whatever action is necessary to protect their forces and equipment against attack and ensure their Soldiers operate IAW established ROE. A unit can push engagement authority of threat system UAS lower, but they balance the risks of a quicker response with the potential for fratricide.

Airspace Control

7-279. Divisions and brigades distribute the airspace coordination order, the unit airspace plan, and the current air picture via command and control systems that subordinate units have access to. This includes systems such as the CP computing environment or the joint battle command-platform. Not all brigades and battalions have access to the tactical airspace integration system which is the command and control system that manages the air picture, forward area air defense command and control, or air and missile defense early warning systems. Subordinate units without air defense and air management cells or access to these systems, are not capable of maintaining awareness of the current friendly air picture and rely on those echelons with those systems to share and create products they can use.

Air Defense Warning Conditions

7-280. Air defense warning condition is an air defense warning given in the form of a color code corresponding to the degree of air threat probability. Warning conditions are a procedural control used to prepare units based on the assessed threat. Different conditions can be provided for different air threats. Commanders may issue higher, but not lower, conditions for their assigned area. Leaders ensure that every Soldier knows the current air defense warnings.

Weapons Control Status

7-281. WCS is a control measure that establishes the conditions under which air defense weapons (including small arms and crew served weapons) are permitted to engage threats. WCSs can apply to weapon systems, volumes of airspace, or types of air platforms. The tactical situation normally determines the degree or extent of control necessary over weapon systems. The brigade air and missile defense cell either establishes separate WCSs for various air threats, including fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and UASs or an overall control status for any threat air engagement. The three WCSs for counter-UASs are—

- Weapons free.
  - Engage any UAS that is not positively identified in IAW ROE as friendly.
  - This is the least restrictive WCS.
- Weapons tight—UASs are engaged only when identified as hostile IAW with ROE.
- Weapons hold.
- Units may fire only in self-defense or when ordered by proper higher authority.
- This is the most restrictive WCS.

Early Warning Network

7-282. As part of their counterreconnaissance efforts, all units establish an air threat early warning network. This network is usually over frequency modulation (FM) and is a means of sharing air threat situational understanding for units without dedicated air defense command and control systems. These networks alert everyone. Units practice relaying information using this network to reduce the time required to notify everyone.

Prioritized Protection List

7-283. Normally, the company receives a prioritized protection list (developed at brigade and battalion echelons) to help prioritize the use of assigned or allocated protection capabilities. The prioritized protection list provides focus on defending critical assets such as command and control nodes or logistics areas as part of the overall protection plan. Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials.

Warnings

7-284. Once an air threat is detected, all friendly forces need to be quickly warned. This can happen by two methods-a top-down approach, or a bottom-up approach. Small UASs are typically detected by forward units first, so rehearsing the use of the unit early warning net and rehearsals from the bottom-up are critical. No matter which approach is used, the information is passed using the size, activities, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report format. Receipt of this report should trigger additional follow-on actions for all units. These follow-on actions could be for units to freeze in place or engage with lethal or non-lethal means. When possible, units detecting air threats alert adjacent units. Table 7-2 on page 322 shows some additional information to collect on unknown UAS and to include in a SALUTE report. (See ATP 3-01.81 for additional information.)

Table 7-2. Example counter-unmanned aircraft system detection report (SALUTE format)

Line	*Information*	*Example*
1	Size	Report the number of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) or size of the formation.
2	Activity	Report a detailed account of actions: • What is the UAS's direction of movement? • Was there any hostile action? • Is the threat UAS loitering in one spot? • Is it flying straight? • Was the threat UAS approach observed or was it spotted overhead?
3	Location	Report where the activity was seen. Include 6- to 8-digit grid coordinate of reporting element and either grid or distance and direction from reporting element location (known point).
4	Unit (Description of UAS)	Include details such as— • Fixed-wing or rotor/multi-rotor. • If fixed wing, include— ▪ Estimated length of wingspan. ▪ Tail configuration. • If rotor/multi-rotor, include— ▪ Number of rotors. ▪ Height. ▪ Payload, sensors, and weapons. ▪ Any lights. ▪ Other distinguishable markings.
5	Time	Report the time the activity was observed.
6	Equipment	If possible, report all equipment associated with the UAS, such as payload or weapons.

Force Health Protection

7-285. The nature of area security in support of stability-focused tasks requires the BCT surgeon to emphasize the provisions of operational public health, veterinary services, and combat and operational stress control for supported forces. The BCT's area security mission, within the conduct of stability-focused tasks, involves a far greater degree of public interaction with civilians in the AO. Thus, the probability increases of Soldier exposure to zoonotic diseases, toxic industrial material and other pollutants, and contaminated food and water. The prolonged tours of duty typically associated with these operations and the enemy's use of unconventional weapons such as mines and suicide bombers tend to increase combat and operational stress reactions. The BCT surgeon coordinates the employment of combat operational stress control teams with the chaplain to meet the behavioral health needs for within the BCT Soldiers. (See ATP 3-91 and FM 4-02 for information on force health protection.)

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Operations

7-286. CBRN operations employ capabilities to assess, protect against, and mitigate CBRN incidents to enable freedom of action. They support operational and strategic objectives to counter WMD and protect the force in a CBRN environment. An effective CBRN defense counters enemy threats, enemy attacks, and the presence of toxic industrial materials in the AO by minimizing vulnerabilities, protecting friendly forces, and maintaining an operational tempo that complicates enemy targeting.

7-287. The BCT employs CBRN active and passive defense activities under the two overarching CBRN principles of protection and contamination mitigation to continue operations in a CBRN environment. The

BCT commander and staff, ICW the division or higher HQ, integrate these principles regardless of the mission type.

7-288. The commander plans for CBRN support when intelligence assesses that the enemy possesses and has employed CBRN agents or has the intent to do so. A mix of CBRN units (for example, decontamination, hazard response, reconnaissance and surveillance) is necessary to protect the force. The CBRN staff officer at the BCT and battalion or squadron participates in the IPOE to advise the commander of CBRN hazards to include toxic industrial materials in the local area. (See ATP 3-91 and FM 3-11 for information on CBRN operations.)

Convoy Security

7-289. Convoy security is a specialized kind of area security operation conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security operations anytime either insufficient friendly forces exist to secure routes continuously in their AOs or significant danger exists from enemy or adversary ground action directed against the convoy. The BCT may conduct convoy security operations in conjunction with route security operations in its AO. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing guidance on TTP for units to provide for their own security during convoys; and establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Local or theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive security and protection. (See ATP 4-01.45 for information on convoy security.)

AREA SECURITY PREPARATION

7-290. During preparatory activities, the BCT continues to plan and organize area security missions in its AO and to train and equip itself for those missions. The conduct of preparatory activities in support of stability-focused tasks is essentially the same as that in support of offensive and defensive tasks. (See ADP 5-0 for information.) However, distinguishing factors of stability-focused tasks are the increased requirement for interagency coordination at BCT level and below and the demands on the BCT and subordinate staffs to perform tasks or functions outside their traditional scope of duties. The commander's realignment of organizations and functions during area security operations reflects the commander's careful weighing and acceptance of risk (for example, economy of force) appropriate to the demands of the BCT's area security mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING PREPARATION

7-291. Stability-focused tasks within area security operations are more complex because they involve, to a greater extent, unified action partners, sister services, and HN forces. BCT preparatory activities stress clarity and transparency about the command relationship between the BCT and other military service components or agencies who operate in the assigned or projected AOs. Though it often proves difficult, the BCT commander strives to achieve unity of effort with unified action partners, spending a great deal of effort during preparations to clarify the roles and functions of the various, often competing agencies.

Inherent Responsibilities to Area Security

7-292. The BCT commander has inherent responsibilities: to clarify the mission; to determine the controlling legal and policy authorities; and to organize, direct, sustain, and care for the organizations and individuals for whom the BCT provides the effort in interagency and multinational operations. The commander serves as the unit's chief engager, responsible for informing and influencing audiences inside and outside the organization. For example, the commander often integrates HNSF and interagency activities with subordinate battalions, companies, and platoons—down to the individual Soldier level—to serve as support units. Therefore, obtaining the scalable communications packages and linguists necessary for supporting the BCT's planned operations and training is an important preparatory activity.

Liaison Coordination and Conduct

7-293. Coordinating and conducting liaison ensures subordinate commanders and leaders internal and external to the BCT understand their units' roles in upcoming operations and ensures their readiness to perform those roles. In addition to military forces, many civilian organizations may operate in the same AO. Their presence both affects and is affected by BCT operations. Continuous coordination and liaison between

the command and unified action partners helps build unity of effort, especially with civilian organizations due to the variety of external organizations and the inherent coordination challenges.

7-294. Available resources and the need for direct contact between sending and receiving headquarters determine when to establish liaison. Establishing and maintaining liaison enable direct communication between the sending and receiving units or headquarters beginning with planning and continuing through preparing and executing, or liaison may start (though not preferably so) as late as execution. The BCT commander and staff coordinate with higher, lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported units and civilian organizations. Coordination tasks may include those following:

- Sending and receiving liaison teams.
- Establishing communications links that ensure continuous contact during execution.
- Exchanging SOPs.
- Synchronizing security operations with reconnaissance plans to prevent coverage breaks.
- Facilitating civil-military coordination among those involved.

Partnership and Team Building for Area Security

7-295. As part of the BCT's coordination efforts, the commander may establish or employ (from higher echelon) special negotiation elements who move wherever needed to build partnerships or teams and to diffuse or negotiate confrontations in the BCT's AO. Echeloned elements partner with linguist support and with personnel who have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the appropriate level of the chain of command. As the BCT and these elements conduct preparatory activities, subordinate units of the BCT rehearse the activities supporting these operations and ensure these elements have access to any requisite transportation and communications assets.

Information Network Initiation

7-296. During preparation, the information network is tailored and engineered to meet the specific needs of each operation and partner participant. The network includes not only communications, but also the mode in which the commander expects information to move between and be available for subordinate commanders, leaders, and units in the assigned AO. Staffs and subordinate units prepare and rehearse the information network supporting the plan. Network considerations include those following:

- Management of available bandwidth.
- Availability and location of data and information.
- Positioning and structure of network assets.
- Tracking status of key network systems.
- Arraying sensors, weapons, and the information network to support the concept of operations.

Note. Defining the ground rules for sharing unclassified information between the BCT, and unified action partners IAW higher commander policy is an important function of the division and BCT knowledge management and foreign disclosure officers (see ATP 3-16.02). The division assistant chief of staff, signal and the BCT signal staff officer (S-6) staff sections are responsible for disseminating and implementing those ground rules to the subordinate units of the BCT.

Movement and Maneuver Preparation

7-297. Success in area security operations hinges on protecting the BCT forces in the AO and their ability to support stability-focused tasks. The positioning and repositioning of forces address the early detection and defeat of enemy forces attempting to operate in the BCT's AO. Enemy attacks in the BCT's AO range from individual saboteurs and terrorist acts to insurgents' operations.

Responsibility Assignments

7-298. During preparatory activities, the commander defines and assigns responsibilities for the security of units in the BCT's AO or respective base or base cluster. Subordinates' AOs or base and base cluster commanders are responsible for the local security of their respective areas or bases and base clusters. Individual AOs and base commanders designate protection standards and defensive readiness conditions

(ICW the BCT's security plan) for tenant units and units transiting through their areas or bases. Commanders coordinate with the BCT's main CP to mitigate the effects of security operations on the primary functions of units located in their AOs.

Degree of Risk

7-299. The degree of risk from the enemy threat that the BCT commander accepts within an area security operation invariably passes to the subordinate unit commander assigned the area security mission. For example, the subordinate unit commander moves security forces to decrease the threat's impact on logistics and medical units and thereby to support the BCT's continued operations at the anticipated level. When available and so as not to divert any BCT assets from their primary area security missions, military police (see FM 3-39 for information on military police operations) or other available security forces (possibly HN) screen for or guard from enemy observation or attack all friendly CP facilities and critical sites. To protect CPs, critical sites, base, base clusters, and security corridors, commanders rehearse and inspect subordinate unit security plans. These plans address support units, sites, base and convoy defense against Level I threats, and response force operations directed against Level II and III threats. (See chapter 6 and ATP 3-91 for information on threat levels and responses.)

Terrain Management

7-300. *Terrain management* is the process of allocating terrain by specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other (FM 3-90). The commander designates assembly areas and specifies locations for units and activities to deconflict movements, for the repositioning of units, and for other activities that might interfere with each other. Subordinate commanders assigned an area security mission manage the terrain in their boundaries and identify and locate key terrain in the area. The BCT operations officer, with support from others in the staff, deconflicts operations, controls movements, and deters fratricide as units move to execute planned area security missions. The commander and staff also track and monitor unified action partners and their activities in the BCT's AO.

Terrain Preparation

7-301. Terrain preparation starts with situational understanding of the terrain through proper terrain analysis. It involves shaping the terrain to gain an advantage (for example, improving cover, concealment, observation, and fields of fire; reinforcing obstacles for new obstacle effects; the initial positioning of forces through mobility operations). It can mean the difference between the area security operation's success and failure. Commanders develop an understanding of the terrain and infrastructure of their AOs as early as possible to identify potential for improvement, establish priorities of work, and begin preparing the area.

INTELLIGENCE DURING PREPARATION

7-302. As the BCT prepares, the commander takes every opportunity for developing situational understanding before and during operations with an aggressive and continuous information collection plan (through reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence operations, and security operations). The commander executes information collection early in planning and continues it through preparation and execution.

Note. Intelligence operations are tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information and thereby to satisfy validated requirements (see appendix A).

Information Collection for Area Security Operations

7-303. During information collection, the commander and staff continuously plan the tasks for, task, and employ collection forces and assets to collect timely and accurate information. The collected information satisfies the CCIRs and other information requirements. The collection efforts within the BCT work through the BCT intelligence cell (specifically, the intelligence staff officer) to the division intelligence cell. Intelligence cells, ICW the BCT provost marshal, develop a readily searchable database—including any available biometric data—of potential insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in the BCT's AO. Patrols use this information IAW applicable guidance to identify individuals they may encounter during civil reconnaissance patrols (see ATP 3-21.8 for information on reconnaissance patrols) and other operations. (See chapter 4 for information on information collection.)

Analysis and Dissemination of Information and Intelligence

7-304. Intelligence analysis evaluates the collected information and integrates it with existing information to produce intelligence. The commander and staff refine security requirements and plans (including counterterrorism [CT] and COIN) as the answers to various requests for information become available. Timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence analysis, reporting, and products enable the commander to determine the best locations to place area security measures and to conduct area security missions in support of stability-focused tasks. The rehearsal of area security measures and missions enables subordinate units to understand how these measures and missions fit into the BCT's area security operation and, when applicable, that of the HN. (See ATP 2-19.4 for information on the analysis and dissemination of information and intelligence.)

SUSTAINMENT DURING PREPARATION

7-305. The resupply, maintenance, and issuance of supplies and equipment occur during temporary and long-term area security commitments. The repositioning of sustainment assets also occurs. During preparation, sustainment planners take action to optimize the means (force structure and resources) for supporting the commander's area security plan. These actions may include identifying and preparing bases, HN infrastructure and capabilities, contract support requirements, and lines of communication; forecasting and building operational stocks; and identifying endemic health and environmental factors. Integrating environmental considerations serves to sustain vital resources and reduce the logistics footprint. Planners focus on identifying currently available resources and confirming access to them. During preparation, sustainment planning continues to support operational planning (branch and sequel development) and the targeting (lethal and nonlethal) process.

7-306. Depending on the METT-TC (I) variables, sustainment elements may support the BCT inside its AO or from echelon support areas outside the AO. The threat inside the assigned AO is generally the major consideration when determining the appropriate size and composition of forces (support and operational) to array for an area security operation. Support elements (and any other force) inside the BCT's AO must be able to defend themselves against a Level I threat, which is a small enemy force who can be defeated either by the units normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters. The BCT commander employs a response force to respond to a Level II threat (see chapter 6). When feasible, HNSF can effectively reinforce the security of the supporting sustainment elements inside and outside the BCT's AO due to their knowledge of the area, language(s), and customs. (See chapter 6 for information on threat levels and responses.)

Notes. Base and base cluster defense is the cornerstone of successful area security and support area efforts. The commander achieves the application of effective area security for bases and base clusters and their tenant and transient units by developing a comprehensive plan linked to site selection, layout, and facility design. ATP 3-21.20 outlines force organization, control measures, and considerations for planning, preparing, and executing base and base cluster operations.

The commander and staff assess the need for providing protection to contractors operating in the BCT's AO, and they designate forces to provide security appropriately. The mission and location of and threat to each contractor determines the necessary degree of protection. Protecting contractors involves active protection (escort or perimeter security) and self-protection training and equipping (protective equipment and weapons). Under certain conditions, contract security forces serve as another means of reinforcing the security of those sustainment elements supporting inside and outside the BCT's AO and base and cluster defenses.

Protection During Preparation

7-307. As preparatory activities and the area security operation itself continue, the commander's situational understanding may change. Enemy actions may require revision of the security plan, or unforeseen opportunities may arise. Protection assessments made during planning may prove true or false. Intelligence analysis from reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations may confirm or deny enemy actions or show changed security conditions in the AO due to supporting efforts. The status of friendly forces may change with the situation. In any of these cases, the commander identifies the changed conditions and assesses how the changes might affect upcoming area security missions. Significant new information requires commanders to make one of three assessments regarding the area security plan: the new information—

- Validates the plan with no further changes.
- Requires adjustments to the plan.
- Invalidates the plan, requiring the commander to reframe it or develop a new plan.

7-308. Protecting information during preparatory activities is key in protecting BCT subordinate units and the overall BCT area security operation. The secure, uninterrupted flow of data and information allows the BCT to multiply its combat power and to synchronize division and other unified action partner capabilities and activities. The needs to be candid and responsive to requests for information balance against the need to protect operational information such as troop movements, security plans, and vulnerabilities identified during preparation (inspections and rehearsals). Working closely with all partners develops the EEFIs to preclude the inadvertent public disclosure of critical or sensitive information. Information protection includes cybersecurity, computer network defense, and electromagnetic protection. All three are interrelated.

AREA SECURITY EXECUTION

7-309. Though close combat dominance remains the principal means of influencing enemy actions, performance conditions and standards undergo modification IAW the METT-TC (I) variables and the more restrictive ROE for the conduct of stability-focused tasks. The general scope of the BCT missions in support of stability-focused tasks covers security operations, patrols and patrolling (reconnaissance and combat), intelligence operations (for example, HUMINT assets from the BCT's higher HQ), surveillance (ground forces and aerial assets), convoy security, and Soldier and leader engagements. Additionally, missions supporting the conduct of stability-focused tasks often require the establishment of static security posts, base and base clusters, searches, roadblocks, checkpoints, observation posts, and combat outposts. The condition set surrounding each mission varies and requires detailed analysis and planning.

Apportionment of Combat Power and Dedicated Assets

7-310. During area security operations, the BCT commander apportions combat power and dedicates assets to protection tasks based on analysis of the OE, the likelihood of enemy action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Though all resources have value, the METT-TC (I) variables render some resources, assets, or locations more significant to the enemy than to friendly forces. The commander relies on RM (see chapter 4) and other assessments to facilitate decision making, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and recuperability are among the most significant considerations when

determining protection priorities that will become the subject of the commander's guidance and the focus of the BCT's area security efforts.

7-311. Generally, the BCT conducts area security operations to establish stability after open hostilities cease. With their complex and dynamic nature, area security operations and their related activities change from day to day, depending on the METT-TC (I) variables. Figure 5-11 on page 207 illustrates example counterinsurgent area security activities, with one set of conditions for discussion purposes. ATP 3-21.20 provides two detailed scenarios that suggest (for discussion purposes) ways an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) may employ forces during the conduct of an area security operation. ATP 3-21.10 reviews these same scenarios for the employment of forces (subordinate units of an Infantry battalion) during the conduct of area security.

Criteria to Judge Progress

7-312. For employment during execution, *evaluating* is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists (ADP 5-0). Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process (see chapter 4), during which most of the analysis occurs. The BCT commander's evaluation reveals what is and is not working and provides insight for how better to accomplish the mission.

7-313. Criteria in the form of MOEs and MOPs aid in the determination of attained progress toward desired end state conditions, objectives, and task performances. MOEs help determine whether a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine whether a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria and not assessment itself. They require relevant information to serve as indicators for evaluation.

7-314. MOEs are criteria for assessing changes in system behavior and capability or the OE; they gauge changes—positive or negative—in conditions. The attainment of a desired end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect are all measurable by these changes. MOEs suggest an answer to the question of whether a force is doing the right things. They commonly appear and initiate in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective to provide a safe, secure environment may include the level of insurgent activity or the level of public trust in the HNSF.

7-315. MOPs are criteria for assessing the friendly actions whose outcomes inform the measure of task accomplishment. They suggest answers to questions of whether the action was or the tasks were completed to standard or whether a force is doing things rightly. For example, an MOP confirms or denies a task was performed properly. MOPs appear and initiate at all levels in execution matrixes. Evaluations of the training completed during the BCT's SFA missions commonly employ MOPs.

7-316. At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to track task completion. The status of those tasks and subtasks are MOPs. Similarly, operations comprise a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, purpose, and resources to accomplish missions. Current operations integration cells use MOPs in execution matrixes and running estimates to track completed tasks. MOP usage is a primary element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on the friendly force. Evaluating task accomplishment by MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in answers of yes or no. Examples of MOPs include the confirmation that route X has been cleared or that the generators have been delivered, are operational, and are secured at villages A, B, and C.

SECTION III – SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-317. SFA contributes to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the capacity and capability developing of FSF and their supporting institutions, whether of a partner nation or an intergovernmental organization (regional security organization). Capacity and capability development is integral to successful stability missions and extends to all organizations and personnel under partner nation control whose mission is to secure the populace and protect the nation's sovereignty from internal and external threats. FSF are duly constituted foreign military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces (such as border police, coast guard, customs organizations, prison guards and other corrections personnel, and all their supporting institutions).

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES OVERVIEW

7-318. SFA activities organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise FSF from ministry or department level down through tactical units. The DOD maintains capabilities for SFA through conventional forces, special operations forces, the Civilian expeditionary workforce, and contractor personnel either inside or outside a joint operational area. SFA activities require carefully selected, properly trained, and well-experienced personnel (as trainers or advisors) who are subject matter experts and have the cultural understanding, language skills, and seasoned maturity to relate to and train FSF. SFA activities help build the FSF's capacity to train their own forces independently of the sustained efforts of the U.S. Government.

Note. Asking the three questions of with, through, and by whom initiates a study of the process of FSF interaction. This process initially involves training and assisting (interacting with the forces). The next step involves advising, which may transpire in combat situations (acting through the forces). The final phase involves FSF operating independently (acting by themselves). (See DODI 5000.68 for information on this process.)

SUPPORT TO SERVICE AND JOINT OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

7-319. The conduct of SFA activities occurs across the range of military operations and across the competition continuum (from peace through war), supporting Service and joint operations and missions (see figure 7-5). Routinely, the conduct of significant SC and military engagements occurs worldwide for peacetime theater and global shaping through the geographic combatant commanders' theater campaign plans. Some of those SC activities include SFA activity efforts in the lower range of the competition continuum. The timely and effective execution of relevant SFA activities, as part of the SC for shaping in the theater campaign, may contribute to stabilization and perhaps a measure of deterrence to render unnecessary the conduct of a contingency operation by U.S. Forces. Joint forces maintain the capability of conducting SFA activities throughout all phases of an operation or campaign to partner effectively with FSF supporting U.S. or U.S.-led multinational requirements. (See FM 3-22 for information on SC.)




Figure 7-5. Security force assistance in the competition continuum

PHASING FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-320. For the purposes of this publication, the initial response, transformation, and sustainability fostering phases of the stabilization framework address SFA. Phasing for SFA (again, initial response, transformation, and sustainability fostering) mirrors the stabilization framework (see section I) and depends on the OE. SFA can start in any phase or even move to a previous phase due to changes in the conditions of the OE. Differences within and between phases may not change on the surface even while relationships with FSF

change drastically. For example, the latter stage of the transformation phase can differ greatly from the initial stage of the transformation phase. Span of control and the AO for SFA can expand within a phase and as operations continue within the stabilization framework. Since the OE is the basis for the three phases, they, themselves, provide a baseline for augmentation. Potential augmentation may require military police, legal, public affairs, CA, PSYOP, engineering, cultural expertise, sustainment, and SFA team personnel.

Note. A provincial reconstruction team embedded at the BCT level is a key element during the conduct of SFA. The BCT leads the efforts to establish civil security, to provide support to civil control (when approved by Congress), and to develop and enable FSF. The embedded provincial reconstruction team has the lead in providing support to economic and infrastructure development, restoring essential services, and providing support to governance. Together, the BCT and an embedded provincial reconstruction team can effectively support the FSF and execute all six stability operations tasks.

TRANSITIONS

7-321. Transitions during SFA depend on the conditions in the OE. Planning by a comprehensive approach initially identifies transitions. They occur simultaneously or sequentially, in different levels of conflict, in separate echelons (including their potentiality at the tactical level), and for different units in the BCT's AO. Major transitions include the BCT's status as the supported unit in the beginning of an initial response phase changing to the FSF's status as the supported unit later in the phase. At this point in the transition, the area in which the BCT conducts SFA expands. Expansion can occur multiple times, depending on conditions and especially FSF capacity and capability. To facilitate flexibility and to enable transitions, the commander visualizes and incorporates branches and sequels into the overall plan. Without planning, preparation, and efficient execution, transitions can reduce operating tempo and momentum and surrender the initiative.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-322. Planning for SFA, like any other operation, begins either with the anticipation of a new mission or the receipt of a mission as part of the MDMP. The Army design methodology is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual planning when integrated with the detailed planning typically associated with the MDMP to develop the capacity and capability of the FSF and its supporting institutions. Planning helps the commander develop and communicate a common vision across the staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners. Planning results in a plan and order that synchronize the actions of participating partners in time, space, purpose, and resources to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-323. SFA planning requires a comprehensive approach, as well as an in-depth understanding of the OE. Planning nests within policy, IDAD strategy, the campaign plan, and any other higher echelon plan. Continuous and open to change, SFA planning identifies how best to assist the FSF and develops a sequence of actions to change the situation.

UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-324. Understanding the OE is fundamental to all operations and is essential to SFA activities. In-depth understanding of the OE grasps the sizes, organizational structures, capabilities, dispositions, roles, functions, and missions of the HN forces, threats, regional players, and transnational actors in the AO and AOI, as well as the sociocultural factors of the citizenry and other relevant populations. Identifying all actors who influence the OE and determining their motivations help planners and practitioners define the goals and methods for developing HNSF and their institutions.

7-325. The plan, which includes the commander's intent, supports the U.S. Forces and FSF in their determinations of the actions to take. Plans and orders provide decision points and branches that anticipate the options that enable the force to adapt as the operation unfolds. This is especially important for SFA since these operations tend to be prolonged efforts. Units conducting SFA often rotate before achieving all objectives. As a result, planning establishes objectives and milestones that can be achieved during the BCT's

mission. These objectives and milestones support higher echelon plans, including the campaign plan and IDAD strategy.

Note. SFA planning may involve the development of nonmilitary security forces and their supporting institutions.

LEGITIMACY OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-326. Public perception of the legitimacy of those forces providing SFA may prove tenuous during some phases of a complex operation, but public legitimization is essential for achieving long-term objectives. SFA ensures all FSF operate within the bounds of domestic and international laws, respect human rights, and support wide-ranging efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law, thereby advancing legitimacy and transparency. Legitimacy fosters transparency and confidence among the HN government, FSF, HN population, and U.S. Government agencies. Another aspect of legitimacy is supporting HN ownership in the SFA effort because it facilitates a sense of sustainability for capacity building or security reform through public acceptance.

7-327. Throughout planning, the BCT commander and staff consider how each SFA activity will shape public perception and focus on the activities that would advance the HN government's and FSF's legitimacy and not just highlight their technical competence. Having a just cause and earning and sustaining public trust affect the relationship with the citizenry. Commanders and staffs ensure an appropriate information management plan is developed for SFA ICW interagency partners and the division or other higher HQs. SFA advisors and trainers work with the FSF to present a positive context and narrative for the FSF professionalization effort and capacity to secure the populace. The coordination of the information themes and messages among the U.S. Forces, FSF, and HN government and the presentation or availability of information to the civilian population can limit or mitigate the propaganda efforts of insurgents or hostile forces. This may, in turn, mitigate the destabilizing influences of hostile forces or criminal elements as they propagandize SFA efforts and damage the HN government's credibility and legitimacy.

SECURITY FORCE FUNCTIONS

7-328. Security forces perform three generic functions: executive, generating, operating. The executive function includes strategic and operational direction and provides oversight, policy, and resources for the FSF generating and operating functions. The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating forces. In the United States, the sister services primarily perform the generating function, especially the military schools, training centers, and arsenals. Foreign security institutional forces refer to the capability and capacity of the FSF to organize, train, equip, and build operating force units. Foreign security operating forces form operating capabilities with concepts similar to warfighting functions to achieve FSF security objectives.

Note. Employing operating forces to fill those SFA capabilities associated with the FSF generating function (FSF tasks such as developing FSF doctrine or standing up a staff officer's college) and possibly the FSF executive function (ministries) would likely exceed the inherent capability of the operating forces and require special training or augmentation by subject matter experts drawn from U.S. generating organizations.

7-329. U.S. operating forces are typically better suited to develop foreign security operating force capabilities than they are to develop foreign security institutional forces of generating capabilities. Typically, the BCT is tasked to train or advise foreign security operating forces. The operating function employs military capabilities by applying the warfighting functions of command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection during actual operations. Operating, as it applies to police security forces, may include training an actual operation with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigation, incarceration, communications, and sustainment. Operating forces are responsible for collective training and for performing missions assigned to the unit.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TASKS

7-330. SFA activities normally use the following general developmental tasks: organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess (OTERA-A). These functional tasks, serving as SFA capability areas, are useful for developing the capabilities required by the FSF. OTERA-A tasks are tools to develop, change, or improve the FSF capacity and capabilities (see table 7-3). From a baseline assessment of the FSF, and considering U.S. interests and objectives, the BCT commander and staff planners determine which OTERA-A tasks are necessary to build the proper capacity and capability levels within the various FSF units. Assessments of the FSF in comparison to a desired set of capabilities assist in developing a plan to improve the FSF based on the OTERA-A tasks. (See FM 3-22 for information on SFA activities.)

Table 7-3. Organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess tasks

Task	*Description*
Organize	All activities conducted to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. May include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and staffing functions.
Train	All activities conducted to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. May include task analysis, the development and execution of programs of instruction, implementation of training events, and leader development activities.
Equip	All activities conducted to design, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life-cycle management. May include fielding of new equipment, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.
Rebuild and build	All activities conducted to create, improve, and integrate facilities. May include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.
Advise and assist	All activities conducted to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the assigned missions of the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.
Assess	All activities conducted to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective using MOEs and MOPs to evaluate FSF capability. Once an objective is achieved, the focus shifts to sustaining it.

DECISIONS TO REDUCE OR OFFSET RISK

7-331. RM (see chapter 4) is the Army's process for helping organizations and individuals make informed decisions about reducing or offsetting risk. The RM measures identified during SFA planning add to the plan's flexibility during execution. A flexible plan can mitigate risk by partially compensating for a lack of information. SFA planning requires a thorough, comprehensive approach toward analyzing and agreeing upon risk reduction measures. Each SFA activity is distinct due to context and changes over time. Potential risk exists in focusing SFA efforts in one area or type of relationship at the expense of other SFA efforts based on short-term goals. Regarding SFA activities as the means of and ways to achieve end states and meaningful, mid- to long-term objectives with partners mitigates that risk.

7-332. Reducing or alleviating risk does not only rely on the SFA force and supporting agencies but also on the FSF elements in question. Conditions determine when to employ an element of the FSF. The BCT commander and staff use assessments to determine objectives and requirements for reducing or offsetting risk. Risk applies to how well the FSF, BCT, and HN and partner organizations and agencies tolerate the changes in the OE and the challenges and conditions inherent to the operation.

7-333. The BCT commander and FSF commander assess the risk associated with the employment forces and mitigate that risk as much as possible. For example, advisors from the BCT play a significant role in SC missions such as the SFA. They live and work with their partner FSF and are sometimes required to fight alongside them. The relationship between advisors and FSF is vital. Advisors are not merely liaison officers. Though they do not command FSF units, they contribute to the recognition of the human dimension across

the range of military operations, specifically relationship management and risk mitigation between the SFA forces and FSF.

SUSTAINING ACTIVITIES

7-334. The sustainment of SFA activities entails two major components: the ability of the United States and other partners to sustain the SFA activities successfully and the ability of HNSF to sustain their capabilities independently over the long term. The first component relies on the HN government's maintaining its legitimacy, and the second component undergoes holistic consideration during the work with the HN to build its security forces. Considering the sociocultural factors, infrastructure, and education levels of prospective FSF is important when fielding weapon systems and maintaining organizations. Though this is neither the BCT's nor the division commander's decision, a strong recommendation passes through the SFA chain regarding this consideration.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE INTELLIGENCE

7-335. Intelligence supports assessments of HN capabilities, capacities, and shortfalls and those of the adversary. It involves sociocultural factors, information and intelligence sharing, and intelligence training. Information sharing between the BCT and FSF is an early consideration for planners. A continuous intelligence effort gauges public reaction, determines the effects of the SFA efforts on the infrastructure, and evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, and dispositions of opposition groups in the area. Ultimately, intelligence supports the SFA and FSF leaders' decision-making processes and the protection of friendly forces and assets.

Note. Personnel two deep in every staff section or advisory subunit receive training on foreign disclosure and derivative classification procedures before deployment. Interaction with the HN and FSF, even North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other coalition allies, requires foreign disclosure officer approval. The authorized release or disclosure of classified information requires personnel trained in derivative classification and foreign disclosure. This requirement creates a serious bottleneck without the proper training and decentralization. (See ATP 3-16.02 for additional information.)

SUSTAINMENT DURING SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-336. Logistics planners at the BCT level maintain understanding of the division's concept of support and sustainment estimates, which outline the responsibilities and requirements for maintaining logistic support of deployed forces in the division's AO. Logistic support includes the support of SFA augmentees and FSF in the BCT's AO to the conduct of operational missions (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, power generation, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities).

PROTECTION DURING SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

7-337. Protection is incumbent upon the commander's full understanding of the threat environment in the BCT's AO. With access to fused intelligence from local, regional, and national sources, the commander can accurately assess threats and employ measures to safeguard SFA personnel and facilities. Protection planning addresses support requirements for the response force, emergency procedures, personnel recovery, or the requirement to integrate SFA personnel into the HN protection plan.

7-338. Nontraditional threats such as the insider threat undermine SFA activities and the cohesion of U.S. Forces and FSF. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation between HN forces and U.S. Forces affects military capability. Adversaries view attacks against U.S. Forces as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted HN forces to conduct these attacks. While these types of insider attacks have been theater specific, commanders nevertheless ensure their protection plans consider the potential for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures.

Note. Commanders and leaders balance the more stringent and overtly heavy-handed protection controls and measures well enough with cultural sensitivity to avoid sending the wrong message to the very people and organizations U.S. Forces are assisting.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE PREPARATION

7-339. Preparation for SFA creates conditions that improve the BCT's opportunities for success. The degree to which the BCT is tasked within SFA operations depends on its preparedness in cultural knowledge, language, functional skills, and the practical application of all these in the OE. Preparation lies in initiating security and information collection, continuing liaison coordination and conduct, refining the plan, completing task organization, conducting pre-mission training, conducting rehearsals and inspections; continuing partnership and team building, and conducting initial movement, among other capabilities. Preparation facilitates and sustains plans-to-operations transitions, including those to branches and sequels, which are of vital importance for the oftentimes dynamic OE of SFA.

PRE-MISSION PREPARATIONS

7-340. After receiving a mission, the BCT continues detailed preparatory activities, prepares and rehearses classes given in the country, and conducts extensive briefings on the AO. Paragraphs 7-331 through 7-342 address the key staff and subordinate unit actions particular to SFA.

Current Operations

7-341. The BCT S-3 ensures predeployment training for Soldiers, including preparations for training FSF and rehearsals for movement. The S-3 reviews the program of instruction for training FSF, including getting approval from the commander (and higher HQ as necessary). The S-3, ICW the BCT CAO staff officer (S-9), ensures the operation plan minimizes the public impact of operations and mitigates the civilian impact on operations. The CMO plan undergoes coordination with the citizen population, domestic institutions, unified action partners, other civil entities, and any necessary interagency. This coordination may include CA battalions or brigades, provincial reconstruction teams, or USAID project officers in the AO.

Note. The primary staff officers of the current operations cell may be called upon to be the primary advisors to the HN forces staff sections and cells.

7-342. The BCT intelligence staff officer (S-2) supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within the unit and, as applicable, to higher, lower, or adjacent units or agencies. The S-2 monitors the implementation of the information collection plans, including updating the commander's PIRs, conducting area assessments, and coordinating for additional intelligence support. The S-2 establishes liaison with FSF intelligence and security agencies (within the guidelines provided by the applicable higher authority). The S-2 assesses the intelligence threat and resulting security requirements, including coordination with the S-3 on specific security and OPSEC measures.

7-343. The BCT personnel staff officer (S-1) supervises the battalion personnel staff section ICW brigade and higher echelon personnel staff sections. The S-1 screens personnel files to identify and review the records of Soldiers with specific skill sets that would prove useful to the BCT or higher echelon during the conduct of SFA operations. Certain professional certifications or work experiences in nonmilitary fields offer transferrable skill sets to operations focused on the conduct of stability operations tasks.

7-344. The BCT S-4 supervises, as required, the logistic support of SFA augmentees and FSF in the BCT's AO to the conduct of operational missions (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, power generation, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities).

7-345. The BCT S-6, ICW the division assistant chief of staff, signal, ensures depth in communication and synchronization between organizations both horizontally and vertically in the BCT's proposed AO. The S-6, ICW the BCT S-9, establishes communications and facilitate the establishment of a CMOC to enable civil engagements, integration, and coordination of the interagency and unified action partners.

Predeployment Training

7-346. During predeployment training, Soldiers receive training, materials, and briefings on the operational area. This training often covers the history, cultures, religions, languages, tribal affiliations, local politics, and cultural sensitivities present in the operational area, as well as the significant NGOs operating there.

Advisors focus their pre-mission training on the specific requirements of developing an FSF. The training emphasizes HN cultures and languages and provides cultural tips for building rapport with foreign personnel.

7-347. Based on the BCT commander's or higher commander's training guidance, subordinate unit commanders assign missions and approve the draft mission-essential task list that supports SFA. The staff plans, conducts, and evaluates training to support this guidance and the approved mission-essential task list for SFA missions. Subordinate commanders prioritize the tasks that need training. Since there is never enough time to train in every area, commanders focus on tasks essential for mission accomplishment.

7-348. Once commanders select tasks for training, the staff builds the training schedule and plans on these tasks. The staff provides the training requirements to the commander. The commander and staff include the tasks in the unit training schedule. The staff then coordinates the support and resource requirements with the S-3 and S-4. Finally, the commander ensures standards are enforced during training.

Evaluation

7-349. Evaluations can be either internal or external. Internal evaluations occur at all levels and are inherent in all training. External evaluations are usually more formal and conducted by a headquarters one or two levels above the unit under evaluation. This subject is carefully planned and discussed with FSF leaders to account for cultural sensitivities and current capabilities. A critical weakness in training is the failure to evaluate each task every time it is executed. Every training exercise provides potential for evaluation feedback. Every evaluation is also a training session. Leaders and trainers continually evaluate to optimize training. Evaluation occurs as the training takes place. Emphasis is on direct, on-the-spot evaluations. However, leaders allow Soldiers to complete the task first. Leaders plan after action reviews (AARs) at frequent, logical intervals during exercises. Such timing allows the correction of shortcomings while they are still fresh in everyone's minds. The AAR eliminates any reinforcement of bad habits.

Specified Training

7-350. Augmentation elements require area orientation, refresher combat training, and field training exercises. Unit training objectives are for developing the capabilities to conduct internal and external defense activities for tactical operations, intelligence operations, PSYOP, PRC operations, and CAO and advisory assistance operations in the HN language. Units identified for SFA begin intensive training immediately upon their notification of deployment.

7-351. After deployment to the HN and before commitment to operations, the unit may receive in-country training at HN training centers or at designated training locations. This training targets the psychological and physical acclimation of personnel to the HN. It affords commanders and staffs time to coordinate and plan within their own commands and with civilian and military joint and multinational organizations. After commitment, training continues and is stressed between operations; the operations, themselves, reveal necessary improvements for subsequent trainings to target.

7-352. Insider attacks are a threat in any AO. The BCT commander ensures military forces, the Civilian expeditionary workforce, and contractor personnel receive training to identify behavioral indicators of insider threats and to apply prevention tools to mitigate this threat. Cultural capability yields situational awareness and leads to increased force protection for SFA personnel. Eliminating or minimizing the insider threat, especially by the proper preparation and training of forces, is critical to mission success.

Note. To reduce the potential for insider attacks, FSF undergo a vetting process that identifies individuals whose motivations toward the HN government and U.S. Government are in question.

Partnership and Team Building for Security Force Assistance

7-353. The BCT, augmented for SFA, employs subordinate units whose sole focus is working with the FSF. Advisor teams often form from BCT or battalion organic resources, external augmentation, or a combination of both. These teams are best embedded with counterpart units, yet they may reside on a U.S. camp and commute to the FSF they support. The method depends on policy, direction from higher HQ, the conditions of the OE, and the capacity of the FSF camps to accommodate the U.S. Forces.

7-354. When the BCT has an SFA mission, it may support multiple FSF organizations in its AO. Additionally, these organizations may each report through different HN government channels and even to different ministries. To synchronize efforts, the BCT achieves unity of effort within the partner organizations, and each FSF organizational commander synchronizes efforts with HN government representatives. (See figure 7-6 for an example battalion task organization of a BCT supporting multiple SFA activities [for discussion purposes].)

7-355. Within the task organization, one company team acts as a response force with adequate tactical mobility and designated fire support to defeat Level I and II threats. The response force shapes Level III threats until either a TCF or another capable response force can defeat it. It is task-organized with an intelligence support team comprising two intelligence analysts (based on the situation) to support operations. Additionally, the task organization demonstrates how a company team may serve as the foundation for HN military and border support. It also demonstrates how a company team may provide police support. Support is in the form of two platoons supporting police assistance teams and a third platoon in a combined (multinational) security station providing support to a police assistance team.




Figure 7-6. Support to security force assistance, example

Note. The designation of force assistance teams that appears in figure 8-3 on page 355 is not prescriptive for how a battalion is to support a particular SFA activity. Designations are useful guides that illustrate one way the battalion may be task-organized to support multiple SFA activities in the AO.

7-356. The best location for the training of subordinate units of the BCT conducting SFA is inside the base of the FSF. Co-location facilitates integration with the FSF and allows the two forces to develop mutual understanding and trust. It and close cooperation shape public perception of the U.S. Forces' and FSF's legitimacy—often an essential condition of the overall mission's desired end state.

7-357. When protection conditions require, though admittedly not optimal, a U.S. area may be established in the FSF base. Key considerations for co-locating include the threat, FSF acceptance, physical space inside the FSF base, sustainment capabilities, medical facilities, and availability of response forces.

7-358. When U.S. Forces are operating out of smaller outposts in an urban environment, the local populace sees the U.S. Forces and FSF working together. This integration not only enhances overall operational effectiveness and trust, but living and working together also builds the two forces' and FSF's legitimacy. It reinforces trust between the FSF and the people they are tasked to protect.

DEPLOYMENT

7-359. The BCT often conducts SFA in OEs in which it is a guest of the HN or partner organization. When not already in the country, it moves into the operational area per its deployment order and IAW its established SOPs. When located in the operational area, subordinate units conduct troop movement to their assigned AOs. (See FM 3-22 for information on SFA deployment, redeployment, and postdeployment activities.)

IN-COUNTRY PREPARATIONS

7-360. Upon arrival, the BCT commander and S-3 brief the division or higher HQ on the planned execution of the mission and reconfirm the required command relationship. Local conditions may require the BCT to confirm or establish its in-country and external command and control systems and sustainment functions relationships from outside its operational area upon arrival. The BCT establishes direct working relationships with the next higher in-country or out-of-country supporting element to—

- Determine the limits of the available support and expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and fulfillment.
- Confirm or establish communications procedures between the supporting element and individual SFA unit(s), including alternative and emergency procedures for command and control, all support operations, and medical evacuation.

7-361. The BCT establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronization. The BCT—

- Identifies the location of the concerned HN, U.S., or other agencies.
- Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.
- Exchanges information or intelligence.
- Confirms or establishes other coordination protocols appropriately.
- Incorporates the newly established or changed procedures into the plans for mission execution.

7-362. The BCT immediately establishes OPSEC procedures to support its mission execution. It identifies and incorporates rally points into its protection (generally, an area security mission), evasion, and personnel recovery plans.

7-363. After receiving a detailed briefing and further guidance from the advance party (when one has preceded the main body's arrival), BCT personnel continue to build rapport with the FSF commander, staff, and other counterparts. They also assess their working, storage, and living areas for security and verify the locations of training sites, communications centers, dispensary areas, and FSF troop areas. In relation to the FSF commander and staff, the BCT commander and staff (led by the S-3)—

- Conduct introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner.
- Brief on the BCT mission and capabilities, as well as the higher HQ-imposed restrictions and limits on the organization.
- Request counterpart linkups be made under the mutual supervision of the FSF and BCT commanders (or the appropriate BCT subordinate commander).
- Ensure all the current unit plans are tentative and determine whether assistance is needed to finalize the plans.
- Deduce or solicit an accurate estimate of unit capabilities and the perceived requirement for advisory assistance and materials.
- Recommend the most desirable COAs while emphasizing how they satisfy present conditions, achieve the desired training, and meet advisory assistance goals.
- Prepare and brief the plans for training and advisory assistance.
- Inform the division or higher in-country command of any significant changes in the BCT's plan to assist the FSF.

7-364. Through the BCT S-2, the commander's PIRs are based on the latest information available and requirements for additional PIRs arising from modified estimates and plans. The S-2 also—

- Analyzes the FSF's status to finalize unit plans for advisory assistance, plans which may include the following:
  - The task organization of a unit with counterparts.
  - Staff functions for planning SFA.
  - Advisory assistance for executing SFA.
- Explains analysis to counterparts and encourages them to help with and participate in analyzing, preparing, and briefing the analysis to the FSF commander.
- Helps (ICW the provost marshal) the FSF inspect the available facilities to identify deficiencies.
- Upon the unit's finding deficiencies, prepares estimates of COAs for the FSF commander to correct.
- Supervises the preparation of the facilities with counterparts and informs the BCT and FSF commanders on the status of the facilities.

7-365. The BCT (led by the S-3 and provost marshal) ensures its security is based on the present or anticipated threat. Some recommended actions for the BCT include those following:

- Hardening positions based on available means and requirements to maintain low visibility.
- Maintaining communication with all subordinate unit personnel deployed outside the immediate area controlled by the main body.
- Establishing plans for immediate defensive actions across the BCT in the event of an attack or a loss of rapport with hostile reaction.
- Discussing visible security measures with foreign counterparts to ensure shared understanding and to maintain effective rapport.

Note. BCT personnel do not divulge sensitive information for the sake of rapport.

- Encouraging the FSF, through counterparts, to adopt the additional security measures identified when analyzing the FSF's status and inspecting its facilities.
- Coordinating defensive measures with the FSF to develop a mutual defense plan.
- Encouraging the FSF to conduct mutual full-force rehearsals of defensive plans but, when unsuccessful, still conducting its internal rehearsals of the plans.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE EXECUTION

7-366. In execution, the BCT commander, staff, and subordinate commanders focus efforts on translating those decisions made during planning and preparation into actions supporting the SFA mission. Once the BCT arrives in country, it begins the employment of forces to support the development of FSF capabilities and capacities. Employment of the BCT occurs generally with the establishment of advising, assisting, and training teams and key individuals. These teams and key individuals partner with foreign counterparts during FSF planning (preparing the FSF for the mission itself) to increase the capability and capacity of FSF planning processes, as well as to increase the probability of success.

Note. SFA activities normally use the general developmental tasks known as FSF development tasks, or OTERA-A, to develop the functional capabilities required by the FSF. (See paragraph 7-320 for information on the organizing, equipping, and rebuilding and building developmental tasks.)

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES DEVELOPMENT TASKS—ADVISE, ASSIST, AND TRAIN

7-367. The BCT conducting SFA missions normally undergoes task organization into smaller, rotational teams and the identification of key individuals for execution. These teams and key individuals focus on advising, assisting, or training a specific partner individual, unit, or activity. They may include advisory teams and individuals within the BCT. For example, partner sustainment, engineer, or police units may require specialized teams and individuals.

Advise and Assist Foreign Security Forces

7-368. The BCT, generally with additional augmentation teams, advises and assists FSF to improve their capabilities and capacities. Advising establishes a personal and professional relationship in which trust and confidence dictate how much the advisor can influence the FSF. Assisting is providing the requisite supporting or sustaining capabilities, so FSF can meet objectives and the desired end state. The level of advice and assistance is based on conditions and continues until FSF can establish necessary systems or until conditions no longer require them. Advising and assisting teams from within the BCT do not permit the FSF to fail critically at any point that would undermine the overall effort.

Security Force Assistance—Advise and Assist Activities

7-369. The following advise and assist activities present (for discussion purposes) those actions conducted by the BCT. Paragraphs 7-360 through 7-375 delineate the key BCT advisors.

Brigade Combat Team Commander

7-370. Before the mission, the commander advises and assists the FSF commander. The FSF commander then issues planning guidance for the execution of the mission and clarifies the commander's intent. The commander advises and assists the FSF commander throughout the operations process for the tactical operation(s) or training. In accompanying the FSF commander when the mission is received from higher HQ, the commander assists any subsequent missions. The commander monitors how FSF subordinate units understand the commander's intent and all specified and implied tasks.

7-371. During the execution of the mission, the commander helps the FSF commander provide command and control during operations. While monitoring the tactical situation, the commander assesses activities and makes recommendations for changes to the chosen COAs to exploit the situation. After monitoring the flow of information, the commander assesses and suggests improvements to the employment of information collection assets and the processes of the subordinates in reporting required information.

Brigade Combat Team Executive Officer

7-372. The executive officer (XO) performs the organizational analysis of the FSF coordinating staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process IAW the FSF commander's initial planning guidance. The XO advises and assists the foreign counterpart in directing foreign staff sections as they develop estimates,

plans, and orders. The XO monitors and assesses the liaison and coordination with FSF higher HQ, recommending changes to improve efficiencies.

Brigade Combat Team Staff

7-373. Before the mission, members of the staff advise and assist foreign counterparts in preparing running estimates and assess COAs for essential tasks. The staff helps write tentative plans or orders based on the FSF commander's planning guidance and the FSF SOPs. Plans, depending on the situation, may include primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans.

7-374. During execution, the staff helps foreign counterparts coordinate and assess the execution of FSF tasks. The staff assists in the dissemination of FSF plans or orders to senior and adjacent staff sections and supporting elements appropriately. The staff helps notify higher, lower, or adjacent staff sections of modified estimates and plans. The staff—led by the S-3 and S-2 and their counterparts—helps update the CCIRs with the latest information and future requirements.

7-375. The personnel staff officer, or S-1, advises and assists the foreign counterpart in all matters concerning human resources support, including making assessments and recommendations. This work includes monitoring the maintenance of foreign unit strength, pay, accountability of casualties, and unit morale. The S-1 emphasizes to subordinates the need to assist counterparts in paying troops and accounting for funds. The close observation of disbursement and the unobtrusive polling of the FSF about their pay are vital but unfamiliar skills among U.S. Forces.

> ***Note.*** The U.S. Forces' automated pay systems are nothing like the cash transactions in many FSF. Graft, corruption (ghost soldiers or policemen), and extortion are rife in these exchange systems.

7-376. The intelligence staff officer, or S-2, advises on and assists in the monitoring of FSF OPSEC over classified and sensitive material and operations and then recommends improvements. By helping the foreign counterpart update the situation map, the S-2 helps keep both commands updated on the current situation. The S-2 assesses and recommends improvements to the SOPs of the main CP (when established, the tactical CP) communications framework, so the intelligence section receives situation reports. The S-2 helps the counterpart monitor the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information. The S-2 assists in the examination of the captured documents and material from the insurgency. The S-2 helps gather and disseminate intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all unit operations assets. The S-2 makes assessments to help the counterpart brief and debrief patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance, surveillance, and security activities. The S-2 works with the advisor S-3 to develop an information collection plan with the FSF partner.

7-377. The operations staff officer, or S-3, helps the foreign counterpart prepare tactical plans or orders with estimates, predictions, assessments, and information. The S-3 monitors command and communications nets, assists in preparing all plans and orders, and helps supervise the training and preparation for operations. The S-3 monitors the planning process and makes recommendations for consistency with FSF partner objectives and goals.

7-378. The S-4, advises and assists the foreign counterpart and makes assessments of and recommendations for equipment readiness and the support provided to the foreign unit, subunits, and attachments. The S-4 helps supervise the use of transportation assets.

7-379. The signal staff officer, or S-6, advises and assists the foreign counterpart in all matters concerning DODIN-A (Department of Defense information network–Army) operations, network transport, network sustainment, information services, and spectrum management operations within the BCT's SFA and in the FSF's AO. The S-6 monitors communications security material throughout planning, preparation, and execution of SFA and FSF activities. The S-6 ensures SFA personnel are trained in the protection of sensitive communications equipment and cryptographic materials during the execution of FSF operations. The S-6 identifies SFA and FSF communications requirements, obtains communications resources for austere locations, and ensures redundant and backup systems are available and tested.

7-380. The S-6, ICW the division signal officer or higher HQ signal officer, continuously assesses and assists with interorganizational information management coordination, normally required by participating

interagency partners and the affected partner nation organizations. The S-6 uses assessments as part of the SFA and FSF communications synchronization plan. The S-6 uses foreign disclosure procedures and tailored, responsive information sharing as part of the SFA and FSF assessment plan for dissemination among unified action partners.

7-381. The brigade financial management staff officer is the principal SFA financial management advisor to the BCT commander. This staff officer, ICW legal representatives, advises the commander regarding laws and financial management regulations governing obligations, expenditures, and limitations on the use of funds in the BCT's SFA AO. The brigade financial management staff officer—

- Coordinates financial management policies and practices with U.S. counterparts in the contracting command.
- Identifies, certifies, and manages funds available for immediate SFA operations expenses.
- Integrates all financial management requirements into SFA planning.
- Analyzes total cost to develop SFA funding requirements and submits requirements to the division or higher HQ.
- Monitors and reports status of funding and spending plans.
- Coordinates contracting and financial management disbursing support for field ordering officers and pay agents.
- Monitors execution of the SFA contract expenditures.

7-382. Any assigned S-9—the CAO staff officer—would be the principal and coordinating staff officer for synchronizing CAO and integrating CMO in the BCT's SFA AO. The S-9 conducts the initial assessment during mission analysis that determines CA force augmentation requirements. The S-9 provides direction and staff oversight of the supporting CA units during planning, preparation, and execution and assesses throughout the operation. The S-9 ensures each COA effectively integrates civil considerations. The S-9's analysis considers the impact of SFA activities on public order and safety and enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the BCT's AO. When the BCT is not assigned an S-9, the commander may assign these responsibilities to another staff member. The S-9 has SFA activities staff planning and oversight responsibility for—

- Advising the commander and staff and their counterparts on the effect on the civilian population.
- Minimizing civilian interference, including displaced people operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.
- Deconflicting civilian and military activities with due regard for the safety and rights of displaced people.
- Advising the commander on the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of SFA activities on civilian populations.
- Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating civil-military plans, programs, and policies with those of the division or higher HQ.
- Advising on the prioritization and monitoring of expenditures of allocated activities and other funds dedicated to CAO objectives.
- Coordinating and integrating area assessments and area studies in support of SFA activities.
- Integrating civil information from supporting CA units into the COP.

7-383. A CA team, when assigned to a BCT deployed to an SFA mission, conducts CAO in support of the division or higher echelon headquarters CMO plan. It is the basic CA tactical support element provided to a supported commander. It executes CAO and is capable of conducting civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and assessments of the civil component of the OE. The success of the overarching CAO plan is predicated on the actions of the CA team at the lowest tactical levels. The CA team, due to its limited capabilities, relies on its ability to leverage other CA assets and capabilities, through reachback to the CA company CMOC, to shape operations. The CMOC is a standing capability formed by CA units, tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission, and normally augmented by other enablers such as engineer, medical, and transportation resources available to the supported commander. The CA team attached to the BCT interfaces with the BCT S-9 (when assigned, or S-3), CMOC, and CA company at the BCT or division level to ensure all CMO are nested within the higher commander's CMO plan.

7-384. Civil-military teams, upon deployment and when assigned, advise the SFA and FSF commanders and staffs on civil-military considerations and coordinate efforts by any CA units to support the FSF operation.

They mentor counterpart teams and the supported foreign element staff on CMO and the importance of respecting human rights. They may introduce counterparts to relevant NGOs, USAID project officers, and provincial reconstruction team staff.

Note. The judge advocate (judge advocate general corps) mentors (provides legal mentorship) and coordinates the legal and ethical obligations of BCT commanders to civilian populations or when supporting FSF during SFA (see AR 27-1 and FM 3-84). The public affairs officer advises and counsels the commander and staff on how affected publics, both external and internal, may perceive the BCT's operations. This officer maintains understanding of and coordinates the flow of information to Soldiers, other U.S. units, and the general population (see FM 3-61). BCT personnel, coordinating staff, and special staff officers mentor, advise, and assist foreign counterparts in the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of SFA and FSF activities.

Battalion- and Company-level and Below Advisors

7-385. Battalion- and company-level and below advisors assist foreign counterparts in analyzing the FSF mission and commander's intent from higher HQ. Advisors assist FSF commanders and subordinate leaders in restating the mission, conducting an initial risk assessment, identifying a tentative decisive point, and defining their own intents. Advisors assist their foreign counterparts in analyzing the mission and operational variables. From these variables, advisors help their foreign counterparts develop a COA that meets the higher HQ's concept of operations and commander's intent. Advisors assist in the conduct of operations and the flow of information to the FSF higher commander. (See ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-21.10 for information on advisor assistants to FSF.)

Foreign Security Force Training

7-386. Trainers (or advisors) within the BCT consistently provide and instill leadership at all levels of the FSF organization. Depending on the circumstances, the BCT or subordinate unit may execute an SFA training mission unilaterally or as part of a multinational force. In any case, leadership is especially important in the inherently dynamic and complex environment associated with SFA. SFA activities require personal interaction between trainers (or advisors) and FSF trainees and other military and civilian organizations and agencies. A high premium is placed on effective leadership from the most junior to the most senior commissioned officers and NCOs. Leaders maintain full comprehension of the OE and remain prepared, fully involved, and supportive, so FSF training succeeds. An effective FSF requires leadership from both the provider and the recipient sides throughout training to build the FSF capacity to train their own forces.

Security Force Assistance—Training Activities

7-387. Trainers within the BCT work with the FSF to present a positive context and narrative for the FSF professionalization efforts and capacity to secure the populace. The coordination of the information themes and messages among the BCT, FSF, and HN government and the presentation or availability of information to the civilian population can limit or mitigate the propaganda efforts of insurgents or hostile forces. This may, in turn, mitigate the destabilizing influences of hostile forces or criminal elements as they propagandize the BCT's training effort and damage the FSF's credibility and legitimacy. (See FM 7-0 for information on training activities.) The following training activities in paragraphs 7-378 through 7-390 present (for discussion purposes) training actions to support FSF training.

Training Assessment

7-388. Prior to training the FSF, the BCT commander and subordinate commanders and leaders, ICW the FSF commander and subordinates, begin with a training assessment of the training plans designed before the BCT's employment. This assessment serves to evaluate the FSF and to exercise the working relationship between the subordinate units of the BCT and the FSF. The training assessment covers all aspects of leadership, training, sustainment, and professionalization. To support an assessment, the commander analyzes the following specific foreign unit considerations:

- The unit's mission and mission-essential task list and capability to execute them.
- Staff capabilities.

- Personnel and equipment authorizations.
- Physical condition.
- Any past or present foreign influence on training and combat operations.
- Operational deficiencies identified during recent operations or exercises with U.S. personnel.
- Sustainment capabilities, including training programs.
- Internal training programs and personnel.
- Training facilities.

7-389. The commander assesses the level of professionalism of FSF, units, and individuals. The ethics, by which the commander is making assessments, adhere to the established ROE, established laws and regulations of the commanding authority, laws for land warfare, and human rights. FSF support of civilian leaders and political goals also undergo assessment.

7-390. Subordinate commanders and leaders within the BCT, working with FSF leaders, evaluate the current members of the FSF for past military skills and positions. Often military reorganizations arbitrarily shift personnel to fill vacancies for which their knowledge and experience is inappropriate.

Analysis of the Prepared Training Plan

7-391. After completing the training assessment, the BCT commander and subordinate commanders and leaders analyze the prepared training plans and determine whether changes are necessary. Training plans stress the deficiencies identified in the training assessment. They identify those in the HN who can train the FSF and strengthen the process's legitimacy. A comprehensive approach in the BCT's AO can provide support and expertise that enhance the training and operations process and the eventual self-sustainment of the FSF. As the FSF gain the sufficient capacity and capability to perform independently, trainers and advisors transition from a leading role to a mentoring role.

Program of Instruction

7-392. The staff and subordinate units of the BCT, ICW the FSF staff and subordinate units, develop programs of instruction. These programs incorporate all the training objectives that will satisfy the training requirements identified during the training assessment. Training programs support these requirements. The FSF commander approves these programs of instruction before their execution by subordinate units within the BCT. When executing programs of instruction, trainers and advisors adhere to training schedules consistent with changes in the mission variables. Trainers and advisors ensure, through their foreign counterparts and the FSF commander, all personnel receive training. Foreign trainers rehearse all the classes approved on the programs of instruction.

Presentation of Instruction

7-393. To present the training material properly, trainers follow the lesson outlines approved in the programs of instruction. All training clearly states the task, conditions, and standards for each lesson, so the FSF understand them. Trainers and advisors state all warning and safety instructions (through interpreters when necessary) to the FSF. The training to reinforce the concepts includes demonstrations of the execution of each task, stressing the execution as a step-by-step process. Trainers monitor the progress of the FSF during instruction and practical exercises, correcting their mistakes as they make them.

Training Methodology (Crawl-Walk-Run)

7-394. An effective method of training is the crawl-walk-run training methodology to assist trainers in teaching individual tasks, battle drills, and collective tasks and in the conduct of field exercises. This methodology supports the development of well-trained leaders and units. Crawl-walk-run methodology is based on the three following characteristics of lane training:

- Crawl (explain and demonstrate)—the trainer describes the task step by step, indicating what each person does.
- Walk (practice)—the trainer directs the unit to execute the task at a slow, step-by-step pace.
- Run (perform)—the trainer requires the unit to perform the task at full speed, as if in an operation, under realistic conditions.

7-395. During all phases, the training includes the unit's mission in the context of the higher unit's mission for practical application. Identifying the higher commander's mission and intent, as well as the tasks and purposes of other units in the area, adds context to the training. This method expands to include the other actors' roles.

7-396. Trainers continue individual training to improve and sustain individual task proficiency while units train on collective tasks. Collective training requires interaction among individuals or organizations to perform those tasks, actions, and activities that improve mission-essential task proficiency. Collective training includes performing collective, individual, and leader tasks associated with each training objective, action, or activity. (See FM 7-0 for information on training methodology.)

Collective Training

7-397. Collective training starts at the squad level. Squad battle drills provide key building blocks to support FSF operations. Trainers within the BCT link battle drills and collective tasks through a logical, tactical scenario in situational training exercises. Though a mission-oriented exercise, collective training results in greater than mission proficiency. Battle drills and collective tasks support situational training exercises while these exercises support operations. Trainers and advisors maintain understanding of the OE when training FSF; training incorporates the ways in which internal and external threats and civilians affect the OE.

7-398. Flexibility in using Army doctrine in training enhances efforts to make training realistic. Trainers and advisors modify Army doctrine to fit the level of expertise of the FSF, command and control systems, tactical situation, security measures, and sustainment base. Often, the structure and capabilities of the FSF differ from those the Army doctrine requires. When the FSF counter an insurgency, these exercises emphasize interplay among psychological, tactical, PRC, intelligence, and CA operations. (See FM 7-0 for information on collective training.)

Individual Training

7-399. Individual training within the FSF by the BCT emphasizes physical and mental conditioning, tactical training, basic rifle marksmanship, first aid, combatives, and the OE. It includes general tactics and techniques of security operations and the motivations, operations, and objectives of internal and external threats. Tough, realistic training conditions the FSF mentally and physically to withstand the strain of continuous operations. BCT subordinate leaders cross-train the FSF on unit-specific weapons, communications systems, individual equipment, and skills. Personnel losses are not to equate to weapons, communications equipment, or essential skills loss (due to a lack of fully trained replacement personnel).

Small-unit Leader Training

7-400. SFA activities frequently entail rapidly changing circumstances. Thus, FSF small-unit leaders develop the capabilities to plan and execute operations with little guidance. Trainers and advisors stress small-unit leadership training concurrent to individual training. Tools the trainer uses to train leaders are manuals, previously established training, tactical exercises without troops, and unit missions. Small-unit leader training develops aggressiveness, tactical proficiency, and initiative. It includes combined arms technical training procedures for forward observers and tactical air control party personnel. Leadership training includes land navigation in difficult terrain and under conditions of limited visibility. Mission readiness and the health and welfare of subordinates are continuous parts of training.

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES DEVELOPMENT TASK—ASSESS

7-401. The functional OTERA-A tasks (see paragraph 7-320) serve as SFA capability areas that the BCT uses to develop, change, or improve FSF capacity and capabilities. The BCT conducts an assessment of the FSF to determine which area(s) within the OTERA-A task construct would serve to achieve the desired FSF capacity and capabilities. In essence, the BCT assesses the FSF's current standing against the desired capabilities and then develops a plan for the FSF to build capacity and capabilities IAW the OTERA-A tasks.

Foreign Security Force Assessment

7-402. SFA assessments by the BCT to evaluate the status of FSF capacities and capabilities establish a measurement at a particular time that allows comparison to other assessments for differences and for attributable progress of the SFA activities. These assessments involve the deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of the BCT's employment. More specifically, they help the BCT commander and staff determine the amount of progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving the objectives, and performing the tasks.

Security Force Assistance—Assessment Activities

7-403. The assessment developmental task—not limited to planning, preparing, or executing—by the BCT is ongoing throughout the operations process. Assessment involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the OE to determine what changes might affect the conduct of training and operations. Paragraphs 7-394 through 7-398 present (for discussion purposes) assessment actions to assess training and operations.

Foreign Security Force Training and Evaluation

7-404. In training, the AAR provides the critical link between training and evaluation. It is a professional discussion between the training participants and focuses directly on the training goals. It occurs after all the collective training of the FSF. Effective AARs cover training goals with the responsible FSF commander or subordinate leader. During the AAR, SFA trainers and advisors ask leading questions, surface important tactical lessons, explore alternative COAs, assist the retention teaching points, and keep the discussion positive.

Comprehensive Review

7-405. The BCT commander encourages the FSF commander to conduct a comprehensive review of collective training events with the entire unit or, at a minimum, with key subordinate leaders. Whenever possible, the review occurs during the field portion of the training when the unit assembles at logical stopping points. During the review, the commander and subordinate trainer and advisors avoid criticizing or embarrassing the FSF commander or subordinates. AARs provide feedback to support and reinforce learning and a database for key points. During reviews within subordinate echelons, evaluators draw information from FSF subordinate leaders to form possible alternative COAs for future activities.

Note. Conducting comprehensive AARs and reports that focus on the specifics of the SFA activities is important in expeditious information gathering after execution.

Short-, Mid-, and Long-term Success

7-406. During SFA activities, including FSF operations, success is defined within the context of three period durations: short-, mid-, and long-term. In the short-term period, FSF make steady progress in fighting threats, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces. In the mid-term period, FSF lead in fighting threats and providing security, have a functioning government, and work toward achieving economic stability. In the long-term period, FSF are peaceful, united, stable, and secure; integrated into the international community; and a full partner in international security concerns.

Situation Monitoring

7-407. The BCT commander and subordinate advisors help foreign counterparts monitor the current situation for unanticipated successes, failures, or enemy actions. When assessing the progress of FSF operations, the commander looks for opportunities, threats, and acceptable progress. The commander considers, as part of the MDMP, the second- and third-order effects of the FSF operation. The commander and subordinate advisors develop cultural capability, so operations and relationships achieve the desired end state.

Operational Success

7-408. Throughout the operation, the BCT commander and staff assist the FSF commander and staff in addressing changes to the operation and feeding the assessments of the progress or regression back into the planning process. The closer SFA and FSF commanders work with trainer and advisor teams and the more they interact with local political and cultural leaders, the better the overall chances of mission success. Key to operational success in the SFA and FSF's AO is the establishment of the following:

- MOEs as benchmarks for the commander to gauge progress toward mission accomplishment.
- MOPs for determining whether the performance of a task or action was to standard.
- Close and continuing relationships with all advisor teams, other actors operating in the AO, and foreign area officers with local or regional expertise.
- Close and continuing relationships with all foreign units, including military and police, operating in the AO.
- Close and continuing relationships with all political entities and actors in the AO.
- Redundant communications in the AO, especially when the BCT shares its AO with other entities who lack or possess degraded communications systems or whose cultural differences impact communication.

Chapter 8
Support to Host-nation Security Forces

This chapter addresses the working relationship between U.S. Forces and host-nation security forces (HNSF). It begins with a review of relevant benefits and challenges and requisite resources. It provides a framework for successful U.S. and host nation (HN) operations that accomplish both HN and U.S. objectives.

Note. This chapter presents one framework for discussion purposes and not as the only way to support HNSF. (See chapter 7, section III for information.)

SECTION I – BENEFITS, CHALLENGES, AND GOALS

8-1. Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government with popular support and the ability to address the root causes insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the HN to secure the populace, defeat the insurgents, uphold the rule of law, and provide essential services. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective HNSF. A goal in any COIN operation is the eventual transition of the responsibility for security to the HNSF. Many factors influence the requisite amount and type of assistance for developing HNSF. These factors include those following:

- HNSF's existing capabilities.
- Insurgency's character.
- HN's population and culture.
- HN's level of commitment and sovereignty.
- The levels of commitment from the United States and other nations.
- U.S. Forces' impact on the local infrastructure's and the HN government's legitimacy.

BENEFITS

8-2. A *host nation* is a nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory (JP 3-57). An HN naturally needs security forces. A primary goal of partnering is getting the best both sides have to offer. (See figure 8-1 for a depiction of the typical balance between these benefits.)

UNITED STATES UNITS PROVIDE THE HOST NATION:	HOST NATION PROVIDES UNITED STATES UNITS:
• ROBUST INTELLIGENCE REPORTS • EFFECTIVE TRAINING STRATEGIES • REFINED TARGET LISTS • MODEL OF ETHOS • MODEL OF STRONG NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER CORPS	• IMPROVED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS • IMPROVED CULTURAL AWARENESS • MORE IMPACTFUL INFORMATION OPERATIONS • GREATER ACCESS TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS

Figure 8-1. Partnership benefits

UNITED STATES ARMY ASSETS

8-3. The U.S. Army brings numerous assets to the COIN fight. It brings a professional military with its training, leadership, targeting, technology, assets, resources, and expertise.

HOST NATION ASSETS

8-4. The HN brings many assets to the fight. When properly measured, organized, rebuilt, trained, equipped, advised, and mentored, an HNSF unit is uniquely able to protect the HN population because it understands the operational environment (OE) far better than U.S. Forces. The cultural and situational awareness of HNSF

is a significant force multiplier during any COIN operation, especially in human intelligence (HUMINT), information collection, negotiations, and targeting. In terms of specific COIN operations, HNSF can aid or even take the lead on shape-clear-hold-build-transition operations. Security forces are completely integrated in the planning process, instrumental in the decision of which areas to clear, included in the site selection process for the hold phase, and leveraged in the decisions of which stability operations to conduct during the build phase. Thus, an HN unit can bring multiple abilities to a COIN fight (see table 8-1).

Table 8-1. Host nation contributions

Understand the Operational Environment	The area of operations is their home and culture; they know the language, different groups, political situation, education levels, economic considerations, historically bad actors, and unofficial community leaders.
Provide Human Intelligence	Their security force is better able to gather information that leads to human intelligence for a host of reasons; for example, they speak the same language and understand the important players in the area.
Put the Pieces Together	Oftentimes, they can better integrate the different fragments of intelligence into the context of the operational environment.
Determine Credibility of Intelligence Assets (Sources, Walk-ins, Call-ins)	They possess a vastly superior sense of cultural and situational awareness vital for assigning credibility to and managing sources.
Validate and Check Interpreters	They can confirm not only interpreters' abilities but also their loyalties.
Identify and Root out Infiltrators	They can distinguish the differences between normal and abnormal behavior, be they even the most minute.
Gain Potential Avenues for Influence	They can write messages that resonate with the local populace.

CHALLENGES

8-5. Most HNs encounter at least some cultural obstacles in developing a professional military who is responsive and accountable to the HN population. Part of the challenge is to design a professional military who will minimize these cultural obstacles. Most challenges arise from differing perspectives between the United States and the HN.

EXAMPLE CHALLENGES

8-6. Past developments of professional militaries have revealed common cultural challenges. A few include those following:

- Nepotism in assignments of rank or position from personal connections.
- Denial of errors or negative results to protect a perceived image or ethos.
- Corruption such as unofficial or surreptitious entitlements.
- Influence from competing loyalties such as ethnic, religious, tribal, or political allegiances.

CATEGORIES OF COMMON CHALLENGES

8-7. Common cultural challenges fall under one of four broad categories. These categories include resources, leadership, abuse of power, and organizational structures.

National Resources

8-8. Governments properly balance national resources to meet public expectations. Funding for services, education, and health care can limit the resources available for security forces. HN spending priorities may result in a security force capable of protecting only the capital and key government facilities, leaving the rest of the nation unsecured. HNSF do not tend to have the same resources, equipment, or salaries of U.S. units. U.S. units do not necessarily have the means for the partial sustainment of the HNSF to maximize their effectiveness. Conducting effective COIN operations requires resource allocation across the entirety of efforts to develop all aspects of the security forces.

National Leadership

8-9. Counterinsurgents may need to influence the existing HN approach to leadership. Family ties or party or faction membership, as opposed to the demonstrated competence or performance of host-nation leaders,

can lead to those leaders' appointments or promotions. Leaders may not seek to develop their subordinates or feel the need to ensure the welfare of subordinates. In some cases, leaders enforce subordinate obedience through fear and use their leadership positions to exploit subordinates. Positions of power can lead to corruption, and local culture can affect it as well. The ethical climate and decision making of HNSF leaders often influence how the HNSF treat detainees. This ethical standard is a proven barometer of the commander's ability to guide the unit and provide lasting security for the HN population.

8-10. The U.S. Forces tasked with developing HNSF take special interest in how the HN appoints, promotes, and develops leaders. U.S. advisors and partner units can best influence leaders by providing positive leadership.

Abuse of Power

8-11. The behavior of HNSF personnel is often a primary cause of public dissatisfaction. Corrupting influences of power merit guardedness. Cultural and ethnic differences within a population may lead to significant discrimination among the security forces and by the security forces against minority groups. In more ideological struggles, discrimination may occur against members of other political parties, regardless of whether they are also members of a minority cultural group. Security forces who abuse civilians do not earn public trust and confidence; their actions may even contribute to popular support for the insurgency. U.S. partners and advisors identify and address biases and improper or corrupt practices.

8-12. The abuse of power such as property hoarding, extortion, or targeted reprisal attacks can be a root cause for the initiation or strengthening of an insurgency. Units maintain awareness of the issues in the OE and define the problems before applying solutions. Various groups may have a long, cyclical history of conflict. Ethnic, historical, political, racial, religious, social, and territorial turmoil may contribute to cycles of violence in the HN so intractably as to require the establishment of discipline, a code of honor, patriotic nationalism, and a merit-based promotion system in the professional military to break this societal norm. Even then, these efforts may prove inadequate to stop the abuse of power.

Organizational Structures

8-13. Perhaps the biggest hurdle for U.S. Forces is accepting the different organizational and operational structures the HN uses to ensure security. The goal is not to make the HN unit a U.S. unit, nor even to make it operate like a U.S. unit. HNSF commanders possess leeway in resolving their own security problems. An HNSF structure that is a mirror image is often impractical and does not approach the problem from the perspective of the root causes of the insurgency. The HN population, and subsequently their military, has cultural aspects that differ with U.S. norms.

8-14. With respect to most HNSF, commanders renounce as counterproductive the biased belief that the U.S. way is the best way. While relationships among U.S. police, customs, and military organizations and individual units work for the United States, those relationships may not exist in other nations since each national societal structure develops differently. Units and advisors provide more appropriate and useful support when they develop innovative ways to maximize the effectiveness of the HN's organization, units, and bureaucracy.

GOALS

8-15. Training HNSF is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to an ease of approach or method. To ensure long-term success, commanders clarify their desired end states for training programs early. These goals entail military characteristics common to all militaries yet harboring nuances in different countries. (See table 8-2 on page 350 for the characteristics of well-trained HNSF.)

Table 8-2. Characteristics of well-trained host-nation security forces

PROFICIENT
Security forces work well in close coordination to suppress lawlessness and insurgency. Military units are— • Tactically and technically proficient. • Able to perform their national security responsibilities. • Able to integrate their operations with those of multinational partners. Nonmilitary security forces— • Maintain civil order, enforce laws, control borders, secure key infrastructure, and detain criminal suspects. • Are well trained in modern police ethics. • Understand police and legal procedures, including the basics of investigation and evidence collection.
WELL-LED
Leaders at all levels— • Have sound professional standards and appropriate military values. • Are selected and promoted based on their competence and merit.
PROFESSIONAL
Security forces— • Are honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights. • Are loyal to the central government and to the mission of serving national interests and recognize their role as the people's servants and not their masters. • Operate within codes of conduct and ethics. • Recognize the merits of a trained and capable noncommissioned officer and junior officer corps.
FLEXIBLE
Security forces accomplish the broad missions required by the host nation—not only to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but also to increase security in all areas. This requires an effective command organizational structure that makes sense for the host nation.
REPRESENTATIVE OF SOCIETY
Security forces represent the host nation's major ethnic groups. They are not seen as instruments of just one faction. Cultural sensitivity toward the incorporation of women must be observed, but effort should also be made to include women in police and military organizations.
SELF-SUSTAINED
Security forces manage their own equipment throughout its life cycle. They also provide their own administrative and sustainment support, especially for fuel, water, food, and ammunition.

SECTION II – A COMPLEX AND CHALLENGING MISSION

8-16. Developing HNSF is a complex and challenging mission. U.S. Forces and multinational partners succeed only when they approach the mission with the same deliberate planning and preparation, energetic execution, thorough assessment, and appropriate resourcing with which they approach the combat aspects of the COIN operation. Accordingly, COIN force commanders and staffs consider the task of developing HNSF in their initial mission analyses. They make that task an integral part of all planning, coordination, preparation, and assessment. This section addresses the complexities and challenges of developing HNSF.

DEVELOPING A PLAN

8-17. To defeat the insurgency and sustain success capability, the HN develops a plan, with U.S. assistance as necessary, to improve unit organization, training, materiel, personnel, and facilities and to strengthen unit leadership. However, these elements are tightly linked, simultaneously pursued, and not easily prioritized.

Commanders monitor progress in all domains. The HNSF plan remains appropriate to HN capabilities and requirements. At the tactical level, U.S. advisors and partner units outline goals, allocate resources, and schedule events as part of the plan (for example, under the COIN line of effort [LOE] to support HNSF).

CONSIDERATIONS WHEN DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES

8-18. Competently trained and led HNSF are vital to winning in COIN and to sustaining a stable, secure, and just state. When the civilian population does not perceive U.S. Forces and HN forces as legitimate or as capable of providing security, they will not risk providing the timely intelligence necessary to defeat the insurgency. In addition, when they do not see at least a gradual transition to HN responsibility, they often begin to view the HNSF as an instrument or puppet of U.S. Forces. Finally, these failures can result in HNSF who are ill equipped to persevere in a protracted struggle after U.S. Forces and coalition forces withdraw.

8-19. U.S. leaders must build trust and form bonds with HNSF units and personnel as part of the partnership mission. Working toward cultural understanding improves the relationship between U.S. Forces and partner units. Commanders treat the individuals in partner units as they treat Soldiers—by living, eating, sleeping, socializing, planning, and fighting side by side. The goal is for the HNSF to know, without doubt, the U.S. Forces care for them, both individually and professionally. It is this bond, not the materials or support commanders provide, that inspires a dedicated level of commitment and loyalty. To train and support HNSF successfully, the U.S. partner unit or advisor—

- Ensures security forces understand they support the HN government and people.
- Maintains relevancy of security forces for their culture, population, and laws.
- Understands and defines the security problem.
- Promotes all COIN operations' credibility and legitimacy.
- Provides a model for society by using military units of, for example, mixed ethnic, religious, and political affiliation who work together to secure and protect the entire populace.
- Conducts multinational operations with each newly trained security force.
- Promotes mutual respect between U.S. Forces and HN forces and between the military, police, and paramilitary.
- Trains the trainers first and then trains the HN cadre.
- Supports the HN cadre in training the whole force.
- Separates HN military and police forces, especially during their training.
- Places the HN cadre in charge as soon as possible.
- Recognizes achievement, especially excellence.
- Trains all security forces not to tolerate abuses or illegal activity outside of cultural norms.
- Develops methods to report violations.
- Enables the HN to assume the lead in COIN operations to alleviate effects of a large U.S. presence.
- Creates any needed special elements in each force, such as waterway, border, special operations, or special weapons and tactics.
- Establishes and employs mobile training teams.
- Ensures infrastructure and pay is appropriate and managed by the HN government.
- Promotes professionalism that does not tolerate internal incompetence.
- Develops methods to redress.

ORGANIZING UNITED STATES FORCES

8-20. As planning unfolds, mission requirements drive the initial organization of the unit charged with developing security forces. To achieve unity of effort, a single organization receives this responsibility. Typically, some form of an advisor team undertakes these duties. Due to personnel constraints, some functions are best undertaken by partner units.

Partner Units

8-21. Partner units share all or a portion of an area of operations (AO) with an HNSF unit. U.S. Forces operating as partner units to HNSF remain prepared to make organizational changes. U.S. Forces consider establishing combined staff cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and logistics. These staff cells support transparent operations and unity of effort, enhance the relationship between BCT units and HN forces by

demonstrating a degree of trust, and develop HN capacity in key staff areas by familiarizing HN personnel with various staff procedures through the HN personnel's performance of those procedures alongside their coalition partners.

8-22. Additionally, before deploying, U.S. Forces train in partnering with HNSF. This preparation eases their transition to multinational operations. At a minimum, the training includes cultural capability training, basic language training, and basic soldier skills training such as marksmanship and first aid.

Advisor Units

8-23. An advisor is a military member who conducts operations that train HN military individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills; who advises and assists military leaders; who trains on the requisite tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; and who supports skill development for citizens and domestic organizations. Advisor units can be internally or externally resourced. Internally resourced advisor teams are created from the partner unit when the latter is required to establish them on its own. Externally resourced teams are usually resourced for the duration of the advisor team mission. One way of organizing for this role is to have an eleven-person team with clearly divided responsibilities. Each person's duties reflect the responsibilities to the internal team and to advising their HNSF counterpart. In certain situations, the partner unit commander needs to provide a security element to support an advisor team. This security element may need to be large enough to guard a compound on an HNSF base and to crew several vehicles. A 10-person security element proved useful in Iraq and Afghanistan. (See table 8-3 for possible duties of an advisor team.)

Table 8-3. Typical duties of the advisor team

Team Chief	The principal advisor to the HN battalion commander and the advisor team commander.
Team Sergeant	The advisor team NCOIC who also serves as principal advisor to the HN command sergeant major or equivalent.
Executive Officer	The principal advisor to the HNSF executive officer who also performs the same functions as any unit executive officer in a traditional unit.
Intelligence Officer	The principal advisor to the HN intelligence staff who also provides intelligence to the advisor team chief.
Operations Officer	The principal advisor to HN staff for operations and training who also plans the advisor team operations.
Operations NCOIC	The training NCOIC for the advisor team and the principal advisor to the operations staff NCO in the HNSF.
Operations NCO (Individual and Collective Training)	The advisor team armorer and principal instructor for basic rifle marksmanship (small arms), short-range marksmanship / close quarters battle, urban operations, patrolling, checkpoints, and any other individual training deemed necessary based on the operational environment.
Operations NCO (Personnel, Fires)	The advisor team S-1 and the principal instructor for targeting and fires (including lethal effects [indirect fires and close air support] and nonlethal effects [information activities]).
Medical NCO	The advisor team medical NCOIC and primary instructor to HNSF regarding medical issues.
Communications NCO	The advisor team communications NCOIC and principal communications instructor.
Logistics Officer	The principal advisor to the HN staff for logistics and the logistics chief for the advisor team.

Legend:
HN host nation
HNSF host-nation security forces
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
S-1 battalion or brigade personnel staff officer

DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES

8-24. Five phases serve as the organizing basis for the mission to develop HNSF at all levels: the planning of HNSF; the resourcing of HNSF; the generation of HNSF; the transition of responsibility for security to HNSF; and the sustainment of HNSF. The developmental tasks—measure (assess), organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and mentor (assess)—incorporate all doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facility requirements for developing the HNSF. Though described as sequential, the performance of these tasks is normally concurrent. For example, integrating the training and equipping operations is necessary, and as the operation progresses, assessments lead to changes. The direct involvement of U.S. Forces in operations against insurgents requires a transition period within the development program, during which major COIN operations transition to HNSF. (See figure 8-2 for a presentation of the developmental framework tasks as an iterative and cyclical process of both advisor teams and partner units measuring and mentoring HNSF.)

Note. Security force assistance (SFA) activities normally use the general developmental tasks, or foreign security forces (FSF) development tasks—organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess (OTERA-A)—to develop the functional capabilities required by the FSF. (See paragraph 7-320 for information on the OTERA-A developmental tasks.)




Figure 8-2. Developmental tasks framework

ASSESS HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES


8-25. Commanders, advisor units, and partner units take an initial assessment of HNSF capabilities as part of their comprehensive analysis of the OE (see chapter 1) and the insurgency (see chapter 2). From this initial assessment, planners develop short-, mid-, and long-range goals and programs. As circumstances change, so do the goals and programs. Assessing the state of the HNSF may reveal such dysfunction or corruption within some existing security forces that the organizations undergo disbanding rather than rehabilitation. In some cases, commanders need to replace some host-nation leaders before their units can become functional. While every situation is different, leaders of the development program assess the following HNSF factors throughout planning, preparation, and execution of the operation:

- Social structure, organization, demographics, interrelationships, and education levels of security force elements.
- Extent of acceptance of ethnic and religious minorities.
- Laws and regulations governing the security forces and their relationship to national leaders.
- Corruption, abuse of power, and nepotism.
- Equipment and facilities, with a priority placed on maintenance.
- Logistic support structure, and its ability to meet the force's requirements.
- The unit's methods and proficiency at conducting COIN operations.
- State of training at all levels, and the specialties and education of leaders.

Assessment Techniques and Measurements

8-26. HNSF require training and tactical proficiency development for some time before they are ready to conduct operations on their own. U.S. partner units are responsible for the mentoring, training, and welfare of their HN counterparts. Advisors assigned to the unit provide the day-to-day connection but are not sufficiently equipped to do everything required to build a well-trained, well-led, sustainable, and professional force. A nation's armed force who behaves unprofessionally can quickly lose its legitimacy, which is necessary for conducting COIN operations and drawing quality recruits. When a U.S. military mission fails to prepare the HNSF to take the lead, which is a key political objective, unity of effort suffers at many levels. The results are often corruption, nepotism, and bureaucracy, which generate obstacles to units who need to adapt rapidly to insurgent strategies and tactics. Due to these factors, the HN eventually loses the ability to persevere against a steadfast insurgency fighting a protracted war.

8-27. U.S. Forces often use a readiness measurement to assess an HNSF unit. (See figure 8-3 for an example format for a readiness measurement.)



UNIT: HOST NATION COMPANY **LOCATION: HOST NATION BASE CAMP** **REPORT DATE: 2023-04-20**

1. Personnel	Red	Orange	Amber	R O A G Green
Overall Manning Assigned on Hand	<50% of auth manning	50-69% of auth manning	70-84% of auth manning	> or =85% of auth manning
Staff Manning	<50% of staff manning	50-69% of staff manning	70-84% of staff manning	> or =85% of staff manned
Officer / NCO Manning	<50% of auth manning	50-69% of auth manning	70-84% of auth manning	> or =85% of auth manning
Pay	Unable to pay troops	Pay system established	Personnel paid according to grade	Personnel consistently paid for 3 months

2. Command and Control	Red	Orange	Amber	R O A G Green
Intel	No intelligence capability	BN / BDE able to process, analyze, disseminate information	Participates in decision making; develops enemy COAs	BN / BDE able to implement R&S plan; conduct information collection OPS
OPS	No operational capability	BN / BDE able to establish MAIN CP / maintain SA	BN / BDE able to send and receive reports / orders from higher / lower echelons	BN / BDE staff able to conduct TLP
COMM	No ability to communicate	BN / BDE able to establish / maintain internal COMM	BN / BDE able to maintain external COMM with higher	BN / BDE able to sustain COMM for 7 days / has capable and sustained alternate COMM

3. Training	Red	Orange	Amber	R O A G Green
METL	Achieves proficiency in <50% of all METL tasks	Achieves proficiency in 50-69% of all METL tasks	Achieves proficiency in 70-84% of all METL tasks	Achieves proficiency in > or =85% of all METL tasks

4. Sustainment	Red	Orange	Amber	R O A G Green
Supply (I, III, V, X)	Secure / Store Supplies	Account / Issue Items	Forecast / Requisition Resupplies	Sustain Stockage Level (UBL)
Infrastructure	Temporary Billeting	Statement of Work / Construction Begun	Minimal Billeting, Admin, and Perimeter Security Infrastructure	Adequate Billeting Admin Mess, Motor Pool, and Perimeter Security
Maintenance	No Maintenance Conducted	Conduct PMCS; Report Equipment Issues	Conduct Field-level Maintenance, Repair Requests, Repair Parts; Maintenance Personnel MOS Qualified	Established Program and Reporting Procedures, > or =50% Maintenance Personnel MOS Qualified

5. Equipment	Red	Orange	Amber	R O A G Green
On Hand				
Weapons	<50% of authorized	50-69% of authorized	70-84% of authorized	> or =85% of authorized
Vehicles	<50% of authorized	50-69% of authorized	70-84% of authorized	> or =85% of authorized
COMM	<50% of authorized	50-69% of authorized	70-84% of authorized	> or =85% of authorized
Operational Readiness				
Weapons	<50%	50-69%	70-84%	> or =85%
Vehicles	<50%	50-69%	70-84%	> or =85%
COMM	<50%	50-69%	70-84%	> or =85%

6. Leadership	Red	Orange	Amber	R O A G Green
Leaders are rated as "capable" by superiors	<50%	50-69%	70-84%	> or =85%

7. Subjective Assessment
Unit assumed an Area of Operations 2 months ago; sustainment and leadership issues remain problems.

Readiness Assessment

Green Host-nation unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.
Amber Host-nation unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with U.S. support.
Orange Host-nation unit is capable of conducting certain operations.
Red Host-nation unit is forming and / or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Host-nation unit is currently assessed at R O A G and will be ready to assume an area of operations in 2 months

LEGEND

ADMIN	ADMINISTRATION	NCO	NONCOMMISIONED OFFICER
AUTH	AUTHORIZED	OPS	OPERATIONS
BDE	BRIGADE	PMCS	PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE CHECKS AND SERVICES
BN	BATTALION	R&S	RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
COA	COURSE OF ACTION	ROAG	RED-ORANGE-AMBER-GREEN
COMM	COMMUNICATIONS	SA	SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
MAIN CP	MAIN COMMAND POST	TLP	TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
METL	MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST	UBL	UNIT BASIC LOAD
MOS	MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY	U.S.	UNITED STATES

EXAMPLE

Figure 8-3. Readiness measurement, example

Readiness Measurement Periods

8-28. Readiness measurement periods to assess HNSF should occur across distinct periods of time—short-term, mid-term, and long-term. Paragraphs 8-29 through 8-31 review considerations for each duration.

Short-term

8-29. The advisor and partner unit are involved in training the HNSF unit. An example of a short-term goal for an advisor unit is ensuring the HN operations officer is tracking all the units conducting missions. An example for a partner unit is training the HN soldiers on marksmanship and room clearing.

Mid-term

8-30. The HN unit is more self-sufficient but still not fully capable, and the advisor acts in a supervisory role. An example of a mid-range goal for an advisor unit is ensuring the HN staff plans for logistic support during missions. An example of a mid-range goal for a partner unit is training platoon-sized units to move tactically during patrols.

Long-term

8-31. The HN unit can conduct training, planning, sustainment, and operations with little guidance and the advisor provides oversight and mentorship. An example of an advisor unit long-range goal is ensuring the HN intelligence officer gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence and is fully integrated into the planning process. An example of a partner unit long-range goal is providing only the additional forces and response force capabilities to the HNSF unit.

Assessing Methods and Proficiency

8-32. The training, leadership, equipment, logistics, and operations of HNSF require assessment. If U.S. advisors are not on the objective with the HN forces, U.S. Forces may not know their capabilities. Assessment of HNSF may include their abilities to—

- Plan and brief an operation.
- Perform correct actions on contact.
- Clear and mark rooms, halls, and stairwells properly.
- Perform other small-unit tasks appropriate to the HN OE.
- Use noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
- Employ fire control measures and maintain fire control.
- Call for air reserves or quick reaction force.
- Sustain themselves with Classes I (rations and gratuitous issue of health, morale, and welfare items), III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and V (ammunition) supplies.
- Provide medical support.
- Maintain vehicles and equipment.
- Maintain professionalism.

ORGANIZE

8-33. Organizing HN forces depends on the HN's social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats. The development program's aim is to create an efficient organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations structure that makes sense for the HN. Conventional forces with limited special purpose teams such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and special weapons and tactic are preferable. Elite units tend to divert a large share of the best leaders and to remove critical talent from the regular forces. Doctrine remains standard across the force, as do unit structures. The organization facilitates information collection, processing, and dissemination across and throughout all security forces.

8-34. In many situations, simple personnel accountability is one of the greatest impediments to effective organizations. The advisor team mentors and advises the HNSF on keeping better accountability. HNSF can be slow to accept the formations, timelines, and uniform standards, sometimes due to a lack of supplies. Of

equal importance is the HN unit's ability to manage its leave and pass system. All these further capability achievements of the HN unit allow it to focus on operations and training, not troops to task.

Security Force Organizational Structure

8-35. As much as possible, the HN determines the security force organizational structure. The HN may be open to proposals from U.S. Forces but ultimately approve all organizational designs. As the HN government strengthens, U.S. leaders and trainers expect it to make increasingly independent organizational decisions. These decisions may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, and internal organizational designs. Cultures and conditions can result in the assignment of what U.S. Forces may consider nontraditional roles and missions to the HNSF. HN police sometimes prove more paramilitary than their U.S. counterparts, and the military can play a role in internal security. Eventually, police and military roles clearly differentiate. Police counter crime while the military addresses external threats. However, the exact nature of these missions depends on the HN situation. In any event, police and military roles undergo clear delineation.

Security Force Organizational Types

8-36. The day-to-day troops-to-task requirements and priorities of effort require a wide assortment of HNSF to conduct COIN operations. Although the police force serves as the front line of COIN security forces, other units are required to assist the police on a temporary basis until the police can conduct operations on their own. Police forces are neither equipped nor trained to operate in high-intensity situations.

Military Functions of Security Forces

8-37. Military forces sometimes perform police duties at the start of an insurgency. However, it proves best for police forces to assume these duties as soon as possible. Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate HUMINT picture of the AO. Because of their frequent public contact, police forces are often the best type of force to counter small insurgent bands supported by the local populace.

8-38. Although the long-term objectives in training HN militaries focus on foreign defense, the realities of COINs often dictate the military establishes civil security and civil control. Commanders ensure military units coordinate with local police on information gathering, civilian interactions, and civil affairs (CA).

8-39. An HNSF unit is task-organized into elements for accomplishing one of three functions—conducting offensive operations, conducting defensive operations, and implementing civil control. These organizations' sizes vary based on the OE, the insurgent components, elements, and dynamics, and the phase of the COIN. An HNSF unit has command and control, a reserve, and some form of sustainment support.

8-40. As an offensive force, an HN unit maintains the capability to conduct offensive operations and specific COIN operations (for example, search and attack, raid, cordon and search, ambush, site exploitation). Due to the elusive nature of an insurgency, this force may be the smallest organization in the unit.

8-41. As a defensive force, an HN unit maintains the capability to conduct defensive operations. Typically, HN COIN units focus on executing area defense at the tactical level, which includes securing important events, critical infrastructure, and bases. Depending on the phase of the COIN and insurgency capabilities, this force may be quite large.

8-42. As a civil control or constabulary force, an HN unit has a force capable of contributing to national security and performing police duties and civil functions. Typically, such a force conducts tasks associated with the civil control LOE such as staffing checkpoints, collecting information, conducting crime and attack investigations, and performing reconnaissance and surveillance. Often the largest force, it constantly interacts with the civilian population, which increases security to both the unit and civilians. Historical and current examples include the Philippine Constabulary, Italian Carabinieri, Iraqi National Police, and Haitian Gendarmerie.

Police Functions of Security Forces

8-43. The primary front line COIN force is often the police, not the military. However, the police are only a part of the rule of law. Common roles of the police force are to investigate crimes, to provide traffic control, to preserve the peace by resolving simple disputes, and to control civil disturbances. Police forces require

support from a code of law, judicial courts, and a penal system. Such support provides a coherent, transparent system that imparts justice. Upholding the rule of law also requires other civil institutions and an HN capability to support the legal system. When parts of the rule of law do not work, commanders remain prepared to meet detention requirements.

8-44. Countering an insurgency requires a police force who is visible by day and night. The HN government does not gain legitimacy when citizens believe insurgents and criminals control the streets. Well-sited and well-protected police stations establish a presence in communities, which secures communities and builds support for the HN government. Daily public contact affords the police force a chance to collect information for counterinsurgents.

8-45. Police might be organized on a national or local basis. Whatever the established police organization, Soldiers maintain understanding of the organization and help the HN effectively organize and employ it. This often means dealing with several police organizations and developing plans for training and advising each one. A formal link or liaison channel exists between the HN police, HN military forces, and U.S. Forces. This channel for coordination, deconfliction, and information sharing enables successful COIN operations. Police often comprise several independent but mutually supporting forces, which may include those following:

- Criminal and traffic police.
- Border police.
- Transport police for security of rail lines and public transportation.
- Specialized police forces.
- Internal affairs.

Paramilitary Functions of Security Forces

8-46. Success in a COIN depends on isolating the insurgents from the general population. Insurgents intimidate the populace into passive support and prevent their providing information to counterinsurgent units. A technique to combat this is to establish a paramilitary organization. Paramilitary forces are designed to support the rule of law and stabilize the operating environment, particularly for when the HN police forces and military forces are initially organizing. Temporary in nature, the paramilitary unit's mandates are—

- To provide the populace with a means of securing themselves.
- To maintain the capability to gather and report intelligence about the insurgency.
- To remain available for covert employment to target insurgents within higher headquarters' (HQs') guidance.

8-47. In terms of organization, upon identifying citizen leaders, units work with the local populace to organize paramilitary units. These need recognizable uniforms, standard light weapons, and salaries. The salaries take away from the insurgent recruitment base.

8-48. As regards their limitations, paramilitary organizations are not to conduct offensive operations. They undergo close monitoring for insurgent infiltration or abuse of power.

8-49. As regards demobilization, in the final analysis, the best way to demobilize a paramilitary force may be to integrate part of it into the HN military or police force.

Corrections Functions of Security Forces

8-50. When counterinsurgents seek to delegitimize an insurgency by criminalizing it, the HN establishes a robust corrections system. A COIN with this goal receives a more robust armament than stable governments have.

Philippine Constabulary–Established 1901

The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not the first time U.S. forces have created HNSF from scratch and allowed them to win in a COIN. The Philippine−American War began in 1899 and ended officially in 1902, but hostilities remained until 1913. The war was not a popular one in the United States but resulted in a stable and free Philippine Republic.

The Philippine Constabulary was established in 1901 to assist the U.S. military in combating the remaining Filipino revolutionaries. The Philippine Constabulary was entrusted to the hands of Captain Henry T. Allen, named as the chief of the Philippine Constabulary force. With the help of other Army officers, Captain Allen organized the force, trained, equipped, and armed the men as best as could be done under difficult conditions.

The Constabulary was instrumental in defeating the insurgency. Originally officered by U.S. forces, the Filipinos slowly overtook all operations of the unit. At a tactical level, they initially augmented U.S. forces and then were assigned their own AO. Although equipped with only shotguns and revolvers, the constabulary soon maintained ownership of entire provinces.

TRAIN

8-51. U.S. and multinational training assistance addresses shortfalls at every level with the purpose of establishing self-sustaining training systems. Training activities include those conducted to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. They may include task analysis, the development and execution of programs of instruction, implementation of training events, and leader development activities.

Training Mission

8-52. Soldiers on training mission assignments receive training on the specific requirements of developing HN forces. Appropriate courses emphasize the HN's cultural background, introduce its language, and provide cultural tips for building rapport with HN personnel. They also provide protection training for troops working with HN forces. U.S. trainees develop familiarity with the HN organization and equipment, especially weapons not in the U.S. inventory. This training emphasizes the following:

- Sustaining training and reinforcing individual and team skills.
- Using the smallest possible student-to-instructor ratio.
- Developing HN trainers.
- Training to standards (and not to time).
- Providing immediate feedback and using after action reviews (AARs).
- Respecting the HN culture but learning to distinguish between cultural practices and excuses.
- Learning the HN language.
- Working with interpreters.

Evaluation Standards

8-53. The HN unit and trainers establish clear measures for evaluating the training of individuals, leaders, and units. Insurgent strategies and their corresponding responses from targeted governments vary widely. COIN operations require many of the same individual and collective skills performed in conventional military operations but also include additional requirements for COIN. Small units execute most COIN operations. Therefore, effective COIN forces require strong junior leaders. Metrics for evaluating units include subjective measures such as loyalty to the HN government, as well as measures of competence in military tasks. However, the acceptance of values such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption is far more difficult to assess than evaluating task performance.

Security Force Members

8-54. A systematic training program develops security force members. It first builds their basic skills, then teaches them to work as a team, and finally allows them to function as a unit. Basic military training focuses first on Soldier skills such as first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline. Leaders train in any necessary planning tactics such as patrolling and urban operations. Everyone learns and practices the rules of engagement (ROE) and the law of armed conflict. The following are requisite capabilities:

- Conduct basic information collection activities.
- Maintain security.
- Coordinate indirect fires.
- Conduct logistic operations (planning, maintenance, sustainment, and movement).
- Conduct casualty care and evacuation.
- Maintain personnel management.

8-55. HNSF staffs, when fully capable, are able to accomplish the following:

- Synchronize plans and consider all warfighting functions:
  - They disseminate the plans to appropriate personnel in a timely manner.
  - Plans operate within short-, mid-, and long-term planning frameworks.
- Share intelligence with other units and agencies:
  - The planning process fully integrates intelligence.
  - Intelligence is bottom fed.
  - Intelligence uses multiple sensors.
- Maintain synchronized methods for units to request supplies and sustainment assets.

Note. Planners account for logistical capabilities during the planning process.

- Unify the command structure:
  - Leaders empower subordinate leaders within the commander's intent.
  - Commanders visualize, describe, and direct units.

8-56. Training fits into the following three categories. Individual training covers marksmanship, first aid, land navigation, and individual movement techniques. HNSF do not always have the institutional military instruction that U.S. Forces have, so much of the individual skills training occurs at the unit. Marksmanship is of particular concern due to the need for precise fires in COIN. Unit training focuses on getting HN battalions, companies, platoons, and squads ready to conduct operations. This typically means training focuses on three key tasks—checkpoint operations, combat patrols (mounted and dismounted), and raids—and cordon and search operations. Staff training involves staff use and implementation of those systems focused on planning, logistic support, intelligence integration, and command and control.

Role of Advisor Teams in Training

8-57. Advisor teams are generally responsible for initial HN unit training and then provide oversight as the HN units implement their own training plans. All aspects of training integrate leader and ethics training.

Role of Partner Units in Training

8-58. Partner units play an important role in advising. Advisors cannot accompany every HN operation. However, since almost all operations in COIN are combined, a partner unit can effectively advise an HN unit. Partner units can be most effective at advising HN units in the planning process, especially the military decision-making process (MDMP) or troop leading procedures (TLP). The MDMP or TLP (see chapter 4, section III) may require modification to suit the HNSF. Staff sections work closely with their HN peers as part of the planning process.

8-59. Partner units may have to provide limited support or supplies to their HN units. For example, a unit might provide its HN unit with jet fuel or Class VIII (medical supplies) items, or it might help recover a disabled tank or vehicle. However, the HN unit never develops a reliance on partner unit support. The commander allocates partner support appropriately for the realities of the situation.

Police Training

8-60. Police training is best conducted as an interagency and multinational operation. Ideally, leaders for police training are civilian police officers from the Departments of Justice and State, along with senior police officers from multinational partners. Civilian police forces have personnel with extensive experience in large city operations and in operating against organized crime groups. Experience countering organized crime is especially relevant to COIN; many insurgent groups are more like organized crime in their organizational structure and public relations than they are like military units. U.S. military police units serve best when operating as a support force for the professional civilian police trainers. However, military police units may be assigned the primary responsibility for police training, and they remain prepared to assume that role as necessary. Higher level police skills such as civilian criminal investigation procedures, anti-organized-crime operations, and police intelligence operations are best taught by civilian experts.

8-61. Effective policing requires an effective justice system that can process arrests, detentions, warrants, and judicial records. Such a system includes trained judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, prison officials, and court personnel. These roles are important to establish the rule of law.

8-62. Military police or corrections personnel can provide training for detention and corrections operations. HN personnel receive training by the appropriate U.S. personnel to handle and interrogate detainees and prisoners in accordance with (IAW) internationally recognized human rights standards. Prisoner and detainee management procedures provide for the security and the fair and efficient processing of those detained.

8-63. Effective police forces, like military forces, require quality support personnel. Training teams ensure the establishment of training in support functions. Police forces require these specially trained personnel:

- Armorers.
- Supply specialists.
- Communications personnel.
- Administrative personnel.
- Vehicle mechanics.

Security Force Leader Training

8-64. The effectiveness of the HNSF directly relates to the quality of their leaders. Developing effective leaders requires a comprehensive program of officer, staff, and specialized training. The ultimate success of any U.S. involvement in counterinsurgent efforts depends on creating viable host-nation leaders who can carry on the fight at all levels and build their nation on their own. One of the major challenges partner units and advisor teams face is a low quality of leaders, especially in the junior leader ranks.

8-65. Leader training reinforces the different levels of authority within the HNSF. The roles and responsibilities of each commissioned officer and NCO rank remain firmly established, so recruits understand the expectations upon them. Their subordinate relationship to civilian authorities is reinforced to ensure civilian control. In addition, training establishes team dynamics. In some cultures, security forces need training to develop understanding of the vital role of members not in primary leadership positions.

Commissioned Officers

8-66. Officer candidate standards are high. Candidates maintain good health and pass an academic test with higher standards than the test for enlisted troops.

Officer Candidates

8-67. Careful vetting of officer candidates ensures they do not have close ties to any radical or insurgent organizations. Various models for basic officer training exist, including those following:

- One-year military college.
- Two-year military college.
- Four-year military college.
- Officer candidate school.
- Military training at civilian universities.

Additional Training

8-68. In addition to tactical skills, commissioned officers receive training in accountability, decision making, delegation authority, values, and ethics. Special COIN training addresses the following:

- Information collection and legal considerations.
- Day and night patrolling.
- Site security.
- Cordon and search operations.
- Search and attack operations.
- Operations with the following entities:
  - Other U.S. Forces.
  - Other HN government agencies.
  - Intergovernmental organizations.
  - NGOs.
- Treatment of detainees and prisoners.
- Psychological operations.
- Civil-military operations (CMO).
- Negotiations.
- Ethnic and religious sensitivity.

Noncommissioned Officers

8-69. Professional and effective security forces all have a professional NCO corps. NCOs receive training in tactical skills, accountability, values, and ethics. Relations and responsibilities between the officer and NCO corps are clearly defined and are to empower the NCO corps. Units often create special NCO academies to train NCOs from partner HN units.

Civilian Leaders

8-70. Additionally, HN civilian leaders may need specific training to improve their skills and performance. Key representatives may include those following:

- City mayor.
- Officials from public works, utilities, transportation, and communications.
- Local police chief.
- Firefighting officials.
- Superintendent of schools.
- Religious leaders.
- Health and medical officials and leaders.
- Judicial representatives.
- Editors of local news media.
- Business and commercial leaders.

Augmentation

8-71. Augmentation is an arrangement wherein the HN provides either individuals or elements to U.S. units or vice versa. (See figure 8-4 for an example unit augmentation.) It occurs at numerous levels and in many forms. For example, HN individuals might augment a U.S. squad, an HN platoon might augment a U.S. company, and an HN company might augment a U.S. battalion. One benefit of this arrangement as a training strategy is the HNSF can emulate U.S. Forces in actual combat operations. Additionally, U.S. Forces can develop valuable cultural, language, and information-gathering skills. Typically, a chain of command will be agreed upon prior to execution. However, command may be executed as a partnership.




Figure 8-4. Unit augmentation, example

EQUIPMENT

8-72. The requirement to provide equipment may be as simple as assisting with maintenance of existing formations or as extensive as providing everything from shoes and clothing to vehicles, communications systems, and investigation kits. When insurgents use heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, HNSF need comparable or better equipment. This requirement especially applies to police forces, who are often lightly armed and vulnerable to well-armed insurgents.

8-73. Primary considerations include maintainability, ease of operation, and long-term sustainment costs. Few developing nations can support highly complex equipment. In COIN operations, having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly capable armored vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance. Developing an effective HN maintenance system may begin with contractors performing any major maintenance. The program then progresses to partnership arrangements with U.S. Forces as HN personnel are trained to perform the support mission.

FACILITY REBUILDING OR BUILDING

8-74. HNSF need infrastructure support. Soldiers and police forces need buildings for storage, training, and shelter. Requirements often include barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military facilities. Construction takes time; the HN needs to invest early in such facilities to have them available when needed. Any infrastructure design, including headquarters facilities, takes protection into consideration since infrastructure is an attractive target for insurgents.

8-75. During an insurgency, HN military and police forces often operate from local bases. Building training centers and unit garrisons requires a long-term, force-basing plan. Whenever possible, garrisons include housing for commissioned officers, NCOs, and families; government-provided medical care for family members; and other benefits that render national service attractive.

8-76. The easiest way for a partner unit is to build a combined facility to house both itself and the HN unit. As the situation improves and the partner unit leaves, the HNSF can occupy the entire compound.

8-77. Advisor units often use their funding to build showers, tents, toilets, dining facilities, and barriers and to make minor building renovations. Improving the military facilities can increase the morale and performance of the HN unit.

ADVISING AND ASSISTING

8-78. Advisors are the most prominent U.S. personnel to serve with HN units. They live, work, and fight alongside their HN units. Segregation occurs at an absolute minimum. The relationship between advisors and HN forces is vital. U.S. partner unit commanders remain mindful that advisors are not liaison officers, nor do they command HN units. Additionally, partner units regularly advise their HNSF counterparts.

8-79. Effective advisors are powerful force enhancers. The importance of the position demands the most capable individual to fill it. Soldiers who take the initiative and set standards for others make ideal advisors.

8-80. Professional knowledge and competence earn the respect of HN troops. Effective advisors build rapport with HN personnel but avoid the temptation to adopt any HN positions contrary to U.S. or multinational values or policies. (See table 8-4 for considerations related to advising and assisting.)

8-81. Advisors understand the HN military culture and witness local politics yielding national effects. Effective advisors recognize cultural factors and use them to develop HN commitment and teamwork. They use the culture's positive aspects to inspire the best performance from each security force member and leader.

Table 8-4. General considerations for advising and assisting

Ask By, With, and Through Whom	Not counting immediate action battle drill responses, the mark of an effective advisory effort is the amount of stake the host-nation security forces invest in their own operations.
Empathy Leads to Cultural Competence	Truly understanding other human beings and where they come from allows honest relationships to develop. These relationships are critical factors of success.
Success is Built upon Personal Relationships	Numerous occasions and challenges test the two-way relationship between U.S. advisors and host-nation personnel. Only a relationship built upon a solid basis of mutual trust can survive and ensure mission success.
You Are Not "One of Them"	Advisors are often alone, navigating between two military systems and two cultures and never quite fitting in with either of them. The realization that one exists in such a situation can be particularly frustrating and demoralizing. Advisors must be aware of this and make all attempts to limit the effects of these feelings.
You Will Never Win . . . Nor Should You	The advisor who attains a tactical objective does not achieve success; success occurs when the host nation forces achieve the objective.
Advisors are not Commanders	Advisors are not intended to lead host-nation security forces in combat; they are ultimately responsible for command and control of their own small team of U.S. combat advisors only.
Advisors are Honest Mediators	Advisors are advocates for the host-nation security forces with partner units.
Learn to Live with Shades of Gray	Advisors are apt to find themselves isolated with great autonomy, often with no supervision and encountering moral and ethical dilemmas daily.
Talent is Everything, but Understand Rank	A paradox lies in recognized talent taking a back seat to rank in some host nation forces. Advisors must understand, though rank on the uniform is important to many armies, it is but skin deep. The ways around rank are relationship and talent.
Make Do	Advisors never have everything they feel they need to succeed. Scrounging, bartering, and horse trading are daily activities of the combat advisor. An enormous amount of energy must be devoted to these activities. These efforts not only help advisors achieve mission success but also endear them to their counterparts.

Guidelines for Advising and Assisting

Remain patient. Be subtle. In guiding HN counterparts, explain the benefits of an action and convince them to accept the idea as their own. Respect the ranks and positions of HN counterparts.

Exercise diplomacy in correcting HNSF. Praise each success and work to instill pride in the unit.

Work to train and improve the unit continually, even in the combat zone. Help the commander develop unit standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Know light infantry tactics and unit security procedures.

Use confidence-building missions to validate training.

Maintain understanding of an advisor not as the unit commander but as an enabler, there to assist. The HN commander makes decisions and commands the unit. Advisors assist with these tasks.

Train HN units to standard and then fight alongside them. Consider HN limitations and adjust.

Flexibility is key. It is impossible to plan completely for everything in this type of operation.

Constantly look forward to the next issue and be ready to develop solutions to problems that cannot be answered with a doctrinal solution.

Remember most actions have long-term implications.

Learn enough of the language for simple conversation and, at a minimum, greetings.

Keep HN counterparts informed; do not to hide agendas.

Remain prepared to act as a liaison to multinational assets, especially air support and logistics. Maintain liaison with CA and humanitarian teams in the AO.

Remain ready to advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.

Stay integrated with the unit. Eat their food. Do not isolate from them.

Remain aware of the operations in the immediate area to prevent fratricide.

Insist on HN adherence to the recognized human rights standards concerning treatment of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents. Report any violation to the chain of command.

Remain objective in HN unit and leader proficiency reports. Report corruption or incompetence.

Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.

Advisor Teams

8-82. Advisor teams link HN units and U.S. partner units to fill the gaps in the HN's supply system. They can bring attention to equipment shortfalls both with their higher U.S. chain of command and through the HN units' chain of command to the HN higher HQ. They first ensure the HN units are properly using the HN's logistic support system. In addition, they assist by guiding the HN counterpart through the HN system.

8-83. Advisor teams often have authority to provide tactical equipment such as radios with their appropriated funds. They use this money since it is one of the few forms of leverage they possess.

8-84. Of special note, advisors never use bribery or coercion since any results achieved from these actions are only temporary. As soon as the benefit is provided or the support is removed, the HN counterpart has no reason to comply. In practice, these techniques are inefficient and inadequate for achieving the long-term goals of developing proficiency, competence, and initiative in the counterpart.

The Art and Science of Advising

8-85. The most important mission of advisors is to enhance the military professionalism of their counterparts. Establishing rapport, credibility, and legitimacy requires time, proximity, and interaction. Advisors mentor the HN's leaders at every opportunity. Partner units engage in every aspect of the HN's development.

8-86. Advisors sleep and eat daily alongside HNSF units. They depart from U.S. encampment. The closer they operate to the HNSF, the faster the unit improves. The social and cultural aspects of the mission are just as or more important than patrolling with the unit.

8-87. Just as the credibility of U.S. advisors is critical to influence the leaders and members of the HNSF, the actions of these advisor teams are equally vital to inspire public confidence. Advisors build their credibility by public contact, visibility, technical and tactical proficiency, resource provisions, battle successes, and respectful public interaction.

8-88. Often, to be successful, advisors partner with their HN equivalents. For instance, U.S. leaders partner with host-nation leaders, U.S. staffs partner with HN staffs, and U.S. Soldiers partner with HN soldiers.

8-89. Combat advisors go on patrol and operations to—

- Lead and advise by example.
- Share the risk.
- Improve the HNSF's legitimacy and unity of effort.
- Bond with the counterparts.
- Coordinate assets (close air support, quick reaction force, EOD).
- Prevent fratricide.
- Provide accurate and specific AARs.
- Prevent, report, and remedy human rights violations.
- Collect information for intelligence.
- Ensure thorough site exploitation.
- Ensure the correct collection and processing of collected exploitable material.
- Improve situational awareness.

Challenges for United States Advisors and Units

8-90. U.S. advisors and units share the same challenges and often develop the same practices. Some of these practices are negative while others are positive. Some challenges are common to all U.S. advisors and units. These include aspects often referred to as the *American military culture*.

8-91. Just as in COIN operations, advising and assisting are iterative processes. The advisor team and the HN unit do not tend to get them right the first time. However, both the HN unit and the advisor team strive to learn and adapt more rapidly than the insurgents.

Common Advisor Challenges

Adjusting to native cuisine. Refusal to accept offered food and beverages might be insulting.

Susceptibility to discouragement. Not all advice is accepted. Some is implemented later.

The careless word or action that can cost the United States dearly in good will and cooperation, which may have required great effort and considerable cost to establish.

Temptation to criticize HN policy in front of HN personnel. An advisor obligation, of U.S. national policy, is to support the incumbent government just as one does one's own government.

The study of counterparts' personalities and backgrounds. Advisors make every effort to establish and maintain friendly relationships. Advisors learn something about their counterparts' personal lives and demonstrate an interest in their likes and dislikes.

Ongoing recognition and observation of military courtesy and local customs and courtesies. Advisors recognize, in many cultures, the observance of formal courtesies precedes the conduct of other business. When in doubt, they lean toward the polite.

Getting caught up in personality clashes between HN officers and personnel.

The different priority HN partners may place on person-to-person relationships, especially as greater than those of organizational frameworks.

Navigating HN norms regarding time and timeliness.

Advisor Relationships with Host Nation Peers

8-92. Advisors spend maximum time with the units, so troops get opportunities to know and trust them. They talk to and get to know the troops—not just the unit leaders, so they receive excellent feedback through the common Soldier's candid comments. Such comments often reflect troop morale and operational effectiveness. Advisors stay abreast of what is happening in the unit by staying in close contact with commanders and staffs. Additional advisor relationships include the following:

- The advisor encourages frequent command inspections by the commander while noting these related considerations:
  - In some cultures, this action is a new concept or not a common practice.
  - Many HN commanders are reluctant to inspect.
  - Many HN commanders rely solely on correspondence and reports to evaluate unit effectiveness.
- The advisor continually stresses the obvious advantages of good military-civilian relations to avoid the development of military arrogance, which irritates civilian populations:
  - The development of proper Soldier-civilian relationships is a critical factor in COIN.
  - Improper behavior by Soldiers toward civilians requires immediate correction.
- The advisor maintains high training standards, so the unit remains prepared for combat at all times.
- The advisor stresses human rights and the consequences of mistreating suspects and prisoners.
- The advisor constantly promotes unit esprit de corps to sustain the unit in the face of difficulties.
- The advisor persuades HN personnel to pass information up, down, and laterally.

MENTORSHIP

8-93. Effective mentorship is based on mutual respect, relationship building, and trust. Patience is key in developing positive situations for mentorship. All these also go into the building of an effective team. Both advisor teams and partner units have an equal ability to mentor when the conditions have been set.

Respect, Relate, and Trust

8-94. To earn respect, mentors show respect. Additionally, they maintain a good working relationship with HN forces. Finally, the best way to build trust is through shared danger and hardship. Nothing builds trust more quickly than facing the insurgency together.

Team Building During Mentorship

8-95. The desired end state serves unity of effort across the advisor team, HN unit, and partner unit. Once a recommendation is made to the HN unit, mentors move on. If every recommendation were to become a point of contention, that dynamic would damage the mutual respect and relationship that had been so carefully cultivated. Showing respect sets the conditions for building trust and ultimately the kind of team among whom mentoring can occur.

After Action Review

8-96. Doctrinally, an *after action review* is guided analysis of an organization's performance, conducted at appropriate times during and at the conclusion of a training event or operation with the objective of improving future performance (FM 7-0). AARs signal the start of the next planning cycle or operation and have as their objective improving future performance. Lessons learned from the performance reviews provide leaders with the specifics of what and how to perform better for future training or in the next operation. In the U.S. Army, the AAR process ensures participants discover for themselves what went right, what went wrong, and how to perform to standard next time. An AAR can be formal or informal and include a facilitator, event participants, and other observers.

Host Nation After Action Review

8-97. First, advisors do not take credit for an idea. Instead, they empower their counterparts. They discuss the issue and come up with the solution collaboratively, even when they have the answer. The point is to mentor HN counterparts toward coming up with their own solutions in the future. Second, after giving counterparts the credit and making them look good, the counterpart leaders more readily come to the advisors for advice and take advice in the future.

Areas to Sustain and Improve

8-98. Advisors cover all activities and salient points (sustainment and improvement) for each phase of the operation, including information activities. AARs conclude with a plan to follow up and make improvements appropriately. Just as with U.S. Forces, an AAR with HNSF is not only potentially of great value but also potentially full of pitfalls. To evaluate the HNSF, advisors assess, at a minimum, the following:

- Leadership.
- Level of training demonstrated on operations.
- Use and effectiveness of administration and logistics (as applicable).
- Professionalism, including human rights and public interactions.

Criticism in Front of Others

8-99. Advisors need to bring up general positive points with the groups, but they refrain from criticizing a leader, staff, soldier, or unit in front of others. Group AARs within the U.S. military culture include discussion around any mistakes made—a technique valuable in that context due to that culture's acceptance of learning from mistakes as an important element for improvement. Other cultures do not accept public criticism of one person or group to another. Advisors take aside that member or unit for private discussion about the issue; they ask them to speak to how they will productively improve on that point. (See figure 8-5 for an example AAR report for HNSF after an operation.)




Figure 8-5. Host-nation security forces after action review report, example

Commander's One-to-one

8-100. Some AAR points are best kept between the advisors and HN commanders. HN commanders may recommend additional participants attend this one-to-one.

Internal Advisor After Action Review

8-101. To advise HNSF effectively, the U.S. advisor team conducts an internal AAR, focusing on what the team will sustain and improve. Internal AARs are for the advisors only and cover three primary topics:

- Conduct of advisors and U.S. partner.
- Conduct of the HNSF.
- ROE and escalation of force (for effectiveness, compliance, and training level).

EMPLOYMENT OF NEWLY TRAINED FORCES

8-102. Building the morale and confidence of the HNSF is a long-term objective. Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results in high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While defeat in a small operation may have little effect on the outcome of a conventional war, even a small tactical defeat of HNSF can have serious strategic consequences since COIN is largely about perception. Effective insurgent leaders quickly turn minor wins into major propaganda victories. In short, the HNSF remain prepared for operations, so they have every possible advantage. The decision to commit units to their first actions and their employment method requires careful consideration. As much as possible, HNSF begin with simpler missions. As their confidence and competence grow, HNSF assume more complex assignments.

8-103. Newly trained units enter their first combat operations in support of more experienced U.S. Forces or HN or multinational forces. Partner units and advisor teams closely monitor the situation and support each other and the HN. That the HNSF does not suffer defeat in the initial stages of their operations is of paramount importance. HN units can be reorganized into smaller elements and paired with U.S. Forces to identify the operation with the HN and to provide support and training experience to the HN.

8-104. In summary, support to HNSF is deemed successful when it establishes HN institutions capable of sustaining the HN government's legitimacy. Developing effective HNSF—including military, police, and paramilitary forces—is one of the most highly prioritized COIN tasks. Soldiers make vital contributions to this mission when they train and advise the HNSF. Effective tactical commanders appreciate the importance of this mission and select the right personnel to become those trainers and advisors. (See chapter 7, section III for information on SFA.)

Appendix A

Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency Operations

The complexity of an insurgency and the greater number of variables (and their infinite combinations) increase the difficulty of providing timely, relevant, and effective intelligence support to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Intelligence is critical in an operational environment (OE) against the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, and challenge regional political control. Intelligence and the effective conduct of information collection operations allow commanders to develop situational understanding and thereby to visualize, describe, and direct subordinates in the successful accomplishment of a mission. This appendix reviews how the COIN force, as part of a joint team and in conjunction with unified action partners, develops intelligence to support COIN operations. It describes intelligence and information collection operations using current Army capabilities and formations in today's OE.

SECTION I—INTELLIGENCE FUNDAMENTALS

A-1. Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand a threat's characteristics and objectives and related threat goals and courses of action (COAs) and thereby to execute successful operations in an OE against the subversion and violence organized to challenge, seize, and nullify regional political control. Precise intelligence is critical to accurate, timely targeting (see chapter 4, section IV) on nodes (people, places, and things) and for opening windows of opportunity across domains—particularly the friendly, neutral, and threat networks representing multivarious targets and potentializing links between objectives and effects in COIN. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge about insurgent strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, and tactics, insurgency capabilities, and the insurgency's equipment to plan and execute COIN operations.

ROLE OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF

A-2. Commanders and staffs at all levels synchronize intelligence with other warfighting functions to maximize their ability to visualize the OE simultaneously and accomplish the requisite tasks and activities throughout an assigned area of operations (AO). The intelligence process, driven by commanders, supports all activities of the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and undergoes continuous performance to support each activity.

A-3. Although the intelligence process has unique aspects and activities, its design is similar to that of the operations process. The step of the intelligence process to plan and direct closely corresponds with the plan activity of the operations process. The steps of the intelligence process to collect and process, produce, and disseminate, and integrate, together with the analysis activity, correspond to the execute activity of the operations process.

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS ACTIVITIES

A-4. The intelligence process activities (synchronize; conduct intelligence operations; conduct processing, exploitation, and dissemination [PED]; analyze; and assess) add details and areas of emphasis to the intelligence process steps. The continuing activities also assist in filling gaps from some of the detailed aspects of the intelligence warfighting function. To support operations, the intelligence warfighting function makes observations about the threat, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other relevant aspects of the OE. Military intelligence units conduct intelligence operations resulting in collected data. A dedicated effort performs PED to convert the data into useable information for analysis. This effort results in intelligence. Because of its complexity, intelligence professionals continually synchronize and assess this effort to ensure the effectiveness of the intelligence warfighting function.

Synchronize

A-5. Intelligence synchronization integrates intelligence with operations and ensures all requirements are met, as much as feasible, through close collaboration between commanders, their battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2), battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3), and other members of the intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence synchronization occurs through a broader perspective than collection management and includes aspects of long-range intelligence planning, maintaining, and revising the intelligence architecture. Intelligence synchronization could be considered the orchestration of the intelligence warfighting function. This holistic activity ensures intelligence support is effective and flexible to meet changing conditions and requirements. While the commander drives the intelligence warfighting function, and the military intelligence unit commanders performs an invaluable role, the S-2 is ultimately responsible for successful intelligence synchronization. Intelligence activities and tasks drive the intelligence warfighting function and leverage national to tactical intelligence.

Conduct Intelligence Operations

A-6. Intelligence operations comprise the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information and thereby to satisfy validated requirements. To support operations, the intelligence warfighting function makes observations about the threat, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other relevant aspects of the OE. Military intelligence units conduct intelligence operations resulting in collected data. A dedicated effort performs PED to convert the data into useable information for analysis. This effort results in intelligence. Because of its complexity, intelligence professionals continually synchronize and assess this effort to ensure the effectiveness of the intelligence warfighting function.

Perform Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination

A-7. *Processing, exploitation, and dissemination* comprise the execution of the related functions that converts and refines collected data into usable information, distributes the information for further analysis, and, when appropriate, provides combat information to commanders and staffs (ADP 2-0). Intelligence PED is that conducted specifically by intelligence personnel or units. Intelligence synchronization integrates information collection; intelligence PED; and intelligence analysis with operations to fight effectively and efficiently for intelligence in support of decision making. Intelligence personnel performing PED as well as analysis must understand and effectively deal with potential information overload. As time progresses, intelligence professionals will experience increases in the volume, pace, and complexity of the data they receive. Military intelligence professionals must develop data literacy skills to confront this issue effectively.

Analyze

A-8. Intelligence analysis is the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production. There are many forms of analysis within Army operations. Analysis assists commanders, staffs, and intelligence leaders in framing the problem, stating the problem, and solving the problem. Leaders and staffs at all levels conduct analysis to assist in making many types of decisions and to conduct targeting. Analysis also occurs in many forms throughout the intelligence process. For example, collection management analysis is critical in ensuring information requirements receive the appropriate priority for collection and are assigned to the proper collection asset. The most important form of analysis within the intelligence process is intelligence analysis. The following represent two distinct examples of intelligence analysis:

Single-Source Collector

A-9. A single-source collector performing initial analysis—in intelligence, often referred to as exploitation during the collect and process step. The collector adds context to information (analysis) based on experience and knowledge before reporting the information to single-source or all-source analysis elements.

All-Source Predictive Analysis

A-10. An all-source analyst performing predictive analysis to identify threat activities and trends that present possible windows of opportunity and subsequent positions of relative advantage to friendly forces. The

analyst uses indicators for each threat COA as well threat characteristics and threat models as the basis for the analysis and conclusions.

Continuous Assessment

A-11. Commander involvement and interaction enable the operations and intelligence staffs to assess more effectively how well the produced intelligence is meeting the commander's requirements. Commander involvement also assists the staff in keeping the command's information collection efforts, including intelligence operations, synchronized with host nation (HN) and unified action partners and the overall operation. The commander drives intelligence, intelligence facilitates operations, and operations are supportive of intelligence; this relationship is continuous.

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS TAILORING

A-12. Commanders, based on recommendations from intelligence staff, tailor intelligence capabilities and operations to support missions. General force-tailoring and specific task organization establish an ordered command and support structure with technical channels for intelligence operations. The distribution of specific intelligence assets enhances the combined arms team's capabilities to concentrate combat power and minimize risk. Commanders provide, to staffs and subordinate units, guidance and continuous feedback throughout operations by—

- Providing direction.
- Providing their understanding, visualization, and description of the problem.
- Directing through clearly stated commander's critical information requirements and priorities.
- Leading and making decisions.
- Continuously assessing the operation through collaboration with the S-2 and S-3 (brigade combat team [BCT] and battalion, respectively) during the execution of operations.

A-13. Command and support relationships direct the flow of reported information during intelligence operations along various echelon-specific transmission paths or channels. Channels assist in streamlining information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the right people. Commanders and staffs normally communicate through three channels: command, staff, technical. (See ADP 6-0 and ATP 6-02.71 for information on command and support relationships and information dissemination.)

TECHNICAL CHANNELS

A-14. Technical channels, while not a command or support relationship, often affect intelligence operations. For intelligence operations, they serve as the transmission paths between intelligence units and sections performing a technical function that requires special expertise. They control the performance of technical functions. They neither constitute nor bypass command authorities. Rather, they serve as the mechanism for ensuring the execution of clearly delineated technical tasks, functions, and capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of combined arms operations. (See FM 2-0 for information on technical channels.)

A-15. Commander's direct operations but often rely on technical expertise to plan, prepare, execute, and assess units' collection efforts. Technical channels involve translating information collection tasks into specific parameters used to focus highly technical or legally sensitive aspects of the information collection effort. Technical channels include but are not limited to—

- Defining, managing, or prescribing specific employment techniques.
- Identifying critical technical collection criteria such as technical indicators.
- Providing supporting technical data or databases.
- Recommending collection techniques, procedures, or assets.
- Conducting operational reviews.
- Conducting operational coordination.
- Conducting specialized intelligence training.

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND RUNNING ESTIMATES

A-16. Commanders and staffs use personal knowledge and running estimates (see paragraphs 4-89 through 4-90) to assess social, economic, and political factors. Commanders consider how

these factors relate to potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. Their goal is to develop cultural awareness. At this level, commanders estimate the effects of friendly actions and direct subordinates with confidence. Cultural awareness improves how units interact with the populace through Soldier and leader engagements and deters false or unrealistic expectations from both sides. Soldiers and leaders have more knowledge of the society's common practices, perspectives, assumptions, customs, and values, giving better insight into the intent of individuals and groups. This deepens staff understanding of how friendly actions affect the OE and how better to plan for possible branches and sequels.

SOCIOCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

A-17. To improve commanders' sociocultural understanding, intelligence staffs establish access to national databases and repositories for each intelligence discipline and complementary capability, as well as links to joint, Service, multinational, and HN databases and repositories. Staffs use any available sociocultural databases and repositories to aid the intelligence analysis conducted as part of the civil considerations assessment (see chapter 1, section III). Additionally, commanders and staffs continually improve their sociocultural understanding and thereby their roles in the intelligence process, specifically the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE).

COMMAND NODES AND INTELLIGENCE CELL

A-18. Intelligence operations are distributed across and support redundant and functionally integrated command nodes—main command posts (CPs) and tactical CPs. Each command node retains the capacity to execute command and control of the warfighting functions synchronized with higher and lower echelons of command. Intelligence personnel not assigned to intelligence cells in main CPs assist the S-2 (brigade or battalion) in managing intelligence operations from across the battlefield. This generally includes intelligence personnel assigned to integrating cells in tactical CPs. (See echelon specific FMs and ATPs for additional information on staff roles and responsibilities.) Within these cells intelligence personnel accomplish the following tasks:

- Support current operations.
- Ensure the main and tactical CPs remains informed of the current enemy situation.
- Make recommendations related to the operation.

A-19. Intelligence personnel accomplish these tasks by continuous communication and collaboration between functional and integrating cells within the supported unit headquarters. The structure of an intelligence cell is organic to the unit's mission. In most situations, the structure is designed based on unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) and mission variables (METT-TC [I], which stands for mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations).

Note. This section provides information on intelligence cell structures based on modified tables of organization and equipment and force design updates. Commanders can task-organize based on mission requirements.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

A-20. *Intelligence operations* are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADP 2-0). They are also one of the four primary tactical tasks and missions the Army conducts as part of information collection, the other three being reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations. Intelligence drives operations, and operations support intelligence; this relationship is continuous. The BCT commander and staff need timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence to understand threat centers of gravity, goals and objectives, and COAs. Precise intelligence is also critical for targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place and opening windows of opportunity across domains during large-scale combat operations. The commander and staff maintain detailed knowledge of threat strengths, weaknesses, organization, equipment, and tactics to plan for and execute BCT operations.

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

A-21. The intelligence warfighting function executes the intelligence process by employing intelligence capabilities. All-source intelligence and single-source intelligence are the building blocks with which the intelligence warfighting function develops situational understanding and supports decision making. Since the intelligence warfighting function receives information from a variety of capabilities, some of these capabilities are commonly referred to as *single-source capabilities*. Intelligence operations employ single-source capabilities along with other means of information collection such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations. Intelligence PED capabilities (see paragraph A-7) process information and prepare it for subsequent analysis. The intelligence based on all these capabilities is called all-source intelligence. (See FM 3-24 for information on intelligence capabilities.)

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

A-22. Army forces conduct operations based on all-source intelligence assessments and products developed by intelligence staffs. *All-source intelligence* is the integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations (ADP 2-0). In joint doctrine, *all-source intelligence* comprises the intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0). Although all-source intelligence normally takes longer to produce, it is more reliable and less susceptible to deception than single-source intelligence. Intelligence organizations fuse data and information into all-source intelligence products to support COIN operations.

All-source Intelligence Analysis

A-23. The fundamentals of all-source intelligence analysis comprise intelligence analysis techniques and all-source intelligence analytical tasks—situation development, intelligence knowledge generation, IPOE, and support to targeting and information activities. Within the BCT, intelligence staffs determine the significance and reliability of incoming information, integrate incoming information and current intelligence holdings, and determine changes in threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs. Intelligence staffs support the integrating processes (specifically the IPOE [see paragraphs A-63 through A-65]; targeting [see chapter 4, section IV]; information collection [see paragraphs 4-162 through 4-166]; risk management {RM} [see paragraph 4-16]; and knowledge management [see paragraph 4-10]) by providing all-source intelligence analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Intelligence staffs use all-source intelligence to produce the requisite supporting materials for developing situational understanding, plans and orders, and answers to information requirements. Analysis for COIN operations is challenging, partly due to the following:

- The need to understand perspectives and cultures.
- The need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities.
- The localized nature of insurgencies.
- The tendency of insurgencies to change over relatively short periods of time.

All-source Intelligence Production

A-24. *Fusion* is consolidating, combining, and correlating information together (ADP 2-0). It facilitates all-source intelligence productions. Fusion occurs as an iterative activity to refine information as an integral part of all-source intelligence analysis. All-source intelligence production is continuous and occurs throughout the intelligence and operations processes. Most of the products from all-source intelligence are initially developed during planning and updated appropriately throughout preparation and execution, based on information gained from continuous assessment. For example, commanders and staffs require updated data for their continual analysis and synthesis of current insurgent activities and personalities, particularly upon the killing, capturing, or replacing of insurgents.

SINGLE-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

A-25. Single-source intelligence includes the joint intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities. Intelligence PED capabilities are a critical aspect of single-source intelligence activities because they ensure the results of the collection inform single- and all-source intelligence analyses. Military intelligence units

conduct intelligence operations with a single intelligence discipline or complementary intelligence capabilities or as a multifunctional intelligence operation, which combines activities from two or more intelligence disciplines or complementary intelligence capabilities.

A-26. Military intelligence units follow the guidance outlined in the intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities (see figure A-1) to ensure the accomplishment of all tasks successfully and in accordance with (IAW) intelligence regulations and policies. (See FM 2-0 for a description of the intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities.)

INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES	COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITIES
• COUNTER INTELLIGENCE • GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE • HUMAN INTELLIGENCE • MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE • OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE • SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE • TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE	• BIOMETRICS • CYBERSPACE • DOCUMENT AND MEDIA EXPLOITATION • ELECTROMAGNETIC WARFARE • FORENSICS • IDENTITY ACTIVITIES • SPACE

Figure A-1. Intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities

Note. PED are not exclusive to military intelligence organizations; other branches employ sensor collection capabilities. Through these three functions, the intelligence warfighting function processes collected data and information, performs an initial analysis (exploitation), and provides information in a useable form for further analysis or combat information to commanders and staffs. (See FM 3-96 for information on PED.)

Intelligence Disciplines

A-27. An *intelligence discipline* is a well-defined area of intelligence planning, collection, exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources (JP 2-0). Intelligence disciplines, supported by military intelligence personnel, include counterintelligence (CI), geospatial intelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and technical intelligence. They support reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations through which intelligence units and staffs complete tasks in intelligence operations. (See FM 2-0 for information on intelligence disciplines.)

Note. Military intelligence units, external to the BCT, conduct both reconnaissance and surveillance missions. They provide electronic intercept, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) sensor feeds, and HUMINT, CI, and downlinks from the theater of operations and national assets. Theater- and national-level reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide broadcast dissemination of information and intelligence and provide near real time imagery as part of an integrated intelligence effort. Artillery and air defense target acquisition radars complement military intelligence surveillance systems as a part of that effort. HUMINT collection occurs through face-to-face interrogation of captured enemy soldiers, insurgents, mercenaries, proxy forces, and criminal entities, the screening of the civilian population, and debriefing of friendly Soldiers such as scouts and special operations forces. (See FM 2-0 for information on military intelligence units external to the BCT.)

Counterintelligence

A-28. *Counterintelligence* is information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-0). Army CI applies its resources to four primary mission areas—counterespionage, CI support to force protection, information collection to identify and counter threat intelligence collection

targeting Army equities, and CI support to technology and critical infrastructure protection. Army CI accomplishes these missions by conducting—

- Operations.
- Investigation.
- Collection.
- Analysis and production.
- Technical services and activities.

A-29. CI capabilities consist of CI teams and assigned biometric collection equipment. These capabilities produce the following products:

- Intelligence information reports.
- CI investigative reports.
- Threat assessments.
- Notices of intelligence potential.
- Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (also called SALUTE) and/or spot reports.
- Input to multiagency vulnerability assessments.

Geospatial Intelligence

A-30. *Geospatial intelligence* is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-0). GEOINT supports operations through various types of imagery collection within an OE. GEOINT data assists commanders in visualizing the domains and dimensions of the OE. This data includes literal and nonliteral still and motion imagery and geospatial information, all of which allow analysts to see what or who exists in the OE while also assessing what it is doing across time and space.

A-31. GEOINT capabilities consist of manned and unmanned platforms and aerial and space-based collection platforms. These capabilities produce the following products:

- Phases I, II, and III full-motion video.
- Panchromatic, infrared, synthetic aperture radar, and moving target indicator exploitation.
- Imagery, initial phase, and supplemental phase interpretation reports.
- Reconnaissance exploitation reports.
- Imagery-derived products.
- Change detection and route density analysis.
- Support to IPOE, target mensuration, and tactical identification of equipment.
- Deliberate and dynamic targeting support.
- Collateral damage and BDA intelligence products.

Human Intelligence

A-32. HUMINT is the collection by a trained HUMINT collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. HUMINT uses human sources as a tool to gather information about the plans, intentions, capabilities, and operations methods of threat military forces. Army HUMINT accomplishes its mission through interrogations, source operations (recruited, nonrecruited, and debriefing), and HUMINT collection support activities (screenings, liaisons, support to targeting, and document and media exploitation [DOMEX]).

A-33. HUMINT capabilities consist of HUMINT collection teams (HCTs), HUMINT operations cells, and assigned biometric collection equipment. These capabilities produce the following products:

- Intelligence information reports.
- Biographic intelligence information reports.
- Notices of intelligence potential.
- Knowledgeability briefs.
- Collection emphasis messages.
- Size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) and/or spot reports.

Measure and Signature Intelligence

A-34. *Measurement and signature intelligence* is information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0). The purpose of measure and signature intelligence is collecting technical data associated with warfighting equipment, people, developmental weapons programs, and disseminating data for exploitation to commanders, planners, weapons developers, and policy makers.

A-35. Measure and signature intelligence capabilities consist of unattended ground sensors, infrasonic monitors, and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) detectors. Intelligence reach capabilities include scientific and technical intelligence, research and development, foreign weapons exploitation, and foreign materiel exploitation. These scientific and technical capabilities—electro-optical, geophysical, human signatures, material, nuclear, radar, and radio frequency—produce the following products:

- Spot reports.
- Preliminary technical reports.
- Complementary technical reports.
- Attack scene investigation reports.

Open-Source Intelligence

A-36. *Open-source intelligence* is intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement (Public Law 109-163). OSINT is derived from publicly available information collected by trained and certified OSINT collectors/practitioners, who use tools, processes, and analytics to generate operationally relevant intelligence from the vast amounts and variety of publicly available information. OSINT may include—

- Social media exploitation.
- Access to large data sets for analysis.
- Warning intelligence and tipping and cueing for other collection disciplines.
- Support to targeting and battle damage assessment.
- Traditional monitoring of press and news outlets, publications, and periodicals.

A-37. Units may obtain OSINT capabilities through the Army OSINT Office. OSINT collectors/practitioners produce the following stand-alone products:

- OSINT reports (also known as OSIR), which may be incorporated into intelligence estimates, intelligence summaries, intelligence running estimates, and others.
- Tactical OSINT report format (also known as OSINT tipper).

Signals Intelligence

A-38. *Signals intelligence* is intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals (JP 2-0). SIGINT is one of several military functions operating within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); it provides EW support when used in military operations for threat warning, combat information, and situational awareness. SIGINT comprises

- Communications intelligence.
- Electronic intelligence.
- Foreign instrumentation SIGINT.

Technical Intelligence

A-39. *Technical intelligence* is intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy's technological advantages (JP 2-0). Technical intelligence ensures the Army understands the threat's full technological capabilities as well as its limitations and vulnerabilities. This enables friendly forces to adopt the appropriate countermeasures, operations, and tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP). Technical intelligence involves the application of forensic science and various technical specialties across seven categories:

- Communications and electronic equipment.
- Automation systems.
- Weapons.
- Munitions.
- CBRN materiel.
- Medical materiel.
- Mobility systems.

A-40. Technical intelligence is an intelligence reach capability that includes scientific and technical intelligence, research and development, foreign weapons exploitation, and foreign materiel exploitation. Technical intelligence products include—

- Spot reports.
- Preliminary technical reports.
- Complementary technical reports.
- Attack scene investigation reports.

Complementary Capabilities

A-41. JP 2-0 recognizes the following intelligence applications: identity intelligence, biometrics, forensics, and DOMEX. The Army also recognizes various specialized capabilities that can contribute to all-source or single-source intelligence through intelligence coordination with other warfighting functions and branches. These specialized and technical capabilities, many of which are not typically conducted by military intelligence units, can provide valuable insight into threat activities and intentions and can fill intelligence gaps. In some instances, they can provide critical information that supports security and consolidating gains. These capabilities include but are not limited to the following:

- Biometrics.
- Cyberspace.
- DOMEX.
- EW.
- Forensics.
- Identity activities.
- Space.

Biometrics

A-42. *Biometrics* is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). It enhances force protection and targeting by supporting the positive identification of persons of interest, insurgents, terrorists, criminals, and others who would do harm to U.S. Forces and facilities and to friendly forces and facilities. Other COIN-related missions' biometrics support the following:

- Raids and cordon and search operations.
- Base access, checkpoints, and protection of critical sites.
- Area security operations.
- Border control and ports of entry.
- Site exploitation.
- Population census using biometric data collection devices and mapping the human environment and patterns of life.
- Medical capacity and medical records management.

Cyberspace

A-43. A *cyberspace capability* is a device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace (JP 3-12). The use of cyberspace

capabilities facilitates understanding the threat's cyberspace capabilities, intentions, potential actions, and vulnerabilities, as well as their impacts on the environment, friendly operations, and the local populace.

A-44. Cyberspace capabilities depend on an established technical architecture. Intelligence produced using cyberspace capabilities facilitates decision making at all levels through the analysis and production of relevant and tailored intelligence on activities in the cyberspace domain that may affect a unit's ability to conduct operations. The intelligence can range from broadly disseminated products focused on general users to very specific and narrowly focused analysis and reports distributed via classified channels.

Document and Media Exploitation

A-45. *Document and media exploitation* is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. Government's physical control and are not publicly available (FM 2-0). Threat intent, capabilities, and limitations may be derived through the exploitation of captured documents and media.

A-46. DOMEX is an increasingly specialized, full-time mission requiring advanced automation and communications support, analytical support, and qualified linguists. When conducted properly, DOMEX—

- Provides the commander an initial assessment of captured information.
- Maximizes the value of intelligence gained from captured enemy documents and media.
- Provides the commander timely and relevant intelligence to effectively enhance awareness of the threat's capabilities, operational structures, and intent.
- Assists in criminal prosecution or legal proceedings by maintaining chain of custody procedures and preserving the evidentiary value of captured enemy materiel, documents, and media.

Electromagnetic Warfare

A-47. *Electromagnetic warfare* is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). EW consists of three distinct divisions—electromagnetic attack (EA), electromagnetic support (ES), and electromagnetic protection. JP 3-85 and FM 3-12 provide detailed discussions about EW and its three divisions.

A-48. *Electromagnetic attack* is division of electromagnetic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires (JP 3-85). An EA requires close coordination with intelligence to ensure assets are used at the correct location and time and operate in the correct portions of the EMS to achieve desired effects. Throughout an EA mission, intelligence provides reattack recommendations and BDAs to the CEMA section to inform the continuation, redirection, conclusion, or outcome of an EA. An EA denies the threat the ability to use the EMS or spectrum-dependent equipment (see ATP 3-12.3). The deliberate use of EA can provide opportunities for intelligence collection and expose threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.

A-49. *Electromagnetic support* is division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations (JP 3-85). ES acquires adversary combat information to support the commander's maneuver plan. Data collected through ES can also support SIGINT PED to support the commander's intelligence and targeting requirements and provide situational understanding. ES assists in conducting analysis of the EMS for inclusion in IPOE. This analysis must include updating the electromagnetic order of battle and providing the intelligence staff threat EW capabilities and information for inclusion in threat characteristics and threat models.

A-50. *Electromagnetic protection* is division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-85). Electromagnetic protection facilitates the friendly use of the EMS if, through analysis of the EMS, the threat is understood; this supports IPOE. In coordination with (ICW) the division signal staff officer (also called G-6)/battalion or brigade signal staff officer (S-6) and the CEMA section, ES, intelligence systems, and personnel may inform electromagnetic protection efforts by providing information about an organization's radio frequency

signatures throughout all emission control levels as well as sources and locations of EMS interference or jamming.

Forensics

A-51. *Forensic science* is the application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts (DODD 5205.15E). Forensic techniques provide timely and accurate information that facilitates situational understanding and supports decision making. This includes collecting, identifying, and labeling collected items for future exploitation. The collection of latent fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acid (also called DNA), and other forensic data can aid in more in-depth analysis and better intelligence about the OE.

A-52. Forensics can assist in identifying an adversary's key personnel, tactics, intent, and capabilities (current and future). Forensic exploitation of collected exploitable material—

- Provides answers to commanders' information requirements.
- Supports offensive and defensive operations.
- Influences decision making.
- Develops timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence.
- Increases situational understanding of complex, uncertain OEs.

A-53. *Forensic-enabled intelligence* is the intelligence resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest (JP 2-0). Forensic-enabled intelligence assists in accurately identifying persons, networks, and complex threats, and it attributes them to specific incidents and activities. (See JP 2-0 for doctrine on forensic-enabled intelligence.)

Identity Activities

A-54. Identity activities are a collection of functions and actions that appropriately recognize and differentiate one person from another to support decision making. These include the collection of identity attributes and physical materials; the processing and exploitation of that information; all-source intelligence analytic efforts; the development of identity and criminal intelligence products, including those for Department of Defense law enforcement; the dissemination of those products to inform policy and strategy development; operational planning and assessment; and the appropriate action at the point of encounter. They result in the discovery of true identities; link identities to events, locations, and networks; and reveal hostile intent. Their outcomes enable tasks, missions, and actions that span the range of military operations. Maneuver, intelligence, and law enforcement components conduct these functions and actions.

A-55. The ability to identify or verify an individual accurately is a critical component in COIN operations. In COIN conflicts, combatants, noncombatants, insurgents, and civilians may dress the same and live and work together. Hence, the positive identification of individual combatants assumes much greater importance.

A-56. Identity intelligence is not an intelligence process but an intelligence product that results from the fusion of specific identifying attributes (biological, biographical, behavioral, and reputational information related to an individual) and other information and intelligence associated with those attributes collected across all intelligence disciplines. Identity activities employ information-related capabilities—like biometrics, forensics, and DOMEX—to discover the existence of unknown threat actors by connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials, by analyzing patterns of life, and by characterizing their levels of threat to U.S. interests.

Space

A-57. A *space capability* is 1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in or through space. 3. The ability of a space asset to contribute to a mission from seabed to the space domain (JP 3-14). The use of space capabilities is inherently joint. The Army uses space capabilities and effects to support its dominance in land operations. The need for the Army to accomplish space-enabled operations is firmly established in policy and practice. Space capabilities are integrated into Army operations across all domains. Army space operations executed through the seven codified joint space capabilities (see JP 3-14 for a detailed discussion of each capability) impact intelligence support:

- Space situational awareness.
- Positioning, navigation, and timing.
- Space control.
- Satellite communications.
- Missile warning.
- Environmental monitoring.
- Space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

A-58. FM 3-14 discusses Army space operations and Army space forces, capabilities, and formations, as well as their contributions to multidomain operations.

INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

A-59. COIN operations generally require a more tailored intelligence and intelligence support approach that places greater emphasis on specific aspects of the OE. For example, irregular warfare (IW) (COIN and unconventional warfare) requires an approach with far greater emphasis on understanding the civilian population and critical infrastructure. Adversaries may pursue aggressive activities covertly through a combination of proxy forces, unconventional warfare, and information warfare. Likewise, the contribution of intelligence and intelligence support efforts toward countering asymmetric approaches requires techniques and products specifically tailored to the types of combined arms employments of capabilities from all domains that create and exploit relative advantages to defend against and defeat asymmetric threats. Efforts undertaken during IW require a more detailed understanding of the relevant area's sociocultural factors than those undertaken during *conventional warfare*—a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states (JP 1, Volume 1). Sociocultural analysis improves the commanders' and staffs' abilities to understand, predict, respond to, and influence the decision making and the associated behavior of relevant actors. Commanders, subordinate commanders, and staffs maintain their understanding of the cultural landscape in which they operate to make sound decisions concerning protection and force deployment. Intelligence and intelligence support products describe the impacts of ethnic groups and religions, including their associated leaders, the locations of places of worship and with cultural or historical significance, spoken languages, population densities, ages, living conditions, allocations of wealth, and means of income.

Notes. Two characteristics distinguish IW from conventional warfare.

The intent is to erode a political authority's legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of those friendly entities engaged in the struggle.

The nonmilitary instruments of power are essential in that the military instrument of power alone is often insufficient to achieve the desired objectives.

A-60. This publication uses the following key doctrinal terms (see JP 3-05, JP 1 Volume 1, and FM 3-0 for information):

- *Unconventional warfare*—activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (JP 3-05).
- *Irregular warfare*—a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities (JP 1, Volume 1).
  - Indirect activities target an adversary or support an ally or partner through one or more intermediaries (e.g., allies, partners, proxies, surrogates).
  - Non-attributable activities target an opponent or support an ally or partner in ways that conceal the source of the activities or their sponsorship.
  - Asymmetric activities target an opponent or support an ally or partner when a gross disparity in relative comprehensive power causes the weaker party to resort to irregular methodologies (such as disinformation, terrorism, insurgency, resistance to occupation) to erode or exhaust their opponent's power, influence, and will.

Note. However, a stronger party may target opponents asymmetrically when the risks and cost associated with a direct, symmetric approach are unacceptable.

- *Irregular warfare*—the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare (FM 3-0).
- Proxy forces:
  - Proxy forces are generally actors unaffiliated with the state, though aligned with specific state actors, who perform activities on behalf of or IAW the state actor's strategic objectives (for example, paramilitary groups, criminal organizations, private civilian organizations, private companies, special interest groups, religious groups).
  - Proxy forces or other coverts provide adversaries with plausible deniability and cost savings in achieving strategic objectives.
- Information warfare:
  - In the context of the threat, information warfare is a threat's orchestrated use of information activities to achieve objectives (for example, cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare [EW], psychological operations).
  - Unconstrained by ethics and morality, and under the cloak of anonymity, peer threats conduct information warfare aggressively and continuously to influence the populace and decision makers.

SECTION II—INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

A-61. The operations process, while simple in concept (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), is dynamic in execution. Commanders follow it in their continuous design and conduct of operations. Integrating intelligence into the operations process provides the necessary information and intelligence to conduct COIN operations. (See FM 3-96 for information on the operations process.)

ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

A-62. Close interaction between the commander and the S-2 is essential as the staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes (see paragraph 4-16). The S-2 supports the commander's understanding of the OE and visualization of the operations by leading the IPOE process and portraying the enemy throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP), developing the information collection plan (see paragraphs 4-162 through 4-166) ICW the S-3, updating the intelligence running estimate, and developing intelligence products and reports. Commanders direct the intelligence warfighting function through their relationship with the S-2, who is ICW the S-3. (See FM 2-0 for information on the role of the intelligence officer.)

Note. The IPOE is essential to understanding the OE. It is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the mission variables of threat or adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations within the contexts of a specific area of interest and a specific mission. By applying the IPOE, commanders gain the necessary information for selectively applying and maximizing operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. In a COIN environment, the IPOE must engage OE considerations. (See chapter 1 for considerations about the OE and chapter 2 for considerations on analyzing an insurgency.)

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A-63. The *intelligence preparation of the operational environment* is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their

effect on operations (FM 2-0). Led by the BCT S-2 (ICW the battalion S-3), the entire staff participates in the IPOE to develop and maintain an understanding of the threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. IPOE helps in the identification of the available options for friendly and threat forces.

A-64. During planning, the commander focuses activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing, while directing and assessing. The IPOE is one of the processes the commander uses to plan. The IPOE comprises four steps. Performing or assessing and refining each step on a continual basis ensures complete and relevant IPOE products. (See figure A-2 for a depiction of the relationship between IPOE and the steps of the MDMP, along with key inputs and outputs during the process.) The four IPOE steps follow:

- Step 1—Define the OE.
- Step 2—Describe environmental effects on operations.
- Step 3—Evaluate the threat.
- Step 4—Determine threat COAs.




Figure A-2. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment and military decision-making process

A-65. IPOE supports all activities of the operations process and identifies gaps in current intelligence. It produces useful intelligence for the MDMP, especially the development of friendly COAs and decision points

(see paragraph 4-108) for the commander. Through IPOE products, the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders and leaders deepen their understanding of the threat, physical environment, and civil considerations throughout the operations process. Additionally, the conclusions and products included in the intelligence estimate and developed during IPOE are critical to planning information collection and targeting (see chapter 4, section IV) operations. IPOE products include those following (see ATP 2-01.3 for information on IPOE):

- Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and high-value target (HVT) lists.
- Event templates and associated event matrixes.
- Modified combined obstacle overlays, terrain effects matrixes, and terrain assessments.
- Weather effects work aids—weather forecast charts, weather effects matrixes, light and illumination tables, and weather estimates.
- Civil considerations overlays and assessments.

FOCUS—THREAT, CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND FRIENDLY FORCES

A-66. In many operations, the defeat of the enemy military capabilities is the main focus of the IPOE. COIN, however, focuses on the threat (insurgents, terrorists, criminals, and their direct support), civilian population (often the neutral network), and friendly forces (part of the friendly network) with the intention of mitigating the conditions driving or enabling a continuing insurgency. COIN success requires the BCT and unified action partners to understand and influence the various actors' decision cycles; it requires them to create effects consistent with the desired end state that will drive relevant actors' decision making. Paragraphs A-35 through A-39 address mitigating conditions as regards COIN.

INCREASED COMPLEXITY

A-67. Uncovering intricate relationships takes time, careful analysis, and constant refinement to determine actual effects on friendly and threat COAs. These relationships exist among the following:

- Population groups.
- The infrastructure.
- The historical, cultural, political, or economic significance of the area in relation to surrounding urban and rural areas or the nation as a whole.
- The physical effects of the natural and artificial terrain.

A-68. A primary goal of any IPOE is to predict likely threat COAs (step 4, which may include political, social, religious, informational, economic, and military actions) with accuracy. Commanders then develop their own COAs that they intend to maximize and apply combat power at decisive points (see paragraph 3-52). Understanding the decisive points in COIN operations allows commanders to select clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives.

REDUCED UNCERTAINTY AND ITS EFFECTS

A-69. Commanders and staffs maintain familiarity with the intricacies of a COIN. Without detailed situational understanding, commanders may assign missions subordinate forces prove unable to achieve. As detrimental, commanders and staffs may miss critical opportunities due to their appearing overwhelming or impossible and consequently concede the initiative to the threat. They may also fail to anticipate potential threat COAs afforded by the distinctive OE. Commanders may fail to recognize that the least likely threat COA may be the one adopted precisely because it is least likely and, therefore, may be intended to maximize surprise. Misunderstanding the AO's effect on potential friendly and threat COAs may rapidly lead to mission failure and the unnecessary loss of Soldiers' lives and other resources. A thorough, accurate IPOE of the AO greatly reduces uncertainty and contributes to mission success.

AMPLIFIED IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

A-70. In COIN operations, the terrain and enemy are still essential considerations, but the societal component of the COIN environment undergoes closer consideration throughout the operations process. Moreover, civil considerations gain importance in COIN or stability operations. As chapter 1 explains, a key tool for the counterinsurgent unit is the analysis of civil considerations by areas, structures, capabilities, organizations,

people, and events. Overall, public effects are significant in how they impact the threat, Army forces, and overall accomplishment of operational goals.

A-71. Describing the OE's effects (step 2 of the IPOE process) ascribes meaning to the characteristics under analysis. It helps commanders understand how the environment enhances or degrades friendly and insurgency forces and capabilities. It also helps commanders understand how the environment supports the population. It explains how changes in the environment (intentional, unintentional, and resulting from insurgent or friendly activities) may affect the population. Included in this assessment are matters of perception. At each step of the IPOE process, commanders seek to determine public perception of ongoing activities to ensure a positive view of U.S. Army operations. Throughout this process, commanders, staffs, and analysts cannot allow biases—cultural, organizational, personal, or cognitive—to influence or alter their assessments in a marked manner. This particularly applies when they analyze the societal aspect of the OE. With so many potential groups and varied interests in such a limited area, misperception is always a risk.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

A-72. *Intelligence analysis* is the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production (ADP 2-0). Intelligence analysis considers the AO's distinguishing attributes—terrain, weather, societies, infrastructure, and the threat. Because the COIN environment is so complex, it is often useful to break it into categories. From analyzing these, commanders come to understand the intricacies of the environment that may affect their operations, and they assimilate this information into clear mental images. Commanders then synthesize these images of the AO with the most recent statuses of friendly and threat forces and develop a desired end state. After that, they determine the most decisive sequence of activities for moving forces from the current state to that desired end state. By identifying and understanding the environment's characteristics (from the COIN's, insurgency's, and HN population's perspectives), commanders develop and maintain situational understanding. Finally, commanders develop the appropriate COAs and ROE to lead to the desired end state.

INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS AND A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS

A-73. Commanders avoid falling into the trap of familiarity when dealing with the military aspects of an insurgency. Rather, they recognize all the parts of the insurgency as both individual systems and a system of systems. Since the COIN environment provides an interconnected system of systems, considerations among the key elements of the environment overlap during COIN intelligence analysis. For example, boundaries, regions, and areas relate to physical locations on the ground. Hence, they have terrain implications. Yet, the delineation of these boundaries, regions, or areas often originates in religious, political, administrative, or social histories that also partly define societal characteristics. Overlaps also occur within a specific category such as infrastructure. For instance, dams maintain priority consideration for their potential effects on transportation and distribution (mobility), administration and public services (water supply), and energy (hydroelectric).

A-74. This overlap recognition is of critical concern to commanders and staffs. In analyzing the different pieces composing the COIN environment, commanders and staffs maintain perspective on how each piece interacts with any other and as a part of the whole. Otherwise, their vision would be shortsighted, and they would fail to recognize the second- and third-order effects of their proposed COAs—the actual end state differing dramatically from the one the commander had envisioned. The higher density of combatants and noncombatants, infrastructure, and complex terrain means a given action is likely to have unintended consequences—positive or negative. The impact of those consequences is more widely felt and spreads more rapidly than in other environments. These unintended results may have important strategic and operational consequences. The multiple ways these dynamic COIN elements and characteristics combine make it necessary to approach each COIN environment as a unique challenge for intelligence analysis.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

A-75. Earlier admonitions that civil considerations are more closely considered in COIN do not necessarily mean that considerations for terrain and weather are deemphasized. Every COIN operation requires an assessment and understanding of terrain and weather and their effects on both threat and friendly forces. Then, commanders can quickly choose and exploit the terrain (and weather conditions) that best supports their missions. Effective terrain analysis thoroughly assesses structures as well as the ground on which the

unit stands (see figure A-3). Analysis of terrain and weather first considers broader characteristics and effects and then progresses to details.




Figure A-3. Significant terrain characteristics common to counterinsurgency operations

Natural Terrain

A-76. Natural terrain features significantly influence unit operations. They dictate potential building sites, the slopes and patterns of streets, and even the broad patterns that develop over longer periods, all of which influence the commander's concept of operations and, in general, a unit's scheme of maneuver. The military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment—remain critical to the analysis of the natural terrain in, under, and around the areas in which COIN operations will be conducted (see paragraph 1-42). Fortunately, commanders and staffs are normally accustomed to this type of analysis.

Artificial Terrain

A-77. Building composition, frontages, placement, forms and functions, size, floor plans, and window and door locations affect maneuver, force positioning, and weapons deployment considerations. Angles, displacement, surface reflection, and antenna locations influence command and control. Structures also influence information collection operations (specifically, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations). The higher density and greater volume that artificial structures create increases the requisite number of collection and assessment assets, as well as the requisite number of forces. Building materials and construction also influence force structures, including the requisite weapons and equipment. Heavily constructed buildings, combined with hot and cold extremes, affect target identification for thermal sights. Thick walls, for example, distort hotspots and render combat vehicle identification difficult. Additionally, the increased use of heaters and warming fires clutter thermal sights with numerous hotspots. The abilities to maneuver through the urban dimensions—airspace, supersurface, surface, and subsurface—and to shoot through walls, ceilings, and floors increase psychological stress (see ATP 3-06.11). The physical characteristics of artificial terrain can undergo analysis by the military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment.

Weather in the Counterinsurgency Operational Environment

A-78. Examinations of the military aspects of terrain often consider weather and its effects. The military aspects of weather (see paragraph 1-42) include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure. Their military effects during COIN are similar to those in any OE. Extremes of heat and cold affect weapon systems and the Soldiers who operate them. Precipitation affects mobility and visibility.

A-79. Commanders also analyze weather for its potential effects on civilians, civilian infrastructure, Soldiers, and military equipment. Rain might create sewage overflow problems in areas with collapsed sewage infrastructure, increasing disease and even creating panic. Rain and flooding may also make some subsurface areas impassable or extremely hazardous to civilians and military forces alike. Paragraphs A-48 through A-52 highlight other potential weather effects on COIN.

A-80. Heavy snowfall may paralyze area transportation and distribution infrastructure, hindering the government's ability to provide vital human services (police, firefighting, medical, and rescue). Heavy rains and flooding may have similar effects, especially on poorly designed and constructed roads or roads damaged by tracked vehicles.

A-81. Extreme hot and cold weather climates increase the dependence on (and military significance of) many elements of the infrastructure. For example, the energy infrastructure becomes critical when its compromise means inadequate cooling or heating of civilians or their inability to cook.

A-82. In tropical areas, rain can occur at the same time each day during the wet season. Threat forces may attack during these periods, knowing aircraft will have difficulty responding. Bad weather also reduces the effectiveness of surveillance, direct and indirect fire, and logistic support.

A-83. Inclement weather may preclude demonstrations or rallies by threats. Good weather may mean a maximum turnout of civilians for events such as festivals, sporting events, and other social, cultural, or religious activities.

A-84. Severe weather may affect psychological, civil-military, and humanitarian aid operations. Heavy rains and severe dust storms may disrupt leaflet drops, construction projects, food and water distribution, and medical and veterinary assistance programs.

SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

A-85. Critical to operational success is knowing which groups live in an area, what relationships exist among them, and how each population group will respond to friendly and threat activities. Often determining any of this is very difficult. Cultural capability allows commanders and staffs to view the area as residents do. (See figure A-4 in which demographics present existing conditions while the other categories speak to the root causes or other reasons for the conditions.) Categories besides basic demographics are important to deepen understanding, such as health, history, leadership, ethnicity, culture, religion, government, and politics.




Figure A-4. Societal considerations

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Appendix B

Readings for Counterinsurgency Tactical Leaders in a Time-constrained Environment

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Appendix C

"Twenty-Eight Articles": Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, PhD, entered this essay to the Combined Arms Center Commanding General's Special Topics Writing Competition one year. However, the content was quickly recognized as useful for Soldiers currently in the field, and *Military Review* sought immediate publication instead. Even though doing so cost LTC Kilcullen the opportunity to compete, the Australian Army officer retracted his submission and permitted its distribution. The article is reprinted verbatim in this appendix and formatted to fit this publication.

Note. Appendix C presents these fundamentals for discussion purposes and not as the only way to conduct company-level counterinsurgency.

Your company has just been warned about possible deployment for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence, and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and now understand the history, philosophy, and theory of counterinsurgency.[1] You have watched *Black Hawk Down* and *The Battle of Algiers*, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.[2]

But what does all that theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action at night, with the GPS (global positioning system) down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen?

There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: You are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.

WHAT IS COUNTERINSURGENCY?

If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: Counterinsurgency is a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything with less strength than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people don't have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.

Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience, the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

[1] FM 3-24, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006).
[2] *Black Hawk Down* (Los Angeles, CA: Scott Free Productions, 2002); *The Battle of Algiers* (Casbah Film and Igor Film, 1967).

PREPARATION

Time is short during predeployment, but you will never have more time to think than you have now. Now is your chance to prepare yourself and your command.

1. KNOW YOUR TURF.

Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion, and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district. If you don't know precisely where you will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book: Study it every night before sleep and redraw it from memory every morning until you understand its patterns intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area, a framework in which to fit every new piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from predecessors; better still, get in touch with the unit in theater and pick their leaders' brains. In an ideal world, intelligence officers and area experts would brief you; however, this rarely happens, and even if it does, there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader area of influence, which can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on global grievances. Share out aspects of the operational area among platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers; have each individual develop a personal specialization and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge, and it will kill you.

2. DIAGNOSE THE PROBLEM.

Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick? Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between each side to mobilize the population in support of its agenda. So you must understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. The enemy is adaptive, resourceful, and probably grew up in the region where you will be operating. The locals have known him since he was a boy; how long have they known you? Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood; it is the charismatic follow-me warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled or naïve; much of his success may be due to bad government policies or security forces that alienate the population. Work this problem collectively with your platoon and squad leaders. Discuss ideas, explore the problem, understand what you are facing, and seek a consensus. If this sounds unmilitary, get over it. Once you are in theater, situations will arise too quickly for orders or even commander's intent. Corporals and privates will have to make snap judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared understanding, then trust them to think for themselves on the day.

3. ORGANIZE FOR INTELLIGENCE.

In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence-driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a product prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and an intelligence section (including analysts). You might need platoon S2s and S3s, and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) element. You will not have enough linguists—you never do—but carefully consider where best to use them. Linguists are a battle-winning asset, but like any other scarce resource, you must have a prioritized "bump plan" in case you lose them. Often during predeployment the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language. You will probably not get augmentation for all this, but you must still do it. Put the smartest soldiers in the S2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad, but the intelligence section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.

4. ORGANIZE FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS.

Almost everything in counterinsurgency is interagency. And everything important, from policing to intelligence to civil-military operations to trash collection, will involve your company working with civilian actors and local indigenous partners you cannot control, but whose success is essential for yours. Train the company in interagency operations: Get a briefing from the U.S. Department of State, aid agencies, and the local police or fire brigade. Train point-men in each squad to deal with the interagency people. Realize that civilians find rifles, helmets, and body armor intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Ask others who

come from that country or culture about your ideas. See it through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military. How would you react if foreigners came to your neighborhood and conducted the operations you planned? What if somebody came to your mother's house and did that? Most importantly, know that your operations will create a temporary breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.

5. TRAVEL LIGHT AND HARDEN YOUR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS).

You will be weighed down with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other things. The enemy will carry a rifle or rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a shemagh (head scarf), and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and out-maneuver you. But in lightening your load, make sure you can always reach back to call for firepower or heavy support if needed. Also, remember to harden your CSS. The enemy will attack your weakest points. Most attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside preplanned combat actions like the two battles of Falluja or Operation Iron Horse, were against CSS installations and sustainment convoys. You do the math. Ensure your CSS assets are hardened, have communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your rifle squads.

6. FIND A POLITICAL/CULTURAL ADVISER.

In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might receive a political-cultural adviser at company level, a diplomat or military foreign area officer able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics. Back on planet Earth, the corps and division commander will get a political advisor; you will not, so you must improvise. Find a POLAD (political-cultural adviser) from among your people—perhaps an officer, perhaps not (see article 8). Someone with people skills and a feel for the environment will do better than a political-science graduate. Don't try to be your own cultural adviser: You must be fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different task. Also, don't give one of your intelligence people this role. They can help, but their task is to understand the environment. The POLAD's job is to help shape it.

7. TRAIN THE SQUAD LEADERS—THEN TRUST THEM.

Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon leader's war, and often a private soldier's war. Battles are won or lost in moments: Whoever can bring combat power to bear in seconds, on a street corner, will win. The commander on the spot controls the fight. You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, and basic drills. When in doubt, spend less time on company and platoon training, and more time on squads. Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once people are trained and you have a shared operational diagnosis, you must trust them. We talk about this, but few company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no choice.

8. RANK IS NOTHING; TALENT IS EVERYTHING.

Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don't understand the concept, and some can't execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few naturals do exist. Learn how to spot these people, and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent—a few good men led by a smart junior noncommissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well-armed soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail.

9. HAVE A GAME PLAN.

The final preparation task is to develop a game plan, a mental picture of how you see the operation developing. You will be tempted to try and do this too early. But wait, as your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea of what needs to be done and a fuller understanding of your own limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once you hit the ground, and it may need to be scrapped if there is a major shift in the environment. But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple, robust idea of what to achieve, even if the methods change. This is sometimes called "operational design." One approach is to identify basic stages in your operation, for example "establish dominance, build local networks, marginalize the enemy." Make sure you can easily transition between phases, forward and backward, in case

of setbacks. Just as the insurgent can adapt his activity to yours, so you must have a simple enough plan to survive setbacks without collapsing. This plan is the solution that matches the shared diagnosis you developed earlier. It must be simple, and known to everyone.

THE GOLDEN HOUR

You have deployed, completed reception and staging, and (if you are lucky) attended the in-country counterinsurgency school. Now it is time to enter your sector and start your tour. This is the golden hour. Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of your tour, while early successes will set the tone for victory. You will look back on your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness. So be it. But you must act.

10. BE THERE.

The most fundamental rule of counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you can't do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach: living in your sector, in close proximity to the population rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling—all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist in hell, degrades situational awareness, makes you a target, and is ultimately more dangerous.

11. AVOID KNEE-JERK RESPONSES TO FIRST IMPRESSIONS.

Don't act rashly; get the facts first. The violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy; it may be various interest groups fighting it out with each other or settling personal vendettas. Normality in Kandahar is not the same as in Seattle—you need time to learn what normality looks like. The insurgent commander wants to goad you into lashing out at the population or making a mistake. Unless you happen to be on the spot when an incident occurs, you will have only second-hand reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This fragmentation and "disaggregation" of the battlefield, particularly in urban areas, means that first impressions are often highly misleading. Of course, you can't avoid making judgments. But if possible, check them with an older hand or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or two officers from your predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid a rush to judgment.

12. PREPARE FOR HANDOVER FROM DAY ONE.

Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not you must start them. The folders should include lessons learned, details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps, and photographs—anything that will help newcomers master the environment. Computerized databases are fine, but keep good back-ups and ensure you have hard copy of key artifacts and documents. This is boring and tedious, but essential. Over time, you will create a corporate memory that keeps your people alive.

13. BUILD TRUSTED NETWORKS.

Once you have settled into your sector, your key task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds, which comprises two separate components. Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has anything to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy's networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and letting you seize the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other friendly or neutral nonstate actors in your area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the community, then follow through to meet them. Build common interests and mobilize popular support. This is your true main effort; everything else is secondary. Actions that help build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions—even killing high-profile targets that undermine trust or disrupt your networks—help the enemy.

14. START EASY.

If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don't try to crack the hardest nut first—don't go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by extending your influence through the locals' own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society. First win the confidence of a few villages and see who they trade, intermarry, or do business with. Now win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now you have local allies, a mobilized population, and a trusted network at your back. Do it the other way around and no one will mourn your failure.

15. SEEK EARLY VICTORIES.

In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector. Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory over the enemy. Looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral damage—especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target, which is a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or by co-opting a key local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later and helps seize the initiative, which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.

16. PRACTICE DETERRENT PATROLLING.

Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks. This is counterproductive; it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a bunker mentality. Instead, practice deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this, including multiple patrolling in which you flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all the patrols are—making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include so-called blue-green patrolling, where you mount daylight, overt humanitarian patrols, which go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the enemy off balance, and the population reassured through constant and unpredictable activity, which, over time, deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that one- to two-thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.

17. BE PREPARED FOR SETBACKS.

Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person. You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, don't lose heart, simply drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well while others do badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom to adjust their posture to local conditions. This creates elasticity that helps you survive setbacks.

18. REMEMBER THE GLOBAL AUDIENCE.

One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers; print, radio, and television reporters; and others are monitoring and reporting your every move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car bomb, they do so not to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware of the scripted enemy who plays to a global audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion. You counter this by training people to always bear in mind the global audience, to assume that everything they say or do will be publicized, and to befriend the media. Get the press on-side—help them get their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with nonembedded media, especially indigenous media, dramatically increase your situational awareness and help get your message across to the global and local audience.

19. ENGAGE THE WOMEN, BEWARE OF THE CHILDREN.

Most insurgent fighters are men. But in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including interagency people, to do this effectively. Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population. Conversely, though, stop your people from fraternizing with the local children. Your troops are homesick; they want to drop their guard with the kids, but children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy, and willing to commit atrocities their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching: They will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child, and either harm the child as punishment, or use them against you. Similarly, stop people throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to our vehicles, creates crowds the enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the children at arm's length.

20. TAKE STOCK REGULARLY.

You probably already know that a body count tells you little, because you usually can't know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into the area, how many transferred from supporter to combatant status, or how many new fighters the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military, and economic issues. Use metrics intelligently to form an overall impression of progress—not in a mechanistic traffic-light fashion. Typical metrics include percentage of engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents; longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; number and quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; and economic activity at markets and shops. These mean virtually nothing as a snapshot; it is trends over time that help you track progress in your sector.

GROUNDHOG DAY

Now you are in "steady state." You are established in your sector, and people are settling into that "groundhog day" mentality that hits every unit at some stage during every tour. It will probably take you at least the first third of your tour to become effective in your new environment, if not longer. Then in the last period you will struggle against the short-timer mentality. So this middle part of the tour is the most productive—but keeping the flame alive, and bringing the local population along with you, takes immense leadership.

21. EXPLOIT A "SINGLE NARRATIVE."

Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion makers—local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence, including the pernicious influence of the insurgents, often takes the form of a "single narrative": a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people's experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative, or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. This narrative is often worked out for you by HHQ—but only you have the detailed knowledge to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps by getting to know local opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them, and building on this to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.

22. LOCAL FORCES SHOULD MIRROR THE ENEMY, NOT THE AMERICANS.

By this stage, you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in the U.S. image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy's

capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent's role. This does not mean they should be irregular in the sense of being brutal or outside proper control. Rather, they should move, equip, organize like the insurgents, but have access to your support and be under the firm control of their parent societies. Combined with a mobilized population and trusted networks, this allows local forces to hard-wire the enemy out of the environment, under top-cover from you. At the company level, this means that raising, training, and employing local indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military) are valid tasks. This requires high-level clearance, of course, but if support is given, you should establish a company training cell. Platoons should aim to train one local squad, then use that squad as a nucleus for a partner platoon. Company headquarters should train an indigenous leadership team. This mirrors the growth process of other trusted networks and tends to emerge naturally as you win local allies who want to take up arms in their own defense.

23. PRACTICE ARMED CIVIL AFFAIRS.

Counterinsurgency is armed social work, an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first, then progress up Maslow's hierarchy as each successive need is met. You need intimate cooperation with interagency partners here—national, international, and local. You will not be able to control these partners—many NGOs, for example, do not want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs, and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else—not least the insurgents—so civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid (local communities and leaders) to help you help them.

24. SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL.

Another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass programs. In particular, we have a tendency to template ideas that succeed in one area and transplant them into another, and we tend to take small programs that work and try to replicate them on a larger scale. Again, this is usually a mistake: Often programs succeed because of specific local conditions of which we are unaware, or because their very smallness kept them below the enemy's radar and helped them flourish unmolested. At the company level, programs that succeed in one district often also succeed in another (because the overall company sector is small), but small-scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep programs small; this makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key, and (importantly) recoverable if they fail. You can add new programs-also small, cheap and tailored to local conditions—as the situation allows.

25. FIGHT THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY, NOT HIS FORCES.

At this stage, if things are proceeding well, the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive, because you have created a situation so dangerous to the insurgents (by threatening to displace them from the environment) that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of offensive insurgent activity late in the campaign. This does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong (though it may, it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemy's forces in open battle. This is rarely the best choice at company level, because provoking major combat usually plays into the enemy's hands by undermining the population's confidence. Instead, attack the enemy's strategy. If he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the local population, then co-opt them against him. If he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict, go over to peace-enforcement mode. The permutations are endless, but the principle is the same: Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces.

26. BUILD YOUR OWN SOLUTION—ONLY ATTACK THE ENEMY WHEN HE GETS IN THE WAY.

Try not to be distracted or forced into a series of reactive moves by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution, the game plan you developed early in the campaign and then refined through interaction with local partners. Your approach must be environment-centric (based

on dominating the whole district and implementing a solution to its systemic problems) rather than enemy-centric. This means that particularly late in the campaign you may need to learn to negotiate with the enemy. Members of the population that supports you also know the enemy's leaders. They may have grown up together in the small district that is now your company sector, and valid negotiating partners sometimes emerge as the campaign progresses. Again, you need close interagency relationships to exploit opportunities to co-opt segments of the enemy. This helps you wind down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies who have relatives or friends in the insurgent movement. At this stage, a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill.

GETTING SHORT

Time is short, and the tour is drawing to a close. The key problem now is keeping your people focused, maintaining the rage on all the multifarious programs, projects, and operations that you have started, and preventing your people from dropping their guard. In this final phase, the previous articles still stand, but there is an important new one.

27. KEEP YOUR EXTRACTION PLAN SECRET.

The temptation to talk about home becomes almost unbearable toward the end of a tour. The locals know you are leaving, and probably have a better idea than you of the generic extraction plan. Remember, they have seen units come and go. But you must protect the specific details of the extraction plan, or the enemy will use this as an opportunity to score a high-profile hit, recapture the population's allegiance by scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them that your successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent. Keep the details secret within a tightly controlled compartment in your headquarters.

FOUR "WHAT IFS"

The articles above describe what should happen, but we all know that things go wrong. Here are some what ifs to consider:

WHAT IF YOU GET MOVED TO A DIFFERENT AREA?

You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by al-Hassani tribes and Shi'a communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to "case" an operational area and how to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again, and this time the process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure and can focus on what is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.

WHAT IF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS DOESN'T "GET" COUNTERINSURGENCY?

Higher headquarters is telling you the mission is to "kill terrorists," or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp mentality. They just don't seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage "first do no harm." Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities—they own the indirect fires.

WHAT IF YOU HAVE NO RESOURCES?

You have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, and you have a low priority for civil affairs. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance: Keep things small and sustainable and ruthlessly prioritize effort. The local population are your allies in this: They know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest with them; discuss possible projects and options with community leaders; get them to choose what their priorities are. Often they will find the translators, building supplies, or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their support and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is achievable, the situation can still work.

WHAT IF THE THEATER SITUATION SHIFTS UNDER YOUR FEET?

It is your worst nightmare: Everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Falluja, the Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time for you to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance, and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. But see article 28: If you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the folklore that those who went before you have learned. Like any folklore it needs interpretation and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article remains, and if you remember nothing else, remember this:

28. WHATEVER ELSE YOU DO, KEEP THE INITIATIVE.

In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy, even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers, then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly, and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations: Focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan, and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.

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Appendix D

Twenty-seven Articles of T.E. Lawrence

T.E. Lawrence published this briefing note in *The Arab Bulletin* on 20 August 1917. He founded the journal a year prior as a discussion platform for experts of the Arab Revolt. He intended these observations and lessons learned to serve as an aid to new members of the Arab armies, especially as regards working with Arab tribes and tribal leaders. The text is reprinted verbatim in this appendix and formatted to fit this publication.

The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu [Bedouin]; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person's need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same time we have a great chance there; the Sherif [Feisel] trusts us, and has given us the position (towards his Government) which the Germans wanted to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it all the interest and skill we possess.

1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with yourself and them.

2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf [tribal name] and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be a little stiff at first.

3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency's sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive of your joint plans.

4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. Live with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the Sherif, it will do the Arab cause much harm.

6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to avoid going behind or beyond the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given them on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you altogether destroy your own.

7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif [local leader descended from Mohammed], with respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you must attain it.

8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sherifs are above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled always with a Sherif's, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When the moment comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow suit.

9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as the natural aristocracy of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position, and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money would be insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf.

10. Call your Sherif 'Sidi' in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh 'Abu Annad', 'Akhu Alia' or some similar by-name.

11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you will have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show.

12. Cling tight to your sense of humor. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humor. Do not cause a laugh at a Sherif except among Sherifs.

13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but what you have really done is to build a wall between you and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the less you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will not go mad yourself.

14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have the patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.

15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow to milk.

17. Wear an Arab head cloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably to British obstinacy of dictation) is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick headcloth forms a good protection against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in public.

18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous and difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign theatre, playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an anxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in

character: while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught.

19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. Dress like a Sherif, if they agree to it.

20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the European to beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our action, and put more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have taken an immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood language, the savage food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy and quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the climate, and the Turks, that this road should not be chosen without serious thought.

21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervor, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food.

22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too ‘set’ to learn to handle the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don’t attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don’t take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win. Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they lack initiative and expect you to. Don’t play for safety.

23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of them and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.

24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures. In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language, are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollen-headed to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough to give any) would be more readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are much more objectionable than poor strangers.

25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally.

26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and leave you if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. They are only really possible if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an Ageyli [tribal name] or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels.

27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.

Source Notes

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. For terms with differing Army and joint definitions, *Army* or *joint* precedes the definitions in effect. The proponent publications of terms appear in parentheses at the ends of the definitions. ATP 3-24.2 is not the proponent (the authority) of any Army terms.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	after action review
ADP	Army doctrine publication
AFJI	Air Force joint instruction
AFP	Air Force pamphlet
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
AR	Army regulation
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP	Army techniques publication
BCT	brigade combat team
CA	civil affairs
CAO	civil affairs operations
CARVER-P	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability, and psychological impact
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CI	counterintelligence
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
C.O.	commanding officer
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COP	common operational picture
CP	command post
CSS	combat service support
CT	counterterrorism
D3A	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DA	Department of the Army
DHA	detainee holding area

DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DOMEX	document and media exploitation
EA	electromagnetic attack
EEFI	essential element of friendly information
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ES	electromagnetic support
EW	electromagnetic warfare
F3EAD	find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FFIR	friendly force information requirement
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FMFRP	Fleet Marine Force reference publication
FOB	forward operating base
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
FSF	foreign security forces
GPW	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GTA	graphic training aid
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HCT	human intelligence (HUMINT) collection team
HQ	headquarters
HN	host nation
HNSF	host-nation security forces
HPT	high-payoff target
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVI	high-value individual
HVT	high-value target
IAW	in accordance with
IBCT	infantry brigade combat team
ICW	in coordination with
IDAD	internal defense and development
IED	improvised explosive device
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
IW	irregular warfare
JP	joint publication
LOE	line of effort
LOO	line of operation
LTC	lieutenant colonel

MCO	Marine Corps order
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MDMP	military decision-making process
METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
MISO	military information support operations
METT-TC (I)	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OE	operational environment
OPNAVINST	Chief of Naval Operations instruction
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OSINT	open-source intelligence
OTERA-A	organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, advise and assist, and assess
PB	professional bulletin
PED	processing, exploitation, and dissemination
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PRC	populace and resources control
PSYOP	psychological operations (forces)
RM	risk management
ROE	rules of engagement
S-1	battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4	battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-6	battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9	battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SC	security cooperation
SCT	small capture team
SEO	sniper employment officer
SFA	security force assistance
SFAB	security force assistance brigade (USA)
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SKT	small kill team

SOP	standard operating procedure
SOT	small observation team
SWEAT-MSO	sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations
TC	training circular
TCF	tactical combat force
TLP	troop leading procedures
TM	technical manual
TOW	tube-launched, optically tracked, wire- or wireless-guided
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
U.S.	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VBIED	vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
VEO	violent extremist organizations
WCS	weapons control status
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
XO	executive officer

SECTION II – TERMS

after action review

A guided analysis of an organization's performance, conducted at appropriate times during and at the conclusion of a training event or operation with the objective of improving future performance. (FM 7-0)

all-source intelligence

(Joint) Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence. (JP 2-0)

(Army) The integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations. (ADP 2-0)

area defense

A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)

area security

A type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, installation routes and actions within a specific area. (FM 3-90)

Army design methodology

A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

attack

A type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or secures terrain. (FM 3-90)

base camp

An evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations. (ATP 3-37.10)

base cluster

A collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control. (JP 3-10)

base cluster operations center

A command and control facility that serves as the base cluster commander's focal point for defense and security of the base cluster. (JP 3-10)

base defense

The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces. (JP 3-10)

base defense operations

The combined activities of counterintelligence, security, military police, emergency responders, antiterrorism and force protection working groups, and the commander to deny, disrupt, or counter foreign intelligence entities, insider, and other threats targeting United States bases and facilities. (ATP 2-22.2-1)

base defense operations center

A command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. (JP 3-10)

biometrics

The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 2-0)

block

A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or an avenue of approach. (FM 3-90)

branch

The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0)

breach

A tactical mission task in which a unit breaks through or establishes a passage through an enemy obstacle. (FM 3-90)

cell

A subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a headquarters. (JP 3-33)

center of gravity

The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

clear

A tactical mission task in which a unit eliminates all enemy forces within an assigned area. (FM 3-90)

collateral damage

A form of collateral effect that causes unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. (JP 3-60)

combat identification

The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. (JP 3-09)

combat outpost

A reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations. (FM 3-90)

combat power

(Joint) The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. (JP 3-0)

commander's critical information requirement

Specific information identified by the commander as being essential to facilitate timely decision making. (JP 3-0)

contain

A tactical mission task in which a unit stops, holds, or surrounds an enemy force. (FM 3-90)

conventional warfare

(joint) A violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. (JP 1, Volume 1)

cordon and search

A variation of movement to contact where a friendly force isolates and searches a target area. (FM 3-90)

counterguerrilla operations

Activities conducted by security forces against the armed paramilitary wing of an insurgency. (JP 3-24)

counterinsurgency

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-24)

counterintelligence

The information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (JP 2-0)

decision point

A point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 5-0)

decisive point

Key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

decisive terrain

Key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplishment. (ADP 3-90)

defeat

To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. (ADP 3-0)

defeat mechanism

A method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. (ADP 3-0)

defensive operation

An operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. (ADP 3-0)

deny

A task to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities. (ATP 3-21.20)

destroy

A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted. (FM 3-90)

detainee

Any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel. (JP 3-31)

disintegrate

To disrupt the enemy's command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations. (FM 3-0)

dislocate

To employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. (FM 3-0)

dynamic targeting

Targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting. (JP 3-60)

end state

The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

enemy

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADP 3-0)

entity

Within the context of targeting, facilities, individuals, virtual features, equipment, and organizations. (JP 3-60)

essential element of friendly information

A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. (ADP 6-0)

evaluating

Using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. (ADP 5-0)

exploitation

(Army) A type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth. (FM 3-90)

explosive hazard

Any material posing a potential threat that contains an explosive component. (JP 3-15)

exterior lines

Lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy. (ADP 3-0)

fires

The use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. (JP 3-09)

fix

A tactical mission task in which a unit prevents the enemy from moving from a specific location for a specific period. (FM 3-90)

follow and assume

A tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation and continues mission if lead force cannot continue. (FM 3-90)

follow and support

A tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation. (FM 3-90)

foreign internal defense

Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

forensic science

The application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. (DODD 5205.15E)

forward operating base

An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. (JP 3-09.3)

forward operating site

A scalable location outside the United States and its territories intended for rotational use by operating forces. (JP 4-04)

fratricide

The unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly firepower. (ADP 3-37)

friendly force information requirement

Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 3-0)

fusion

Consolidating, combining, and correlating information together. (ADP 2-0)

geospatial intelligence

The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. (JP 2-0)

governance

The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. (JP 3-24)

high-payoff target

A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. (JP 3-60)

high-value individual

A person of interest who is identified, surveilled, tracked, influenced, or engaged. (FM 3-60)

high-value target

A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)

host nation

A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

human intelligence

(Army) The collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. (ADP 2-0)

identity intelligence

The intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest. (JP 2-0)

improvised explosive device

A weapon fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals. (JP 3-42)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

information environment

The aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information. (JP 3-04)

informational considerations

Those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information. (FM 3-0)

insurgency

The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

intelligence analysis

The process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production. (ADP 2-0)

intelligence discipline

An intelligence discipline is a well-defined area of intelligence planning, collection, exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. (JP 2-0)

intelligence operations

(Army) The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADP 2-0)

intelligence preparation of the operational environment

The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (FM 2-0)

intelligence synchronization

The art of integrating information collection; intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently fight for intelligence in support of decision making. (ADP 2-0)

interagency

Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)

interdict

A tactical mission task in which a unit prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy's use of an area or route in any domain. (FM 3-90)

interior lines

Lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. (ADP 3-0)

internal defense and development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

irregular warfare

(Army) The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. (FM 3-0)

(joint) A form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. (JP 1, Volume 1)

isolate

To separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat. (ADP 3-0)

joint

Organizations, activities, or missions, in which two or more significant elements of Military Departments operate under a single joint commander or leader. (JP 1, Volume 1)

knowledge management

(Army) The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADP 6-0)

Level I threat

A small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters. (ATP 3-91)

Level II threat

An enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster's defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force. (ATP 3-91)

Level III threat

An enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base cluster and any local reserve or response force. (ATP 3-91)

line of effort

(Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state. (ADP 3-0)

line of operation

(joint) A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (JP 5-0)

link

A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. (JP 3-0)

local security

The low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (ADP 3-90)

measure of effectiveness

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

measure of performance

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

measurement and signature intelligence

Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event. (JP 2-0)

military decision-making process

An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)

mission

The essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action. (JP 3-0)

mobile defense

A type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. (ADP 3-90)

movement to contact

A type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation. (FM 3-90)

multinational

Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 5-0)

mutual support

That support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)

neutralize

A tactical mission task in which a unit renders the enemy incapable of interfering with an operation. (FM 3-90)

node

An element of a network that represents a person, place, or physical object. (JP 3-0)

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

observation post

A position from which observations are made or fires are directed and adjusted. (FM 3-90)

offensive operation

An operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. (ADP 3-0)

open-source intelligence

Intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement. (Public Law 109-163)

operational approach

A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

operational environment

The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational framework

A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations. (ADP 1-01)

operations in depth

The simultaneous application of combat power throughout an area of operations. (ADP 3-90)

overwatch

A task that positions an element to support the movement of another element with immediate fire. (ATP 3-21.10)

parallel planning

Two or more echelons planning for the same operations nearly simultaneously facilitated by the use of warning orders by the higher headquarters. (ADP 5-0)

paramilitary forces

Armed forces or groups distinct from the conventional armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 3-24)

phase

(Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADP 3-0)

planning horizon

A point in time commanders use to focus the organization's planning efforts to shape future events. (ADP 5-0)

priority intelligence requirement

The intelligence component of commander's critical information requirements used to focus the employment of limited intelligence assets and resources against competing demands for intelligence support. (JP 2-0)

processing, exploitation, and dissemination

The art of integrating information collection; intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently fight for intelligence in support of decision making. (ADP 2-0)

pursuit

A type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (FM 3-90)

retrograde

(Army) A type defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90, error from proponent publication retained here in verbatim definition)

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

search

In personnel recovery, a systematic reconnaissance of a defined area. (JP 3-50)

search and attack

A variation of a movement to contact where a friendly force conducts coordinated attacks to defeat a distributed enemy force. (FM 3-90)

security cooperation

Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20)

security force assistance

The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

security sector reform

A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)

seize

(Army) A tactical mission task in which a unit takes possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force. (FM 3-90)

sequel

The subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase. (JP 5-0)

signals intelligence

Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. (JP 2-0)

site exploitation

The synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law. (ATP 3-90.15)

stability mechanism

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADP 3-0)

stability operation

An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)

strike

An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 3-0)

subversion

Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. (JP 3-24)

support by fire

A tactical mission task in which a in which a unit engages the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. (FM 3-90, error from proponent publication retained here in verbatim definition)

supporting distance

The distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation. (ADP 3-0)

supporting range

The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems. (ADP 3-0)

suppress

A tactical mission task in which a unit temporarily degrades a force or weapon system from accomplishing its mission. (FM 3-90)

tactical combat force

A rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to, and capable of, defeating Level III threats, including combined arms. (JP 3-10)

target

An entity that performs a function for the adversary or enemy considered for possible engagement. (JP 3-60)

target audience

An individual or group selected for influence. (JP 3-04)

target folder

A folder, hardcopy or electronic, containing target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. (JP 3-60)

target intelligence

Intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (JP 3-60)

targeting

The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

task organization

(Army) A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. (ADP 5-0)

technical intelligence

Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy's technological advantages. (JP 2-0)

tempo

The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADP 3-0)

terrain management

The process of allocating terrain by specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other. (FM 3-90)

troop leading procedures

A dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. (ADP 5-0)

unconventional warfare

Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 3-05)

unexploded explosive ordnance

Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for action and that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. (JP 3-42)

unified action

The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Volume 1)

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (ADP 3-0)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1, Volume 2)

weaponeering

The process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target. (JP 3-60)

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